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Part I. Setting the stage

1. From ‘market correction’ to ‘global
catastrophe’: framing the
economic downturn
Paul ’t Hart and Karen Tindall
1. Economic rhetoric in times of turbulence
The global downturn that followed the collapse of major US financial institutions
is no doubt the most significant economic crisis of our times. Its effects on
corporate and governmental balance sheets have been devastating. It destroyed
the employment and compromised the wellbeing of tens of millions of people.
At the time of writing, it continues to pose major challenges to public
policymakers and economic actors around the world.
Although it had been bubbling away for more than a year in the form of a
US-based ‘credit crunch’, the crisis deepened and widened to a truly global and
whole-of-economy phenomenon during a number of critical months in 2008.
This volume studies how public policymakers in a range of polities responded
to the cascading problems in financial institutions and their growing impact on
the ‘real’ economy. In particular, our focus is on how these public leaders
described and explained the downturn to the public and sought to persuade it
of the courses of action they proposed to tackle the crisis.
Ours is, therefore, a study of crisis rhetoric, embedded in a broader perspective
of the challenges of leadership and governance in times of crisis. When nagging
problems such as financial-sector instability escalate, policymakers face the
challenge of switching from ‘business as usual’ into ‘crisis management’ mode.
Doing so entails much more than turning to emergency plans and invoking
emergency powers. The very act of perceiving a certain set of events as a ‘crisis’
and publicly labelling it as such involves numerous judgment calls. When are
economic conditions considered to be so bad one can start using the otherwise
dreaded ‘r’, ‘c’, or ‘d’ words (recession, crisis, depression) to describe them?
What does using those words do in terms of public perceptions and emotions?
How does one use the language of crisis without sounding defeatist or
opportunistic? How does one persuade audiences not just that a crisis is
occurring, but that it has done so for particular reasons and should be met with
particular responses?
These are questions in which issues of fact, speculation, values and interests are
intimately intertwined. Policymakers will grapple with these problems in their
3
own minds, particularly when situations are fast moving, uncertain, ambiguous
or when different bodies of evidence and advice seem to pull them in different
directions. At the same time, however, policymakers can seldom afford to wait
until they really know what’s going on before communicating about it publicly.
In the case of economic turbulence, for example, markets, media and mass
audiences will be talking about the issues constantly, and if the voices of key
leaders are absent from those debates, governments will be on the back foot and
will in effect lose credibility.
Risk and crisis communication is a tricky business in any sector—witness the
recent dilemmas regarding the global ‘swine flu’ outbreak: how should one
respond to and talk to the public about a virus with ominous potential but whose
current manifestations are quite mild? Such communication is especially tricky
in the world of finance and economics. If, as is often observed, economics is
essentially about psychology, then the ill-considered use of terms such as crisis,
recession or depression by authority figures can generate self-fulfilling
prophecies. That is a scary thought in an age when truly massive capital flows
can be redirected across the world in a matter of seconds. If, however, key
economic or political elites maintain an upbeat, business-as-usual facade when
public sentiment is already heading south, they might look out of touch, inept
or impotent—which will create a backlash in markets in a different way. Talking
up the economy makes sense for public leaders only when there is at least some
basis in fact and when the intended audience has not already made up its mind
in the other direction. Timing and the tone of conveying both good and bad
news about the economy in an overall climate of uncertainty and anxiety are,
therefore, crucial.
2. A leadership perspective on economic crisis management
This volume analyses the economic rhetoric of key government figures during
the escalation of the US and later global financial crisis in 2008–09. Its chief
analytical tools come not from economics but from crisis research—an
interdisciplinary body of work dealing with how individuals, groups,
organisations and societies prepare for and respond to unpleasant, unscheduled
and uncertain events. In particular, we draw on insights about the recurrent
challenges and patterns of public leadership in times of crisis. Since our main
objects of interest are public office-holders, we focus on how crises can affect
their political capital and policy commitments. We focus on these leaders in turn
and examine how they try to shape debates about crises to achieve their political
and policy aims.
There is wide agreement in the literature that crises can be said to occur when
the problems confronting a society are widely perceived as threatening and
urgent, yet also involve high levels of uncertainty (Boin et al. 2005). First, there
must be a feeling that core values or the vital systems of a community are under
4
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threat. Think of widely shared values such as safety and security, welfare, health,
integrity and fairness, becoming shaky or even meaningless as a result of
(looming) violence, destruction, damage or other forms of adversity. This explains
why the prospect of war or natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, hurricanes,
heat waves) usually evokes a deep sense of crisis. The threat of death, damage,
destruction or bodily mutilation violates deeply embedded societal values of
safety and security.
Physical damage is, of course, only one type of threat that can trigger a crisis.
As the global financial crisis amply demonstrates, if the key institutions on which
an economic system relies are threatened, then a sociopolitical crisis can follow,
particularly if the job security of citizens is threatened. The size of the threat,
however, cannot be derived by counting the numbers of bodies, jobs or dollars
affected. Psychological or societal impacts of threats are functions of cultural
expectations of levels of order, predictability, security and prosperity, which
can vary within and between different communities and polities (Douglas and
Wildavsky 1982).
Crises furthermore induce a sense of urgency. If leaders ignore or downplay
potential threats—for example, the Bush Administration’s stance on al-Qaeda
before 9/11, levee protection in southern Louisiana before Hurricane Katrina or
climate change—the message is: ‘there is no crisis.’ While experts and activists
might worry and attempt to push their concerns up the political agenda, many
political leaders do not lose sleep over problems with a horizon that exceeds
their political life expectancy. Conversely, public policymakers can feel a great
sense of threat and time pressure when they or their organisations become the
subject of intense and critical media or parliamentary scrutiny, even when the
issues involved do not necessarily hold major importance for actors outside that
policy arena. Sometimes, however, time pressure is hard, direct and
non-negotiable. So, when former US President, George W. Bush, and
Congressional leaders were told in 2008 that if they did not act immediately, ‘we
may not have an economy on Monday’, they paid attention. The sense of time
pressure can, however, also be self-generated: in cases of conflict and negotiation,
every policymaker that seeks to pressure demonstrators, terrorists or states by
setting a deadline or issuing an ultimatum also puts pressure on themselves to
‘deliver’ on time. When that deadline approaches with no solutions in sight, the
sense of urgency may quickly become overwhelming—as is often the case with
international trade negotiations or dispute-resolution summits.
In a full-blown crisis, the perception of threat is accompanied by a high degree
of uncertainty. This uncertainty pertains to the nature and the potential
consequences of the developing threat: what is happening? How did it happen?
What’s next? How bad will it be? More importantly, uncertainty clouds the
search for solutions: what can we do? What happens if we select this option?
5
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How will people—or markets—respond? Again, uncertainty can be inherent in
the situation at hand but also in institutional responses to it. For example, when
decision makers consult various radiation experts on the risks associated with
an accident at a nuclear facility, such experts often disagree on the nature and
depth of these risks or on the measures that need to be taken (Rosenthal and
’t Hart 1991)—and they work with an exact science! Despite its modelling
prowess and the unrelenting certitude conveyed by some of its best-known
practitioners, the field of economics is anything but an exact science. So, by
inference, in managing globalised national economies under conditions of
unprecedented turbulence, expert disagreement is the norm and is, in fact, an
additional source of uncertainty rather than a mechanism for helping
policymakers cope with it.
In sum, crises are the combined products of unusual events and shared
perceptions that something is seriously wrong. That said, it is vital to the
perspective of this volume to remind ourselves that no set of events or
developments is likely to be perceived in exactly the same way by members of
a community. Perceptions of crisis are likely to vary, not just among
communities—societies experience different types of disturbances and have
different types and levels of vulnerability and resilience—but within them,
reflecting the different biases of stakeholders as a result of their different values,
positions and responsibilities (Rosenthal et al. 1989; ’t Hart 1993; see further
Chapter 2).
When perceptions of crisis are widespread, key public leadership challenges
arise, regardless of the specific sector or context in which the events take place
(Boin et al. 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010). The way in which these challenges are taken
up, when and by whom greatly determines how crises will run their course in
the systems in which they occur, and what sort of impact they will have on
those systems. Prudent crisis leadership might not guarantee complete mitigation
or total control of the problems. It is, however, a necessary condition for ensuring
that the problems are addressed in a sensible, orderly fashion, which is
understood and accepted by the maximum possible share of stakeholders,
journalists and the general public. Moreover, effective crisis leadership is
necessary to make sure that crises do not turn into messy blame games or give
rise to ill-considered knee-jerk policy reforms (Boin and ’t Hart 2003). The key
challenges of crisis leadership are:
1. The challenge of sense making: diagnosing confusing, contested and often
fast-moving situations correctly.
2. The challenge of meaning making: providing persuasive public accounts of
what is happening, why it is happening, what can be done about it, how
and by whom.
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3. The challenge of decision making: making strategic policy judgments under
conditions of time pressure, uncertainty and collective stress.
4. The challenge of coordination: forging effective communication and
collaboration among pre-existing and ad hoc networks of public, private
and sometimes international actors.
5. The challenge of delimitation: managing public expectations of the nature,
scope and duration of crisis support that will be provided and determining
principles for targeting and rationing such support among often ill-defined
social and territorial ‘victim’ communities.
6. The challenge of consolidation: switching the gears of government and
society back from crisis mode to recovery and ‘business as usual’, yet doing
so without a loss of attention and momentum in delivering long-term
services to those who are eligible.
7. The challenge of accountability: managing the process of expert, media,
legislative and judicial inquiry and debate that tends to follow crises in
such a way that responsibilities are clarified and accepted, destructive
blame games are avoided and a degree of catharsis is achieved.
8. The challenge of learning: making sure that the organisations and systems
involved in the crisis engage in critical, non-defensive modes of self-scrutiny
and draw evidence-based and reflective lessons for their future performance
rather politics-driven and knee-jerk ones.
9. The challenge of remembering: acknowledging that many crises are traumatic
experiences for victims, responders and the organisations and communities
involved and accommodating their desires that they and others should
‘never forget’.
Most of these challenges are readily visible in the management of economic crises
including the current global downturn. For example, the big sense-making
challenge was obviously seeing it coming before it really happened. Very few
policymakers, or economic forecasters for that matter, actually did. Once the
problems had started to bite, the sense-making challenge was to gauge correctly
what would happen next, which economic institutions and sectors were at
greatest risk and how deep the eventual recession would flow. This was a
daunting task. Those who were in the middle of it recall it as an experience that
was bewildering, sobering and shattering all at the same time: absorbing a
seemingly never-ending stream of indications (including rumours) that the
problems were serious, bigger than before, bigger in fact that many could
conceive of—and then going on to once again revise down one’s own diagnosis
and medium-term estimates.
Knowledge begets action. During the course of the crisis, national and
international policymakers faced several critical decision-making junctures
regarding interest rates, bailouts, the size and type of stimulus packages and,
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early on, what to do after the Irish Government’s announcement of bank deposit
guarantees. These were big calls, often to be made in the course of days or even
hours, when under less extreme circumstances decisions such as these would
have been under consideration and scrutiny for weeks or months.
Because of the interconnected nature of financial markets and indeed the global
economy as a whole, coordination challenges were manifold. The need for
politicians and central bankers to carefully align their words and actions was
highlighted. The crisis also saw remarkable features of transnational coordination,
including concerted interest rate moves by national banks, an unprecedented
EU-wide crisis-recovery plan and intensive G7/G8/G20 summitry. All these
efforts were made in full awareness that, as political parties like to remind
themselves periodically, ‘disunity is death’. Even more so, in a fast-moving
international financial crisis, lack of coordination in governmental signals to
market actors can fatally undermine their effectiveness and risk wastage of
billions of (borrowed) taxpayer dollars.
Once governments got into the business of bailing out banks and other
corporations threatened with collapse, key challenges of delimitation arose.
Which corporations were deemed ‘too big to be allowed to fail’, and on what
grounds? Why give emergency aid to banks or car manufacturers and not to
retailers or aircraft manufacturers? What if corporations receiving support kept
coming back for more? Questions such as these generated robust public debate
as well as significant disagreement among policymakers within and across
different countries.
Issues of consolidation become poignant when the financial sector has stabilised
and stock markets are buoyant again, but many sectors of the ‘real economy’
keep struggling and unemployment figures remain high. Does one accept that
each recession leaves a residue of hundreds of thousands, if not more, people
who will never make it back from the dole to a job? Or does one continue to
define it as a crisis and treat it as such in terms of the commitment of political
attention and government resources?
Meeting these challenges requires an approach to crisis response that is truly
strategic, looking beyond the here and now of the operational challenges that
can seem all consuming at the time and that dominate the daily news stories. In
this volume, we focus on one particularly pivotal leadership task in the response
to economic crises: the challenge of meaning making—how to communicate an
unprecedented economic downturn to the public. This focus on crisis
communication hardly exhausts the possibilities for analysing leadership
responses to the global economic crisis, particularly regarding sense making
(‘why did they not see it coming?’), decision making and learning. Some accounts
are already available, mostly by economists advancing particular theses about
why the crisis became as big as it did (for example, Morris 2008; Shiller 2008;
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Taylor 2009). At present, however, much of this analysis is premature, as events
are still unfolding and information about the inner workings of corporate and
governmental crisis-response machineries remains inaccessible to researchers.
Meaning making, on the other hand, by definition takes place in public, and
the signals sent by leaders and their reception in the public sphere can be easily
gauged from readily available sources. Let us explain more what meaning making
in crises entails, why it matters and how we propose to study it in the context
of the 2008–09 financial crisis.
3. Meaning making in economic crises: frames and
counter-frames
Arguably, the way in which problems are defined publicly permeates most of
the other crisis leadership challenges. For example, if a crisis is seen as a case of
pure misfortune, triggered by factors that none of the relevant policymakers
could realistically have been expected to foresee or control, the debates about
accountability and learning will be shaped quite differently from instances in
which the crisis is widely seen to have been predictable and avoidable (Bovens
and ’t Hart 1996). Past research suggests that when critical contingencies unfold,
politicians and senior public policymakers (as distinct from operational incident
managers, who face more hands-on questions) are expected to provide answers
to the same recurrent questions:
• how bad is the situation?
• how did this occur?
• who or what is to be held responsible for it?
• what if any changes to our current ideas, policies and practices are required
to deal with it?
Clearly, answering each of these questions in the public arena is bound to be a
matter of judgment and, more often than not, controversy. As implied above,
how these questions are being answered in any given crisis has political and
policy consequences. Politically, the ways in which causes and responsibilities
are framed can have a severe impact on the public support for key actors and
institutions. When something bad happens in a society, someone or something
will be held to account. Apportioning blame is an integral part of contemporary
politics in times of crisis (Bovens and ’t Hart 1996; Brändström and Kuipers 2003;
Furedi 2005; Boin et al. 2008). In policy terms, the very occurrence of significant
crises (rather than run-of-the-mill incidents or slow-burning problems) raises
acute questions about the effectiveness and robustness of current policies and
institutions. In doing so, crises are threatening to the proponents of the status
quo and provide opportunities for those committed to change and innovation.
All parties will therefore seek to mould and exploit emerging crises in ways that
suit their interests.
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With the stakes of crises so high, the very act of defining and interpreting them
constitutes a crucial battleground for stakeholders in the political and policy
struggles that crises invariably unleash. In this volume, we study how public
leaders in nine jurisdictions engaged in such ‘framing contests’ and how their
attempts to interpret the cascading events of the economic downturn were
received in the media. The central question of this volume is: how did key heads
of government, finance ministers and national bank presidents publicly interpret
the severity, causes, responsibilities and policy implications of the emerging
global economic downturn and how were their framing attempts received
publicly?
In Australia, for example, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was conspicuously engaged
in this politics of crisis exploitation. In an essay published in February 2009 in
the magazine The Monthly, Rudd (2009) took the view: that the global economic
downturn amounted to the biggest economic collapse since the Great Depression
of the 1930s; that it was caused in large part by speculation and greed, which
were allowed to reign free by the laissez-faire approach to economic regulation
propagated and institutionalised by proponents of ‘neo-liberalism’; that
responsibility for the downturn should therefore rest with governments who
allowed this to happen on their watch, in particular governments of the
neo-liberal ilk (such as the government led by Rudd’s predecessor, John Howard)
that actively aided and abetted a ‘let the market rule’ philosophy, the credibility
of which had now entirely collapsed; and that Australia needed a paradigm shift
away from neo-liberalism and towards a rejuvenated form of social democracy
in which the State was no longer seen as part of the problem but rather as a
pivotal part of the solution when it came to creating and sustaining prosperous
and fair societies.
Rudd’s essay was also published in Le Monde and distributed among the
participants of the 2009 G20 summit on the crisis. Within Australia, it was
sharply criticised by the Liberal opposition and hotly debated in newspapers,
the ‘blogosphere’ and subsequent issues of The Monthly. Whatever the intellectual
merits of Rudd’s argument, his framing attempt no doubt shaped the terms of
Australian public debate about the underlying causes and wider implications
of the crisis (see further Chapter 9).
In this volume, we look at Rudd as well as many of his counterparts
internationally. We also look at other key office-holders in economic crisis
management, particularly treasurers/finance ministers and national bank
governors. How did other heads of government and other key managers of the
national economy frame the unfolding events? How did these frames seek to
accomplish their political and policy aims in dealing with the crisis? How
persuasive were their accounts believed to be by key media and public opinion
at large?
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Theoretically, this study sits at the intersection of the fields of political
communication, leadership and crisis management. Understanding political elites
through rhetorical analysis is a tried and tested genre in political science and
has found itself a new lease on life in the age of television and the Internet
(Edelman 1977; Tulis 1987; Hart 1989; Hinckley 1990; Gaffney 1991; Uhr 2002,
2003). We are also not the first to study the economic rhetoric of leaders—in
times of crisis or otherwise (see Wood 2007). Many scholars of political rhetoric
stress its significance in making or breaking leaders’ careers, as well as in
influencing their effectiveness as agenda setters, legislators and policymakers,
although there are indications that this influence should not be overstated
(Edwards 2003; Canes-Wrone 2006; Curran 2004; Wood 2007:10–13). As
described, the field of crisis management studies is vast and interdisciplinary,
but studies that take a rhetorical perspective on it are few and far between in
political science, though more common in business studies (cf. Bostdorff 1994;
Kiewe 1994; Kuypers 1997; Fearn-Banks 2002; Millar and Heath 2003). The
present study is, however, unique in examining the economic crisis rhetoric of
leaders in the context of a broader, political theory of crisis leadership, which
will be outlined in Chapter 2.
4. Overview and acknowledgments
The centrepiece of this volume is a series of structured and focused case studies
of leader rhetoric about the economic crisis during its critical escalation stage
(April 2008 to March 2009) and media and public opinion responses to that
rhetoric. The volume comprises five parts. Part I sets the stage of the research
project as a whole and continues in Chapter 2 with the presentation of the
analytical framework underpinning all the national case studies. Part II looks
at North America and is a study of contrasts. The crisis originated in the US
sub-prime mortgage market and eventually swept up that country’s entire
financial system as well as destroying significant parts of its ‘real’ economy. The
challenge for US leaders was therefore to read the writing on the wall and
somehow get on top of a mountain of bad tidings and offer a realistic pathway
out of the crisis, without themselves being consumed by the widespread public
despair and disenchantment that accompanied the downturn. In Canada
meanwhile, the Harper Government long stuck to a story of optimism about that
country’s economic resilience even while its neighbour—with whose giant
economy Canada’s was intimately intertwined—was coming unstuck
economically and psychologically. In both countries, the escalation of the
financial crisis coincided with elections, shaping the way in which old and new
incumbents talked about the issues. In the United States, the voters punished
the Republican Party; in Canada, the incumbent government managed to
consolidate its mandate.
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Part III switches focus to Europe. It contains case studies of the crisis rhetoric
of the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Ireland and the European
Commission and the European Central Bank. The crisis hit hard and fast in the
United Kingdom and Ireland. In both countries, long-serving governments
struggled to switch from an initial facade of optimism to acknowledging the
depth of the problems, yet sidestepped questions about their own responsibilities
in exposing their financial systems and national economies to the risks of
‘irrational exuberance’ (Shiller 2006). In France, the relatively new President,
Nicolas Sarkozy, did not labour under that kind of pressure. His rhetoric
suggested that he saw the crisis as an opportunity for financial and economic
reform, while not denying the grave threat it posed to the French economy and
the already tenuous employment figures. Sarkozy furthermore had to combine
roles as national leader with that of (rotating) President of the European Council,
and thus carefully balance French national and supranational perspectives in
his crisis rhetoric. In the final chapter of this part, we look at the leaders of the
European Commission and the European Central Bank. The leaders of the former
knew they were facing a stern test given the chequered history of attempts at
keeping member states united in the face of major emergencies and crises,
including the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
and major veterinary emergencies including the outbreak of Bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease) (Van Selm-Thorburn and Verbeek
1998; Gronvall 2001). The global economic crisis thus became an exercise in
demonstrating European crisis management capacity (cf. Boin et al. 2006)—one
that EC President, José Manuel Barroso, seemed to embrace wholeheartedly in
an oft-repeated public mantra that stressed European unity, opportunity and
strength.
Part IV goes on to examine the leaders of three countries in the Asia-Pacific
region: Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. The first is of special interest for
three reasons: it is the only country in the set that had relatively recent
experience of responding to a financial meltdown (the 1997–98 East Asian crisis);
it is the only country without a free media (although the European Union does
not as yet have its own public sphere either, but for a different set of reasons);
and it has an extremely open economy highly dependent on foreign investment
(like Ireland’s). During the period studied here, Singaporean leaders consistently
stressed their country’s sound fiscal and monetary policies and pointed their
fingers towards ‘the West’ as the cause of all the problems. Australia and New
Zealand make for an interesting pair-wise comparison. In late 2007, Rudd’s Labor
government assumed office in less than ideal circumstances, taking charge of
the national economy at the very moment when the financial crisis gained
momentum. For that very reason, however, the crisis also presented the
government with major opportunities for heroic posturing, sweeping policy
packages and heaping blame on predecessors. Helen Clarke’s three-term New
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Zealand Labour government, in contrast, was facing a much more difficult
political situation: a more vulnerable national economy, a strong and vocal
opposition challenging its economic policy competence and a looming election
deadline. This proved too much to handle; Labour lost the election. With the
economy in ever more dire straits, the new National Party coalition government
led by newcomer John Key faced severe policy predicaments but fertile political
ground for advocating reforms.
Finally, Part V places the case studies in a broader perspective. It contains a
number of thematic reflections by invited experts. Taking the focus away from
executive government, Brendan McCaffrie looks at the role of opposition leaders
during the crisis. Arjen Boin reflects on the limits of rhetoric and considers other
critical challenges for leaders when faced with an economic crisis. Allan
McConnell offers some thoughts on the place of framing and meaning making
in leaders’ broader strategies for remaining politically competitive and achieving
the policy outcomes they seek to attain. Finally, Bengt Sundelius’s chapter takes
the form of a prescriptive memo to a government leader, reminding him/her of
the broad array of challenges as well as opportunities that contemporary
trans-boundary crises tend to present.
In the concluding editorial chapter, we review the fruits of this volume and offer
some reflections triggered by the similarities and differences that can be observed
in the ways in which leaders within and across the different jurisdictions go
about the work of framing the global meltdown. We identify a number of
contextual factors that we suggest shape their perceptions of the crisis and make
them prefer some framing tactics to others. We also show that much of the
rhetoric of the leaders followed a pattern of ‘staged retreat’: from denying the
magnitude of the crisis, through acknowledgment, through various forms of
blame deflection and, occasionally, some forms of contrition or at least public
self-reflection. Finally, we review the public reception and political effects of
leader rhetoric in this crisis. While it is clearly too early to produce a final
assessment, one thing we note and reflect on is the remarkable absence of
anything remotely resembling a ‘rally around the flag effect’ in the media or
public opinion at large. The financial meltdown and the recession that followed
it were, by and large, divisive issues that tended to play out along the lines of
government versus opposition. Despite the magnitude and universal nature of
the threat, no leader or government in the countries studied managed to construct
a truly national coalition in tackling the crisis.
This volume is an exercise in quick-response research: a concerted effort to
employ tools of social science research to shed light on key issues of politics and
public policy and publish the results at the time when the events in question
are still unfolding. The idea for devoting a volume to leader rhetoric on the
financial crisis was born when the participants in Paul ’t Hart and Karen Tindall’s
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honours course on crisis leadership showed extraordinary ambition and
application in conducting their empirical research assignments. Their sustained
efforts form the backbones of parts II–IV of this volume, and they deserve our
thanks for their first-class work. An auditor to that same course, experienced
journalist Garry Sturgess, kindly commented in detail on all the papers that later
became the chapters in this volume. His input was highly valued. The senior
scholars featured in Part V responded quickly and positively to our call for them
to contribute a thematic essay to this volume—and to do so fast. Fitting this into
their busy schedules was an act of exemplary collegiality that we gratefully
acknowledge. The Dean of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government,
Professor Allan Fels, kindly provided instantaneous financial support for this
exercise, without which we could never have produced a volume of this kind
within three months. Finally, John Butcher of the Political Science Program at
The Australian National University’s Research School of Social Sciences was the
ever-reliable conduit between us and ANU E Press, which kindly fitted us into
their already tight production schedule. We thank John and the press for their
assistance and flexibility.
Box 1.1 Global shockwaves and global initiatives, July 2007 – April
2009 1
July 2007: After rival banks decide not to bail out Bear Stearns, investors
are told that they will get back little of the money invested in two hedge
funds. Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, warns that the US
sub-prime crisis could result in losses of $100 billion.
9 August: Investment bank BNP Paribas announces liquidity problems.
The next week sees the European Union inject €200 billion into the
banking market and the beginning of intervention by the US Federal
Reserve and the Bank of Canada.
14 September: A BBC report that Northern Rock has requested
emergency assistance from the Bank of England sparks the largest run
on a British bank in more than a century.
October: Citigroup, Swiss bank UBS and Merrill Lynch all announce
massive losses ($5.9 billion, $3.4 billion and $7.9 billion, respectively)
from sub-prime related investments.
13 December: Five major central banks offer banks loans worth billions
of dollars in a move coordinated by the US Federal Reserve.
9 January 2008: The World Bank predicts a slowdown in global
economic growth during 2008.
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21 January: Global stock markets experience their most significant falls
since 9/11.
22 January: Global stock markets recover from massive falls the day
before. In an attempt to avoid a recession in the United States, the Federal
Reserve makes its largest rate cut in a quarter of a century.
10 February: Leaders of the G7 put the potential losses from the US
sub-prime crisis at $400 billion.
17 March: JP Morgan Chase acquires Bear Stearns in a deal backed by
$30 billion of central bank loans.
8 April: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) puts the figure for
potential losses from the crisis at $1 trillion and warns the sub-prime
crisis will likely affect other sectors of society.
14 July: Financial authorities in the United States intervene to assist the
two largest lenders, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, after their share prices
freefell the previous week.
4 August: HSBC, a major European bank, records a profit fall of nearly
one-third.
7 September: After determining that the downfall of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac poses a systemic risk to the stability of the US economy,
the government rescues the two mortgage lenders in one of the largest
bailouts in the country’s history.
15 September: Lehman Brothers becomes the first major bank to collapse
since the crisis began.
16 September: With an $85 billion rescue package, the US Federal
Reserve attempts to save AIG, America’s largest insurance company,
from bankruptcy.
28 September: Fortis, a major European banking and insurance company,
is partly nationalised. Lawmakers agree on the $700 billion rescue plan
for the US financial sector, which is to be put forward for approval by
Congress.
29 September: The US House of Representatives rejects the $700 billion
rescue plan. The decision has major negative repercussions on Wall
Street.
30 September: The Belgian, French and Luxembourg governments bail
out European bank Dexia.
3 October: The US House of Representatives passes the $700 billion
rescue package.
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8 October: An emergency interest rate cut of 0.5 of a percentage point
is made by the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, Bank of
England and the central banks of Canada, Sweden and Switzerland.
11 October: Washington, DC, hosts a meeting of the G7 finance ministers,
who issue a plan of ‘decisive action’ to reinvigorate the frozen credit
markets.
6 November: The IMF approves a $16.2 billion loan to the Ukraine.
14 November: The eurozone is officially in recession after a third-quarter
contraction of 0.2 per cent. Washington, DC, hosts a meeting of the G20
leaders to discuss the global financial crisis, short-term solutions and
possible long-term reforms.
20 November: After Iceland’s entire banking system collapsed in October
2008, the IMF approves its first loan since 1976 to a Western European
nation.
25 November: The IMF approves a $7.6 billion loan to Pakistan. The
Federal Reserve plans to inject another $800 billion into the US economy.
26 November: The European Commission announces a €200 billion
economic recovery plan.
31 December: In 2008, the FTSE 100 dropped 31.13 per cent, the Dax
in Frankfurt fell 40.4 per cent and the Cac in Paris lost 42.7 per cent.
28 January 2009: The IMF warns that world economic growth is likely
to decrease to 0.5 per cent in 2009. The International Labour Organisation
(ILO) warns that up to 51 million jobs could be lost worldwide in 2009.
17 February: US President, Barack Obama, signs into law ‘the most
sweeping recovery package in our history’—a $787 billion economic
stimulus plan.
14 March: G20 finance ministers announce that they will work together
to bring the world out of recession.
2 April: London hosts a summit of G20 leaders, who agree on $1.1 trillion
worth of measures to deal with the global financial crisis.
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Unless otherwise stated, dollar values refer to US dollars. Thanks to Michael Jones for compiling the
global chronology.
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2. Understanding crisis exploitation:
leadership, rhetoric and framing
contests in response to the
economic meltdown
Paul ’t Hart and Karen Tindall
1. Crises as political battlegrounds
Dramatic episodes in the life of a polity such as financial crises and major
recessions can cast long shadows on the polities in which they occur (Birkland
1997, 2006; Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 2002; Lomborg 2004; Posner 2004).1
The sense of threat and uncertainty they induce can profoundly impact people’s
understanding of the world around them. The occurrence of a large-scale
emergency or the widespread use of the emotive labels such as ‘crisis’, ‘scandal’
or ‘fiasco’ to denote a particular state of affairs or trend in the public domain
implies a ‘dislocation’ of hitherto dominant social, political or administrative
discourses (Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 1994; Howarth et al. 2000). When a crisis
de-legitimises the power and authority relationships that these discourses
underpin, structural change is desired and expected by many (’t Hart 1993).
Such change can happen, but not necessarily so. In fact, the dynamics and
outcomes of crisis episodes are hard to predict. For example, former German
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder miraculously emerged as the winner of the national
elections after his well-performed role as the nation’s symbolic ‘crisis manager’
during the riverine floods in 2002, yet the Spanish Prime Minister suffered a
stunning electoral loss in the immediate aftermath of the Madrid train bombings
of 2004. Former US President George W. Bush saw his hitherto modest approval
ratings soar in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, but an already unpopular Bush
Administration lost further prestige in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Likewise, public institutions can be affected quite differently in the aftermath
of critical events: some take a public beating and are forced to reform (the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA] after the Challenger and
Columbia shuttle disasters); some weather the political storm (the Belgian
gendarmerie after its spectacular failure to effectively police the 1985 European
Cup Final at the Heysel Stadium in Brussels); others become symbolic of heroic
public service (the New York City Fire Department after 9/11).
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The same goes for public policies and programs. Gun-control policy in Australia
was rapidly and drastically tightened after the 1996 Port Arthur massacre in
Tasmania. Legislation banning ‘dangerous dogs’ was rapidly enacted in the
United Kingdom after a few fatal biting incidents (Lodge and Hood 2002). And
9/11 produced a worldwide cascade of national policy reforms in areas such as
policing, immigration, data protection and criminal law—for good or bad (cf.
Klein 2007; Wolf 2007). In other cases, however, big emergencies can trigger
big investigations and temporarily jolt political agendas but in the end do not
result in major policy changes.
What explains these different outcomes? Most scholars writing about the nexus
between crises, disasters and public policy note their potential agenda-setting
effects, but have not developed explanations for their contingent nature and
their variable impacts (Primo and Cobb 2003; Birkland 2006). The emerging
literature on blame management has only just begun to address the mechanisms
determining the fate of office-holders in the wake of major disturbances and
scandals (Hood et al. 2007).
This literature suggests that the process of crisis exploitation could help to
explain the variance in outcomes. Disruptions of societal routines and
expectations open up two types of space for actors inside and outside
government. First, crises can be used as political weapons. Crises mobilise the
mass media, which will put an intense spotlight on the issues and actors involved.
To the extent that they generate victims, damage and/or community stress, the
government of the day is challenged to step in and show it can muster an
effective, compassionate, sensible response. At the same time, it might face
critical questions about its role in the very occurrence of the crisis. Why did it
not prevent the crisis from happening? How well prepared was it for this type
of contingency? Was it asleep at the wheel or simply overpowered by
overwhelming forces outside its sphere of influence? In political terms, crises
challenge actors inside and outside government to weave persuasive narratives
about what is happening and what is at stake, why it is happening, how they
have acted in the lead-up to the present crisis and how they propose we should
deal with and learn from the crisis moving forward. Those whose narratives are
considered persuasive stand to gain prestige and support; those who are found
wanting can end up as scapegoats.
Second, crises help ‘de-institutionalise’ hitherto taken-for-granted policy beliefs and
practices (Boin and ’t Hart 2003). The more severe a current crisis is perceived
to be, and the more it appears to be caused by foreseeable and avoidable problems
in the design or implementation of the policy itself, the bigger is the opportunity
space for critical reconsideration of current policies and the successful
advancement of (radical) reform proposals (Keeler 1993; Birkland 2006; Klein
2007). By their very occurrence (provided they are widely felt and labelled as
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such), crises tend to benefit critics of the status quo: experts, ideologues and
advocacy groups already on record as challenging established but now
compromised policies. They also present particular opportunities to newly
incumbent office-holders, who cannot be blamed for present ‘messes’ but who
can use these messes to highlight the need for policy changes they might have
been seeking to pursue anyway.
The key currency of crisis management in the political and policy arenas is
persuasion. More specifically, this study presumes that crises can be usefully
understood in terms of framing contests—battles between competing definitions
of the situation—between the various actors that seek to contain or exploit
crisis-induced opportunity space for political posturing and policy change (cf.
Alink et al. 2001). 2
Crises invite four types of framing efforts, concerning 1) the nature and severity
of a crisis, 2) its causes, 3) the responsibility for its occurrence or escalation, and
4) its policy implications. Actors inside and outside government will strive to
have their particular interpretations of the crisis accepted in the media and by
the public as the authoritative account (’t Hart 1993; Tarrow 1994; Brändström
and Kuipers 2003; De Vries 2004; see also Stone 2001). In other words, they seek
to ‘exploit’ the disruption of ‘governance as usual’ that emergencies and
disturbances entail: to defend and strengthen their positions and authority, to
attract or deflect public attention, to get rid of old policies and sow the seeds of
new ones (Keeler 1993). When a particular ‘crisis narrative’ takes hold, it can
be an important force for non-incremental changes in policy fields that are
normally stabilised by the forces of path dependence, inheritance and
veto-playing (Hay 2002; Kay 2006; Kuipers 2006).
This chapter provides the analytical framework that has guided this comparative
study of leader rhetoric and media responses to that rhetoric during the escalation
stage of the global economic downturn. We place this rhetoric within the broader
context of what we have elsewhere referred to as crisis exploitation (Boin et al.
2009). We define crisis exploitation as the purposeful utilisation of crisis-type
rhetoric to significantly alter levels of political support for incumbent public
office-holders and existing public policies and their alternatives. By studying
and interpreting leaders’ crisis rhetoric through this lens, we seek to open the
‘black box’ of politico-strategic crisis management (rather than its operational
management, which is the focus of the bulk of existing research on emergencies
and crises).
In formal terms, the ultimate explanandum of the study of the rhetoric of crisis
exploitation is twofold: the nature and depth of changes in political support for
key public office-holders and/or agencies; and the nature and degree of policy
change in the wake of an emergency/disturbance. 3  Its triggering condition is
the occurrence of non-routine, disruptive incidents or trends: the cascade of
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‘bad news’ about the state of US financial institutions, the housing markets and
its national economy, eventually spilling over into financial institutions and
macroeconomic indicators worldwide. The focus of our analytical attention,
however, lies with what happens in between; how these adverse events are
‘framed’ (that is, given meaning) by key public leaders.
2. Dissecting framing contests
To a considerable extent, emergencies, economic downturns and other forms of
social crisis are all in the eye of the beholder. Following the classic Thomas
theorem (‘if men define their situations as real, they are real in their
consequences’), it is not the events on the ground, but their public perception
and interpretation that determine their potential impact on political office-holders
and public policy. As many have remarked in the context of the emerging
recession: much of it has evolved from perceptual, psychological factors such
as confidence, trust and fear. Accordingly, we define crises as events or
developments widely perceived by members of relevant communities to constitute
urgent threats to core community values and structures. Notwithstanding that,
it is essential to note no set of events or developments is likely to be perceived
entirely uniformly by the members of a community. Perceptions of crisis are
likely to vary not just among communities—societies experience different types
of disturbances and have different types and levels of vulnerability and
resilience—but within them, reflecting the different biases of stakeholders as a
result of their different values, positions and responsibilities. These differential
perceptions and indeed accounts of a crisis constitute the stuff of crisis
exploitation, as will be detailed below.
Figure 2.1 offers a stylised representation of the constructed nature of ‘crises’.
Actors confronted with the same situation (for example, an earthquake, a case
of collective corruption in the public service, a shooting spree or a child dying
of parental abuse) might adopt fundamentally different types of frames. We
distinguish here between three types.
• Type-1. Business-as-usual frame: denial that the events in question represent
more than an unfortunate incident, and thus a predisposition to downplay
the idea that they should have any political or policy repercussions
whatsoever.
• Type-2. Crisis as threat frame: deeming the events to be a critical threat to
the collective good embodied in the status quo before these events came to
light, and thus a predisposition to defend the agents (incumbent
office-holders) and tools (existing policies and organisational practices) of
that status quo against criticism.
• Type-3. Crisis as opportunity frame: deeming the events to be a critical
opportunity to expose deficiencies in the status quo ex ante, and hence a
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predisposition to pinpoint blameworthy behaviour by status quo agents and
dysfunctional policies and organisations in order to mobilise support for
their removal or substantive alteration.
Figure 2.1 Severity and causality: the first two crisis-framing contests
Not so long ago, type-1 or type-2 representations of incidents and disasters were
likely to dominate and scholarly interest focused on the ‘solidarity impulses’
and ‘altruistic communities’ these events tended to generate (Barton 1969). Most
disasters entered collective memory as an ‘act of God’, defying explanation,
redress and guilt (Rosenthal 1998). They were treated as incomprehensible events
that tested and defeated available administrative and political repertoires of
prevention and response. After these events, which few people (if any) were
able to fathom (let alone plan for), bewilderment and sorrow gave rise to an
urgent need to move on and rebuild a state of order (see, for instance, Rozario
2005).
Even natural disaster experts agree that times have changed (Quarantelli 1998;
Steinberg 2000; Quarantelli and Perry 2005). In today’s risk society, disasters
typically evoke nagging questions that spell trouble for incumbent leaders: why
did they not see this coming? We have seen this before, so why did they not
know what to do this time? Almost invariably, post-mortem activities bring to
light that there had been multiple, albeit scattered and sometimes ambiguous
hunches, signals and warnings about growing vulnerabilities and threats along
the lines of the scenario that actually transpired. These were evidently not acted
on effectively, and much of the political controversy in the aftermath of the once
‘incomprehensible’ crisis focuses on the question of why no action was taken.




The first framing contest: severity—ripple or crisis?
Figure 2.1 presents two of four types of framing contests that occur in the event
of any set of unscheduled, negative events. The first contest centres on the
significance of the events: are they within or outside the community’s ‘zone of
indifference’ (Barnard 1938; cf. Romzek and Dubnick 1987) and its standard
collective coping repertoires? Are they both ‘big’ and ‘bad’ for the community
at hand (for example, the Al Gore view of climate change); bad but not really
big (the nuclear industry’s view of the nuclear-waste problem); only big but not
really all that bad (the Stern Report view of global warming); or neither (the
Dutch view of recreational soft drug consumption)? At stake in this significance
contest is the agenda status of the issues raised by the events: will they be seen
as top priority (however temporary that might turn out to be) or can they be
ignored altogether or dealt with in routine, piecemeal fashion?
Clearly, proponents of type-1 frames argue to minimise event significance,
proponents of type-2 frames are more likely to acknowledge event significance
and proponents of type-3 frames are most likely to maximise event significance.
The political risk of adhering to a type-1 frame is to be accused of ‘blindness’,
‘passivity’ and ‘rigidity’; the political risk of type-3 frames is to come across as
‘alarmist’ or ‘opportunistic’. Both can be accused of being divorced from reality,
if not of outright lying. Equally clearly, a true sense of crisis can be said to exist
in a political and policy sense only when there are sufficiently credible, audible
voices and seemingly self-evident facts and images underpinning the idea that
what is going on is indeed big, bad and moreover urgent (Rosenthal et al. 1989).
If this is not the case, denials or otherwise comparatively benign and complacent
definitions of the situation are likely to prevail.
Crisis framing in cases other than major disasters, huge outbursts of violence
and the like is therefore a political challenge of considerable magnitude. Many
unscheduled events and latent risks are fundamentally ambiguous, leaving
considerable space for type-1 denials. Companies that see their share prices fall
have no reason to claim that these depreciations reflect underlying problems in
corporate strategy and/or management. In fact, many big companies as well as
public organisations are on record as systematically neglecting and genuinely
underestimating their own latent vulnerabilities (Slatter 1984; Mitroff and
Pauchant 1990; Turner and Pidgeon 1997).
Take an example. A director of a child protection agency will not self-evidently
treat the violent death of one of her agency’s young clients as a major event. In
her business, child-protection professionals have to live with the reality that
not every endangered child can be saved. Even if two die within one week, this
could still be explained away as a statistical aberration—as coincidence. There
is a point, however, at which a type-1 reaction, however well entrenched,
becomes cognitively or politically unsustainable—for example, if an unusually
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high number of children die in a given short time, or even if only one child dies
in particularly gruesome circumstances, or if reports emerge about one hitherto
unnoticed fatality that contain facts or allegations compromising the child
protection agency’s performance of its custodial role.
This tipping point, however, is never fixed or readily recognisable, because it
is a function of a constellation of variable situational, historical, cultural and
political forces (cf. Axelrod and Cohen 2000). Rosenthal (1988) has captured the
only generalisation that might apply, arguing that the greater the sense of
invulnerability in a society, the more likely it is that relatively minor disturbances
will have major destabilising effects. In contrast, societies with a well-developed
‘disaster subculture’ or organisations with a resilient ‘safety culture’ have learned
to live with adversity and have developed cultural and organisational coping
resources.
In instances where denial is no longer a credible option, debates about
responsibility, blame and policy implications take a different turn depending
on which causal story about the nature and genesis of unscheduled events comes
to prevail: the type-2 notion of well-meaning policymakers not being informed
of looming vulnerabilities and threats (in which case blame goes down the
hierarchy and outside the organisation); or the type-1 notion of senior executives
unwilling to address the growing risk brought to their attention (in which case
blame attribution moves upward and to the centre). The same applies to cases
where the official response to a clearly exogenous incident or development is
widely perceived as being slow, disorganised or insensitive to the needs of the
stricken community.
For example, after Hurricane Katrina, the US Federal Emergency Management
Agency and the White House took a terrible public beating—not so much because
they had failed to prevent the levee break (although the Federal Government
was certainly blamed by state and local authorities for having long neglected
the flood defences in the region), but primarily because the disaster evoked an
image of total disarray at the very heart of the government’s much vaunted
post-9/11 crisis-management machinery (cf. Garnett and Kouzmin 2007). Likewise,
its tardy and seemingly indifferent response to the fate of thousands of its citizens
victimised by the 2004 tsunami created political problems for the Swedish cabinet
(Brändström et al. 2008). An official investigation revealed clear evidence that
the need to build and maintain crisis-response capacity at the cabinet level had
not been given the priority it deserved. Moreover, clumsy attempts by the prime
minister and the foreign minister to deflect blame for the slow response
compounded their problems. Not only did they fail to instigate quick and
effective crisis operations, their limited grasp of the symbolic dimensions of the
tsunami predicament was painfully exposed.
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The second framing contest: causality—incident or
symptom?
When type-1 crisis denial is not or no longer an option, the main emphasis in
the framing contest centres on causality: who or what drives the course of events?
At stake in the causality contest are the political fortunes of office-holders and
their challengers, as well as the future of the current and existing set of policies,
programs and organisations in the domain in which the crisis has materialised.
In their study of policy fiascos, Bovens and ’t Hart (1996:129) argue that ‘to
explain is to blame’. As Figure 2.1 shows, type-3 causal frames that emphasise
factors deemed to be foreseeable and controllable by a particular set of
policymakers serve to ‘endogenise’ accountability; such frames focus blame on
identifiable individuals and the policies they embody. Type-1/2 frames that
‘exogenise’ accountability serve to get policymakers ‘off the hook’ and leave
the fundamental premises of existing policies in tact. These frames typically
refer to forces of nature or ‘out-groups’ of various kinds (Islamic radicals;
hard-core ‘anarchists’ in otherwise peaceful protest movements; greedy or
fraudulent corporate managers; human errors of technical designers or low-level
operators). They point to either unforeseeability (the Indian Ocean tsunami from
the perspective of state and local officials in Indonesia, Thailand or Sri Lanka)
or uncontrollability (an economic recession allegedly brought about by a global
slump pervading an otherwise well-managed national economy). In the latter
case, for example, some might argue that the central bank did not loosen
monetary policy soon enough or that the government was complacent in riding
a boom period based on a limited and therefore vulnerable mix of export assets.
More often than not, however, they provide enough loopholes for blame diffusion
across the ‘many hands’ that usually make up complex contemporary governance
arrangements (Bovens 1998).
The third framing contest: the political game—blameworthy
or not?
In the third framing contest (Table 2.1) the crucial issue at stake is where blame
for the occurrence or escalation of the crisis lands. Anti-establishment actors—for
example, opposition leaders, advocacy groups, but potentially also newly
incumbent executive office-holders themselves—will have to decide whether
they can convincingly blame (past) incumbents. If they find they have a case to
make, they will have to decide whether they want to use it to call for sanctions
against those office-holders or whether to stop short of that and merely use the
crisis to undermine their authority by damaging their reputations. In contrast,
(past or incumbent) office-holders must choose between rejecting, deflecting or
diffusing responsibility for the crisis or accepting it wholly or partially. As said,
newly incumbent leaders, such as some of the heads of government to be
discussed in the case study chapters in this volume, can try and pinpoint blame
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on their predecessors. Blame deflection occurs when leader rhetoric points to
exogenous factors (‘market forces’) or failures of subordinates (that is, the public
service). Blame diffusion is the logical outcome of a ‘many hands’ argument: if
people are persuaded that the causes of the crisis are multiple and complex then
blaming a single leader or a small subset of leaders feels arbitrary. Such arguments
seek to substitute a ‘forensic’ logic of responsibility for the ‘political’ logic of
responsibility that can be found in doctrines of collective or ministerial
responsibility. If the many-hands view prevails, the buck stops nowhere.
Focus blameAbsolve blameCritics
Incumbents








III. Blame avoidance: elite
escape likely
Deny responsibility
Table 2.1 Who’s to blame? The third crisis-framing contest
Table 2.1 depicts this third framing contest as a simple game matrix, juxtaposing
the strategic choices office-holders and their critics will encounter in the politics
of the post-crisis phase. It predicts the outcomes of the debate about
accountability and blame that follows from particular configurations of political
strategies.
All other things being equal, box II is the clearly preferred outcome for
anti-establishment forces. They will, however, have to consider that the
likelihood of incumbents simply absorbing responsibility for crises appears to
be small. So they have to weigh the odds in the lower half of the figure. They
can stop short of seeking wholesale removal of office-holders and push for a
tactical victory (box III), but at the risk of ending up in their least favourable
box I: letting the government off the hook entirely (this happens when
incumbents opt for pre-emptive blame absorption and get away with ritual
promises to do better next time around). Box IV depicts an indeterminate scenario,
which is most likely to evolve into a protracted and intensely politicised process
of crisis investigation, reinvestigation, spin and counter-spin. It is impossible
to tell who will prevail in such a—potentially epic—struggle.
The calculus for (long) incumbent office-holders involves a similar political
trade-off: fighting to come away unscathed (or even gain credit, for example,
for allegedly wise or heroic crisis-response leadership) or pragmatically accepting
whole or partial responsibility for alleged errors of omission or commission in
the run-up to the crisis or during the response to it. If we assume government
leaders first and foremost value their own political survival, boxes I and III are
clearly their preferred outcome. They too, however, have to consider the
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likelihood of their opponents assuming the conciliatory posture that these two
boxes presuppose. Depending on their assessment of the opposition’s
determination and ability to inflict major damage on them, they might consider
proactively accepting responsibility and come out looking strong, fair and
self-reflective. If, however, they make the much more likely assessment that the
opposition is going to scream and holler, they are better off opting for a
blame-avoidance strategy, if only to avoid their worst-case scenario (box II).
They could still lose at the end of the protracted blame struggle that is then most
likely to ensue (box IV). As incumbent government, however, they might have
confidence in their heresthetic abilities (cf. Riker 1986) to manipulate (delay,
speed up, displace, reframe) ‘diversionary’ mechanisms such as crisis inquiries.
In sum, this matrix exercise suggests that, ceteris paribus, box IV is the most
likely battleground where the third framing contest will end up.
The fourth framing contest: the policy game—maintain or
change policy commitments?
The final part of crisis framing focuses on the lessons to be learned from the
crisis of the day: does the crisis suggest that ‘the system’ (that is, the existing
cluster of public policy beliefs, institutions and programs) is broken beyond
repair or is essentially sound and merely needs some fixing up at the edges?
Table 2.2 depicts the structure of the main conflicts over policy that crises induce.
The key struggle here is between status quo and change-oriented players.
Aspiring reformers can exploit crises rhetorically to engage in what Schumpeter
called ‘creative destruction’: discrediting and deconstructing the status quo and
proposing an alternative set of ideas and commitments. Reformers have to decide
whether they feel the crisis of the day offers them the opportunity, through
crisis rhetoric, to press persuasively for a wholesale overturning of the policy’s
ideological and/or intellectual underpinnings (Hall 1993), or whether to
momentarily content themselves with advocating more incremental changes.
For example, the bid by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (2009; see further
Chapter 9, this volume), in a much-debated essay he wrote about the global
financial crisis in early 2009 was to nudge the Australian public debate towards
a paradigm shift, encompassing not one particular area of public policy but
rather an entire philosophy of governance.
Status quo players have to gauge the degree of destabilisation and
de-legitimisation of existing policies that the crisis narratives floating around
have evoked among experts, stakeholders and the mass public alike. Based on
that assessment, they might ask themselves whether they have the arguments
and the clout to openly resist any change of policy advocated by inquiries or
change advocates or whether some form of accommodating gesture (‘learning
the lessons’) is necessary. In the case of the Rudd essay, two Liberal leaders (an
aspiring prime minister and a former treasurer) who publicly responded to the
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essay Malcolm Turnbull (2009) and Peter Costello (Lateline 2009), decided that
Rudd’s case for paradigm change could be demolished, since both their responses
flatly denied the need for a fundamental change of course.
That is nothing unusual. As Hall (1993) and Sabatier (1999) have argued,
policymakers who have been instrumental in creating a particular status quo
might be well prepared to change their beliefs and practices with regard to
technical, instrumental, ‘non-core’ aspects of a policy, but they are much less
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Table 2.2 Maintain or change policy? The fourth crisis-framing contest
Depending on these two sets of actors’ calculations and the power balance that
emerges between them in the course of the crisis episode, the fourth framing
contest can take different forms. When both parties play hardball, a protracted
stalemate or a major paradigm shift is most likely, depending on each party’s
ability to form a winning coalition (box I). Incremental change is, not
surprisingly, the most likely outcome in most of the other configurations. There
are, however, important nuances between them that might bear on the long-term
stability of the outcome: a set of incremental adjustments that is imposed by a
more powerful change coalition (box II) is less likely to persist than a negotiated
package between parties both of whom are prepared to settle pragmatically (box
IV). In box III, the way out of a potential conundrum is found in an inherently
unstable mixture of rhetoric and symbols suggesting major shifts (to placate
change advocates) and a reality of much less far-reaching substantive changes
(to satisfy the status quo players).
3. Crisis rhetoric and framing contests in the media arena
The mass media plays a crucial role in reporting elites’ crisis rhetoric (cf. Seeger
et al. 2003; Ulmer et al. 2007). The media is not just a backdrop against which
crisis actors operate, it constitutes a prime arena in which incumbents and critics,
status quo players and change advocates have to ‘perform’ to obtain or preserve
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political clout. Leaders need to convince news-makers to pay attention to their
particular crisis frame and, if possible, support it.
Prior research (Boin et al. 2008, 2009) suggests that—as Edelman (1977)
predicted—incumbent elites can be quite effective at ‘selling’ their frame to the
media. They also show, however, that office-holders can fail miserably in this
regard or succumb under the pressure of suitably dramatised counter-frames
advanced by well-organised oppositional coalitions. The most interesting example
of this contrast is US President Bush’s differential framing performance during
the aftermaths of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. During the first, Bush succeeded
magnificently (in hindsight, many would argue he succeeded all too well, making
any criticisms of his ‘war on terrorism’ seem unpatriotic), but he lost badly after
Katrina hit Louisiana and Mississippi (Preston 2008; ’t Hart et al. 2009). Note
that in the former, Bush took the stance of a change advocate, whereas in the
latter he acted as a status quo player.
Another interesting case was the fight between Spanish Prime Minister José
Maria Aznar and opposition leader José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who tried to
impose their diametrically opposing views of the causes of the 2004 Madrid
bombings on the Spanish public, which was readying itself to vote several days
later. Again, the status quo player lost; the change advocate won. Aznar lost
(while leading in the polls up to the day of the bombings), mostly because he
could not convince the public that Basque separatists had perpetrated the
bombings and consequently was open to charges of deliberately misleading the
public as to the real—to him, politically inconvenient—culprit, namely, al-Qaeda
(Olmeda 2008).
The crisis communication literature argues that a proactive, professional media
performance enhances an actor’s credibility; reactive and disorganised crisis
communication can do the reverse (Seeger et al. 2003; Fearn-Banks 2007). Lying,
understating or denying obvious problems, and promising relief without
delivering, undermine an actor’s credibility (Boin et al. 2005). In this perspective,
the degree to which the media’s crisis reporting and commentary align with the
frames put forward by a particular political actor depends on the credibility of
that actor’s crisis communication.
The rival interpretation is that the media pursues its own agenda in crisis
reporting (see, for instance, Streitmatter 1997) and that the crisis communication
performance by any of the actors matters less than the degree to which their
rhetoric fits with the pre-existing biases of the main media outlets. The content
analysis of media coverage in three countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden)
that saw their nationals victimised by the Indian Ocean tsunami provides some
support for the idea that the selection and tone of media reporting can also matter
(Brändström et al. 2008). It appears especially relevant how willing the media is
to apportion blame directly to individual office-holders, even if the direct causes
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are (in this case quite literally) far removed from them (Hearit 2006). The more
the media’s crisis reporting and commentary emphasise exogenous interpretations
of a crisis, the less likely it is that government actors will suffer negative political
consequences in its aftermath; the more it emphasises endogenous ones, the more
likely it is that they will.
4. Studying framing contests during the economic
meltdown: design and methods
So far, we have argued that skilful office-holders can manage to politically
‘contain’ crises and thereby insulate themselves and their colleagues from
sanctions and reputation losses. Likewise, skilful status quo players can weather
the storm of deinstitutionalisation that crisis inquiries unleash on existing polices
and institutions and effectively protect their policy commitments from pressures
for radical change. Oppositional forces, however, sometimes successfully attempt
to politicise crises in their efforts to weaken or remove their office-holding rivals.
Finally, change advocates might manage to exploit crises to discredit and
dismantle well-entrenched policies and institutions.
In the chapters that follow, we track leader rhetoric and media responses to that
rhetoric during the unfolding of the global economic meltdown, up to April
2009. We aim to detect if and when the kind of framing contests depicted here
occurred in each of the nine jurisdictions studied here. We focus in particular
on the verbal behaviour of three key managers of the national economy: the
head of government, the minister of finance (or treasurer) and the president of
the central bank. Specifically, we aim to answer the following questions:
• How, in their key speech acts, did each of the three actors name (severity),
explain (causality), account for (responsibility/blame) and propose to manage
(policy) the national manifestations of the global economic meltdown?
• How did these framing attempts evolve over time in response to the cascading
events of the meltdown worldwide and nationally?
• To what extent were the meaning-making efforts of these three actors
consistent with one another?
• To what extent did these framing efforts ‘succeed’ in terms of eliciting media
support for their claims about the severity and causes of the crisis, for their
own handling of the crisis and for their proposed policy stances going into
the future?
In each case study, the author:
• reconstructed the local chronology of the economic meltdown in the period
between late 2007 and March 2009 (with different local emphases as




• studied the broader political context in the country to understand the
backdrop against which key political actors operated, and took into account
in their approach to the global economic meltdown—for instance, in Canada,
New Zealand and the United States, the study period coincided with
parliamentary or presidential elections; in the latter two, the crisis became
a key election issue, and in both of them political transitions ensued.
• identified and analysed two to four key speech acts of the head of
government, finance minister and national bank’s president—for example,
in parliament, direct addresses, press conferences and interviews or public
lectures to key stakeholder audiences (the individual chapters will account
for the selection of the speeches). The qualitative content analyses were
aimed at tracing the speaker’s claims regarding severity, causality,
responsibility/blame and policy. Each speech was coded in a qualitative
coding grid. The full extent of the coding work can be found in the online
appendix at <http://globalfinancialcrisis.wetpaint.com/>.
• content analysed three major newspapers for their coverage and commentary
regarding each speech act, categorising articles in terms of (implicitly or
explicitly) supportive, neutral or critical, on each of the four critical
dimensions of rhetoric discerned above (the individual chapters will account
for the selection of newspapers used).
• finally, for each actor, the evolution of their rhetoric (through the series of
speech acts) as well as the evolution of public responses to their speech acts
were tracked.
The case studies were performed following the method of structured, focused
comparison advocated by George and Bennett (2005). Data gathering and analysis
were guided by a joint analytical protocol. In addition to the national case studies,
we invited separate studies of the crisis rhetoric of the European Union’s leaders
(the President of the European Commission, the Finance Commissioner and the
President of the European Central Bank), a comparative piece on the crisis rhetoric
of opposition leaders and a series of short responses to the case study findings
by senior scholars in the fields of leadership, crisis management and political
communication. All these chapters can be found in Part V.
As pointed out in Chapter 1, this study does not aspire to be the definitive
account of crisis management (or even crisis rhetoric) during the global financial
crisis. As a form of ‘quick-response research’, it has limited scope in the time,
numbers of actors and speeches and the types of mass media covered. Its limited
depth cannot compete with the methodological rigour of Wood’s (2007)
comprehensive study of the economic rhetoric of US presidents. Having said
that, our study looks at more than just presidents and other heads of government,
which opens up analytical issues and possibilities not covered by Wood. Finally,
our study does not fully cover all components of the crisis-exploitation framework
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sketched above, since it focuses exclusively on the rhetoric of incumbent elites
(and its reception by the media and the public). A fully rounded
crisis-exploitation analysis needs three further components: a) systematic analysis
of opposition and other non-executive leaders’ rhetoric; b) an analysis of the
interaction between government and oppositional forces in the third and fourth
framing contests applying the game matrices presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2;
and c) a systematic assessment of the political and policy outcomes of the crises
studied. The last is impossible to do given that the crisis is continuing at the
time of writing. The other two tasks were beyond the scope of the present study.
Having said all that, we are confident that this study presents a worthwhile ‘first
stab’ at studying crisis leadership in what will surely become one of the most
intensely scrutinised episodes of modern world history. In the final chapter of
this volume, we shall compare the case study findings and interpret the patterns
of similarities and difference in crisis framing that emerge from this comparison.
We shall furthermore review the perspectives offered by the thematic chapters
and the expert essays. All of this will feed into a set of—necessarily
preliminary—conclusions about the possibilities and limits of crisis rhetoric in
shaping politics and public policy.
References
Alink, F., Boin, A. and ’t Hart, P. 2001, ‘Institutional crises and reforms in policy
sectors: the case of refugee policy in Europe’, Journal of European Public
Policy, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 286–306.
Axelrod, R. and Cohen, M. D. 2000, Harnessing Complexity: Organizational
implications of a scientific frontier, Free Press, New York.
Barnard, C. I. 1938, The Functions of the Executive, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
Barrett, W. and Collins, D. 2006, Grand Illusion: The untold story of Rudy Giuliani
and 9/11, HarperCollins, New York.
Barton, A. 1969, Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective
Stress Situations, Doubleday and Company, New York, pp. 203-79.
Baumgartner, F. R. and Jones, B. D. 1993, Agendas and Instability in American
Politics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Baumgartner, F. R. and Jones, B. D. (eds) 2002, Policy Dynamics, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago.
Birkland, T. A. 1997, After Disaster: Agenda setting, public policy and focusing
events, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC.
Birkland, T. A. 2006, Lessons of Disaster: Policy change after catastrophic events,
Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC.
35
Understanding crisis exploitation
Boin, A. and ’t Hart, P. 2003, ‘Public leadership in times of crisis: mission
impossible?’, Public Administration Review, vol. 63, no. 5, pp. 544–53.
Boin, A., ’t Hart, P., Stern, E. and Sundelius, B. 2005, The Politics of Crisis
Management: Public leadership under pressure, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Boin, A., McConnell, A. and ’t Hart, P. (eds) 2008, Governing After Crisis: The
politics of investigation, accountability and learning, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Boin, A., McConnell, A. and ’t Hart, P. 2009, ‘Crisis exploitation: political and
policy impacts of framing contests’, Journal of European Public Policy,
vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 81–106.
Bovens, M. 1998, The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and citizenship in
complex organizations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Bovens, M. and ’t Hart, P. 1996, Understanding Policy Fiascos, Transaction, New
Brunswick.
Bovens, M., Peters, B. G. and ’t Hart, P. (eds) 2001, Success and Failure in Pubic
Governance: A comparative analysis, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Brändström, A. and Kuipers, S. 2003, ‘From “normal incidents” to political crises:
understanding the selective politicization of policy failures’, Government
and Opposition, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 279–305.
Brändström, A., Kuipers, S. and Daleus, P. 2008, ‘The politics of tsunami
responses: comparing patterns of blame management in Scandinavia’,
in A. Boin, A. McConnell and P. ’t Hart (eds), Governing After Crisis:
The politics of investigation, accountability and learning, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, pp. 114–47.
De Vries, M. 2004, ‘Framing crises: response patterns to explosions in fireworks
factories’, Administration and Society, vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 594–614.
Drennan, L. T. and McConnell, A. 2007, Risk and Crisis Management in the Public
Sector, Routledge, Abingdon.
Edelman, M. 1977, Political Language: Words that succeed and policies that fail,
Academic Press, New York.
Ellis, R. J. 1994, Presidential Lightning Rods: The politics of blame avoidance,
University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, Kans.
Entman, R. 1993, ‘Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm’, Journal
of Communication, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 51–8.
Fearn-Banks, K. 2007, Crisis Communications: A case book approach, 3rd edition,
Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwaw, NJ.
36
Framing the global economic downturn
Garnett, J. L. and Kouzmin, A. 2007, ‘Communicating throughout Katrina:
competing and complementary conceptual lenses on crisis
communication’, Public Administration Review, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 171–88.
George, A. L. and Bennett, A. 2005, Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences, The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Hall, P. A. 1993, ‘Policy paradigms, social learning and the state: the case of
economic policymaking in Britain’, Comparative Politics, vol. 35, no. 3,
pp. 275–96.
’t Hart, P. 1993, ‘Symbols, rituals and power: the lost dimensions of crisis
management’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, vol. 1,
no. 1, pp. 36–50.
’t Hart, P. and Boin, A. 2001, ‘Between crisis and normalcy: the long shadow of
post-crisis politics’, in U. Rosenthal, A. Boin and L. K. Comfort (eds),
Managing Crises: Threats, challenges, opportunities, Charles C. Thomas,
Springfield, pp. 28–46.
’t Hart, P., Tindall, K. and Brown, C. 2009, ‘Crisis leadership of the Bush
presidency: advisory capacity and presidential performance in the acute
stages of the 9/11 and Katrina crises’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol.
39, no. 3, pp. 472–91.
Hay, C. 2002, Political Analysis, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Hearit, K. M. 2006, Crisis Management by Apology, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah,
NJ.
Heyse, L., Resodihardjo, S., Lantink, T. and Lettinga, B. (eds) 2006, Reform in
Europe: Breaking the barriers in government, Ashgate, Aldershot.
Hood, C., Jennings, W., Hogwood, B. and Beeston, C. 2007, Fighting fires in
testing times: exploring a staged response hypothesis for blame management
in two exam fiasco cases, CARR Discussion Paper 42, Centre for Analysis
of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics, London.
Howarth, D., Norval, A. J. and Stavrakakis, Y. (eds) 2000, Discourse Theory and
Political Analysis: Identities, hegemonies and social change, Manchester
University Press, Manchester.
Jones, B. D. and Baumgartner, F. R. 2005, The Politics of Attention: How
government prioritizes problems, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Kay, A. 2006, The Dynamics of Public Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Keeler, J. 1993, ‘Opening the window for reform: mandates, crises, and
extraordinary policy-making’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 25,
no. 1, pp. 433–86.
37
Understanding crisis exploitation
Kingdon, J. 2003, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, 2nd edition, Longman,
New York.
Klein, N. 2007, The Shock Doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism, Metropolitan
Books, New York.
Kuipers, S. 2006, The Crisis Imperative: Crisis rhetoric and welfare state reform
in Belgium and the Netherlands in the early 1990s, Amsterdam University
Press, Amsterdam.
Lateline 2009, ‘Transcript: Peter Costello joins Lateline’, Lateline ABC TV,
3 February.
Lodge, M. and Hood, C. 2002, ‘Pavlovian policy responses to media feeding
frenzies? Dangerous dogs regulation in comparative perspective’, Journal
of Contingencies and Crisis Management, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1–13.
Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2004, Global Crises, Global Solutions, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Mitroff, I. I. and Pauchant, T. C. 1990, We’re so Big and Powerful that Nothing
Bad Can Happen to Us, Carol Publishing, New York.
Mumford, L. 1934, Technics and Civilization, Harcourt Brace, New York.
Olmeda, J. 2008, ‘A reversal of fortune: blame games and framing contests after
the 3/11 terrorist attacks in Madrid’, in A. Boin, A. McConnell and P.
’t Hart (eds), Governing After Crisis: The politics of investigation,
accountability and learning, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.
62–84.
Parker, C. F. and Dekker, S. 2008, ‘September 11 and post-crisis investigation:
exploring the role and impact of the 9/11 Commission’, in A. Boin,
A. McConnell and P. ’t Hart (eds), Governing After Crisis: The politics of
investigation, accountability and learning, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, pp. 255–84.
Posner, R. A. 2004, Catastrophe: Risk and response, Oxford University Press,
New York.
Preston, T. 2008, ‘Weathering the politics of responsibility and blame: the Bush
administration and its response to Hurricane Katrina’, in A. Boin, A.
McConnell and P. ‘t Hart (eds) Governing After Crisis: the politics of
investigation, accountability and learning, Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, pp. 33-61.
Primo, D. M. and Cobb, R. W. 2003, The Plane Truth, Brookings Institution
Press, Washington, DC.
Quarantelli, E. L. (ed.) 1998, What is a Disaster? Perspectives on the question,
Routledge, London.
38
Framing the global economic downturn
Quarantelli, E. L. and R. W. Perry (eds) 2005, What is a Disaster? New answers
to old questions, Xlibris Press, Philadelphia.
Resodihardjo, S. 2006, Crisis and Change: Understanding crisis-reform processes
in Dutch and British prison services, Free University, Amsterdam.
Riker, W. H. 1986, The Art of Political Manipulation, Yale University Press, New
Haven.
Romzek, B. S. and Dubnick, M. J. 1987, ‘Accountability in the public sector:
lessons from the challenger tragedy’, Public Administration Review,
vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 227–38.
Rose, R. and Davies, P. 1994, Inheritance in Public Policy: Change without choice
in Britain, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Rosenthal, U. 1988, ‘The vulnerability of the city’, in L. J. Roborgh, R. Stough
and A. J. Toonen (eds), Public Infrastructure Revisited, Indiana University
Press, Ind., pp. 1–21.
Rosenthal, U. 1998, ‘Future disasters, future definitions’, in E. L. Quarantelli
(ed.), What is a Disaster: Perspectives on the question, Routledge, London,
pp. 146–60.
Rosenthal, U., Charles, M. T. and ’t Hart, P. (eds) 1989, Coping with Crisis: The
management of disasters, riots and terrorism, Charles C. Thomas,
Springfield.
Rozario, K. 2005, ‘Making progress: disaster narratives and the art of optimism
in modern America’, in L. J. Vale and T. J. Campanella (eds), The Resilient
City: How modern cities recover from disaster, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, pp. 27–54.
Rudd, K. 2009, ‘Essay: The global financial crisis’, The Monthly, February,
pp. 26–38.
Sabatier, P. A. (ed.) 1999, Theories of the Policy Process, Westview Press, Boulder.
Scharpf, F. 1997, Games Real Actors Play, Westview Press, Boulder.
Seeger, M. W., Sellnow, T. L. and Ulmer, R. R. 2003, Communication and
Organizational Crisis, Praeger, Westport.
Slatter, S. 1984, Corporate Recovery: Successful turnaround strategies and their
implementation, Penguin Books, London.
Snider, L. 2004, ‘Resisting neo-liberalism: the poisoned water disaster in
Walkerton Ontario’, Socio & Legal Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 265–89.
Steinberg, T. 2000, Acts of God: The history of unnatural disasters in America,
Oxford University Press, New York.
39
Understanding crisis exploitation
Stone, D. 2001, Policy Paradox: The art of political decision making, 2nd edition,
W. W. Norton & Company, New York.
Streitmatter, R. 1997, Mightier than the Sword: How the news media have shaped
American history, Westview Press, Boulder.
Tarrow S. 1994, Power in Movement, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Thelen, K. 2004, How Institutions Evolve: The political economy of skills in
Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan, Cambridge University
Press, New York.
Turnbull, M. 2009, ‘PM’s cheap money shot’, The Australian, 7 March 2009,
viewed 10 June 2009,
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25148674-7583,00.html>
Turner, B. A. and Pidgeon, N. 1997, Man-Made Disasters, 2nd edition,
Butterworth Heinemann, London.
Ulmer, R. R., Sellnow, T. L. and Seeker, M. W. 2007, Effective Crisis
Communication: Moving from crisis to opportunity, Sage, Thousand Oaks,
Calif.
Wagner-Pacifici, R. 1986, The Moro Morality Play: Terrorism as social drama,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Wagner-Pacifici, R. 1994, Discourse and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia
versus MOVE, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Wilkins, L. 1987, Shared Vulnerability: The media and American perceptions of
the Bhopal disaster, Greenwood Press, New York.
Wilkins, L., Walters, T. and Walters, L. M. (eds) 1989, Bad Tidings:
Communication and catastrophe, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
Wolf, N. 2007, The End of America: Letter of warning to a young patriot, Scribe,
Melbourne.
Wood, B. D. 2007, The Politics of Economic Leadership: The causes and consequences
of presidential rhetoric, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Endnotes
1 This chapter is based on Boin et al. (2009), but is significantly abridged, adapted and expanded on
here.
2  Our notion of frames follows that of Entman (1993:52), who argues that ‘to frame is to select some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation’.
3 These dimensions can be tightly connected, as when the political demise of key office-holders removes
the main champion of a particular policy from the political scene. In many cases, however, the
‘programmatic’ (policy-focused) and ‘political’ (office-holders-focused) dimensions of policy evaluation
and political accountability episodes appear to be completely unrelated. See Bovens et al. (2001).
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Part II. One crisis, different worlds: the
United States and Canada

3. The United States: crisis leadership
in times of transition
Isaac Ijjo Donato
1. Going down: the escalation of the sub-prime mortgage
crisis
The US financial crisis, which has since become global, originated in 2007 when
the US mortgage industry began to perform poorly (Kregel 2008). For the past
decade, the United States has pursued aggressive supply-side economic
policymaking, emphasising low interest rates, low taxes and highly deregulated
financial markets (Uchitelle 2008). This created a boom in which money became
cheap, and positive forecasts on the housing market encouraged financial
institutions and prospective homeowners, respectively, to lend and borrow
exceedingly (Obama 2009b). Altogether, this gave rise to sub-prime lending,
whereby banks lent money to even those with poor credit histories
(Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 2006). When the housing bubble finally
burst in 2007, sub-prime mortgage loans, which by this time had grown
substantially and had given rise to a lucrative secondary mortgage market
(mortgage hedge market), were the most adversely affected (Kregel 2008).
The mortgage crash kicked off a market wind-down beginning, prominently,
with Bear Stearns (Bear), a Wall Street investment bank. Earlier the previous
year, Bear had implicated itself in the sub-prime mortgage market by committing
more than $3 billion dollars to bail out one of its hedge funds that had bet heavily
on the sub-prime loans (Burrough 2008). On the morning of 10 March 2008, a
rumour about Bear’s liquidity problems began to spread in the financial market
(PBS Frontline 2009). An unprecedented stock sell-off ensued, driving the bank’s
stock down 47 per cent (Irwin and Tse 2008). Six days later, despite Federal
Reserve and Treasury attempts to save the eighty-five-year-old investment bank,
Bear ran out of its $18 billion cash reserve and collapsed (Irwin and Tse 2008).
Months later, in September 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two federally
backed mortgage lending firms that had also speculated heavily on the returns
from their various mortgage investments, began to falter due to rising defaults
on home mortgage repayments (Irwin and Tse 2008). The Bush Administration
reacted to this by firing their managements and nationalising the banks
(KDKA-TV 2008). In the same month, three other major US financial
institutions—Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual Inc. and American
International Group—had either filed for bankruptcy or failed (KDKA-TV 2008).
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This series of bank collapses was a strident manifestation of an economy in
full-blown crisis, threatening the foundations and lifeblood—the financial and
credit markets—of the US and world economies. On Thursday, 18 September
2008, Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, and Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben
Bernanke, painted a bleak picture of the cascading crisis in a hastily convened
emergency meeting involving the heads of key US financial institutions and
political figures. Respectively, they warned, ‘unless you act, the financial system
of this country and the world will melt down in a matter of days’ and ‘if we
don’t act tomorrow, we won’t have an economy on Monday’ (PBS Frontline
2009).
Boin et al. (2009) observe from the Thomas theorem that it is not the events on
the ground, but their public perception and interpretation that will determine
their potential impact. In the case of the United States in September 2008,
however, the country was in crisis at all levels: reality, perception, emotion and
rhetoric. While the downturn presented policymakers with huge challenges to
manage, it also opened political opportunities to exploit—at least for some of
them. Drawing on the crisis-framing model of Chapter 2, this chapter studies
how US Presidents George W. Bush and later Barack Obama, Treasury Secretaries
Henry Paulson and his successor, Timothy Geithner, and the Federal Reserve
Chairman, Ben Bernanke, framed the unfolding crisis and its policy and political
implications. Some of these actors were predominantly in ‘damage-control’ mode;
others were at times perhaps drawn towards ‘opportunity exploitation’. In
keeping with the analytical approach of this volume, this chapter also examines
how these framing efforts were publicly received by the media and the public,
and, thus, to what extent the various elite framing efforts resonated with (parts
of) their intended audiences.
It is important to understand the context in which the leaders under study
operated. As the meltdown was transforming financial markets, regime change
was transforming politics in the United States. President Bush’s tenure was due
to end in early 2009 and Democrat candidate, Barack Obama, and Republican
John McCain were contending for the presidency in the election due in November
2008. For the two candidates, and the incumbent president, the crisis played
into their political manoeuvring. Although the scope of this volume excludes
non-executive leaders, occasional reference will be made to the continuing
election struggle, especially given that the policy debate between the two
contestants reflected a strong partisan—Republican and Democrat—theme,
which greatly influenced the political context in which Bush and later Obama
operated as presidents when talking about the crisis.
2. Methodological considerations
This chapter is structured in fours parts. Parts one to three will analyse speech
acts of the President, the Treasury Secretary and the Federal Reserve Chairman.
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For each leadership position, four speech acts made by office-holders between
April 2008 and March 2009 will be analysed. Given that there was a change of
administration during this period, the analysis will reflect this by covering two
speeches each by the former and current presidents and treasury secretaries.
Each of these speeches has been selected on the basis of it being delivered in
response to a key development in the unfolding of the crisis in the United States.
Time lapses have also been factored into the selection of the speech acts, in order
to measure the evolution of the framing attempts by these leaders. To place these
speeches in context and gain a sense of the public opinion at the time of these
speeches, public opinion poll data published by Gallup Poll alone or in association
with USA Today have been collected. In addition to the public opinion data,
three US newspapers of national and international stature form the basis of the
media response: The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times and The Washington
Post. The ideological bent of the first is more towards the conservative end,
whereas the other two are more towards the progressive end. The New York
Times has a daily circulation of more than million readers, The Wall Street Journal
has more than two million and The Washington Post more than 600 000 (Audit
Bureau of Circulations 2009). For each speech act, a sample of articles was
examined, including news reports, editorials and op-ed pieces relevant to the
financial crisis published one or two days after the speech.
How the relevant leaders’ framing attempts evolved over time in response to
the unfolding events of the crisis—nationally and globally—is discussed in
relation to each leadership position, based on an examination of the key speech
acts. Four speech acts are analysed for each leadership position. As such, the
analysis of this evolution was limited to only two speeches for each office-holder,
bar Bernanke. Finally, part four of the chapter interprets the findings. At this
point, the extent to which the meaning-making efforts of these actors relate to
one another is examined, and the main ‘battlegrounds’ of the ‘framing contests’
surrounding the crisis are pinpointed.
Box 3.1 The United States’ financial crisis trajectory, March 2008 –
March 2009
10 March 2008: Bears Stearns’ liquidity problems start, putting the bank
on course to collapse seven days later.
14 March: Federal Reserve officials find Bear is ‘systemically’ connected
with the wider financial markets, meaning its failure could risk the
collapse of the whole financial system. Federal Government rescue efforts
begin.
2 April: Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, testifies before
Congress, warning that recession in the United States is possible.
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10 April: The Senate passes a bipartisan measure aimed at boosting the
housing market.
30 April: The Federal Reserve cuts interest rates to the lowest point in
nearly four years.
11 July: IndyMac Bank fails.
12 July: Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, successfully seeks power
to take over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two government-sponsored
mortgage-lending entities.
30 July: President Bush signs a housing bill, allowing homeowners who
cannot afford repayments to refinance access to more affordable
government-backed loans.
7 September: The Bush Administration nationalises Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.
12 September: Lehman Brothers requests a bailout, but Paulson decides
not to bail the firm out, citing moral hazard.
14 September: Merrill Lynch sells itself to Bank of America and Lehman
Brothers files for bankruptcy, after it fails to find a buyer in an
increasingly nervous market.
16 September: The Federal Reserve changes course and spends $84
billion to bail out American International Group (AIG), the largest
insurance firm in America.
18 September: Paulson proposes a $700 billion plan to buy toxic assets
from America’s biggest banks.
25 September: Washington Mutual Bank fails.
29 September: Congress rejects Paulson’s proposal.
3 October: Congress approves Paulson’s revised plan.
28 October: The Federal Reserve cuts its lending rate to 1 per cent.
4 November: Barack Obama is elected President.
14 November: Leaders of 20 major economies gather in Washington,
DC, to discuss coordinated emergency action to address the financial
crisis.
16 December: The Federal Reserve cuts its interest rates again—to nearly
zero.
20 January 2009: Barack Obama is sworn in as the forty-forth President
of the United States.
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26 January: The Senate confirms Timothy Geithner as Treasury
Secretary, succeeding Paulson.
10 February: Geithner outlines a new, sweeping overhaul and expansion
of the government’s rescue effort.
17 February: Obama signs a $787 billion package to revive the economy.
18 February: Obama announces a $275 billion plan to help financially
struggling families to refinance their mortgages.
19 February: Obama orders the nation’s 19 largest banks to undergo a
‘stress test’ to help bolster confidence in the bailout plan.
23 March: Geithner lays out a detailed version of his 10 February rescue
plan.
24 March: Obama and the Federal Reserve seek to expand the Federal
Government’s power to seize control of troubled financial institutions
deemed too big to fail.
3. Crisis development and elite rhetoric in the United States
From crisis to opportunity: Presidents Bush and Obama
The financial and economic meltdown that took place in 2008–09 affected
Presidents Bush and Obama very differently. Bush was serving his last term in
office and, by mid 2008, he was well and truly a lame-duck president. His steadily
declining approval rating had hit a new low of 32 per cent by 14 March 2008,
and never really recovered (Gallup Organization 2008). On the other hand, by
the end of 2008, Obama had been voted into office on a popular platform of
change. His approval rating was as high as 69 per cent at the time he assumed
office (Jones 2009). What for Bush was yet another nasty crisis eating away at
his political capital, and possibly his place in history, to Obama became a window
of opportunity to dramatise his ability to bring a fresh approach and renewed
vigour to the presidency at a time of national despair. Bush’s challenge was to
avoid being labelled as a modern-day Herbert Hoover (whose presidency was
destroyed by the impact of the 1929 Wall Street crash); Obama’s bid was to
become a modern-day Franklin D. Roosevelt (whose ‘New Deal’ gave Americans
hope and pioneered Keynesian economic policies that would become the norm
after World War II).
14 March 2008: President Bush’s ‘business as usual’
By 14 March 2008, the financial crisis had taken a critical turn; banks on Wall
Street were fear-stricken after Bear Stearns’ liquidity problems (PBS Frontline
2009). In a speech he delivered to the Economic Club of New York four days
after Bear’s liquidity troubles began and two days before the bank collapsed,
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the President steered clear of using the word ‘crisis’ to describe the gathering
storm. The closest he came to doing so was by describing the situation as a ‘rough
time’ for the economy—an economic downturn and a slowdown, which he
explained were inherent periodic features of the free-market system. In a free
market, he claimed, ‘there is going to be good and bad times…ups and downs,
[which is] how markets work’. For Bush, there was no crisis; it was business as
usual and his purpose in the speech was to downplay the problem and its extent.
The President was intent on alleviating public anxiety and rekindling faith in
the American economy. ‘I am coming to you as an optimistic fellow,’ he told the
club members, adding that he believed America’s was a resilient economy, which
would continue to grow, because its foundations were solid. He added that the
government had recognised the market slowdown early and had taken action
in the form of policies designed to spur growth and strengthen oversight of the
mortgage industry. These policies included a tax package targeting 130 million
households to boost consumer spending through a newly created Federal Housing
Administration (FHA Secure) to help facilitate the prevention of unnecessary
foreclosures.
Despite these assurances and initiatives, Bush’s speech did not resonate in the
media. The three newspapers surveyed for this article mostly disagreed with
his claims regarding the origins and the severity of the situation and his proposed
policy package (see the online appendix at <http://global
financialcrisis.wetpaint.com/>). The few who welcomed the President’s speech
expressed a sigh of relief for Bush having at least acknowledged, though not
fully, that there were problems with the economy (Thomas 2008). The main
thrust, however, was criticism of Bush’s alleged lack of leadership and his
deliberately steering clear of the word ‘recession’, which by this time the United
States was already in, according to key economists (Baker 2008; Thomas 2008).
In none of the press reactions to the speech surveyed was there any statement
of support for the President (Table 3.1). A host of reasons contributed to the
lack of positive public response to the President’s speech, but perhaps the
overarching one was Bush’s record low popularity on the wings of the nasty
war in Iraq and his failure as national crisis manager during Hurricane Katrina.
By 2008, crisis-management competence had long ceased to be a political selling
point for a president who had once enjoyed a strong and comparatively long
boost in popularity after the 9/11 crisis (Gallup Organization 2008; see ’t Hart
et al. 2009).
48








Table 3.1 Media response to President Bush’s 14 March 2008 speech
Clearly, President Bush had pre-existing credibility deficits in the face of the
American public, even before the global financial crisis started to unfold (Boin
et al. 2009:78). His understated admission that the American economy was going
through a rough time served only to confirm this, certainly among media outlets
long critical of his record. For example, in an editorial entitled ‘George speaks,
badly’, a New York Times columnist derided Bush’s poor articulation, inept
understanding of the subject matter, lateness and, above all, incapacity to perform
as a leader in crisis (Collins 2008).
24 September 2008: Bush’s acknowledgment of deep problems
By September, President Bush had changed his tone. He delivered a prime-time
address to the nation on the American economy and the proposed bailout on
24 September 2008. The speech came after it had become exceedingly clear that
the American economy was in deep crisis. Three particular moments were
noteworthy. In addition to Bear Stearns, seven other major banks had collapsed
(FIDC 2009). The crisis was going global fast, and reached well beyond the
financial and housing sectors alone. It became apparent that the US Government’s
(Paulson’s and Bernanke’s in particular) hitherto piecemeal efforts of bailing out
one bank at a time had failed. So the Treasury Secretary and the Federal Reserve
Chairman went to the President to ask Congress to release money for a wholesale
rescue of the country’s financial market (PBS Frontline 2009).
At this time, denial was no longer a credible option. In terms of the
crisis-exploitation model of Chapter 2, Bush therefore shifted from type-1 to
type-2 rhetoric, acknowledging that the entire economy, not just the housing
market and the financial sectors, was in trouble. He admitted that America’s
economy was ‘in the midst of a serious financial crisis’, which he depicted as ‘a
moment of great challenge’.
His account of the causes of the crisis emphasised exogenous factors, particularly
market forces (mortgage defaults, excessive risk taking and the influx of foreign
capital) and unscrupulous financial trading practices. He said that many lenders
approved loans for borrowers without carefully examining their ability to pay
and many borrowers took out loans larger than they could afford.
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In terms of his proposed response to the crisis, Bush invoked the same ‘can-do’
crisis-management rhetoric he had used successfully after 9/11, but which had
backfired badly after Katrina, to reassure Americans that the government was
in control. He asserted that Americans had good reasons to be confident of their
economic strength, insisting that despite ‘market corrections’ and instances of
abuse, democratic capitalism remained the best system ever devised—because
it had given the American economy the flexibility to absorb shocks, adjust and
bounce back.
This time, the media was somewhat more attentive and its opinions were more
mixed. The acknowledgment of severity was welcomed, and a few voices agreed
with the President’s causality claims, but most did not. Of the press articles
surveyed, a significant majority disagreed with Bush’s proposed policies (Table
3.2). Notwithstanding that, a Gallup Poll conducted a week later showed that
the $700 billion bailout Bush had proposed in the speech was well received by
the public (Saad 2008). Paradoxically, the President’s overall job approval rating









Table 3.2 Media response to Bush’s 24 September 2008 speech
4 February 2009: President Obama blames Wall Street
Having assumed office with all the energy of a new president enjoying an
extraordinary political honeymoon, Obama arguably took the crisis as an
opportunity to drive the last nail in the coffin of Bush’s legacy. In his first key
speech on the economy and executive pay, delivered on 4 February 2009, Obama
took a type-3 stance, describing the situation as ‘an economic crisis unlike any
other we have faced in our lifetime…a crisis of falling confidence and rising
debt’. Before becoming president, Obama had strongly focused blame for the
meltdown and its persistence on the Bush Administration’s fiscal and regulatory
policies, which he had promised to change (Obama 2008). Now that he was in
office, his blame focus had changed somewhat. The President’s main targets
were the executives in the financial institutions that had received government
rescue funds.
The President remained in the offensive type-3 mode, with his aim now to change
the remuneration regime that had helped trigger the crisis. He explained that
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the crisis had been years in the making and was brought about by a corporate
culture that disregarded risk, cost and consequences by offering perverse
incentives structures to traders and executives. Obama focused blame on Wall
Street and utilised the opportunity to introduce his policy, the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Plan, one aspect of which was reforming executive
remuneration regimes. Through that, the President aimed to cap at $500 000 the
pay of executives in firms receiving support from the government’s rescue fund.
Media reaction to the President’s speech was mixed (Table 3.3). The bulk of the
press coverage sampled made no comment about the President’s causality claims.
More than half agreed with the salary cap aspect of the policy; and nearly all
made no comment about support for the President. A Gallup Poll taken four









Table 3.3 Media response to Obama’s 4 February 2008 speech
24 February 2009: Obama’s address to Congress
Obama showed his most strident type-3 posture in an address to the Joint Houses
of Congress on the 24 February 2009. Acknowledging the recession up front,
the President told the nation that ‘the state of our economy is a concern that
rises above all others…you do not need a long list of statistics to know that our
economy is in a crisis’. He explained that the American economy had not fallen
into decline over night and the problems had not started when the share and
stock markets collapsed. The problems, Obama claimed, had roots in expensive
health care, poor education and dependence on foreign energy sources—the
challenges that went unmet while Americans spent more money and piled up
more debt.
In accounting for the crisis, Obama implicitly attributed a significant portion of
blame to the previous administration, although, as politicians often do, he
explicitly denied doing so. Apart from the few lines of therapeutic rhetoric such
as ‘we will rebuild’, ‘we will recover and the USA will emerge stronger than
before’—lines somewhat reminiscent of Bush’s—Obama prescribed major reforms
of health care, education and energy as a way out of the crisis. Constituting the
thrust of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan, these reforms were to
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jump-start job creation, save existing ones, restart lending, bring the government
deficit down and grow the economy.
Obama underlined his policy appeal with a sweeping use of historical analogies;
he told Americans:
History reminds us that, at every moment of economic upheaval and
transformation, this nation has responded with bold action and big
ideas…In the midst of civil war, we laid railroad tracks from one coast
to the other that spurred commerce and industry…From the turmoil of
the Industrial Revolution came a system of public high schools that
prepared our citizens for a new age…In the wake of war and depression,
the GI Bill sent a generation to college and created the largest middle-class
in history.
Obama’s rhetoric proved popular with the papers and the public. Most of the
press coverage studied here supported the President’s causality claims. The
overwhelming majority agreed with his policy propositions and an equal amount
expressed support for the President (Table 3.4). After his approval rating had
dropped to 59 per cent two days earlier, a Gallup Poll taken on the day of the
speech found the President’s approval rating had spiked back up to 67 per cent
(Jones 2009).
The result must be interpreted with some caution. Obama was elected to the
presidency on a strong platform of change in the three key areas of energy,
education and health care (Obama 2008). The positive response was arguably
being expressed at least in part for Obama having acted on his election promises
rather than his articulation of novel measures addressing the economic crisis.
Indeed, only 41 per cent of people interviewed said they now had more
confidence in Obama’s plan to fix the economy (Morales 2009).
In comparison, Obama’s crisis-framing effort in this subsequent speech changed
quite significantly from that in his first. Given that no significantly seismic
development in the unfolding crisis happened between his two speeches studied
here, the change in his rhetorical pitch could be attributed to the particular
policy aspect he sought to introduce through each speech. Obama’s framing,
especially his naming and explaining of the crisis in the first speech, bore a
semblance to his predecessor’s. This was mainly because his main targets were
the corporate executives, whose pay-outs were a hot topic in the news at that
time. The 24 February speech had a wider explanatory scope, setting up the
audience for a much wider suite of policy measures.
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Table 3.4 Media response to Obama’s 24 February 2009 speech
From reassurance to repair: Treasury Secretaries Paulson
and Geithner
Henry Paulson, a former chief executive officer of Goldman Sachs, had come to
the Treasury job in the Bush Administration with intimate knowledge of the
working of the financial markets outside government and the trading behaviours
of those on Wall Street. His successor, Timothy Geithner, had been the president
of the Federal Reserve of New York during the Bush Administration. He had
worked with Bernanke and Paulson—albeit in vain—to avert Bear Stearns’
demise in March 2008, and all the way thereafter until Obama appointed him to
head the Treasury. Geithner had intimately experienced the crisis from a senior
policymaker’s perspective. He had observed Paulson respond to the crisis and
saw part of it backfire—not in the least on Paulson himself. With these contexts
in mind, this part of the chapter looks at how the two secretaries named,
explained, accounted for and proposed to manage the unfolding crisis.
26 March 2008: Secretary Paulson’s innuendo
Paulson delivered his first major speech of the period under study barely two
weeks after he had witnessed the collapse of a nearly one-century-old financial
institution, Bear Stearns. Even though the speech was about the problems in
financial and housing markets, the Treasury Secretary steered clear of calling a
spade a spade. He described the events as ‘financial market stress’, ‘turbulence’
and ‘bumps’, which he explained were a result of de-leveraging and re-pricing
of risk (Paulson 2008a). Precipitated by unsustainable home price appreciation,
these reduced access to short-term funding and liquidity and created turmoil in
the American capital markets.
Like Bush at the time, Paulson was painting an image of the American economy
as being essentially sound, albeit experiencing short-term ‘market upheaval’.
For Paulson, it was business as usual; hence, there was no need to account for
the problem, apart from making clear the causes of the current turbulence,
which, again, he sought within the market, not in government regulation or
policy. In the speech, Paulson did not announce specific measures to address
the market turbulence, though he noted that efforts were being made to limit
the impact of the turbulence on the real economy, which was the highest priority.
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He said such efforts to insulate the economy would be achieved through
increasing the availability of affordable mortgage financing through the Federal
Reserve’s temporary lending facility.
Media commentators and the American public remained largely indifferent to
Paulson’s rhetoric (Table 3.5). Most articles expressed no agreement or
disagreement with his causality claims and none expressed support or lack
thereof for the secretary. The lack of a more marked response was perhaps due
to the highly technical content of the speech, combined with the fact that in
times of crisis it is the President, and not the Treasury Secretary, who is the
chief economic storyteller in the country (Wood 2007:63–108). Some writers,
however, did agree with the Treasury’s policy proposition, especially the
establishment of the FHA Secure initiative. Those who expressed support thought









Table 3.5 Media response to Paulson’s 26 March 2008 speech
18 November 2008: Paulson’s switch to crisis mode
Seven months after Paulson made his speech to the US Chamber of Commerce,
and with more banks having collapsed, it had become clear that the problems
were escalating well beyond the mortgage market and financial services sector.
This was an economy-wide crisis that was rapidly going global. At the time,
Paulson requested and was granted $700 billion to execute a full-scale rescue
operation for the financial services sector. It was therefore inevitable that
Paulson’s framing had shifted from business as usual to acknowledging the threat
for what it was. He acknowledged that the US economy was in crisis (Paulson
2008c). In fact, in his testimony to Congress on the implementation of the
Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act, on 18 November 2008, Paulson mentioned
the word ‘crisis’ at least nine times. He described the financial crisis as one of a
magnitude and unpredictability that he and his peers in the sector had never
dealt with—in their lifetimes.
Apart from describing the manifestation of the extent of the damage the crisis
had done already in statistical terms, Paulson acknowledged that the financial
system had gone belly-up and now the economy was in a system-wide crisis. In
his testimony, he provided no causal explanation for the crisis and he did not
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accept or deny responsibility for its escalation. Rather like President Bush, he
continued to assure Americans that he had confidence in the economy’s regulators
and markets. At the same time, he made it clear that there was no set script for
responding to a level of turmoil they had never faced before. Referring to the
bailout, he added that the administration would adjust its strategy to reflect the
dynamics of the crisis, and he urged Congress to work with it to stabilise the
financial system.
Media reaction to the Treasury Secretary’s speech was more negative than
positive. No-one voiced agreement with the secretary’s causal claims or his
proposed stimulus package. Some commentators thought the package was
fundamentally misguided (for example, Washington Post 2008). While most were
neutral about Paulson himself, one journalist criticised the ‘erratic performance’








Table 3.6 Media response to Paulson’s 18 November 2008 testimony
10 February 2009: Secretary Geithner’s historical analogy
On succeeding Paulson as Treasury Secretary, Geithner’s view of the crisis
departed significantly from that of his predecessor. In introducing the Obama
Administration’s Financial Stability Plan, Geithner was more candid, taking the
offensive type-3 posture. He called the state of the economy the worst economic
crisis in generations—more complex than any the American financial system
had ever faced. The crisis, he explained, had many and complex causes, which
had accumulated over time. These included: policies that caused a huge global
boom in credit; imprudent lending and borrowing; excessive executive
remuneration; and poor regulation and oversight.
To make matters worse, he stated, when the crisis began governments had been
too slow to act. Policy was always behind the curve and always chasing the
escalating crisis. The force of government support had not been comprehensive
or quick enough to withstand the deepening pressure brought on by the
weakening economy. Further, the lack of clear criteria and conditions applied
to government interventions caused investors to pull back from taking risks.
The crisis in housing had had devastating consequences and the US Government
should have moved more forcefully to limit the damage.
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Although Geithner did not explicitly mention the Bush Administration, he
clearly apportioned blame to it for the causes and the deterioration of the crisis.
Implicitly, he charged it with having acted too late, applied misguided policies
and failed in its oversight and proper regulation of the financial markets.
His presentation of the new administration’s crisis-management efforts took the
form of a key announcement: that of the Economic Recovery Act—the Financial
Stability Plan, which among other things, was aimed at restarting the flow of
credit and imposing higher standards for transparency and accountability in
the financial market. Geithner made a strong historical analogy in support of
the plan. He referred to the Great Depression in the 1930s and to the Japanese
experience in the 1990s to explain why government (implicitly, the Bush
Administration) had failed to stem this crisis and what the Obama Administration
intended to do differently. The secretary told Americans that the Obama
Administration’s efforts would be guided by the lessons of the preceding few
months and by lessons of financial crises throughout history. In the United States
in the 1930s and Japan in the 1990s, Geithner observed, crises lasted longer and
caused greater damage because governments applied the brakes too early. For
this reason, the administration’s policy response would be comprehensive,
forceful and might be sustained until recovery was firmly established.
Although the Treasury Secretary’s rhetoric sounded forceful, it failed to elicit
a positive public response. Six out of 10 of the articles reporting the speech
disagreed with his policy proposal, although the main concerns were about how
the administration would implement it rather than its content (Table 3.7). Much
of the disagreement was directed at the Financial Stability Plan—an outgrowth
of the Bush Government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which was
controversial. Geithner’s involvement with the previous administration, however








Table 3.7 Media response to Geithner’s 10 February 2009 speech
No support for the secretary was expressed in the press coverage surveyed.
Public opinion polls taken about a month later found Americans were divided
on him, largely owing to his handling of the crisis when he was a senior Federal
Reserve executive in the Bush Administration (Newport 2009). No comment was
made about his version of the causality claims. Once again, this might be because
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a dominant framing of the causes of the crisis had already settled in the public
mind.
26 March 2009: Geithner’s testimony to the House of
Representatives
Geithner’s type-3 framing largely continued in written testimony to the House
Financial Services Committee Hearing a month later. Geithner described the
crisis as the most severe global financial crisis in generations. The financial
system, he explained, had failed in basic and fundamental ways. Geithner saw
the crisis in light of the fragility and instability of the whole financial
system—and in light of the lack of proper government checks and balances,
which resulted in compensation practices that rewarded short-term profits over
long-term returns (for the whole catalogue of causation factors and his
explanation, see the online appendix).
Again, Geithner endogenised the causes of the crisis, holding the Bush
Administration to account for what he saw as government failure to regulate
the markets. His management efforts concentrated on initiating a comprehensive
reform: not modest repairs on the margins, but new rules of the game, which
among other things would subject financial institutions that were critical to the
functioning of the financial system to strong government oversight. The
government’s regulatory reform would cover four broad areas: systemic risk;
consumer and investor protection; eliminating gaps in the regulatory structures;
and international coordination (see the online appendix for a full list). Clearly,
the bulk of Geithner’s framing effort in this statement was focused on rallying
support for the Obama Administration’s reform agenda. Geithner failed, however,
to convince the commentariat and the public once again. Only two out of 10
news stories that covered it in our sample supported the financial system reform
plan. A range of sentiments and doubts was expressed—for example, the plan
would not work, it was complicated and obscure, it certainly would not prevent
the next crisis (Wessel 2009). One commentator put it colourfully:
One of the cool things about being Treasury Secretary is that you get
your signature on dollar bills, giving them authority, defending their
honor. Timothy Geithner’s plan to save the struggling banking system
probably does the opposite, throwing good money after bad to a banking
system struggling under the weight of its own mistakes. The markets
don’t like it. The Dow dropped 382 points while bonds rallied as a port
in a continuing storm. (Kessler 2009)
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And he continued:
The Treasury Secretary seems stuck on keeping the banks we have in
place. But we don’t need zombie banks overstuffed with nonperforming
loans—ask the Japanese. Mr Geithner wants to ‘stress test’ banks to see
which are worth saving. The market already has. Despite over a trillion
in assets, Citigroup is worth a meager $18 billion, Bank of America only
$28 billion. The market has already figured out that the banks and their
accountants haven’t fessed up to bad loans and that their shareholders
are toast.
None of the press coverage engaged with Geithner’s causality claims or expressed
support or lack thereof for the Treasury Secretary. At this time, however, as
mentioned above, public opinion was divided over him (Newport 2009). In a
Gallup Poll taken on 27–29 March 2008 about American opinion of Treasury
Secretary Geithner, 42 per cent approved of the way Geithner was doing his
job, 40 per cent disapproved and 18 per cent had no opinion.
When compared, Geithner’s two speech acts bear close similarity. His naming,
explaining, accounting for and management of the crisis remained the same.
This is because, perhaps, the speeches were only a few weeks apart, during
which the crisis took no dramatic new turns. The differences of emphasis between
the two speeches were due to the development of the administration’s









Table 3.8 Media response to Geithner’s 26 March 2009 testimony
Back to the Depression? Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben
Bernanke
Ben Bernanke had made a career as a scholar of the Great Depression before
coming to the Federal Reserve. For Bernanke, the current crisis—a
‘once-in-a-century’ crisis, as his predecessor, Alan Greenspan, described
it—offered an unique opportunity to put into practice what he had taught all
his academic life: invoking a Depression-era law to lend money from the central
bank to non-depository institutions (Bernanke 2008a). At the same time, in his
running of the Fed, he had stayed within the ‘Greenspan paradigm’, which was
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now clearly discredited—as even Greenspan himself eventually admitted. This
section attempts to analyse how the Federal Reserve Chairman framed the
unfolding crisis and how his framing effort evolved with the change of
administration.
14 March 2008: Bernanke’s response to Bear Stearns’ collapse
Geithner (who was then the President of the New York Federal Reserve) told
Bernanke at 4am on 14 March 2008 of Bear’s precarious position and the potential
risk posed to the US financial system if it collapsed. Even after this dire
prediction, however, in his speech that day on fostering sustainable
homeownership, Bernanke did not name the financial troubles (PBS Frontline
2009). The closest he came to that was in a general statement about mortgage
delinquency and foreclosure rates that had been rising substantially during the
preceding year and a half. In terms of the crisis-exploitation model, at this time,
Bernanke’s stance in relation to the financial crisis was a firm type-1: believing
that the financial system itself was not in crisis. His framing and management
efforts focused on the mortgage market only. The high rate of delinquencies and
foreclosures, he explained, was owed to the sharp deterioration in the
performance of sub-prime mortgages, particularly those with adjustable-rate
features. This, he continued, had its origins in the past quarter-century’s
advances in information technology, the development of credit-scoring
techniques and the emergence of a large secondary market, which had
significantly increased access to the mortgage market.
Bernanke defended existing mortgage market policies. Although much of his
mortgage-related explanations of the crisis pointed to imprudent sub-prime
lending practices, he insisted that sub-prime lending was responsible—except
that it expanded credit to borrowers with less than perfect credit histories. His
account of the troubles emphasised exogenous—market dynamics—factors,
increased access to mortgages, amid irresponsible borrowing on the part of
homeowners. His proposed responses focused on devising a comprehensive rule
to protect consumers from unfair lending practices; to ensure that borrowers
could afford their repayments; banning loan repayment penalties; and tight
regulation of the practices of brokers.
Public reaction to the Bernanke speech was minimal. Of the press articles
surveyed, most made no comment about the causality claim of the chairman.
While five agreed with his policy proposal, seven did not, and most expressed
no support for Bernanke. The majority of the commentators criticised the
chairman for interfering with the working of the market—more especially,
encouraging excessive risk taking among bankers by guaranteeing a federal
bailout of collapsing banks (Irwin and Tse 2008). The lack of diverse reaction
to the chairman’s speech was perhaps due to the attention dedicated to Bear’s
liquidity issues and Bernanke’s role in it.
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Table 3.9 Media response to Bernanke’s 14 March 2008 speech
1 December 2008: Bernanke’s acknowledgment of crisis
In this second speech, on 1 December 2008, Bernanke’s posture had shifted
significantly after it had become clear that the nation’s financial system was in
full-blown crisis (and a change of administration was imminent). At that time,
more major banks had collapsed and the speed at which the crisis was unfolding
had overwhelmed the Federal Reserve and Treasury’s capacity to cope; he and
Paulson had asked for money to bail out the system and the crisis had gone
global. Besides the speech’s title now containing the phrase ‘financial crisis’,
Bernanke described the troubles as economic and financial challenges and an
extraordinary period of financial turbulence. Of all Bush-era officials analysed
here, Bernanke came closest to endogenising the causes of the crisis, by admitting
that there was a serious internal weakness in the American financial system: the
absence of well-defined procedures and authorities for dealing with the potential
failure of systematically important non-bank financial institutions.
His proposed policy responses to the crisis concentrated on directing the Federal
Reserve’s efforts to offsetting its effects on credit conditions and the broader
economy. Ironically, however, at this stage, Bernanke might have not fully come
to terms with the fact that the crisis had already affected the broader economy.
The chairman outlined interest rate cuts, the Emergency Economic Stabilisation
Act and systemic risk minimisation as the few tools at the disposal of the Federal
Reserve to fight the crisis.
Bernanke acknowledged weaknesses in the US financial system, but at the same
time, he insisted that by way of historical comparison, the Federal Reserve’s
action stood out as exceptionally rapid and proactive. That effort was not
particularly successful. As Table 3.10 reveals, the speech received comparatively
little coverage and the tone of the commentaries it did receive was either neutral
or negative.
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Table 3.10 Media response to Bernanke’s 1 December 2008 speech
18 February 2009: Bernanke after the presidential transition
Bernanke’s third speech analysed in this chapter was chosen from the series he
delivered after Obama had been sworn in as president. Obama took office with
a series of policy proposals and measures focused on the crisis and other issues.
Despite these, Bernanke’s type-2 posture prevailed. He fully acknowledged that
the economy was in crisis and recession, describing the time as extraordinarily
challenging for the global economy and for economic policymakers—not least
for central banks such as the Federal Reserve. Bernanke stopped short of
explaining or accounting for the crisis and shifted to assuring Americans of the
steps the Federal Reserve would take to restore financial stability and economic
prosperity. Such efforts, he stated, would be directed towards easing credit
through improving the functioning of credit markets and increasing the supply
of credit to households and markets. He said that these measures would break
with previous efforts that had been geared towards influencing short-term
interest rates, which proved insufficient to overcome the effects of the crisis on








Table 3.11 Media response to Bernanke’s 18 February 2009 speech
10 March 2009: Bernanke acknowledges internal factors
In March 2009, as Federal Reserve chief in the new Obama Administration,
Bernanke remained in the type-2 position. He described the crisis as the worst
since the 1930s. While acknowledging that the fundamental causes of the crisis
remained in dispute, the chairman explained that the crisis was a result of the
1990s’ global imbalances in trade and capital flows. According to Bernanke,
these had been caused by the chronic lack of savings relative to investment in
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the United States and other industrial economies, combined with extraordinary
increases in savings relative to investment in many emerging-market nations.
As a result, he maintained, the United States had experienced large capital inflows
for more than a decade even as real interest rates remained low.
The risk-management system of the private sector and government oversight of
the financial sector in the United States, Bernanke said, failed to ensure that the
inrush of capital was prudently invested. This resulted in the powerful reversal
in investor sentiment and seizing up of credit markets, hence precipitating a
sharp downturn in the global economy. By way of explanation, Bernanke showed
some degree of consistency with Obama’s and Geithner’s framing attempts in
accounting for the crisis. As well as acknowledging the role of endogenous
factors, he pointed to the failures of government in harnessing the inflow of
capital—a failure that caused the crisis.
Media reaction remained consistently indifferent to Bernanke’s third and fourth
framing attempts analysed here (Tables 3.10 and 3.11). Of the 16 press articles
surveyed, the overwhelming majority made no comment about the chairman’s
causality claim. All but one made no comment about continued support for him.
Opinion about his proposed policy was equally divided. Public opinion polls,
however, found that the chairman’s approval rating averaged 71 per cent—better
than the President’s and his Treasury Secretary’s (Izzo 2009).
4. Conclusions: the limits of crisis management by speech
For the Bush Administration, the political and policy implications of the framing
contest regarding the financial crisis were disastrous. The administration’s
handling of the crisis was widely depicted as failing to grasp the nature and
severity of the problems in time. President Bush’s rhetoric failed to stem this
tide, perhaps owing as much to his pre-existing credibility deficit as to his words
and deeds in the current crisis. Bush, Paulson and Bernanke all took a type-1
stance at the early stage of the crisis, denying that the economic woes were more
than incidental and self-correcting. Even after they switched to a type-2 posture,
which implied acknowledgment of the crisis, they never regained control of the
discourse.
Because the administration had initially insisted that there was no crisis, it did
not see the need for a wholesale policy paradigm shift. Rather, it focused on
ad-hoc, reactive measures such as the invocation of the Great Depression-style
law that allowed the Federal Reserve to lend to non-banks and the bailout of
one bank after another. These moves were aimed at aiding the process of market
stabilisation. As we saw, this proved unpopular in the media and among the
American public.
Until September 2008, Bush’s rhetoric focused on talking up the economy and
talking down the crisis. This stood in marked contrast with the pattern in his
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economic rhetoric during most of his first term, when he systematically talked
down the economy in order to mobilise support for a series of unprecedented
tax cuts, which he defended as a much-needed economic stimulus (Wood 2007).
Bush’s consistent stance during this period was one of ‘it ain’t broke, so why
fix it’. For example, in his March 2008 address to the Economic Club of New
York, the President said he disagreed with the idea of massive government
intervention in the event of periodic instances of market ‘stress’ (Bush 2008a).
When later in the year he bowed to the inevitable and started acknowledging
the severity of the crisis, Bush’s preference for minimal government intervention
in the economy had to give way. The limited extent of his stimulus policy,
however, betrayed his continued aversion to a more interventionist stance.
The administration came closer than ever to making a deeper policy change after
shifting posture to type-2 when it pushed for the enactment of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act (an economic stimulus package), which authorised
Treasury to spend $700 billion to undertake a system-wide rescue of the American
financial markets—to buy toxic assets, especially the mortgage-backed securities
(Paulson 2008b). The scope of the stimulus plan, which covered mainly the
private sector, especially the financial markets, signalled the administration’s
willingness to relax its beliefs in government non-interference in, and
deregulation of, the financial markets. It also demonstrated, however, its
unwillingness to make a real policy paradigm shift—for example, by adopting
a new regulatory regime for financial markets. This was especially true for Bush
and Paulson, as both strongly believed in market discipline and freedom and
were anti-regulation (PBS Frontline 2009).
Obama’s economic policy philosophy departed from Bush’s. In his State of the
Nation Address to a Joint Session of Congress in February 2009, Obama rejected
the neo-classical economic doctrine concerning the need for small government
(Obama 2009b). Before his election, Obama had already emphasised his belief
that a radical shift in policy was called for—one that featured stronger
government regulation and oversight of key financial and economic institutions,
as well as more direct public investment (Obama 2008). Once president, Obama
ironically followed in Bush’s rhetorical footsteps by talking down the economy
(more specifically, talking up the magnitude and institutional depth of the crisis)
in order to mobilise support for his economic reform agenda—only the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Plan, which became law in February 2009, was a
quite different reform agenda from the one pursued by Bush during 2001–05.
Combining economic stimulus with policy innovation, the plan’s scope was
broad based and far reaching, including major investments in the areas of energy,
health care, education and infrastructure and heightening government regulation
of the economy.
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The extent to which Obama succeeded, as measured by the public opinion
surveyed in the earlier part of the chapter, should not be overstated. First,
President Bush was totally beleaguered as he prepared to exit office, whereas
Obama had come to office with the energy of a new leader, not least on the
promise of change in areas such as health care, education and energy, which
large segments of the electorate had wanted ‘fixed’. To some degree, the escalation
of the financial crisis during the campaign was a political windfall for Obama,
as it enabled him to develop an additional rationale for policy claims that had
already struck a positive chord in the public anyway. Taking the offensive
type-3 stance on the financial crisis from the outset, President Obama’s crisis
rhetoric acknowledged not just the role of unscrupulous financial trading on
Wall Street, it put the emphasis on his predecessor’s economic philosophies.
Bush’s attempt at defending his administration’s record came late and was fatally
flawed because of his declining popularity and the relentless avalanche of bad
tidings about the economy.
There was a significant level of consistency between Obama’s and Geithner’s
framing efforts during the early months of 2009. The two appeared to talk in
unison in order to ‘sell’ the Obama Administration’s change agenda. The
differences were only of degree, not of kind. Once in office, Obama refrained
from direct attacks on his predecessor’s record, yet Geithner’s framing directed
blame squarely on the Bush Administration—not only for causing the crisis,
but for failing to act early and decisively. His claims were blunt: the crisis
accumulated over time through government policies that encouraged a global
credit boom; and when the crisis began, the government response had been
reactive, slow and incomprehensive.
The only one among the three office-holders to hold his position throughout,
Bernanke charted his own rhetorical course during the crisis. His speeches did
not betray any attempt to explicitly align his rhetoric with that of the Bush and
later the Obama Administrations. Nor should such attempts be expected, given
Bernanke’s statutory independence. As observed earlier, Bernanke changed
stance only once, from type-1 to type-2, nearly halfway through the unfolding
of the global financial crisis in the period under study. Thereafter, the Federal
Reserve chief consistently maintained the type-2 frame. After he had convinced
himself that the current crisis was real and bigger than he had originally
imagined, Bernanke, the scholar of the Great Depression, brought to bear his
knowledge of its (mis-)management on his ideas about the unfolding financial
crisis. It provided him with a wry opportunity: to test his hitherto untested
academic belief that financial crises of this magnitude were manageable by capital
injections from central banks.
Overall, this study lends some support to the notion that when major disruptive
events such as the global financial crisis occur, public leaders are presented with
64
Framing the global economic downturn
an opportunity to reconsider their policy stances, and with a ‘framing contest’
that has potentially far-reaching political consequences. In the case of the United
States in 2008 and 2009, the unfolding economic crisis significantly changed the
economic policy and political landscapes, which started with the campaign
rhetoric of John McCain and Barack Obama, graduated to partisan politicking
between the Democrats and the Republicans and ended with the United States
adopting major policy reforms that broke completely with the past.
The path to reform was paved by Obama and Geithner’s crisis rhetoric, but not
just theirs: there was an avalanche of media diagnosis of this crisis that was
supporting their dire characterisations of the crisis and its causes. When it came
to selling the idea that one—and only one—set of policies was best suited to
combat the crisis, however, opinion was much more divided, and the public
pronouncements of the new administration went only so far in carrying the day.
In the end, it was probably the pressure-cooker effect of the escalating crisis
itself that contributed as much as any other factor to the relatively quick success
of Obama’s arm-twisting of Congress to get his stimulus plan passed.
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4. Canada: the politics of optimism
Anastasia Glushko
1. Warranted optimism or an illusion of invulnerability?
In late 2008, billionaire investor Warren Buffet called the financial crisis a
‘financial Pearl Harbor’ (Clark 2008) and former US Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan described it as a ‘once-in-a-century event’ (Stein 2008). Like
the problem itself, however, Canada’s experience of, and its government’s
response to, the financial meltdown have been more ambiguous. Canada entered
the economic turbulence from a position of relative strength and suffered far
less than would be expected of a country whose economy was so dependent on
its southern neighbour. At the time of writing, Canada’s financial system has
been less affected by the global financial crisis than those of other industrialised
countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and its banks have
not required an injection of government capital. In fact, in October 2008, the
World Economic Forum ranked Canada first in the world for the soundness of
its banking system and, in March 2009, Canada’s banks were expected to report
another profitable quarter, defying global trends (Hopkins 2009).
On the other hand, no one major country in the world is as dependent on another
nation for its economic wellbeing as Canada is on the United States. Canada ships
almost four-fifths of its exports to the United States (Statistics Canada 2008), and
all of Canada’s recent surpluses in its current account are attributable to the
United States’ buying power (Fry 2009:35–6). In addition, investors in the United
States account for about 58 per cent of the foreign direct investment stock in
Canada and these investments have provided more than one million jobs for
Canadian workers. Canada’s tourism and hospitality sectors have also been
seriously dependent on the United States since Americans account for about 80
per cent of all foreign visitors to Canada (Fry 2009:35–6).
As a result, the effects of the global financial crisis on the Canadian economy
did not begin to be felt until late in 2008 and early 2009, when the reduction in
American consumption began to translate into difficulties for Canada’s export,
service, auto and primary sectors. Rising unemployment, reduction in foreign
investment and the falling value of the local currency were particularly
significant manifestations of the financial crisis in Canada. Indeed, the full extent
of its impact was being fully understood—and suffered—by ordinary Canadians
only as of early 2009.
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The three people responsible for leading Canada through this crisis and therefore
subject to analysis in this study are Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Minister
for Finance Jim Flaherty, and the Governor of the Bank of Canada Mark Carney.
Harper and Flaherty are members of the Conservative Party, which has been a
minority government since 2006. Carney’s post is not political, since the Bank
of Canada’s Board of Directors appoints the governor. As this study will show,
however, it was precisely the apolitical nature of his office that conferred
significant importance and legitimacy on his public pronouncements—and meant
Carney was a significant figure in shaping public opinion about the events.
Because the real extent of the effects of the crisis on the Canadian economy was
not revealed until the end of 2008, for most of that year, the Conservative
Government was able to exploit its position of incumbency and Harper’s
reputation as a respected economist—specifically, that Harper, who held an MA
in economics, was Canada’s first Prime Minister to be a professional economist.
Emboldened by an economy that seemed largely unaffected by the crisis that
was engulfing the rest of the world, and by a weak and divided opposition, the
usually cautious Harper called an early election in October 2008. He asked
Canadians for a mandate to lead the country through the financial storm (though
it was widely accepted that he was also hoping to secure a parliamentary majority
the Conservatives had hitherto lacked). Although the Harper Government was
comfortably returned (albeit without a majority), the September election
campaign, coupled with the simultaneous rapid fall on Wall Street, facilitated
public discussion and awareness of the severity of the meltdown and revealed
considerable flaws in the Conservatives’ public framing of the crisis. After the
election, the government’s optimistic outlook proved to be increasingly fragile,
as the reverberations of the global crisis steadily permeated the Canadian
economy. The government was forced to rescind on its assurances that Canada’s
economy was so sound that it would even produce a surplus in the subsequent
fiscal year. In fact, the government had to concede that Canada’s economy was
officially in recession and that the country would be forced to produce a deficit,
the projected amount of which inflated from $30 billion in January 2009 to $50
billion at the time of writing in June (Jones 2009).
The continuous policy backtracking since December 2008 saw the government’s
credibility erode significantly. Its apparent reluctance to admit the severity of
the crisis created a perception that the Conservative Government lacked empathy
for ordinary Canadians hit by the crisis. Despite these setbacks, the government
remained in a position of relative strength in June 2009. It was enabled by
politically weak opposition parties, who had been riddled with their own
leadership difficulties and who, despite the opportunity the crisis presented,
were unable to put aside their divisions to effectively challenge the government
on the basis of economic competency. A telling example was the parliamentary
crisis in December 2008 when the Harper Government found itself facing the
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prospect of defeat in the House of Commons on a motion of confidence brought
by the three opposition parties. In addition, the three parties signed a formal
coalition agreement providing for a Liberal–NDP coalition government (supported
by Bloc Quebecois) to assume power if the government was defeated. The
government was forced to prorogue Parliament for two months, but the coalition
fell apart almost as soon as Parliament returned, unable to agree on an appropriate
response to the budget, thus ending the parliamentary crisis.
Box 4.1 Canada’s financial crisis trajectory, April 2008 – April 2009
24 April 2008: Finance Minister, Jim Flaherty, announces that the
government will tighten securities regulation to force more disclosure
by financial institutions about their investments.
21 August: According to Statistics Canada, 15 of 22 industry groups
reported higher profits, led by oil and gas extraction and manufacturing.
Canadian corporations earned $69.4 billion in operating profits in the
second quarter—up 2.5 per cent from the first quarter.
22 August: Flaherty uses his department’s monthly fiscal update to
announce that the Federal Government has revised its working estimate
for growth to 1.1 per cent from the 1.7 per cent forecast in the February
budget.
28 August: The Harris/Decima Investors Group Survey indicates that
pessimism about the economy in the coming year fell 6 per cent since
the previous survey in May, to 32 per cent.
6 September: Findings show Canadian employers hired 161,000 people
in August, maintaining the unemployment rate at 6.1 per cent.
7 September: Prime Minister Stephen Harper, calls an early election for
14 October.
11 September: Labour productivity falls for the third consecutive
quarter, highlighting a marked deterioration in Canada’s competitiveness
and a signal that growth is slowing.
15 September: As the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) closes down 515.55
points, Harper warns against economic pessimism about the unfolding
US financial crisis, saying that if an economic crash was coming, it would
have happened already.
19 September: Harper says Canadian financial institutions have not
been hit hard by the US financial crisis; therefore, there is no need for
a bailout of Canada’s chartered banks.
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23 September: Statistics Canada says Canada’s consumer price index is
at its highest point since March 2003 due to thriving food and gas
inflation.
24 September: The Bank of Canada pledges $4 billion to unfreeze credit
markets; Statistics Canada says inflation jumped to 3.5 per cent in
August—the highest rate since early 2003.
25 September: The Bank of Canada pledges a further $6 billion in
emergency short-term lending to help lenders deal with tighter credit
markets.
29 September: The TSX closes 841 points down—the biggest one-day
point drop ever—as the US Congress votes down the bailout package;
Scotiabank Commodity Index drops 8.9 per cent.
30 September: The Bank of Canada injects an additional $4 billion into
short-term money markets as a means to increase the flow of credit.
1 October: Volvo closes its Ontario plant, with a loss of 500 jobs;
Statistics Canada says Canada’s economy boomed in July, growing 0.7
per cent on the strength of surging energy output—the fastest pace of
growth since March 2004.
8 October: Central banks announce coordinated rate reductions and the
Bank of Canada lowers its interest rate by 0.5 of a percentage point to
2.5 per cent.
10 October: The Canadian dollar experiences its biggest one-day drop
since 1971.
14 October: Harper’s government is re-elected.
19 October: Flaherty predicts a ‘modest’ surplus for the current fiscal
year.
21 October: The Bank of Canada lowers its interest rate by 0.25 of a
percentage point to 2.25 per cent.
24 October: The government guarantees bank loans.
30 October: Harper announces a new cabinet, enlarging it to 38 members
and increasing Ontario’s representation. Three of the most heavyweight
portfolios (finance, industry and transport) remain unchanged; the
opposition criticises the retention of Flaherty.
31 October: The Harper Government announces it will limit the growth
of equalisation payments to poorer provinces in light of the global
financial crisis.
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1 November: Bank of Montreal and Bank of Nova Scotia say Canada is
entering a recession; the government denies it.
10 November: General Motors’ shares drop to a 60-year low. The auto
industry is Canada’s largest industrial sector by employment, accounting
for 12 per cent of manufacturing gross domestic product (GDP) and
employing more than 500,000 Canadians.
12 November: Canadian stocks fall below 9000 points, as investors
ignore a new Canadian Government pledge to better stimulate lending
by the banks.
20 November: Harper makes his reply to the ‘Speech from the Throne’,
emphasising that he will act quickly to protect Canadians in a time of
global instability.
24 November: Flaherty concedes that Canada is in recession; the
Canadian dollar is up 3.5 per cent, buoyed by the bailout of Citigroup.
30 November: Flaherty announces a five-year economic action plan to
stimulate the economy.
9 December: The Bank of Canada lowers its interest rate by 0.75 of a
percentage point to 1.5 per cent.
20 January 2009: The Bank of Canada lowers its interest rate by 0.5 of
a percentage point to 1 per cent.
24 February: Parliament passes the Economic Action Plan, which seeks
to provide almost $64 billion over two years to support the Canadian
economy, including money for infrastructure, tax cuts and changes to
the employment insurance scheme. The government predicts a deficit
of $34 billion in the next financial year, and $30 billion in the year after
that.
2 March: The Canadian dollar hits a three-month low against the US
dollar, exacerbated by renewed risk aversion and the declining price of
crude oil. A Statistics Canada report reveals that Canada’s GDP shrank
by 3.4 per cent in the fourth quarter—one of the lightest declines among
the major global economies. On an annual basis, GDP fell by 0.7 per
cent—the first decline in the annual rate since 1991.
3 March: The Bank of Canada lowers its rate by 0.5 per cent to 0.5 per
cent.
11 March: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announces that
Canada is ‘better placed than most’ to weather the global recession due
to a strong fiscal package announced in January and a healthy financial
sector.
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6 April: A study by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives finds
that rapid contractions of the economy and the job market eclipsed the
Harper Government’s stimulus package before any money was even
dispensed. The study reports that the package laid out in the 27 January
budget was too small, too late and ‘out of proportion to the threat that
Canadians are currently facing’.
9 April: The Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey shows employment
declined by 61,000 places in March 2009, pushing the unemployment




This chapter follows the overall research design of this volume, so no detailed
account of key concepts, propositions and study design principles is provided
here. A few observations are in order, however, on the specifics of the speeches
and newspapers selected for further analysis. The selection of key speeches was
determined by the amount of media coverage they received. This was because
the initial process of compiling a timeline of the crisis in Canada revealed a
notable lack of general media interest (as manifest in the lack of coverage) in the
manner in which the Canadian Government was handling the crisis, despite its
magnitude. In addition, particular events that received considerable international
coverage and could reasonably be assumed to have been of significance to
Canadians—such as the biggest one-day drop in the Canadian dollar’s value,
the government’s guarantee of banks loans and the proroguing of
Parliament—curiously did not attract very much coverage. This indicated that
to determine which events and consequently which particular speech acts
registered on the Canadian public’s radar (and therefore presented opportunities
to frame the crisis), a comprehensive search of the chosen media outlets was
necessary.
Thus, every article containing a reference to the economic crisis in chosen
publications within the specified time frame was examined in chronological
order. Speech acts that related to events that received significant media attention
generally received significant coverage themselves and were selected for this
merit. A secondary search of references to the selected speech acts and events
was also conducted to ensure no coverage was missed. This method, although
painstaking and time consuming, meant that the process of selection of relevant
newspaper articles was almost simultaneous with the selection of the speeches.
The newspapers chosen for analysis in this study were The Globe and Mail and
the National Post, as well as its business section, the Financial Post—two national
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newspapers with high circulation. It is worth noting that the Toronto Star has
the highest circulation of all newspapers in Canada and was initially considered.
A closer examination, however, revealed that the Toronto Star could be classified
more accurately as a provincial newspaper, due to its preoccupation with
Ontario-based issues. The high levels of circulation can likely be attributed to
the fact that Ontario is by far the most populated province, with almost 13 million
residents, compared with the 4.5 million in British Columbia, for example
(Canadian Newspaper Association 2008:4–5).
The choice of national newspapers is admittedly limiting. Both newspapers are
fairly conservative in their journalistic ethos and mostly endeavour to avoid
particular bias (or attempts to influence public opinion) compared with some of
their more colourful provincial counterparts. Moreover, given the strength of
historical and economic divides between the provinces, regional (mostly tabloid)
newspapers such as the Vancouver Sun, The Calgary Herald or Le Devoir are often
read more widely in their respective localities than are the national broadsheet
papers (Canadian Newspaper Association 2008:6–9). The crisis, however, affected
different Canadian provinces in different ways; central Canada was by far the
worst hit because of its reliance on service and auto manufacturing industries
and the crisis was most painfully manifested in high levels of unemployment.
On the other hand, the wealthier oil and gas-producing provinces of British
Columbia and Alberta were far less affected, and the main issues for people there
were fluctuating commodity prices that generated high levels of anxiety but,
by early 2009, no significant job losses.
Provincial newspapers reveal a perennial preoccupation with their provincial
interests rather than national issues, which presents a significant obstacle when
attempting to measure popular and media opinion in Canada. With this in mind,
the study does on occasion consider a small cross-section of provincial coverage,
particularly where there were wide discrepancies between the views conveyed
in national and provincial papers.
The selected articles were summarised and then coded using a three-point scale
of agreement (agreement, disagreement or neutral/no comment) against four
analytical categories, which referred to the leaders’ framing of the severity and
the causality of the crisis, proposed policy implications and overall support for
the leader. This method was useful in demonstrating the amount of coverage
each speech act received and provided a useful basis when analysing media
interest (or lack thereof) in the government’s framing of the crisis. These findings
were, where possible, supplemented with relevant national public opinion
polling statistics, reflecting the government’s popularity and credibility. The
findings were interpreted through the lens of the crisis exploitation framework
described in Chapter 2.
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3. Crisis development and elite rhetoric in Canada
12 May 2008: the Finance Minister’s assertion of Canadian
resilience
Jim Flaherty used his address to the Economic Club of Toronto to assure Canadian
voters that Canada’s economy would prove to be resilient. He acknowledged a
number of challenges facing the Canadian economy: the US housing market,
volatile financial markets, the strong Canadian dollar (in the face of waning
demand for exports), energy prices and an ageing population. He used upbeat
rhetoric, however, to argue that Canadian banks were well capitalised, the local
housing market was solid and more Canadians were working than before. He
also made a number of historical references to Sir John A. Macdonald, the first
Prime Minister of Canada, whose tenure spanned 18 years and who was the only
Canadian prime minister to win eight majority governments. He drew parallels
between Macdonald’s preference to ‘always look a little ahead’ and his own
government’s preference for grounding broader economic policies in the long
term, rather than ‘band-aid, ad hoc solutions’.
Given the extent to which Canadians were exposed to the US media (and what
would have already been a daily drumbeat of dire economic news), this speech
served a vital function in shaping Canadian public opinion of the domestic
manifestations of the global financial crisis and its causes. This was particularly
significant given the incumbency of the Harper Government—and therefore its










Table 4.1 Media response to Flaherty’s 12 May 2008 speech
The global financial crisis did not start to affect Canada seriously until about
October 2008 and the Canadian public did not fully accept the fact even a number
of months after that. At this stage of the crisis, media agreement with proposed
policy implications was closely tied to support for the national leaders, since the
Canadian Government had not proposed any new measures to deal with the
crisis, instead emphasising the importance of ‘staying the course’. While a lack
of media interest in Flaherty’s subsequent public pronouncements might have
indicated a level of public despondency with the Harper Government, the fact
that this speech attracted very minimal coverage in May 2008 was a big positive
for the Conservative Government. A Strategic Counsel opinion poll conducted
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shortly after Flaherty’s speech showed that the Conservatives enjoyed the support
of 38 per cent of decided voters—down only 1 per cent from a high of 39 per
cent in February 2006 (Strategic Counsel, CTV and Globe and Mail 2008a) and,
a month later, the same poll showed that 38 per cent of people felt the
Conservative Party was best able to manage the economy in the case of a
downturn—compared with the Liberal Party’s 27 per cent (Strategic Counsel,
CTV and Globe and Mail 2008b). It can therefore be concluded that the reason
why Flaherty’s 12 May speech received little public attention was because the
global economic crisis was not yet a major issue for the Canadian media and
public. Flaherty’s choice of using consistently positive rhetoric and downplaying
the interdependence of the US and Canadian economies, however, proved an
effective meaning-making strategy for the time being.
25 September 2008: bank governor Carney’s crisis
narrative
Mark Carney used his address to the Canadian Club of Montreal to outline how
the upheaval in global financial markets and the slowdown in the US economy
were important international factors affecting the Canadian economy. Using
blunter language than Canadians had come to expect from their government,
Carney said that global markets were now at a critical juncture and the nature
of the slowdown in the US economy—with weakness in the housing and auto
sectors—posed particular problems for Canadian exports. He also argued,
however, that the turmoil might be cathartic in restructuring markets, prompting
decisive policy responses and speeding up the reordering of the financial system
to make the world more stable. He concluded that Canada’s financial system was
well positioned to weather the financial storm because it had been prudent and
soundly capitalised. He added that the Bank of Canada would continue to monitor
economic and financial developments carefully and would ‘continue to set
monetary policy consistent with achieving the two per cent inflation target over
the medium term’.
From the outset, it is worth noting that beyond announcements affecting interest
rates, public pronouncements from the Bank of Canada have rarely attracted
much media attention. This could probably be attributed to the level of detail
provided by Carney and the Bank of Canada, which was uninteresting or difficult
for ordinary Canadians to understand (Financial Consumer Agency of Canada
2008). It was also for this reason that the media often oversimplified Carney’s
speech acts. Of the five articles analysed, four essentially disagreed with Carney’s
positive assessment of Canada’s economy and portrayed the severity of the
economic crisis as very acute (Table 4.2). All five left out Carney’s assurances
that Canada’s financial system was well placed and that high commodity prices
could even benefit the Canadian economy, and they expressed very pessimistic
observations about the prospects for the Canadian economy.
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Table 4.2 Media responses to Carney’s 25 September 2008 speech
Unlike Harper and Flaherty, who preferred to avoid any discussion of causality
in their public pronouncements, Carney appeared to view explaining what had
happened as part of his job as the Governor of the Bank of Canada. All five
articles agreed with Carney’s assessment of the causes of the crisis. Perhaps
because Canadians realised that Carney had nothing to gain politically by
exploiting the crisis, and perhaps because they did not realise that it was in his
professional interest to keep public confidence buoyant, none of the articles
expressed criticism of him. In covering this speech, however, three articles
showed disapproval of the Harper Government and portrayed Flaherty and
Harper as dishonest, clueless and uninformed.
It is also worth noting that Carney’s speech attracted significant attention in
media sources not used in this study, particularly regional newspapers. Local
media sources such as the Prince George Citizen and The Montreal Gazette
produced very positive accounts of his pronouncements and focused on his
assertion that Canada could weather the US storm. In the midst of all the gloom
coming from national and US media sources, regional Canadians clearly craved
some positive news.
7 October 2008: Prime Minister Harper’s bid for re-election
This speech, the release of his party’s election platform, marked a deliberate
attempt by Harper to reverse the downward trend in support for the Conservative
Party. Hitherto in the election campaign, Harper had taken advantage of his
position as the frontrunner and as leader of the incumbent party. He had refrained
from presenting a comprehensive package. Although acknowledging that ‘Canada
is heading into a period of economic uncertainty and slower growth’, Harper
used this speech to urge Canadians not to panic because Canada was well placed
to weather the financial storm. Responding to criticisms that the government
had not responded quickly enough to the global financial crisis, Harper said his
opponents were panicking and he vowed to stay the course: ‘prudent leadership
does not set out economic strategy for the nightly news or re-write plans for the
morning papers…you don’t shift long term plans for short-term considerations.’
The speech emphasised previous achievements: variations on the phrase ‘we
will continue to’ and ‘the Conservative government has already’ recurred in the
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text. In contrast with Harper’s usually very reserved and formal communication
style, this speech made a memorable pseudo-biblical reference (‘the plan on
which we have been acting is the plan…as the saying goes, it wasn’t raining
when Noah built the Ark’), which was ridiculed by some commentators.
The policy proposals were modest, probably in order to complement the
government’s mantra that Canada’s banks were insulated from the building
storm in global markets. This logic had seemed like a winning one in early
September when the Conservative Party called the snap election hoping to secure
the majority ‘before the tidal wave sweeping the global financial system breached
Canada’s levies’ (Callan 2008). As the global financial crisis deepened,
however—the Toronto Stock Exchange dropped 3942 points or 28.6 per cent
between 1 September and 8 October (The Economist 2008)—and media discussion
and awareness about its causality and severity increased, this ‘happy-go-lucky’
message (The Globe and Mail 2008) proved to be fragile and increasingly irrelevant










Table 4.3 Media responses to Harper’s 7 October 2008 speech
The media analysis reported in Table 4.3 demonstrates a substantial lack of
support for the national leader as well as the proposed policy implications. There
was marked disagreement about the severity of the global financial crisis, with
six out of the 13 articles analysed refuting Harper’s argument that Canada’s
financial system was sound and criticising his resistance to introduce special
measures to deal with the crisis. The research clearly indicated that the familiar
meaning-making script aimed at convincing voters that the government
anticipated the current problems back in August 2007 had failed. Of the 13
articles analysed, nine questioned Harper’s proposed policy implications and
expressed concerns about the government’s understanding of the global financial
crisis. This was significant given that Harper, a professional economist, had
traditionally been able to control the domestic economic debate.
Having said that, despite Harper’s incumbency, little mention (and no
disagreement with the government) was made of the causes of the crisis. The
coverage implied agreement with Harper’s diagnosis of the causes of the crisis
being exogenous. At least in part, this was testament to the strength of the
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reputation he built throughout his tenure as a competent, sensible and pragmatic
economist.
A major criticism of Harper was his perceived inability to communicate empathy
for the anxieties of the Canadian people or to reach out with convincing
reassurance to those who reasonably continued to fear losing their jobs, losing
their savings and deferring their hopes of retirement. Eight of 13 articles surveyed
berated Harper for his lack of sensitivity. Harper’s suggestion that stock market
bargain hunters could benefit from the economic panic became a particular
target. There were also some concerns that the lack of sensitivity was a portent
of future inflexibility, particularly if the Conservatives were delivered a majority
at the election. The fact that he delivered the speech to the Empire Club of Canada
(as opposed to a group of factory workers, for example) only exacerbated the
perception that Harper’s response to the global financial crisis was cerebral and
out of touch. The voters appeared to share the scepticism of some of the media.
According to a Harris/Decima opinion poll taken one day after the speech (and
eight days out from the election), only 31 per cent of decided voters supported
the Conservative Party—down from a high of 41 per cent one month earlier
(Heard 2008). All of this probably accounted for the fact that the title of the
speech was amended from ‘True north strong and free: Stephen Harper’s plan
for Canada’ to something less self-congratulating before it was placed on the
Prime Ministerial web site.
17 October 2008: a re-elected Harper opens the new
Parliament
Opening the new Parliament, this speech was a broad-strokes outline of the
government’s agenda. The Throne Speech is traditionally a vague statement of
priorities for the new government. It did not contain any details of the economic
stimuli (the government did not release these until the budget announcement
at the end of January 2009). For the most part, Harper stuck to pledges he and
his Conservative Party made in the election campaign, but warned that the
country could be headed back into deficit because it would be ‘misguided’ to
inflict economic pain to avoid it. The speech was a sober one, evoking great
battles of World War I and the subsequent generation that ‘overcame the
Depression and again confronted the devastation of war’. In all, it was a clear
attempt by Harper to manage public expectations by acknowledging the severity
of the situation, yet at the same time highlighting that no matter how serious
the economic downturn might be, far greater challenges had been met and
overcome in Canadian history.
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Table 4.4 Media responses to Harper’s 17 October 2008 speech
The speech enjoyed a low-key, but mixed reception in the press (Table 4.4). Of
the six articles analysed, three expressed disagreement with the speaker and his
policy proposals. Although most articles agreed with Harper’s perception of the
severity of the crisis (as conveyed in the speech), a major point of concern
appeared to be the suggestion that Canada could return to deficit spending. This
might have been an unintended consequence of Harper’s reluctance to publicly
convey the real severity of the economic crisis and manage public expectations
accordingly (and consistently) during the preceding election campaign.
Interestingly, it appears that Harper’s adherence to tradition in avoiding using
the Throne Speech to exploit the economic crisis politically backfired on him.
The New Democratic Party’s leader, Jack Layton, criticised Harper’s address for
lacking any bold or significant action with regard to the economic crisis. He
argued that this was another illustration of Harper’s lack of empathy for ordinary
Canadians—a criticism that was readily picked up by five out of six articles
analysed. This highlights one of two things: either Harper’s inability to interpret
the national mood (a common criticism of his leadership) or his sound judgment
in preferring to be criticised for sticking to tradition in times of crisis rather
than inappropriate exploitation (and potentially, partisanship). To Harper’s
credit, the Throne Speech was not one that usually received significant amounts
of coverage, so while the former criticism might have been common, unless
especially controversial, this particular speech was never likely to be brought
up against him by his critics in the future.
Given how general the speech was, how little coverage it received and how few
policy announcements it contained, it was surprising that it was met with such
relative disapproval. This could be attributed to the widespread feeling of
disillusionment after the election. A national qualitative study conducted by
Ensight Canada the day after the election found that there was widespread
consensus that the election was ‘a waste of time and money’ and ‘prevented
meaningful action being taken to protect Canada’s economy amidst the financial
crisis’ (Watt 2008:2–4). The study showed that the voters were disappointed
with Harper’s vision and program for the economy during the election, but
chose him ‘as the best of an unhappy set of choices’ (Watt 2008:1–2). As such,
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this speech illustrates that the capacity of a leader’s rhetoric to influence public
debate is always limited by the broader context of public mood.
27 January 2009: Finance Minister Flaherty’s budget
speech
Flaherty characterised his budget as necessary to protect jobs and businesses
from the ravages of the financial crisis. The financial plan devoted about half of
the new spending to construction projects that Flaherty hoped would revive
the economy by creating new jobs and stoking demand for lumber and other
Canadian-made goods. In what was his fourth budget in three years, Flaherty
offered consumers a tax break on home renovations and pledged to expand
employment-insurance benefits for two years. Flaherty also stated that the
Conservative Government would make available another $70 billion in credit to
businesses that were struggling to find affordable loans as a result of the global
financial crisis. Although Flaherty used powerful language to introduce and
conclude this lengthy speech, the urgency he hoped to convey did not really
capture the media’s imagination. Not unusually for a budget speech, the majority










Table 4.5 Media response to Flaherty’s 27 January 2009 speech
The major point of concern in media reception of the speech was that the policies
and measures proposed by the Harper Government were inappropriate to the
national needs (Table 4.5). While the majority of the coverage expressed
agreement with Flaherty about the severity of the crisis, there was a strong view
that the budget’s lack of a single compelling direction—‘the whole leaves the
impression of miscellany’ (The Globe and Mail 2009)—was evidence of it having
fallen prey to political engineering. This led many to disagree with the proposed
policy implications—and, therefore, with the necessity of the debt they brought
with them.
Most articles, however, agreed that the government had to step up in times of
crisis and did not refute the need for stimulus. This support was also reflected
in a research poll, conducted in early February, which indicated that 56.6 per
cent of Canadians at least somewhat supported deficit spending to stimulate the
economy (Nanos 2009). The research also revealed, however, that a common
sentiment was that the recession should be seen as an opportunity ‘to do what
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needs to be done anyway’ (Ivison 2009a) so that Canada could emerge from it
‘leaner and meaner’ (Corcoran 2009) than before. Instead, the overwhelming
opinion was that the budget needlessly pandered to the masses at the expense
of Canada’s future economic prosperity.
Of the 24 articles analysed, 13 argued in some way that the budget lacked
foresight and was based on wishful thinking that revenues would recover and
grow more quickly than spending by the next election. Inarguably, this would
have been exacerbated by the still-lingering criticisms that the Harper
Government saw the economy through rose-coloured glasses and therefore did
not realise the gravity of going into deficit. The research indicated that while
there was a belief that the government might have been well intentioned, the
overwhelming suspicion was that help for the Canadian economy would arrive
too late, in the wrong place and hang around longer than expected.
These concerns did not, however, translate into strong public disapproval of
Flaherty as a leader. Overall, he was seen as beholden to Harper, whose imposing
leadership style and public presence were well documented. Flaherty’s own
merits were overtly criticised in only one article; the rest were critical of him
only by the virtue of being Harper’s Finance Minister. This also translated into
assessments of Flaherty’s performance: only those who agreed with the Harper
Government more broadly tended to be complimentary of Flaherty.
Coverage of the budget three months after it was introduced was far more
positive, despite the massive and growing gap between the number of Canadian
job losses and the jobs target in the budget (Akin 2009). This suggested the
government’s attempts to convince the Canadian public that benefits of stimulus
measures would take some time to filter through the economy had been
successful.
10 February 2009: bank governor Carney’s ‘realism’
Carney used this address to reiterate his forecast that after a challenging first
half, ‘the economy will rebound at the fastest pace in decades’. This was almost
twice the pace forecast by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and most
private-sector economists (Schoffield 2009). Carney confidently spoke of the
Bank of Canada’s economic outlook, but said that it would materialise only if
the United States and other major economies took ‘exceptional’ measures to end
the crisis in financial markets. In reply to a suggestion by John McCallum, the
Liberal’s finance critic, that the bank was going ‘out on something of an optimistic
limb’, Carney replied, ‘We don’t do optimism. We do realism at the Bank of
Canada. We don’t do spin.’ He added that the Bank of Canada would continue
to monitor economic and financial developments carefully and ‘will continue to
set monetary policy consistent with achieving the two per cent inflation target
over the medium term’.
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Table 4.6 Media responses to bank governor Carney’s 10 February 2009
speech
While Carney’s positive outlook had hitherto been met with considerable
scepticism, his plain assertion that the Bank of Canada did not ‘do spin’ appeared
to resonate well. This lent his latest crisis assessment considerable legitimacy
and in turn enabled greater control of the message (Table 4.6). Four of the six
analysed articles emphasised in some way that the predictions of the Bank of
Canada were based on economic models and data and therefore should not be
dismissed as mere rhetoric or personal grandstanding (like that of political
leaders). In other words, Carney could be trusted. This accounted for the broad
support for the policy implications Carney recommended, as well as the agreement
with his assessment of the severity of the crisis.
In addition, five out of six surveyed articles lent their support to Carney’s
leadership. This was in marked contrast with previous coverage, which tended
to stay neutral on this issue. Portrayal of Carney as a credible leader did not
change even when he adjusted his outlook two weeks later by cutting the Bank
of Canada’s interest rate in half to just 0.5 of a percentage point and admitting
that there would be ‘a sharper decline in Canadian economic activity’ in the next
couple of months ‘and a larger-than-expected erosion of business and consumer
confidence could mean the economy will not begin to bounce back until early
2010’ (Bank of Canada 2009). Despite the fact that this essentially proved Carney’s
earlier critics right, the media attack focused on Harper’s personal leadership
instead, and again gave rise to suggestions that Harper and Flaherty were not
prepared for the recession, did not understand what was going on and were ill
equipped to deal with the economic crisis.
23 February 2009: Flaherty attempts to rally the public
Flaherty’s piece in the opinion section of the National Post sought to reassure
Canadian families and businesses that the new federal budget would help cushion
the impacts of the downturn and support those hit hardest by the global financial
crisis. He reasserted the Harper Government’s line about the causes of the crisis
(exogenous) and that of the virtues and near-invulnerability of the Canadian
financial system. While acknowledging that ‘there is not [a] magic bullet to
return the world economy back to previous heights’ and that the United States’
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recovery was essential to Canada’s, he assured his readers that the Conservative
Government had acted swiftly to ‘keep our edge’. And, like Harper, he reiterated
once again that most countries were far worse off than Canada. He went on to
recapitulate the key points of the 2009 budget and ended by urging his fellow
parliamentarians to ‘set games aside’ and put his plan to work, arguing that
delay and ‘obstructionism’ were no longer appropriate in such difficult times.
It is quite unusual for a Canadian Finance Minister to write a column in a major
national newspaper, so one could conclude that by this virtue alone the piece
might have attracted some attention. Flaherty’s article, however, received very
few reader comments (four) and even less media coverage. There was only one
short article, also in the National Post, and it focused mainly on Flaherty’s point
that the United States’ recovery would be essential for Canada to pull itself out
of the economic quagmire. In media terms, this framing attempt went down like










Table 4.7 Media responses to Flaherty’s 23 February 2009 article
A thorough search of other media outlets not included in this study (including
regional newspapers in Flaherty’s native Ontario) also failed to produce any
findings. This lack of national interest points to a number of things. First, that
Flaherty’s rhetoric simply failed to kindle public interest. If Harper was
frequently portrayed as dull and uncharismatic by the Canadian media (for
example, Martin 2008), Flaherty seldom said anything that Harper had not
already said in almost exactly the same way. There was never any disagreement
or disparity between the two leaders, so for journalists there was little incentive
to cover Flaherty’s utterances. Second, in most countries, the Minister for Finance
(Canada’s equivalent of Treasurer) tends to be viewed as the expert on most
macroeconomic questions. Harper’s extensive background as an economist,
however, and the fact that his credibility as a prime minister was built almost
entirely on his reputation as a great economic tactician and manager, meant that
as far as public opinion was concerned, Flaherty’s views and statements were
redundant. Moreover, Harper’s dominance of cabinet—some commentators
referred to his alleged ‘controlling’ and ‘secretive’ leadership style (Travers
2007)—left little room for Flaherty to make his own mark in the public eye,
despite his central position in the Harper Government. Finally, this lack of media
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interest could indicate that Canadians were growing tired of hearing the same
thing from their government since its re-election.
Indeed, the government’s messaging was highly consistent throughout the period
under study, enabled by a weak and fractured opposition, which had helped
develop the budget in the first place. On one level, all of this might suggest that
the Harper Government had some success in controlling the meaning-making
script of the global financial crisis in Canada. Indeed, the United States casts a
long shadow on Canada and few would disagree that any Canadian recovery
was not feasible without a US recovery. On another level, however, this lack of
engagement might be a marker of public despondency and apathy regarding
the government and its limited ability to do anything about the global financial
crisis at home. The lukewarm opinion polls provide some support for such an
interpretation (Strategic Counsel, CTV and Globe and Mail 2009).
10 March 2009: Harper’s continued optimism
Although this particular address appeared to be an attempt by Harper to promote
his government’s action to reduce red tape to ensure the efficient delivery of
stimulus measures, media coverage of the speech largely ignored the intended
message. Instead, it focused squarely on Harper’s optimistic outlook for the
Canadian economy. ‘Typically a politician who likes to under-promise and
over-deliver’ (Laghi 2009), Harper asserted that Canada would be the first major
country to come out of the recession, that Canada had been hurt by it much less
than other countries and that Canada’s banking system was the soundest in the
world. He reminded the audience about some of the budget measures designed
to stimulate the economy, such as the home renovation tax credit. In addition,
Harper announced his frustration ‘with the opposition since the election’ and
encouraged his audience to tell the Liberal Party to ‘stop the political games’.
The overall tone was one of boosting morale, with Harper going as far as saying
that ‘if ever there was a time to put away that legendary Canadian modesty, it
is now’.
It is important to note that Harper chose to deliver this speech in Brampton,
Ontario. Ontario is sometimes called ‘car country’ because its economy relies so
greatly on automobile manufacturing. General Motors, Ford and Chrysler had
been producing more cars and light trucks in Ontario than Michigan—due in
part to the generous health care available in Ontario (Fry 2009:37). With all three
companies suffering deep financial setbacks, Ontario’s manufacturing sector had
been devastated almost to the same extent as Michigan’s (Hamilton Chamber of
Commerce 2009). Of all Canadian provinces, Ontario had been the most severely
affected by the global financial crisis. The largest employers in Brampton were
Chrysler and General Motors and the city had experienced a dramatic increase
in unemployment; figures from Statistics Canada show that Brampton’s
unemployment in March was 10.9 per cent, 2 percentage points higher than the
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rest of Ontario (8.9 per cent) and higher still than the national rate (8.3 per cent)
(Statistics Canada 2009a).
Harper’s choice of venue and upbeat rhetoric suggested a deliberate attempt to
reassure the most-affected Canadians of his government’s competency. In
addition, his attack on the opposition presented an attempt to exploit the crisis
to his party’s advantage. This alleged inability to curb his partisan instincts was
perceived by some commentators as antagonistic and irrational (given that Harper
did not enjoy a majority government and that, without the opposition’s
cooperation, the government’s vaunted economic plan would not have been










Table 4.8 Media responses to Harper’s 10 March 2009 speech
The media analysis shows a preponderance of disagreement with Harper about
the severity of the crisis (Table 4.8). Of eight articles analysed, five were critical
of Harper’s ‘rose-tinted’ (Ivison 2009b) view of the Canadian economy. Seven
gave a platform to the Liberal leader, Michael Ignatieff’s, condemnation of Harper
as being ‘on a Conservative planet, off in outer space’. A number of articles
implied that Harper’s boisterous outlook rang hollow with the Canadian public.
One captured the mood by observing ‘yes, Canada is in good shape relative to
everyone else, but that doesn’t mean we’re in good shape relative to our own
expectations and our own standards’ (Cowan 2009). A closely related criticism
was that Harper’s ‘boasting’ was tactless and completely out of touch with the
reality of the difficulties many Canadians faced as a result of the crisis (Radwanski
2009).
With Harper’s assessment of the severity of the crisis clearly contested (in contrast
with the question of causation, which was widely ignored, reflecting a broad
consensus about this being overwhelmingly exogenous), there were some
concerns about the policy direction the government was taking to deal with it.
Overall, however, the coverage of policy implications was mostly neutral,
probably enabled by the opposition’s focus on criticising Harper’s lack of
sensitivity rather than his policy trajectory (quite probably because the
opposition approved the economic plan with very few adjustments and little
debate). Clearly, at this point, crisis politics and crisis policy had become divorced
in the rhetoric of all the major parties. It is worth mentioning that reader
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comments (not included in the quantitative assessment) did express concerns
about Harper’s policy decisions, particularly the proposed tax reform. When
coupled with the low-level coverage this speech received, this suggested that
the extent of public disapproval of Harper could have been greater than these
findings implied. Indeed, a Harris Decima election tracing opinion poll shows
that public approval for the Conservative Party fell to 29 per cent between 8
March and 29 March—down from 33 per cent in late February and early March
(Harris Decima 2009).
1 April 2009: the bank governor sees light at the end of
the tunnel
With the US and global economies plunging deeper and deeper into recession,
Carney used his address in Yellowknife to reassure Canadians that they could
be confident that unprecedented policy measures would—eventually—restore
growth. Using the most powerful language to date (far stronger than any of
Harper’s or Flaherty’s public utterances), Carney acknowledged that these were
‘very challenging times’ for an economy ‘in the most severe financial meltdown
since the Great Depression’. He also remarked that the current crisis was more
challenging than previous downturns because it represented more than a cyclical
shock. He said that Canadians were understandably more concerned about their
economic future than they had been in decades, but he added that ‘there is a










Table 4.9 Media responses to Carney’s 1 April 2009 speech
This speech, although optimistic in parts, was a marked departure from Carney’s
usually positive outlook. It was met with considerable agitation by the media.
None of the media commentators questioned his assessment of the severity of
the crisis, but most tended to amplify it by declaring the central bank’s hitherto
bullish outlook officially buried. Carney’s personal leadership also went
unquestioned, but his pessimism gave rise to criticisms of Flaherty and Harper’s
refusal to increase the size of the government’s stimulus program. Three out of
the five articles called for the increase, despite the fact that in the same speech
Carney warned about the dangers of overshooting the target with stimuli.
The criticisms of Harper were particularly interesting since, as one of the articles
noted, he had indicated in a series of recent interviews with foreign media that
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policymakers must do ‘everything necessary’ to pull the global economy out of
the crisis—a sentiment clearly at odds with Carney’s reservations (Vieira 2009).
While a disparity of views between the Prime Minister and the Bank of Canada
Governor would theoretically make for interesting coverage (particularly given
the vastly different reputations the two enjoyed), in this instance, it failed to
capture public imagination. Nor did it seem to get the attention of the opposition.
4. Framing the financial crisis in Canada: analysis and
conclusions
Because the real extent of the effects of the global financial crisis on the Canadian
economy was not revealed until late in 2008, the government was able to frame
the crisis in optimistic terms for most of the year. In this, they were greatly
enabled by their incumbency and Harper’s reputation as a competent economic
manager. His credentials as an ‘economist by training’ and his government’s
perceived competence at managing the national economy had been readily
circulated by the Canadian media for a long time. These were his major electoral
strengths before the economic downturn began in earnest. In contrast, during
2008, the major opposition party, the Liberal Party (which had held government
for 12 years before Harper’s victory in 2006), was led by the highly unpopular
Stephane Dion. A former political science academic, Dion was widely perceived
as ‘a thinker rather than a doer…a pie-in-the-sky intellectual’ who was frequently
unable to explain basic economic realities (McLean 2008:12). Harper recognised
this weakness and frequently sought to exploit it. In fact, it was commonly
accepted that Harper’s surprising decision to call an early election in September
was motivated largely by his recognition of the public perception that the Liberal
Party (and especially Dion) was ill equipped to lead Canada through perilous
times. Michael Ignatieff, another intellectual, replaced Dion in December. Dion’s
disastrous period of leadership, however, had an enduring impact on the
credibility of the party and continued to compromise the public perception of
the party’s economic management credentials throughout 2009.
As the findings of this study indicate, however, Harper overestimated his ability
to shape public opinion and exploit the crisis to his advantage. By the time the
election campaign started in September and the Wall Street collapse began in
earnest, Canadians began to question his persistently rosy outlook on the state
of the economy. Although Harper’s previous policies were not blamed for causing
the crisis, significant portions of the commentariat as well as most ordinary
Canadians did not believe that problems south of the border would not eventually
affect the Canadian economy. Harper’s unwillingness to concede the severity of
the crisis created an impression that he was putting his political interests ahead
of his economic knowledge. This eventually raised concerns about the policy
direction the government was taking to deal with the crisis.
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The government’s credibility could in theory have been assisted by the fact that
Flaherty’s messaging was consistent with Harper’s throughout the crisis. Harper’s
dominant leadership style, however, and his tendency to speak for the
government on all matters regarding the economy throughout the Conservatives’
tenure had long ago compromised the capacity of the Minister for Finance to
shape public debate. Consequently, Flaherty’s pronouncements were ignored
at best and, at worst, were seen as politically motivated and thus were cynically
received.
It might have been helpful for Harper to emphasise the similarities between his
outlook and that of Bank of Canada Governor, Mark Carney, since the latter’s
apolitical office meant that the public did not question his agenda. Given Harper’s
vested interest in avoiding implicating his government in the causes of the
domestic manifestations of the global financial crisis, however, it is not surprising
that he should want to distance himself from the Bank of Canada’s past (and for
that matter, future) fiscal policy decisions. By the same token, it is reasonable
to assume that if Harper were to publicly align himself with Carney, the
credibility of the Governor of the Bank of Canada would be compromised in
more ways than one.
Moreover (and somewhat ironically), Harper’s unwillingness to resort to explicit
crisis rhetoric fed into pre-existing perceptions of him as a cold, uncaring leader
who lacked sympathy for the plight of everyday Canadians. This was exacerbated
as the effects of the global financial crisis on the Canadian economy became
increasingly obvious. Instead of convincing voters that his government
anticipated the problems long before they became apparent, Harper’s continuous
resistance to introducing special measures to deal with the crisis led Canadians
to question whether the government realised the gravity of the global financial
crisis—and consequently, whether it was equipped to deal with the crisis
appropriately and effectively.
By clinging to a positive outlook that was increasingly portrayed as
overoptimistic, Harper painted himself into a corner. When he and his
government were eventually forced to admit that the country was in recession,
this was widely perceived as backtracking. It seemed to confirm growing fears
that perhaps Harper was not the amazing economic manager Canadians had come
to believe he was. It was no surprise then that the Canadian public received the
2009 budget—which projected a huge deficit—with considerable suspicion.
It is worth questioning why this erosion of credibility under the weight of the
escalating economic problems failed to pose any significant political threat to
the Harper Government. One of the answers lies with the weak and politically
divided opposition parties, which failed to challenge the Conservatives in any
meaningful way. An international observer might intercede here and note that
surely the December 2008 parliamentary crisis constituted one such memorable
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challenge. If anything, however, the parliamentary crisis served to affirm the
position of the Harper Government. National polls conducted during and after
the impasse suggested that although Canadians were beginning to have more
doubts about the Harper Government’s economic competence, they were even
more cynical about the opposition parties’ ability to form a fungible coalition
(reservations that were amplified by their very colourful public disagreements
during the election period). To some extent, Canadians even seemed to blame
the opposition parties for the crisis (Reuters 2008). As a matter of fact, the
proposed alternative coalition government fell apart during its very first test—the
2009 budget—thus ending the parliamentary crisis.
One of the main reasons why the opposition parties failed to present a threat to
the government was their unwillingness to challenge it on the very issue of
economic management until well into 2009. The main opposition parties
consistently echoed Harper’s optimistic outlook; they all initially downplayed
the economic crisis. Even during the election campaign, as the markets went
into free fall, average Canadians watched their investments begin to evaporate
and the economic crisis was obviously spiralling out of Harper’s control, Dion
and his opposition counterparts, Jack Layton (of NDP) and Gilles Duceppe (of
Bloc Quebecois), did not question his mantra of ‘the fundamentals of the Canadian
banking system remain strong’ and ‘Canada is well placed to weather the
economic storm’. The budget presented another obvious opportunity for the
opposition to effectively challenge the government’s credibility in addressing
the global financial crisis. Indeed, it committed Canada to a $38 billion deficit
just two months after Harper asserted that Canada was doing fine and would
even produce a surplus in the next financial year. The opposition parties,
however, spent so much time attacking one another’s stances on the budget that
the infighting attracted almost as much media coverage as the budget itself.
All of this considered, it is important to conclude with a reflection on what is
perhaps the most interesting finding of this study: the notable lack of media
interest in the manner in which the Canadian Government was handling the
domestic manifestations of the global financial crisis. The reasons for this lack
of interest are very difficult to pin down, but two speculations can be offered.
First, Canada is saturated with US media outlets so it is possible that Canadians’
view of the crisis was shaped more by the bombardment of alarmist crisis rhetoric
and imagery beamed into their homes from south of the border than by the
public pronouncements of their own leaders. Canadians might therefore have
viewed the economic downturn as far too colossal for their government to halt
at home, and consequently might have held low expectations of their leaders’
capacity to affect change. In this case, it would have been in the interests of
Harper and Flaherty to stick with their usual bland rhetoric so as not to attract
further media attention.
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It is also possible that the lack of media interest in the government’s efforts to
frame the crisis was a symptom of a general sense of disillusionment, cynicism
and distrust of the government and the opposition among Canadians—that is,
a sign of general disengagement from the political process. It might have been
the case that Canadians were deeply sceptical of their government’s handling
of the crisis, but sensed that things could be much worse if the squabbling
opposition parties held the reins. A telltale indicator of this alternative
interpretation was that voter turnout at the October 2008 election was the lowest
in Canadian history (CBC News 2008). Regardless of the reasons, this notable
absence of media interest and serious pushback helped keep the Conservative
Government firmly in the saddle: it was exercising crisis leadership by default.
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Part III. Dark clouds and turbulence in
Europe

5. United Kingdom: the politics of
government survival
Justin Pritchard
1. From Northern Rock to a global financial crisis
For the United Kingdom in early 2007, the US credit crisis seemed to be a foreign
concern. By August, however, the French bank BNP Paribas, one of the largest
banks in the eurozone, announced to investors that they would be unable to
withdraw funds from two of the bank’s hedge funds; and by September 2007,
when British bank Northern Rock requested emergency financial support from
the Bank of England, the credit crisis had hit home. The significance of this
development was magnified by the fact that Northern Rock’s troubles were first
brought to public attention not by the government, but by the media. On
14 September, the day after the BBC Economics Editor Robert Peston had broken
the Northern Rock story, depositors withdrew £1 billion from the bank—the
largest run on a British bank for more than a century. So, from the first very
public manifestation of the credit crisis in the United Kingdom, the media had
set the agenda and the government was on the back foot. In 2008, more British
institutions announced multi-billion-pound exposures to the US credit crisis,
including the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) in April, Barclay’s and Halifax Bank
of Scotland (HBOS) in July and Bradford & Bingley in August. In response to
these developments, the British Government nationalised Northern Rock in
February 2008 and partly nationalised Bradford & Bingley in September 2008
and HBOS, Lloyd’s and RBS in October 2008.
This chapter focuses on three key actors responsible for managing the global
financial crisis in the United Kingdom: Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Chancellor
of the Exchequer Alistair Darling, and Bank of England Governor Mervyn King.
As well as buying up risky assets and nationalising financial institutions, these
three implemented a number of fiscal and monetary responses to the crisis.
Brown and Darling cut the value-added tax (VAT) from 17.5 per cent to 15 per
cent, raised the aged pension and offered new tax breaks. Together with King,
they injected £300 billion into the financial system. King, who before 2007 was
a fairly low-profile technocrat, presided over a slash in the official bank interest
rate from 5.75 per cent in August 2007 to a historic low of 0.5 per cent in March
2009 (Kollewe 2009b). By this time, King had become a prominent public figure.
From 2007 into 2009, the British political landscape was dominated by economic
turmoil. Contextual factors of this period are, however, worth noting. Brown’s
99
succession to the prime ministership in June 2007 failed to have much of an
impact on the low approval ratings the 10-year-old Labour Government had
endured since late 2005 (UK Polling Report 2009). Brown’s failure to reinvigorate
Labour’s support base can be attributed in part to his role as Chancellor of the
Exchequer throughout the entirety of the reign of former Prime Minister, Tony
Blair. As one pundit phrased it particularly colourfully, Brown and Blair appeared
‘as two cheeks of the same arse’ (Galloway 2006). Despite a brief increase in
Brown’s popularity after the Northern Rock crisis, in July 2008, it was widely
reported in the British press that Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband, would challenge Brown for the
leadership. Miliband, however, made a tactical blunder and the challenge did
not materialise. Throughout 2008, however, Brown’s popularity steadily declined,
sitting consistently 12–16 points behind the Conservative Party leader David
Cameron, as preferred prime minister (UK Polling Report 2009).
Since replacing Brown as Chancellor of the Exchequer in June 2007, Alistair
Darling was scrutinised for more than just his handling of the financial crisis.
In November 2007, Darling announced that the Revenue and Customs Department
had lost two data discs containing the records of 25 million citizens claiming
child-benefit assistance (BBC 2007). This incident damaged confidence in the
Chancellor just as the financial crisis was taking hold (see Times 2007). Just as
it had for Brown, the media reported that Darling would be challenged for the
Chancellorship by the Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families Ed
Balls, after the 2008 local UK elections (Mulholland 2008). While this challenge
also failed to materialise, the intra-party division and the spectre of leadership
challenges are important contextual factors when investigating Brown’s and
Darling’s responses to the financial crisis.
Box 5.1 The United Kingdom’s financial crisis trajectory, September
2007 – March 2009
13 September 2007: BBC Business Editor Robert Peston, breaks the story
that Northern Rock has secured emergency financial support from the
Bank of England (BOE). Northern Rock had relied on market investments,
rather than savers’ deposits, to fund its mortgage lending.
14 September: Northern Bank depositors withdraw £1 billion—the
biggest run on a British bank for more than a century.
17 September: Northern Rock’s shares have fallen precipitously since
14 September. The government announces that it will guarantee all
savings of Northern Rock depositors.
19 September: The BOE breaks with its previous position not to inject
any funding into financial markets and pumps £10 billion into the system.
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15 November: Barclay’s Bank announces a £1.3 billion exposure to the
US sub-prime mortgage collapse.
29 November: The BOE announces that the number of mortgage
approvals has fallen to a three-year low.
6 December: The BOE slashes interest rates by 0.25 per cent to 5.5 per
cent.
12 December: The world’s five largest central banks announce an
unprecedented $110 billion lifeline to commercialise banks over
Christmas, of which £10 billion is given to the British banks.
21 January 2008: Global stock markets, including London’s FTSE 100
index, experience their worst falls since 11 September 2001.
7 February: The BOE slashes interest rates by 0.25 per cent to 5.25 per
cent.
17 February: The government announces that it has knocked back the
bid of Richard Branson’s Virgin Group to take over Northern Rock, and
nationalises the bank.
3 March: The amount in sub-prime loans being written off by HSBC
rises to £51 million a day—a sign of trouble to come for the London-based
bank.
10 April: The BOE slashes interest rates by 0.25 per cent to 5 per cent.
22 April: The RBS announces the biggest rights issue in UK corporate
history: £12 billion. It also writes off £5.9 billion of assets.
22 April: HBOS announces a £4 billion rights issue.
14 May: Bradford & Bingley announces a £300 million rights issue.
25 June: Barclay’s Bank announces for sale a round of discounted shares,
intended to raise £4.5 billion.
1 July: UK annual house prices suffer their biggest fall since 1992.
21 July: The HBOS rights issue receives little enthusiasm from
shareholders, forcing the company’s underwriters to purchase the
remaining shares for £4 billion.
17 September: Lloyd’s Banking Group offers £12 billion to acquire
HBOS.
29 September: Bradford & Bingley is nationalised, although its savings
operations and branches are sold to Spain’s Santander Bank.
30 September: The government announces that it will raise the limit of
guaranteed bank deposits from £35,000 to £50,000.
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6 October: The Icelandic Government announces a rescue package to
save its banking sector and forces its banks to sell off its foreign assets.
8 October: The UK Government threatens legal action against the
Icelandic Government to retrieve UK citizens’ savings tied up in Iceland’s
banking sector. The UK Government announces a £50 billion rescue
package of the UK banking system.
9 October: The UK Government announces plans to freeze assets of
Icelandic companies in the United Kingdom under anti-terrorism
legislation.
13 October: The UK Government provides £37 billion to HBOS, the RBS
and Lloyd’s Banking Group, beginning a takeover of the former two by
Lloyd’s that concludes in January 2009.
15 October: UK jobless figures experience their biggest rise in 17 years.
16 October: The FTSE hits a five-year low: 3850.
24 October: The UK Office of National Statistics announces that the
United Kingdom is on the brink of a recession, revealing that the economy
contracted in the third quarter of 2008.
6 November: The BOE radically slashes the official bank rate from 4.5
per cent to 3 per cent—the lowest interest rate level since 1955.
24 November: Alistair Darling announces in his pre-budget report that
the VAT will be cut from 17.5 per cent to 15 per cent, while the UK
Government’s borrowing will increase. The government also announces
plans to inject £20 billion into the economy in 2010—representing 1 per
cent of gross domestic product (GDP).
4 December: The BOE slashes the official interest rate by another full
percentage point to 2 per cent—the lowest level in 57 years.
17 December: The UK Office of National Statistics announces that there
are now 1.86 million Britons without work, making the jobless figure—6
per cent—the highest in more than a decade.
31 December: The FTSE 100 closes down 31.3 per cent since the
beginning of 2008—the biggest annual fall since the index began in
1984.
8 January 2009: Having existed for 315 years, the BOE slashes interest
rates to an all-time low of 1.5 per cent.
19 January: The government announces a second bank rescue package
worth £50 billion.
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5 February: The BOE slashes interest rates once again to another record
low of 1 per cent.
6 February: The BOE announces a plan to lend directly to credit-starved
companies, aimed at bypassing the banks altogether.
18 March: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announces that it
expects the UK economy to continue to contract in 2010 even as other
economies begin growing again. It predicts that the UK economy will
contract by 3.8 per cent in 2009.
19 March: Adair Turner, head of Britain’s Financial Services Authority
(FSA), releases his report on Britain’s regulatory structure and the global
financial crisis. In it he says that, with hindsight, the FSA and the national
regulatory system had a number of key shortcomings.
24 March: Figures show that the United Kingdom’s jobless figure is
rising above two million for the first time since 1997.
2. Methodological considerations
The focus of this chapter is the period of April 2008 to March 2009, when the
‘credit crunch’ turned into what has been widely described as the worst global
financial crisis since the Great Depression. Since the United Kingdom experienced
the first effects of the global financial crisis in September 2007, this chapter
summarises the early rhetoric of each actor. Exploring their early crisis framing
establishes how much room each actor left himself to manoeuvre when the crisis
worsened through 2008. The speeches analysed within this chapter were sourced
from the official web sites of the individual or their institution. The speeches
were identified as being significant because of their heavy use of
crisis-exploitation rhetoric, but also because most of them received considerable
media coverage. It is worth noting that Darling’s and King’s web sites did not
provide a wide range of their speeches and were missing some speeches that had
been mentioned in the media. This meant that not only was the choice of speeches
somewhat limited, the Chancellor and the bank governor had, by omitting some
speeches from their web sites, signalled that others were the ones intended for
public consumption.
The chapter attempts to gauge the media and public response to the crisis
exploitation of the three actors through a survey of three newspapers that
represent a fair spectrum of British society: The Guardian/Observer, The Times
and the Financial Times. The Guardian (circulated Monday to Saturday) and its
sister paper, The Observer (circulated on Sundays), owned by the public
non-profit Scott Trust, currently have circulations of about 400,000 (Guardian
2009). They are typically seen as left leaning. Whereas 80 per cent of The
Guardian/Observer readership voted Labour in 2000, a 2005 survey showed that
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only 48 per cent voted Labour. This figure was likely to be even lower by 2008
given the further slide in Labour’s popularity (Ipsos Mori Poll 2005).
The Times, owned by News Corporation and historically the best-known UK
paper, has a circulation of 617,000. Its Sunday edition momentarily has a
circulation of 1.2 million (Guardian 2009). For decades, it took a centre-right
political stance, but in the 2001 and 2005 elections, it supported the Labour
Party. The Daily Telegraph, a paper with a political stance further right than The
Times and a slightly larger overall readership, was not selected for analysis
because of its limited coverage of the global financial crisis. The Financial Times
has a lower circulation than the aforementioned papers, but offers a deeper level
of economic insight to the crisis. It is owned by the education and media
conglomerate Pearson PLC and generally adopts free-market stances (Financial
Times 2009b). All three selected papers are published in London. When
attempting to track the media and public response to the three key actors’ crisis
rhetoric, however, the cross-section of ideological views was deemed to be more
important than a regional interpretation of the crisis.
3. Crisis development and elite rhetoric in the United
Kingdom
1 October 2007: Prime Minister Brown’s ‘age of
turbulence’ speech
In the weeks after the 14 September run on Northern Rock, all major British
polls (UK Polling Report 2009) calculated that Labour had extended its 3–5-point
lead to 6–13 points despite some considerable media criticism of its handling of
the crisis (Pratley 2007). Brown’s, and Labour’s, surge in the polls, however,
proved to be remarkably short-lived; by October 2007, the Conservative Party
had become the preferred government (UK Polling Report 2009). It was against
this backdrop that Brown delivered his earliest keynote speech on the downturn
in world financial markets.
Certainly, it would be unreasonable to expect that Brown could have known of
the scale of the global financial crisis that was to emerge one year later.
Nonetheless, his speech was noteworthy insofar as Brown clearly gave his British
audience some expectations about the strength of Britain’s economy and its
ability to confront future turmoil. This early speech was significant because it
affected his room to manoeuvre in subsequently framing the global financial
crisis as it entered a more severe phase in September 2008. Brown acknowledged
that the downturn in financial markets throughout 2007 was a concerning sign
and imputed responsibility for this downturn primarily to global economic
factors and partially to the irresponsibility of ‘those who own and run banks’
in Britain. He also emphasised the need to make ‘changes in the financial system
globally as well as nationally’.
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Brown attempted to normalise the Northern Rock crisis in what he described as
the modern ‘age of turbulence’, in which ‘turbulence is the essence of the
financial system’. This was an early attempt to defend the economic approach
based on free markets taken by ‘New Labour’ since its election victory in 1997.
Brown’s speech lauded former US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
(whom Brown was introducing at the Reuters Building) and he agreed with
Greenspan’s statement that the market was now ‘more…self-correcting…than
it was even a quarter of a century earlier’, and claimed that this approach had
given Britain ‘greater flexibility…to adjust when events threaten our [Britain’s]
growth’. Brown warned of the dangers of governments around the world
‘responding with heavy-handed regulation’ and thereby defended the economic
status quo. In denouncing protectionism, he furnished the historical analogy of
the Enron and WorldCom crashes in the United States, to which the United
Kingdom ‘did not respond with heavy-handed regulation’.
One notable assessment of Brown’s speech came from a Guardian journalist who
acknowledged that Northern Rock’s directors were at fault, but criticised Brown’s
complete denial of responsibility for the crisis. ‘Gordon Brown, a man who claims
to be a master of prudent financial management while presiding over a
debt-addicted and unbalanced economy, must bear a share of the responsibility’
(Sunderland 2007). Despite Brown’s intent to have this speech seen as a major
statement on the economy, it did not receive significant press coverage. Much
of the media concentrated instead on Brown’s lead in the polls and the possibility
that he would call an early election.
September 2007 – February 2008: Chancellor Darling’s
early rhetoric
After just three months as Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling was
confronted with the largest run on a British bank in more than a century. Public
confidence in the nascent Chancellor was dented by the fact that the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), not the government, had broken the story to
the public. Furthermore, after the withdrawal of £1 billion in savings from
Northern Rock, it took Darling three days to announce that the government
would guarantee all deposits up to £35,000.
After the Northern Rock crisis and announcements in late 2007 by more British
banks of multi-billion-pound exposures to the US sub-prime mortgage market,
Darling averred that the United Kingdom was in ‘uncertain’ and ‘turbulent times’
(Darling 2007b). Nevertheless, he emphasised that the British economy was
fundamentally strong and that the public could be confident that the economy
would continue to grow. Darling blamed the recent downturn in world financial
markets on institutions that had based their growth on risky business models,
but also on factors far from British shores that damaged the globalised UK
economy. Despite conceding that globalisation and free-marketism had presented
105
United Kingdom: the politics of government survival
challenges to the United Kingdom, the Chancellor declared that the UK economy
had been overwhelmingly strengthened by an open and globalised approach
since 1997. He also portrayed a potential retreat into protectionism as a dangerous
alternative, utilising the exact historical analogy as the Prime Minister—that of
the Enron and WorldCom collapses—to demonstrate that financial crises need
not be met with a hyper-reactive move away from the sound fundamentals of
globalisation and free markets (Darling 2007a). Darling defended the
political-economic status quo and prescribed an open and globalised economic
orientation as the way for Britain to make it through the financial turmoil.
Through 2007, Darling blamed the crisis on reckless British banks and global
factors in equal measure, but in early 2008 he began to emphasise the latter as
the predominant cause of Britain’s economic downturn. By this time, Darling
was also depicting the crisis in less sanguine tones. In January 2008, he stated
that ‘we operate in far more turbulent times’ (Darling 2008a) and claimed that
‘the global economy is facing its biggest test for more than a decade’ (Darling
2008b). His previous predictions that economic growth would remain high were
now conspicuously absent. He did, however, maintain that the strong
fundamentals of the UK economy—which were created by the Labour
Government—meant that ‘Britain is well placed, indeed better placed than almost
any other, to see through this uncertainty’ (Darling 2008a).
Overall, the press was more disapproving than supportive of Darling in this
period. The three newspapers analysed in this chapter unanimously declared
that the Chancellor and the Labour Government had misjudged the severity of
Northern Rock’s predicament and had been slow to act when depositors withdrew
their savings en masse. In terms of the Chancellor’s severity narrative, The
Guardian wrote that Darling was underplaying the turmoil but that this was
‘fair enough’ considering he did not want to ‘spread doom and despondency’
(Elliot 2008a). The Times wrote that Darling had offered only a ‘crossed-fingers’
approach that the slowdown would not be too severe’ (Riddell 2008a:28).
Darling’s causality narrative divided opinion. The Guardian supported Darling,
saying that ‘neither he nor the government is the source of the Northern Rock
crisis in any way’ (Kettle 2008). The Financial Times, however, declared that the
seed of the credit crisis was the Labour Government’s ill-considered centralisation
of British financial regulation in 1999 (Morley 2007:11). Darling’s policy proposals
prompted little media response, although The Times stated that Darling had
‘little sense…[about] how in the long-term public finances will be restored to
health’ (Riddell 2008a:28).
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September 2007 – April 2008: bank governor King’s early
rhetoric
Before the North Rock crisis, Mervyn King was a technocrat known mainly to
people within the financial industry and newspaper economics correspondents.
His name was periodically mentioned in the general press when he announced
interest rate adjustments. His profile rose exponentially, however, after the
Northern Rock crisis and he became a key figure in imparting meaning to Britain’s
financial turmoil.
King’s early pronouncements on the financial turmoil were more sober than
those of the Chancellor and the Prime Minister. Immediately after the run on
Northern Rock, King publicly stated that to bail out the bank would be a ‘moral
hazard’. Simply put, to rescue the bank with an injection of public funds would
discourage responsible financial management among British companies and set
a standard for bailing out a raft of irresponsible companies. This indicated King
had cause to believe that Northern Rock’s predicament was not an isolated one.
Indeed, the Bank of England (BOE) was aware that HSBC had £10.5 billion of
exposure to the US sub-prime mortgage market in February 2007 (Seager 2009).
Regulatory authorities in the United Kingdom had been aware of other British
banks having to write off billions of pounds worth of bad debt throughout 2007.
King’s rhetoric in this early period was serious, but perhaps not quite as
pessimistic as he might have been behind closed doors. He used measured phrases
to acknowledge the significance of the crisis while not denting consumer
confidence. He explained that ‘conditions were not yet back to normal and
remain[ed] fragile’, and that the intention of financial institutions ‘to tighten
conditions further’ was ‘unlikely to be short-lived’ (King 2008a).
King’s early speeches identified the sub-prime mortgage market in the United
States as being the focal point of financial turmoil. King stated, ‘The challenges
facing us…many of them originate from outside our shores’ and ‘Northern Rock
[was] not the epicentre of the current crisis’ (King 2008a) In November 2007,
King admitted that, if he had his time again, he would have done several things
differently in handling the Northern Rock crisis. This acceptance of partial
responsibility was oddly conspicuous compared with the complete denial of
blame by Brown and Darling, and later placed less pressure on King to admit
blame for not recognising the oncoming British recession (Seager 2009).
The commentary in the three papers expressed some moderate concern that King
was underplaying the severity of the crisis, but the main focus was on his
causality narrative and policy proposals. The Guardian argued that the Northern
Rock crisis was not at all the fault of King or the BOE. The Times agreed that
King did not cause the Northern Rock crisis, but pilloried his volte-face on the
issue of government bailouts and claimed that the BOE significantly exacerbated
the Northern Rock crisis. The Financial Times also pardoned King and the BOE
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from the charge that they were to blame for not recognising the poor business
model of Northern Rock and other British banks, instead blaming the FSA. The
Financial Times did, however, indirectly blame King as part of a group of
influential central bankers in the developed world, whose monetary policy
between 2002 and 2004 was so irresponsible that it was a key source of the
present financial turmoil.
12 March 2008: the Chancellor’s budget statement
There was much gloomy economic news in Britain at the beginning of 2008.
January had seen the biggest one-day fall of the FTSE 100 and in February there
had been the last-resort nationalisation of Northern Rock and HSBC’s
announcement of massive exposure to the US sub-prime mortgage market.
Nonetheless, the Chancellor’s keynote budget speech did not alter his late-2007
description of the severity of the crisis, declaring that ‘these were times of global
economic uncertainty’. He reiterated the role of global factors in causing the
crisis and defended the globalised, free-market orientation of the British economy.
Darling continued to predict growth for the UK economy, although the forecasts
were slightly less optimistic than before. One major difference to his previous
speeches, however, was that he emphasised economic ‘stability’ more than
‘growth’. Nonetheless, Darling asserted that Britain was ‘uniquely placed to
succeed in the global economy’ and ‘enter[s] this period of uncertainty better
placed than any other major economy’.
The budget was the dominant issue in the media in the week after its release,
with the three major papers largely disagreeing with Darling’s severity narrative.
The Times called it a recklessly courageous act to continue to predict growth,
while the Financial Times stated that ‘like the rest of us, Alistair Darling is
navigating the global economic storms without a compass’ (Stephens 2008:5).
The newspaper critiques of Darling’s policy proposals, however, remained vague.
The Financial Times argued that the budget was highly imprudent and that the
‘higher borrowing figures were an embarrassment’ (Stephens 2008:5). The Times
stated that Darling’s budget was a ‘fingers-crossed’ budget, but qualified this
by saying that ‘there is…nothing new about fingers-crossed budgets’ and that
this approach ‘was about as good as could have been expected’ in such a
challenging economic climate (Kaletsky 2008:1). These newspapers indicate the
scepticism and negativity surrounding the policy proposals outlined in Darling’s
budget speech.
10 June 2008: King’s ‘normalisation’ of turmoil
Consistent with the increase in the severity of the crisis since early 2008, King
described the financial milieu as ‘the most prolonged period of financial turmoil
that most of us can remember’—a remarkable statement given King’s 40-year
career as an economist. This austere statement came before the credit crisis
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evolved into the global financial crisis after the September 2008 collapse of
Lehman Brothers. While this statement did maximise the severity of the crisis,
it did not convey the possibility of dire systemic turmoil of which King appeared
to be aware at this time.
As if to downplay the possibility that his serious description of the financial
turmoil might be received with panic, King normalised the financial crisis in the
context of economic history. Rather than calling the crisis ‘unprecedented’, as
he, Darling and Brown would do in later months, he stated that ‘financial crises
[had] been a regular, and disturbing, feature of our and other developed
economies’. He stressed that at this time there should not be a reactionary move
back to the pre-1997 regulatory framework, adding that ‘no framework can
avoid shocks, so we must think carefully about reform’. King also insisted that
‘there is no point blaming anyone for the outcomes’.
King’s reluctance to identify specific actors for their culpability in the crisis
might be explained by the critical scrutiny he was receiving in the press for his
and the BOE’s handling of the financial crisis, particularly their performance
during the Northern Rock crisis. The three newspapers analysed in this chapter
focused not on his causality narrative but on his policy proposals. The papers
were critical of the fact that the inflation rate had overshot King’s inflation target
by a full 1 per cent, and were sceptical about his policy outlook for the continuing
credit crisis.
13 October 2008: the Prime Minister’s ‘unprecedented
times’
Brown’s October 2008 speech was markedly different in tone to his October 2007
address. By this time, the small UK banking crisis and worldwide credit crunch
had morphed into the global financial crisis. Northern Rock required full
nationalisation in January 2008 after the unsuitability of takeover bids. In the
subsequent months, six more banks—HSBC, HBOS, RBS, Bradford & Bingley,
Lloyd’s and Barclay’s—had announced monumental losses (BBC 2009). Moreover,
just a few days before Brown’s speech, the Icelandic economy had begun to
collapse, and Brown had threatened Reykjavik with legal action in a bid to
retrieve savings of UK citizens tied up in Icelandic banks. The domestic political
backdrop had also changed from a year before. Brown was consistently between
8 and 15 points behind Conservative leader, David Cameron, in the polls for
preferred prime minister (UK Polling Report 2009).
Brown declared that ‘these [are] unprecedented times’. He maximised the severity
of the crisis, claiming that ‘the stakes are higher than ever before’. Continuing
on from his October 2007 speech, in which he had identified global financial
forces as the primary cause of the Northern Rock crisis, Brown proclaimed that
‘this is first and foremost a global crisis’. Furthermore, Brown defended himself,
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his government, the BOE and the FSA from charges of negligent financial
regulation, stating that ‘no one country alone can resolve what is truly a global
problem’. Brown declared that this global crisis required a global solution, one
in which there would be increased international cooperation to regulate global
capital flow. Brown utilised the historical analogy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Winston Churchill planning the revolutionary post-1945 Bretton Woods
regulatory structure in the midst of World War II as a means of affirming the
possibility of a new global regulatory system to be achieved by modern-day
leaders in the thick of the global financial crisis.
More significantly, Brown emphasised the global causes of the United Kingdom’s
financial troubles and thereby shifted what in Chapter 2 of this volume was
termed the ‘policy game’ to an international battlefield in which the Conservative
Party could not effectively compete (Boin et al. 2009:90–1). In doing so, Brown
not only defended the status quo approach to British financial regulation, he
cast himself as a ‘change-oriented’ player on global regulatory reform. Brown
was at pains in his speech to emphasise his global financial regulation credentials,
stating: ‘Almost exactly 10 years ago in a speech at Harvard University I made
detailed policy proposals to reshape the international financial system for the
new world.’
Brown’s first major speech since the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the
subsequent freefall in world financial markets received a lot of media coverage.
Brown’s severity narrative encountered some disagreement in The Guardian and
The Times and he was criticised for failing to mention that Britain was heading
towards recession. Brown’s causality narrative, in which he exogenised blame
and failed to accept that he or the British regulatory structure had a role in
causing the crisis, was refuted by all three major papers. Despite this, in all three
papers Brown was praised for taking a leading role in the Europe-wide fiscal
stimulus and reports were cautiously optimistic about Brown’s ability to lead
on global regulatory reform—which they all agreed was the key to preventing
another major global financial crisis.
29 October 2008: Darling’s focus on global economic
governance
The Mais Lecture is an annual speech delivered by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer about the current state and future prospects of the UK economy. The
2008 Mais Lecture was delivered after the precipitous fall in world financial
markets in September 2008 triggered by the US financial services firm Lehman
Brothers filing the largest bankruptcy claim in US history. Domestically, the
FTSE 100 had hit a five-year low and the UK Office of National Statistics had
announced that Britain was on the brink of a recession.
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Unsurprisingly, Darling portrayed the severity of the crisis in starker terms than
he had before September 2008. He continually emphasised the speed at which
the global financial crisis had manifested and declared that ‘the UK, as well as
other countries, is moving into recession’. Despite Darling’s portrayal of a more
severe crisis, however, and economic commentators’ increasingly gloomy
predictions of the future, Darling neither accepted any personal responsibility
for the crisis nor attributed any blame to endogenous actors. Rather, he continued
to exogenise blame—focused predominately on global factors but also on the
British banking industry. Darling also diminished the regulatory record of
previous governments: ‘looking back over 30 years of Mais lectures, I see many
attempts to find solutions to domestic problems. But one aspect of modern
policymaking which seems to have been understated is the impact of global
events.’
Darling criticised the global economic governance system led by the major
international financial institutions (IFIs), and even accepted blame, albeit very
indirectly, as he claimed that the world’s major nations had ‘for too long…acted
as an elite’. This criticism of the ‘world’s major nations’, which undoubtedly
included Britain, was noteworthy in so much as it was an angle completely
absent from Brown’s crisis-exploitation narrative. It appeared that Darling was
diffusing blame across the major economies, thereby accepting slightly more
blame on the Labour Government’s behalf than the Prime Minister, although
indirectly and still very little. Darling claimed that the radical fiscal stimulus
was not an admission of the failure of the ‘marketist’ economic paradigm that
the government had adhered to since 1997. Rather, Darling portrayed it as a
logical development and renewed his commitment to open markets, referencing
economist J. M. Keynes: ‘it is right that the conduct of policy should evolve.
Just as markets change, so should policy. As Keynes said, “when the facts change,
I change my mind”.’ Ultimately, Darling asserted that a global solution to
worldwide regulatory failure was the most important policy that must be
achieved in years to come.
Darling’s address received a fair amount of press coverage. The Times pilloried
Darling’s severity narrative, describing the Mais Lecture as ‘a Panglossian exercise
in making the best of where we are now. It should have been subtitled a study
in ambiguity’ (Riddell 2008b). Darling’s exogenisation of the causality of the
crisis came under similarly heavy attack from the Financial Times: ‘Alistair
Darling tried hard last night to deflect the blame from his immediate predecessor
for scrapping the rules on which Gordon Brown once rested the government’s
economic credibility’ (Eaglesham 2008). For his policy proposals, however,
Darling received sympathetic criticism from The Guardian, which claimed that
the Mais Lecture was a mediocre performance constrained by the rotten legacy
of Brown’s chancellorship (see Guardian 2008). The Times, too, condemned
Darling’s address for ‘its vagueness in indicating a way forward’ and its failure
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on all three aspects of economic policy: fiscal, monetary and regulation (Times
2008). Overall, then, each aspect of Darling’s crisis exploitation in his Mais
Lecture was negatively received.
20 January 2009: governor King’s ‘political’ edge
By the beginning of 2009, an interesting contextual change in the relationship
between King, Darling and Brown had occurred. The crisis-exploitation narrative
that had been fairly unified was becoming discordant. Amid a spiralling decline
in the British economy—high joblessness, low consumer demand (reflected by
record low interest rates) and a plummeting currency value—King had begun
intimating that he, Brown and Darling had all been partly responsible for the
emergence of the United Kingdom’s financial turmoil. After Brown’s
announcement of a second stimulus package the day before King’s speech, the
press reported that King disapproved of any potential further fiscal stimulus by
the government. This put Brown in a defensive position because, without the
fiscal tools of handouts and tax breaks, he would have to rely more on the
monetary policy of the BOE. Hence, King’s statements during this period became
not only discordant from Brown’s, but more overtly political.
Some parts of King’s crisis rhetoric remained conventional: he declared that
‘2009 will be a difficult year for all of us’, he maintained that global factors were
primarily responsible for the crisis and he portrayed the crisis as a leviathan
beyond the control of any single national regulatory system. The speech was,
however, in some key aspects a distinct break from King’s past crisis-framing
efforts. Perhaps the most salient discontinuity was King’s admission that before
the Northern Rock crisis there had been some failings in the UK regulatory
system—a system that might have contributed to the emergence of financial
strife in Britain and in which he played an integral role. King stated that ‘it is
clear that policy did not succeed in preventing the development of an
unsustainable position’ in which the United Kingdom now found itself. Although
this was only a guarded acceptance of partial responsibility for the crisis, it stood
in stark contrast with the unwavering denial of culpability that Brown and
Darling had maintained since September 2007. Hence, while the earlier part of
King’s speech characterised the global financial crisis as being too serious for
any single national regulatory authority to prevent, his admission indicated that
the UK response to the global financial crisis had not been as rapid or effective
as it could have been.
The speech received a considerable amount of coverage in the major newspapers.
The opinion of King’s severity narrative was mostly negative. All papers agreed
with the now widespread public view that the crisis was the most severe in more
than half a century, but disagreed with King’s rose-tinted portrayal of
unemployment and credit easing. In the week or so after the speech, King’s
causality narrative received little attention, probably because King had mentioned
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that there were flaws in the UK regulatory system during a number of doorstop
interviews and press releases in the weeks before the speech. Taking into
consideration the press coverage of these minor speech acts, the papers
overwhelmingly agreed with what they considered a long-overdue admission
of responsibility from the governor. There was not much coverage of King’s
policy proposals, but the Financial Times was in agreement with King that wages
had to be restrained in order to combat inflation.
26 January 2009: Brown’s continued global crisis narrative
Brown’s speech of 26 January was delivered at a time when the public was
becoming increasingly aware that the foundations of the UK economy were not
as strong as Brown and his government had initially portrayed. The European
Commission had forecast on 19 January that the UK economy would not only
enter recession, it would contract significantly—by 2.8 per cent in 2009—and
would then recover only marginally in 2010 (Gow 2009). Also on 19 January,
Brown had announced a second stimulus package of £50 billion.
Brown’s speech reflected the increasingly gloomy state of the UK economy and
further maximised the severity of the global financial crisis. Brown conjured
florid metaphors of ‘storms’ and ‘hurricanes’ to describe the forces battering the
UK economy. Brown stated that ‘the sheer scale and speed of recent events makes
this no ordinary crisis’. Brown also reiterated his previous statements that
promoted the UK economy as among the best equipped to endure financial
turmoil, by stating that ‘Britain is better placed to benefit as the storm passes’.
Brown continued to deny that the government’s regulatory regime was
responsible for the crisis. He witheringly described the financial regulatory
regime before 1997 as archaic and asserted that only Labour’s revolutionary
post-1997 reforms had made British financial regulation effective. Brown declared,
however, that no national regulatory framework—not even one as effective as
Britain’s—could have prevented the unprecedented global financial crisis. Only
through an international system of financial regulation could the global financial
crisis have been forestalled. The Prime Minister’s policy solutions remained
focused on achieving the ‘radical reform of our global financial system’ (Webster
and Duncan 2009).
Surprisingly, the speech did not receive much press coverage; only The Times
published articles relating to the Prime Minister’s crisis framing in the days after
the speech. The paper quoted polls showing that ‘58 per cent…of people…believe
he [Brown] is refusing to acknowledge the full depth of the crisis’ (Webster and
Duncan 2009), and further expressed criticism for Brown’s causality narrative:
‘Gordon Brown is fond of emphasising that the recession is global, and that it
was made in America. But as massive deleveraging takes place around the world,
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it has become clear that the UK economy was one of the most overleveraged in
the world’ (Times 2009a).
It is hard to gauge from the limited newspaper coverage the overall support for
Brown, although the few available articles were not very supportive of him.
This comports with the polls at the time, which indicated that Brown’s deficit
to Cameron in the polls had increased to 9–14 points, from 1–7 points just one
month earlier, in December 2008 (UK Polling Report 2009).
10 February 2009: Brown under increasing pressure
Coming only two weeks after Brown’s previous major speech act, this address
was important, not for any specific shift in the framing of the UK and global
financial crises, but because it provoked a significant media reaction. There were
two significant contextual developments in the two weeks between speeches.
First, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had declared on 28 January that
the United Kingdom would be among the countries worst affected by the global
financial crisis, revising its previous forecast of a 1.3 per cent contraction to 2.8
per cent (Kollewe 2009a). Second, the BOE Governor, Mervyn King, had, since
late 2008, been noticeably less critical of British banks and other financial
intuitions. Instead, he had started to describe, albeit in vague terms, that the
banks were not alone in their failure to prevent the crisis. This led to much
media speculation that there was a rift between King and Brown.
In this speech, Brown continued to make the most of the global financial crisis
and exogenise its causes. Additionally, like all of his speeches since 2007, this
speech again advertised Brown’s strong credentials for achieving global financial
reform and made use of the same historical analogy—the creation of the Bretton
Woods institutions. In fact, in this speech, he expanded the analogy of the
postwar economic reconstruction by referencing the Marshall Plan and describing
it as a revolutionary fiscal stimulus package that brought the European and
world economies back from the brink of ruin to the longest boom in modern
economic history, from 1945 until the 1973–74 global recession. Thus, the analogy
could be seen as a defence of the large fiscal stimulus Brown had injected into
the UK economy and also a pre-emptive justification of future fiscal stimulus by
the government, which was widely believed to be forthcoming despite the
injection of a second round of £50 billion stimulus into the UK financial system
just weeks earlier.
In his speech to the Brookings Institution, Brown also blamed British banks for
promoting a culture that rewarded short-term risk over long-term sustainability.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this speech, however, was that for the
first time Brown emerged from his hitherto position of denial to admit that there
were flaws in the domestic regulatory structure. He then qualified this, however,
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with the ameliorating line that no country’s regulatory system could have
prevented the leviathan global financial crisis.
The three papers all agreed with Brown’s appreciation that the crisis was at this
point egregious. The Guardian, however, noted that Brown’s realisation of the
severity of the crisis was overdue, saying that his claim that Britain ‘was the
victim of international, specifically US, banking problems’ had become a
‘threadbare tale’ (Kettle 2009). The Financial Times also criticised Brown’s
causality narrative after recent negative publicity about ‘how the City of London
[the hub of the financial sector] was run during Mr Brown’s tenure at the
Treasury’ (Financial Times 2009a). The aspect of Brown’s speech on which all
three papers critically focused was, however, his plan to cut bonus payments
from the banks that had been fully or partly nationalised. All three papers
vehemently disagreed with this proposal for various reasons, ranging from The
Guardian’s contention that it would punish genuinely creative entrepreneurs to
the Financial Times’ opinion that it was a tawdry populist policy that did not
address the major problems at the heart of the economy in recession. Overall,
then, there was little to no support in the major newspapers for Brown’s severity
narrative or causality narratives, or for his policy proposals.
11 March 2009: Darling’s G20 finance ministers’ meeting
Since Darling’s October 2008 speech, British economic news had been increasingly
bleak. At the turn of 2009, the pound had fallen to a historic low against the
euro, the jobless figure of 6 per cent was the worst in a decade, the FTSE 100
continued to fall dramatically and the BOE had cut interest rates to the lowest
figure in the bank’s 315-year history.
Darling had admitted in his October speech that the United Kingdom was headed
for recession. In his address to the Foreign Press Association at the G20 Finance
Ministers’ Summit, however, he too put a twist on his old rhetoric of growth,
saying that ‘we mustn’t lose sight of [the fact that] the global economy is expected
to double, so there’s a huge prize to be won’. This speech is notable because of
its heavy use of crisis-exploitation rhetoric. It was particularly strident in
identifying global factors as the primary cause of Britain’s financial crisis and
global re-regulation as the most important policy to achieve. Again, Darling
attempted to shift debate away from the domestic battleground, where the
government was being staunchly challenged by the Conservative Party, to an
international arena in which the opposition, with no internationally recognised
mandate to speak for the UK electorate, could not compete.
Somewhat surprisingly, there was almost no media coverage of Darling’s address
to the press contingent at the meeting of G20 finance ministers. As the President
of the G20 in 2009, Britain had clearly embraced the G20 as a body that could
effectively combat the crisis and effect global financial re-regulation. In the only
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article that dealt with Britain’s role in the G20, however, The Times was dubious
about the government’s embrace of the G20 after ignoring the body for a number
of years. ‘Gordon Brown will be chairman of the summit and his enthusiasm for
remaking supranational organisations almost invites mockery because the
ambitions so far outstrip the amount of work that has been invested in realising
them’ (Times 2009b). It was noteworthy that there was a complete absence of
specific coverage of Darling’s speech. This suggests that his concerted
crisis-exploitation efforts went largely unrecognised by the public.
17 March 2009: King’s caution against rash action
Amid an escalation in the tension between King and Brown, visible in their
media comments since January, the BOE Governor delivered his most significant
speech on the continually worsening effects of the global financial crisis.
Newspapers had widely reported that UK unemployment had reached a 12-year
high of two million people (Hopkins 2009a) and the BOE had again slashed
interest rates to another historic low, of 0.5 per cent. This speech, again,
represented another shift away from the crisis-exploitation rhetoric of Brown
to which King had closely adhered between September 2007 and late 2008.
As in his previous speeches, King maximised the severity of the crisis. At the
same time, however, King downplayed the urgency required for the next
response to the stagnating—if not worsening—financial situation and instead
advised that all key leaders take time to choose the right course of action. This
could have been directed at Brown, who had already approved a number of
fiscal stimulus packages, as just one week later, on 24 March, King sensationally
announced that further fiscal stimulus by the government was inadvisable
(Duncan and King 2009; Hopkins 2009b; Wintour 2009).
King’s causality narrative became more nuanced in this speech. King again
identified global forces as the primary cause of the crisis—particularly the poor
performance of IFIs and the absence of a global regulatory order. King added
another layer, however, to his imputation of blame to global forces by criticising
the role of creditor and debtor nations in the crisis. He criticised creditor nations
for loaning money without pressuring debtor nations to repay and pilloried
debtor nations for naively borrowing massive amounts of money, prolonging
their repayments and racking up significant public debt. From this criticism, he
did not exempt the United Kingdom, which, in Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) terms, had neither high nor low public
debt (CIA 2009b).
There was no media coverage of King’s severity narrative or the new strand
about creditor and debtor nations in his causality narrative. Only the Financial
Times addressed King’s causality narrative in any detail, taking issue with King’s
excuse that his inflation targets had not worked because he did not have adequate
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power to achieve them. Instead, the paper accused King of being a key part of
a short-sighted hierarchy that had not adequately prepared for a financial
downturn when the economy was booming (Giles 2009). ‘In reality, all three
institutions in the so-called tripartite arrangements for financial supervision
were culpable in failing to recognise the toxic combination of rapid credit
expansion and financial innovation’ (Stephens 2009).
There was, conversely, a plethora of coverage of King’s policy proposals. The
papers were unified in their praise for King’s proposals to abolish the banks’
‘casino’ lending and gambling practices as well as his subtle suggestions for the
Prime Minister to avoid further fiscal stimulus. The majority of articles in these
three papers, however, criticised King for his pessimism and for talking down
the UK economy. King was also criticised for failing to admit that the BOE—not
just the FSA and the Treasury—needed to undergo reform to prevent future
crises.
4. Framing the financial crisis in the United Kingdom:
analysis and conclusions
It was not until the precipitous falls in financial markets through mid 2008 that
the global financial crisis manifested in the United Kingdom. Since September
2007, however, the financial turmoil in Britain has been a historic affair. The
British public, more so than the populaces of countries whose economies began
visibly struggling only in mid 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, had
become more attuned to news of the worsening financial turmoil.
Naming, explaining and accounting for the crisis
At first sight, Brown’s, Darling’s and King’s labelling and explanation of the
financial turmoil of 2007–09 followed similar paths. The severity narratives of
Brown and Darling were so similar in their progression towards ever-starker
characterisations as to suggest a high level of coordination between the two.
There was, however, a noteworthy inconsistency among the three actors’ severity
narratives. Brown and Darling initially engaged in minimisation, stating from
late 2007 and throughout 2008 that the United Kingdom was in a distinctly
strong economic position to confront the financial crisis. King, on the other hand,
did not engage in any such minimisation.
The three actors’ causality narratives, and the attendant task of accepting or
denying blame, were fairly consistent. From the outset, they all emphasised
global factors as the primary cause of the United Kingdom’s financial turmoil.
Again, the causality narratives of Brown and Darling were similar to one another
while King’s account diverged in a few small, but key ways. First, whereas
Brown and Darling initially failed to admit flaws in their handling of the Northern
Rock crisis, King in November 2007 absorbed minimal blame, claiming that, if
he had his time again, he would have responded differently to Northern Rock’s
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predicament. Second, in late 2008, King began to eschew specifically identifying
global factors or British financial institutions as causing the crisis. Instead, he
described in vague tones that they were not alone in acting irresponsibly during
the pre-2007 period of high world economic growth. This suggests that King
was admitting, albeit indirectly, that he and other regulators—but more
significantly, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor—had played a part in the
escalation of the crisis. Third, King added another unique strand to his causality
narrative by blaming not just international financial institutions or a lack of
global financial regulation, but debtor economies such as the United Kingdom,
which had complacently relied on easy credit.
It appeared that King’s blunt criticism prompted Brown and Darling to admit
in February 2009 that there had been flaws in the regulatory system before the
global financial crisis. The press, however, interpreted these admissions as cynical
‘road-to-Damascus’ conversions that were a reaction to King and a pre-emption
of the late-March release of the Turner Review, an official government review
on the state of the UK financial regulatory system before September 2007 and
those most responsible for its creation. King’s late-2008 departure from the
causality and blame narratives of Brown and Darling presented an interesting
intra-regime framing contest. This contest contributed to the greater framing
contest between the three actors: the Labour Government (along with the
supposedly apolitical BOE Governor, who was likely to cooperate with the
incumbent government), the opposition Conservative Party and the media.
Framing contests: political survival and policy reform
To examine the larger framing contest, it is broken down into two distinct
contests that have most influenced the political game over issues of responsibility:
between the government and the opposition (parliamentary and
extra-parliamentary); and the policy game over reform: between proponents of
the status quo and change advocates (cf. Table 2.2 in Chapter 2).
Contests over policy framing can be separated into the domestic and international
battlegrounds. Both stemmed from the causality narrative of the political actors
Brown and Darling—and to a lesser extent the non-partisan technocrat
King—who argued that the United Kingdom’s financial turmoil was caused
primarily by global factors. The domestic policy-framing contest was over the
injection of £300 billion into the financial system—Brown and Darling’s response
to the global financial crisis. Brown and Darling depicted this sizeable and highly
statist fiscal stimulus as absolutely necessary. More significantly, the framing
contest centred on implications for existing British financial regulation policies.
Brown and Darling had argued that the British regulatory structure was world
class and revolutionary by British standards; that even this could not prevent
the leviathan global financial crisis hitting British shores; and that policy
implications should be minimal because Britain’s crisis was caused predominately
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by global problems. In terms of the crisis-framing typology of Chapter 2, Brown
and Darling clearly adopted on the domestic battleground a type-2 frame in
which the crisis was viewed as a ‘critical threat to the collective good embodied
in the status quo’ and as such the status quo must be defended against critics.
As argued in Chapter 2, such a type-2 defence is typical of incumbents. For
Brown and Darling, it was a logical frame to adopt. Labour, a long-serving
government, was unpopular in the electorate and, like many long-serving
governments, it appeared to aspire to short-term regime survival. By denying
responsibility for the crisis for so long, however, the two political actors set up
a ‘blame showdown’ in which they might escape political repercussions, but are
more likely to suffer political damage (see Table 2.1, Chapter 2). In the
international policy reform game, however, the government sidestepped the
role of status quo defender and cast itself decisively as a change-oriented player.
Brown and Darling seized the political opportunity afforded to them by the
exogenous-causality narrative and declared that the most important policy
outcome of the global financial crisis should be the complete restructuring of
the global regulation of finances. They unified and strengthened their type-3
rhetoric (focusing blame and attacking the status quo) by deploying historical
analogies that affirmed the benefits of global financial re-regulation, notably the
reference to the creation of the Bretton Woods system. In their declaration to
the public that they and their Labour cabinet colleagues were best credentialled
to achieve such global regulatory reform, Brown and Darling adopted, on the
international battleground, type-3 frames, which regarded the crisis as ‘a critical
opportunity to expose deficiencies in the status quo ex ante’ (see Chapter 2).
Adding to this intricate combination of type-2 and type-3 frames, the defence
of the government’s open and globalised economic approach by each of the three
main UK actors placed the Conservative opposition in a difficult political position.
As The Guardian’s Economics Editor Larry Elliot suggested, the government’s
defence of its marketist approach, combined with its calls to re-regulate the
global economy, put the Conservative Party in an awkward position because
the ‘Conservative Party [has] obviously much more of a [marketist] deregulatory
bent than Labour in historic terms’ (Elliot 2008b). Labour used its centrist ‘third
way’ ideology as a means of wedging the Conservative Party on its key policy
proposals—maintaining open and globalised markets and re-regulating the global
economy.
Brown and Darling’s multilayered framing strategy—a type-2 frame defending
the domestic status quo; a type-3 frame portraying the government as a
change-oriented player; and a defence of marketism and global
re-regulation—seemed set for success. The fact that the press and public largely
agreed with Brown and Darling’s claims that global factors were the primary
119
United Kingdom: the politics of government survival
cause of Britain’s financial turmoil appeared to have made the international
framing contest one that put the incumbents in an advantageous political position.
Nonetheless, the framing contest most important for the political fortunes of the
government and their parliamentary opposition was the domestic one. While
the press agreed that global factors were primarily responsible for the United
Kingdom’s financial turmoil, they reacted vehemently against Brown and
Darling’s long-time denial of responsibility for the crisis. The later concessions
by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor that they were responsible for some
flaws in the British regulatory structure further damaged their government’s
popularity (UK Polling Report 2009). This development fits with the claims of
Boin et al. (2005:86–7) that actors who belatedly admit responsibility for a crisis
suffer far more damage than those who absorb minimal blame early in the crisis.
While the three actors’ assertions that the domestic financial turmoil was caused
primarily by global factors was supported by the press and public, Brown and
Darling’s long-time denial of culpability for the emergence of the crisis and their
defence of the status quo domestic financial regulation was overwhelmingly
rejected by the electorate. This left them in March 2009 far behind in the polls
with just more than a year before the compulsory date for the next national
election.
For King, it appears as though he suffered only minor damage to his credibility.
This appears to be a result of two factors: his acceptance of minimal blame for
the Northern Rock and the British financial crisis in general; and the general
view that he is not technically a political player. King was not required to engage
as much as Brown or Darling in the key task of managing the public’s
expectations about the crisis; as such, he could instead focus on providing
technical explanations and solutions for Britain’s financial crisis. This is not to
say that King is apolitical. The Governor of the BOE became politicised by his
own doing—specifically, by implying that endogenous actors were responsible
for the crisis and, more significantly, by publicly halting the government’s plans
for a further fiscal stimulus. King’s divergence from his previous line of crisis
rhetoric—which had been fairly concordant with that of the Prime Minister and
the Chancellor—was hardly inspired by political motives. He was up for
reappointment to the second of a maximum two-term tenure in January 2008,
which he duly received regardless of his ‘inconvenient’ stance on the issue of
responsibility for the financial crisis.
A general observation that can be drawn from the UK case study, and that might
even apply to all case studies in this volume, is that financial crises, by nature,
appear to require governments to talk up and support the national economy in
the incubation period of the crisis, at the expense of locking themselves into a
specific frame. If key government actors are aware that financial turmoil is likely
to hit their nation’s economy, they are likely to downplay the severity in an
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attempt to maintain consumer confidence and curb the damage of a potential
crisis. If they do not do this, they can easily be blamed for exacerbating any
financial crisis that hits the nation.
The response to the British manifestation of the global financial crisis comports
with the proposition that long-serving governments find it difficult to convince
the public that they are fit to make the changes necessary to prevent another
crisis in the future. The findings from this chapter, however, suggest that the
chances of long-serving governments flourishing in a financial crisis are made
even more remote by their necessary but risky obligation to talk up the national
economy in the incubation period of the crisis.
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6. Republic of Ireland: from Celtic tiger
to recession victim
Adam Masters
1. Boom to bust
Ireland is being battered by international storms the like of which this
generation has never seen. But I am saying this to the Irish people—if
we work together as a team we can ensure that we have a prosperous
future for ourselves, our children and future generations on this island.
(Cowen 2009a)
The case of Ireland presents a distinctive experience of a nation’s response to
the financial crisis. There are, of course, marked similarities with other countries
covered in this volume, such as Ireland having a small open economy like New
Zealand or membership of the European Union like the United Kingdom. The
contextual similarities are, however, far outweighed by differences. Ireland’s
economy had been built up in the ‘Celtic tiger’ years on foreign investment and
high-tech industry. On the back of these external inputs, the boom years
generated bloated domestic finance and real-estate markets. The good times also
resulted in a disproportionate expansion of the public sector and an expectation
by government that the financial cornucopia would always bestow its manna
on the Emerald Isle.
The Irish political leadership first acknowledged the impact of the global financial
crisis on Ireland after a sharp fall in government revenue in July 2008. The
revenue drop was linked to a downturn in the building industry and housing
market, higher food and fuel prices and ‘international financial market
turbulence’ (Hurley 2008b). Before July, Irish authorities had viewed the
turbulence in financial markets as a problem linked to the sub-prime crisis in
the United States and the toxic debt instruments associated with poor lending
practices by US banks (O’Brien 2008:18). During the next nine months, the
impact of the crisis on Ireland became increasingly pronounced as it manifested
within the domestic economy.
The key manifestations of the financial crisis in the Irish economy were driven
by external and internal factors. External factors included the liquidity crisis
triggered by the financial turmoil, which in turn severely impacted on the
domestic banking sector. The Irish banks, although not directly exposed to the
US sub-prime mortgage market, had lent heavily to property developers, thereby
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inflating values and creating Ireland’s own real-estate bubble. Some of these
causal factors had been years in the making; others emerged as a result of the
crisis, driven by the economic downturn.
Three key public figures responsible for leading Ireland during this period were
the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Brian Cowen, his Minister for Finance Brian
Lenihan, and John Hurley Governor of the Central Bank and Financial Services
Authority (CBFSA). Cowen and Lenihan came to these roles in May 2008 after
the former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, stood down. Cowen had been Ahern’s
Minister for Finance and Lenihan previously held the position of Justice Minister.
Hurley had held the position of CBFSA Governor since 2002 (Mitchell 2008).
This chapter examines, through the lens of the crisis exploitation framework
presented in Chapter 2, these three leaders’ attempts to manage and frame the
global financial crisis as it manifested within Ireland.
Box 6.1 Ireland’s financial crisis trajectory, July 2008 – March 2009
8 July 2008: After the Exchequer reports an expected shortfall in
government revenue of €3 billion, the new Taoiseach (and former Finance
Minister), Brian Cowen, announces a number of new budgetary measures
decided on by the government in response to the ‘emerging financial
pressures’. The measures trigger their own crisis, with a backlash against
proposed cuts to pensioners’ medical benefits.
19–20 September: The Irish Times reports that Minister for Finance,
Brian Lenihan, is prepared to review the government system of
guaranteeing 90 per cent of deposits up to a limit of €20,000 amid calls
for this limit to be raised. The next day, the Irish Government moves to
secure the deposits in Irish banks to prevent a run on them. The €20,000
guarantee is increased to €100,000.
25 September: Ireland is officially the first EU member state to slip into
recession.
30 September: Finance Minister Lenihan presents the Credit Institutions
(Protection) Bill 2008 to the Dáil (the Irish national parliament). The bill
enables the government to take a stake in any financial institution that
receives financial support. It also incorporates an ‘insurance premium’
of 0.2 per cent of deposits over the two years it is in effect. This could
amount to €1 billion in additional revenue to the government in return
for a guarantee of more than €400 billion. The institutions being offered
the protection of the guarantee are Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland,
Anglo Irish Bank, Irish Life & Permanent, Irish Nationwide Building
Society and Educational Building Society.
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8 October: The CBFSA reduces the interest rate by 50 basis points.
15 October: The budget is brought forward. Cowen outlines the measures
to achieve savings, including additional government borrowing,
reduction in public services and raising taxes. Cowen also incorporates
an agenda of public service reform.
26 November: The Taoiseach announces measures of reform within the
public sector.
5 December: The open, export and service-driven economy of Ireland
has nosedived, pushing the government’s five-year projected deficit up
to about €12.5 billion. The Finance Minister, indicating the budget
position is worse than expected, announces stimulus borrowings, further
review of public sector spending and the establishment of the Special
Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes. Much
of this is overshadowed by a separate crisis related to an outbreak of
foot and mouth disease in Irish swine, which occurred just before the
Christmas season when hams were in high demand.
18 December: The Taoiseach announces and releases Building Ireland’s
Smart Economy: A framework for sustainable economic renewal. The
announcement and release of the framework appear to be the result of
a long process predating the global financial crisis. The framework is,
however, absorbed into the government’s reaction to the global financial
crisis and linked to the future policy direction for development in Ireland.
19 December: Seán FitzPatrick, chairman of the Anglo Irish Bank (AIB),
resigns. He had been temporarily transferring €87 million in loans to
another institution before the fiscal year’s end to avoid disclosure of
their existence to shareholders—a practice that had been occurring for
eight years. The other institution is believed to be the Irish Nationwide
Building Society. The chief executive of AIB resigns several hours later.
In response, Finance Minister Lenihan announces plans to recapitalise
AIB and the Bank of Ireland, take effective control of AIB and clear out
the remaining board members.
9 January 2009: Patrick Neary, chief executive of the Irish Financial
Services Regulatory Authority, resigns after allegations that his staff
first learned in January 2008 that FitzPatrick had been transferring loans.
28 January: Cowen, speaking in the Dáil, indicates the crisis in Ireland
has developed further. A five-year shortfall of €15 billion has been
identified. Cowen says measures, further to those already announced,
will be necessary. A new policy is also announced: A Pact for Solidarity
and Economic Renewal. This is intended to involve social partners
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(unions, employers) in the solutions and garner political support for
future measures.
3 February: The Taoiseach delivers a statement to the Dáil detailing the
fiscal and budgetary measures to be taken in 2009/10 to rein in borrowing
and reduce expenditure. The unions (social partners) do not agree with
the plan, but the government intends to go ahead regardless. The
measures include cuts to child care, reduction in overseas aid, reduction
in public service pay and delays in agreed pay rises.
19 February: Finance Minister Lenihan presents the second stage reading
of the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Bill 2009.
10 March: CBFSA Governor Hurley, who has agreed to stay on in his
role post-retirement age, claims in response to questions from the
Committee on Economic Regulatory Affairs that the government had
ignored his many warnings about the state of the Irish economy.
24 March: The Minister for Finance meets with two
government-appointed board members for the Irish Nationwide Building
Society (INBS) over recent disclosures in relation to the remuneration of
the CEO of INBS, which requires further investigation.
2. Methodological considerations
It is safe to say in Ireland there is no shortage of speech material from the
Taoiseach or the Minister for Finance relating directly or indirectly to the
financial crisis. Four key speech acts of each leader were therefore selected for
their relationship to key events or the level of public response, rather than the
amount of content relating to the case at hand. Examples of key speeches not
analysed were Finance Minister Lenihan’s speeches in the Dáil introducing the
Financial Emergency Measures Bill (Lenihan 2009b). Although rich in crisis
rhetoric, the speeches did not introduce new key measures or draw significant
media response.
Selection of key speech acts was also limited to those available on the official
web sites of the leaders. Although there were media references to speech acts
that were not on the web sites, these were discounted from analysis for three
reasons. First, the references in the media could be interpreted as vague, referring
to what ‘the Taoiseach said this week’ with no pinpoint reference. Second, the
volume of speech material available via the media, even limited to three outlets,
was prohibitively large. Finally, leaders must take full ownership of what was
posted on an official web site and its provenance should not be disputed.
In analysing the domestic media’s response to the Irish leadership with respect
to the global financial crisis, two daily newspapers, the Irish Independent and
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the Irish Times, and one weekly, the Sunday Business Post, were selected.
Selection of the daily newspapers was based primarily on their position as leading
Irish dailies, with the highest and second-highest circulation, respectively. The
Sunday Business Post was selected on the basis of the quality of analysis and
depth of the articles it published. Although the Sunday Business Post did not
have the highest circulation for Irish Sunday papers, its focus on financial and
economic activity was considered relevant for this case study.
After the selection of the speeches for analysis, searches were conducted in the
chosen newspapers for the week after the speech act. Articles were scanned for
relevance to the speech act or the related event. Articles selected for analysis
were coded using a three-level scale (agreement, disagreement, neutral/no
comment) in relation to four analytical categories: leaders’ framing of the severity
and the causality of the crisis and support for proposed policies and for the
leader. These results were then considered in relation to the crisis-exploitation
framework of Chapter 2 to determine the manner with which, and how
successfully, these three leaders were able to frame and manage the crisis in
Ireland.
3. Crisis development and elite rhetoric in Ireland
18 April 2008: Governor Hurley’s trouble-on-the-horizon
speech
Governor Hurley’s address to the Institute of Auditors on 18 April 2008 was a
measured speech designed to provide reassurances that there was nothing wrong
with the fundamentals of the Irish economy, but that trouble was on the horizon.
Entitled ‘Recent issues in financial stability’, the speech explained the developing
crisis in terms of the turbulence in the international financial markets, which
had persisted longer than many had predicted. Hurley spoke of future outcomes
that could ‘manifest itself in terms of banking crises and recessions and can be
very costly for any economy’. He also noted the greater than anticipated
challenges ahead for the Irish economy in 2008. In a more positive vein, however,
he listed the ‘skilled workforce, flexible labour market, moderate taxation,
business friendly regulatory environment and [Ireland’s] sound fiscal position’
along with the economy’s ability to ‘absorb adverse shocks’ as reasons for
confidence in the future.
Blame for the turbulence in global financial markets was attributed to the effects
of the US sub-prime crisis and the toxic debt instruments backed by US
mortgages. The CBFSA Governor believed that there was little direct exposure
by Irish banks to these instruments—once again underpinning the overall
strength of the Irish economy. The only domestic factor cited was attributed to
a ‘marked decline in house-building’. All of these were exogenous to the CBFSA
and there was no acceptance of responsibility in this speech. Hurley limited the
131
Republic of Ireland: from Celtic tiger to recession victim
management role of the CBFSA, in terms of its response, to ‘monitor[ing] the
situation very closely’ and participation in international attempts at the EU level
to understand the origin of the events in the global markets.
As if to underscore the lack of interest in the doings of the CBFSA Governor,
only a single article was published in the three main newspapers referring to
Hurley’s speech. The article reported that Citigroup (which at the time had 2000
employees in Ireland) was sacking 9000 employees globally. No job losses were
announced in Ireland and the journalist duly noted Hurley’s comment that the
CBFSA and the financial regulator ‘regularly stress-tested the Irish banking
sector and found that it can weather a significant slowdown’ (Carswell 2008a).
8 July 2008: Finance Minister Lenihan’s mixed message
In July 2008, Irish political leaders did not acknowledge any significant impact
of the global financial crisis on the Irish economy. ‘Our remarkable economic
progress has not been reversed overnight,’ the Finance Minister asserted in his
budget speech. As his statement evolved, however, he did signal the need for
change in the government’s fiscal approach. ‘If we do not act now, the situation
facing us for 2009 will be more difficult and the action needed more urgent’.
The urgency that he conveyed was explained by a shortfall in government
revenue of €3 billion resulting from expenditure running 11 per cent ahead and
due to higher unemployment.
To manage the shortfall, Lenihan announced the government’s intent not to
implement planned pay increases for ministers and senior public servants. In
doing this, the Finance Minister acknowledged a responsibility for government
to act and lead the way in making sacrifices without taking any blame for
developments in the economy. The expected savings from the cutbacks were to
total €440 million in 2008 and €1 billion in 2009. Towards the end of his
statement, Lenihan asserted that the government would stand by its choices in
regard to the programs and investments of the previous 11 years in which his










Table 6.1 Media response to Lenihan’s 8 July 2008 speech
The response to Lenihan’s announcement of budget cuts was mixed (Table 6.1).
Of the articles analysed, only one disputed the severity of the situation, arguing
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that ‘it isn’t Armageddon’ as this announcement allegedly had implied (Irish
Times 2008a:15). Lenihan successfully conveyed the causality, which was
reflected by only two articles disagreeing with him and pointing instead to past
policies of Lenihan’s government. While there was general agreement on severity
and causality, there was greater opposition to the proposed policies (that is, cuts
to spending) and little support for the government that was driving them.
10 July 2008: Governor Hurley’s moderation
The timing of the launch of the CBFSA Annual Report coincided with speeches
by the Taoiseach (not analysed) and the Finance Minister (see above). Governor
Hurley remained restrained. In explaining the Irish economic situation, Hurley
again pointed to the slowdown in the housing sector as a causal factor. He added
a new factor: the fall in the share price of the Irish banks. Hurley repeated
reassurances that the Irish banks had little to no direct exposure to the US
sub-prime crisis, which was still perceived as the main threat to Ireland’s
economy.
For Hurley, international turbulence in the financial markets was attributed to
downturns in real estate in major economies as well the steep rise in food and
fuel prices. In turn, higher commodity prices were both cause and effect of the
escalation of the financial problems. The devaluation of the pound against the
euro had caused consumers to cross to Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom
to take advantage of better exchange rates, resulting in an outflow of capital
from the Irish economy. With so many exogenous factors available, there was
no acceptance of blame. The only management strategy offered by Hurley was
the slight increase in interest rates—a matter for the European Central Bank










Table 6.2 Media response to Hurley’s 10 July 2008 speech
The reserved language of the CBFSA Governor did not resonate with all
journalists reporting on the launch of the Annual Report. Some argued the
severity of the downturn was higher than Hurley was letting on. In the Sunday
Business Post, there was an acknowledgment that the CBFSA often forecast
market contractions, however, this was often buried in the fine print of the
Annual Report rather than as part of the public statement from the governor
(Curran 2008). The Irish Independent listed many of the global indicators that
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had impacted on Ireland and noted that Hurley, and the CBFSA, ‘were not nearly
as pessimistic’ (Irish Independent 2008a). Nonetheless, all analysed reports agreed
with the causes Hurley had identified as producing the darker economic outlook.
With respect to his recommendations on inflationary and fiscal control,
commentary was heavily in Hurley’s favour. His warnings of too much
interference in the markets were accepted, along with the broader government
objective of spending cuts announced by the Minister for Finance. Comparing
this speech with Lenihan’s above, Hurley received approval from the financial
press whereas Lenihan did not (cf. Table 6.1). A possible explanation might be
found in the authorship of the policy being attributed more to the politicians
than to the CBFSA Governor, who was seen to be acting as an instrument of the
government’s policy.
2 October 2008: Taoiseach Cowen offering deposit
guarantees
In a speech to the CBI-IBEC Joint Business Council Dinner at Trinity College, the
Taoiseach left his audience in little doubt about the scale and seriousness of the
global financial crisis in Ireland: ‘We live in perilous times…if we do not make
the right [choices] it will have catastrophic consequences for the future prospects
of our economy…nobody will be immune from the pain’. Through the use of
unequivocal language, Cowen set the crisis in terms that were by this time
familiar to his audience and had been for a number of months.
The speech followed a number of meetings and an announcement that the
government would guarantee deposits in Irish banks up to €100,000. While that
decision had been well received in the banking sector, at the time of Cowen’s
speech at Trinity College, legislation had just been passed to give substance to
the announcement. Cowen needed a degree of popular support to shore up
support for the new measure, taken unilaterally by the government, the shock
waves of which had reverberated through the rest of Europe and beyond. His
crisis rhetoric of ‘right choices’ as opposed to ‘catastrophic consequences’ was
a reference to this recent legislative action.
In accounting for the impact of the crisis on Ireland, Cowen was brief: ‘we are
an open economy’. This followed a more detailed coverage of what had happened:
a collapse in the housing market, ‘turbulence in international financial markets,
exchange rate shifts and rapidly rising oil prices’, which combined to result in
a €6.5 billion shortfall in government revenue. There was no acknowledgment
of any responsibility, even though Cowen had been Finance Minister for a
number of years before his elevation to Taoiseach. Blame was attributed to the
vaguely exogenous factor of greed, although greed ‘has not been absent in
Ireland’.
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Table 6.3 Media response to Cowen’s 2 October 2008 speech
As Table 6.3 illustrates, the majority of articles from the week after Cowen’s
Trinity College address supported his assertion that the root cause of the local
banking crisis had been greed, the collapse in the housing market and the global
financial turmoil. There was a higher level of agreement on the severity of the
crisis. The proposal to protect depositors up to €100,000 was supported in just
less than half the commentary, with one-quarter disagreeing and a similar number
making no commitment either way. Those who disagreed were concerned
primarily with the risk to the national economy posed by the guarantee (Kelly
2008:16) or whether it was in line with EU arrangements (Smyth 2008:8).
The Taoiseach’s efforts to frame the banking crisis in a way that supported his
Fianna Fáil Government were relatively successful. Only one-quarter of the
articles analysed reflected a lack of support for the national leader. The strongest
support came from other European news media. Germany’s Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung praised the Irish Government: ‘By calming citizens and securing bank
financing, the guarantee should achieve its aim of avoiding forced bank
nationalisation’ (Irish Times 2008b). Media praise was leavened, however, by
criticism of the guarantee by EU leaders such as Germany’s Angela Merkel and
UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown (Collins and Carswell 2008:1). The strongest
criticism was directed against Cowen in the letters to the editor of the Irish Times,
questioning the fiscal and economic policies from when he had been the Finance
Minister (Irish Times 2008c).
3 October 2008: Governor Hurley’s support for the deposit
guarantee
By October 2008, the continuing drama in Ireland’s banks finally drove the
CBFSA Governor to use crisis rhetoric. Nonetheless, in his statement to support
government moves to guarantee bank deposits for the six major domestic banks,
Hurley maintained his reserved manner and used the specific word ‘crisis’ only
once. He was more explicit when describing the urgency of ‘events [which] came
to a head last Monday evening when the supply of funding…was seriously
threatened’ and as a result ‘decisive action to protect the stability of the
economy…was needed’. The reason the crisis had manifested in such an acute
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manner for Hurley was the ‘unprecedented shortage of liquidity in financial
markets’, and any solution needed to target that problem directly.
Hurley ‘had to inform the Minister that the risks to financial stability were
becoming unacceptably high with knock-on effects for the wider economy’. As
a result of this advice, the government had decided to guarantee depositors and
lenders to Irish banks, thereby protecting the stability of the Irish financial
system. The legislation for the guarantee had passed the day before Hurley’s
speech. While not accepting responsibility for causing the crisis, Hurley and
the government accepted the responsibility for making key and critical decisions










Table 6.4 Media response to Hurley’s 3 October 2008 speech
Response to Hurley’s speech was found within the major media coverage of the
banking guarantee (Table 6.4). As with Cowen’s speech at the same time (see
above), his assessment of the severity and causes of the crisis leading up to the
guarantee was not questioned. There was, however, a major difference in the
responses to the politician and to the banker. Hurley received proportionally
much greater support for himself and the policy proposals than did Cowen. This
was because articles that mentioned Hurley analysed the economic and fiscal
ramifications of the guarantee in greater detail, rather than focusing on the
political results. Four of the 10 articles analysed in response to this speech were
also used to analyse response to Cowen’s first speech act (Carswell 2008b:8;
Carswell et al. 2008:1; Hennessy 2008:9; Irish Independent 2008c).
Hurley’s popularity also stemmed from his rapid response to one bank’s attempt
to exploit the guarantee. After a rapid investigation, the CBFSA and financial
regulator issued a €50,000 fine to the Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS)
for ‘touting’. A senior employee of INBS (who was also the son of the chief
executive) had sent an email to potential customers. The email claimed the INBS
was ‘the safest place in Europe for deposits and money in INBS bond accounts
was guaranteed regardless of the size of the deposit’ (Irish Independent 2008b,
2008e). The positive windfall for the governor from the swift action by the
CBFSA and the financial regulator was reinforced by a biographical piece on
Hurley reflecting on his long public service career as he approached retirement
(Mitchell 2008). Hurley’s role as a statutorily independent public servant
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minimised his use of crisis rhetoric and buffered him somewhat from opinionated
coverage.
15 October 2008: the Taoiseach’s reform agenda
In his budget statement, Cowen utilised the crisis as a vehicle to push through
public service, welfare and education reforms. Public sector reform had been
high on Cowen’s agenda since taking office as Taoiseach, when he announced
the outcomes of an Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) review of the Irish Public Service. Using the language of crisis, Cowen
framed the crisis as being ‘on a scale last seen in the 1930s’. The proposed level
of reform by his government was justified because ‘unprecedented times call
for unprecedented measures’. Direct action was necessary as ‘it is tempting’
during difficult times ‘to batten down the hatches and wait until the storm is
over’—a statement contrived to leave the audience morally obliged to follow
the government’s lead.
The reason given for the big impact of the global crisis in Ireland was once again
its open economy, with decreasing exports hurting government revenue. In this
budget, however, the Taoiseach announced measures to manage revenue
shortfalls that, had it not been a ‘crisis’ situation, would have had little chance
of being supported. Reductions to pensioners’ medical benefits and child benefits
were to be supplemented by restructuring of tax benefits for pension
contributions. One of the major initiatives to manage the crisis would be the
implementation of a public sector reform agenda. In an extension of his early
strategy of leading by example, Cowen announced that government ministers
and departmental heads would take a voluntary 10 per cent pay cut. The only
responsibility Cowen acknowledged was not for the economic crisis, but for the










Table 6.5 Media response to Cowen’s 15 October 2008 speech
Media reaction to the budget was very negative towards Cowen and the
government. In the first week, the majority of media coverage focused on the
changes to pensioners’ medical benefits. Of the 45 articles analysed, 31 focused
on the pensioner medical card debacle. While it made up a relatively small
portion of the overall budget (€100 million out of a health budget of €15 billion),
the backlash caused Cowen and his government to ‘do a U-turn in respect of
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this measure’ (Irish Independent 2008g). Less than half of the coverage
acknowledged the severity of the crisis in their commentary; the remainder
made no comment on it at all. Cowen’s causality claims were also largely ignored.
The four articles that disagreed on causality blamed the past policies of Cowen’s
Fianna Fáil Government.
Cowen was unable to fully exploit the global financial crisis and pass all his
announced budget cuts. The relatively minor financial return from cutting
pensioners’ health benefits resulted in a political crisis within Fiánna Fail, with
government members rebelling (Irish Independent 2008f) and ruptures with
independent parliamentarians (McGee 2008:7). Overwhelmingly, the response
was negative, with only one opinion piece offering any support to the
government’s actions (Irish Times 2008e).
5 December 2008: Lenihan’s reform salesmanship
‘We are in very difficult times’ was a clear public acknowledgment made by the
Finance Minister about the deteriorating condition of the government’s fiscal
position. In a statement on the economy delivered to the Seanad Éirann (The
Senate) in early December, Lenihan explained that ‘a major gap has emerged
between spending levels and tax receipts’ resulting in a projected government
deficit of €3.5 billion for 2008 and €4.7 billion for 2009. The cause of the
consistent slide in revenue rested with the downturn in the domestic housing
sector and the ‘major deterioration in the global economic environment…traced
to…sub-prime mortgage debt’.
To manage the budget shortfall, Lenihan introduced a range of measures to
review spending in the public sector. In doing so, he appeared to make a
conscious and careful effort to use language that would not inflame resistance
to the foreshadowed changes. Lenihan asserted that ‘everybody in this room
[the Séanad] is a public servant’ and ‘the kind of demonisation of the Public
Service that has featured in public debate…including political parties’ had been
deplorable. This linguistic move shifted the blame for any perceived attack on
the public sector to his political opponents. Reforms outlined by Lenihan also
focused on job preservation and support for the unemployed through social










Table 6.6 Media response to Lenihan’s 5 December 2008 statement
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Table 6.6 indicates that in December 2008 the government’s framing of the
severity of the crisis was widely accepted. The public, media, business and
unions all shared Lenihan’s view. There was also less debate about the causality
of manifestations of the global crisis in Ireland. Dispute generally rested on
criticism of past government policy, which some said had failed to insulate the
Irish economy from the current financial trauma.
Lenihan’s use of his ‘Statement on the economy’ to drive the policy outcomes
required to address the global financial crisis was less than successful. The
statement was made amid organised protest against government economic and
fiscal policy. A demonstration of students organised by the teachers’ union
brought about 50,000 protesters to the streets of the capital in a strong show of
dissatisfaction with the Finance Minister’s policies, which translated into a much
lower level of support for the government’s leadership (Flynn 2008:17). Loss of
respect within the Fianna Fáil was also generated by an apparent lack of
consultation among party members and accusations of rule by a triumvirate that
included Lenihan, Cowen and the Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister), Mary
Coughlan (Irish Independent 2008i). The difficulties of balancing the budget and
the use of the crisis to drive reform were soon to be overshadowed as the banking
crisis re-emerged in the New Year.
15 January 2009: Lenihan’s take on AIB nationalisation
There had been much speculation after the government’s deposit guarantee in
October 2008 about whether the marker would be called in by the banks as a
result of the global financial crisis. In mid January, Lenihan announced that the
funding position of the Anglo Irish Bank (AIB) had weakened and ‘unacceptable
practices that took place within it had caused serious reputational damage’
(CBFSA 2009). As a result, the government moved beyond recapitalisation to
the ‘decisive step of public ownership’. The government decision was to
‘safeguard the interests of depositors of Anglo, and the stability of the economy’.
The swift response by the government required a high level of management to
ensure that the public purse would not be hit by a further loss. AIB shares were
suspended from trade in Ireland and the United Kingdom. Information was made
available to shareholders and the public in the form of a question and answer
page on relevant government web sites and that of the AIB. With the move to
nationalisation, the interests of shareholders became secondary to those of
depositors. ‘Shares in Anglo will be transferred to [the Minister of Finance, who]
will appoint an independent assessor, who will decide the value of the shares
and decide what level (if any) of compensation shareholders will get’ (It’s Your
Money 2009).
The share value for AIB had fallen sharply since May 2007—from €17.50 to
€0.22 (O’Halloran 2009:8).
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The poor share performance had led to calls for the government to inject funds
into AIB and hold an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) of shareholders. The
government’s decision not to bail out AIB and nationalise the bank came the
day before the EGM. Nationalisation angered many of the attending shareholders,
particularly when it became apparent their shares had become virtually worthless










Table 6.7 Media response to Lenihan’s 15 January 2009 speech
Reaction to the nationalisation of a major bank, as seen in Table 6.7, reflected
societal awareness of the severity of the financial crisis facing Ireland and an
acceptance of the causality. This did not, however, translate into an immediate
policy victory for Lenihan in his framing of the crisis, nor did it engender political
support. Tracking the tone of media articles through the week reflected an initial
stunned media and public response, followed thereafter by a level of anger,
particularly from shareholders and taxpayers—the former group likely to lose
money in the arrangement and the latter likely to join them (Irish Independent
2009a). When grouped with the variety of opposition parties, there was nearly
three times as much opposition to the government’s decision to nationalise AIB
as there was support. Media reports, however, did not blame the government
for the collapse of AIB. Blame was directed at the AIB chairman and board of
directors, who in the public’s mind were guilty of criminal behaviour (O’Toole
2009:14).
Lenihan’s credibility as a leader during the global financial crisis was undermined
when he was caught out in a radio interview not knowing what the statement
posted on the CBFSA web site actually said. According to one commentator,
Lenihan ‘did not know that the official government response to [the disgraced
chairman of AIB] FitzPatrick’s gigantic scam on his bank’s shareholders was that
it was “disappointing”’ (O’Toole 2009:14). This was a massive understatement
compared with the public and media opinion of the behaviour of the AIB
chairman and board of directors. As one letter to the editor phrased it: ‘which
is the appropriate Government Department to approach for a no-strings-attached,
interest-free and fully concealable loan of approximately €87 million?’ (Irish
Times 2009a:17).
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28 January 2009: Cowen’s crisis plan
In his statement to the Dáil Éireann, Cowen began by framing the situation as
Ireland facing ‘the most difficult global economic conditions in seventy years’
and ‘the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression’. Once again, the
Taoiseach attributed Ireland’s economic problems to the openness of the economy,
adding ‘the sharp appreciation in the value of the Euro’ and decline in the
demand for Irish exports. Cowen’s brevity in naming, explaining and accounting
for the crisis was balanced by a detailed plan to manage it.
Cowen reminded his audience that the government had moved ‘swiftly [to]
introduce a banking guarantee’ and had acted to provide support for mortgagees
who had fallen behind in payments. The government also ‘support[ed] efforts
at [an] international level to establish regulatory mechanisms’ and what was
proportionally Europe’s largest capital investment program. Cowen described
these actions as having the main goal of ‘return[ing] the economy to sustainable
growth per [the] Framework for Sustainable Economic Renewal’. The framework
was a 105-page plan focused on a ‘smart economy’ based on research and
development, innovation, environmental balance, infrastructure investment and
efficiency in the public sector (Department of the Taoiseach 2008). To implement
the broader plan, Cowen called for a Pact for Stabilisation, Solidarity and
Economic Renewal to be negotiated with the social partners.
Cowen used crisis rhetoric in an attempt to box in the social partners so they
would endorse the government’s policy agenda. The Taoiseach implied that any










Table 6.8 Media responses to Cowen’s 28 January 2009 speech
There were two key factors influencing public reaction to the Taoiseach’s speech.
First, there were continuing negotiations to secure €2 billion in savings with the
unions, in their role as social partners. After a long period of industrial harmony
supported by economic growth, there was little chance that Cowen would garner
the unconditional support of the union leadership for economic measures that
directly impacted on union members. The lack of support for Cowen is
attributable to the well-reported response of the unions. Second, there was
Barack Obama. The American President-Elect’s speeches calling for sacrifice in
times of economic uncertainty were widely reported. To add to Cowen’s woes,
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the media and public drew comparisons between the two leaders and the Irishman
was found wanting (Irish Times 2009b:15).
There were calls for the Taoiseach to make a state of the nation address, similar
to the US ‘State of the Union’ address (Devlin 2009). Further comparison found
that ‘unlike Obama, Cowen [had] no plan. He [had] not had a plan since he
started, nor did he have one as Finance Minister’ (Arnold 2009). This additional
pressure made it increasingly difficult for the Taoiseach to exploit the crisis for
policy or political gain.
3 February 2009: Cowen’s break with the social partners
The breakdown of the social partnership between the government and the unions
demonstrated the speed and depth of the impact of the crisis on Ireland. There
was less than a week between Cowen’s announcement on delivering sustainable
economic renewal and securing public finances and his announcement of the
Framework for Stabilisation, Social Solidarity and Economic Renewal. With a
slight variation on his speech of a week before, Cowen described the situation
as ‘the most profound global economic crisis in seventy years’. In another push
to manage the financial crisis, the government had spent the intervening period
engaged in discussions with the social partners that had resulted in the
framework. The framework took ‘urgent and radical action to restore stability
in public finances, to maximise short term economic activity and employment
and to improve competitiveness’.
The Taoiseach had tried to manoeuvre the unions into providing support the
previous week. As a result of the negotiations, the unions decided they could
not agree to the framework, thereby giving Cowen’s government a scapegoat
should the framework fail. The government took a political risk by taking
decisions without backing from one of the major social partners—a break with
a key feature of Irish socioeconomic governance since 1987.
The plan to manage the financial crisis was to be a major economic undertaking.
With an initial commitment to save €2 billion and a total of €18.5 billion in
economic adjustments by 2013, it ‘represent[ed] a huge political, economic and










Table 6.9 Media response to Cowen’s 3 February 2009 speech
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The reaction to the Taoiseach’s announcement of the framework was from a
population now feeling the effects of the crisis. While most media reporting
agreed with the severity of the crisis in Ireland, there was no commentary on
the causal factors. By this stage, however, nearly every speech act by the
Taoiseach made reference to the global financial crisis, so there was no need for
the media to reinforce what was well known. The two articles that disagreed
with the causal factors attributed the blame to the past policies of Cowen’s
government.
The framework stimulated greater media coverage than the other speeches
analysed in this chapter. This was largely due to it marking the collapse of the
social partnership arrangement between unions, business and government that
had dominated previous decades. The articles that disagreed with the fiscal
policies in the framework focused mainly on the union movement’s reaction and
the foreshadowed industrial action protesting against a new pension levy for
public servants (Irish Independent 2009d). Comparing Cowen’s speeches (cf.
Tables 6.3, 6.5 and 6.8), however, the negative reaction was not as overwhelming
as previously experienced. Cowen received support from those who appreciated
his direct style of communication and from business and private sector groups
(Irish Independent 2009b, 2009c).
4 February 2009: Lenihan’s blame management
Facing an ‘ocean of advice out there about [what] to do’, the Minister for Finance
laid out a grim message to the Dáil when seeking its support in ‘tackling the
current economic and fiscal crisis’. Lenihan’s statement on economic and spending
measures forecast decline in growth, negative export growth and a significant
increase in unemployment. These negative factors had resulted in growth in
government borrowing to €18 billion for 2009. The result of these developments
had blown out national debt to 45 per cent of gross national product (GNP), with
an annual interest bill of ‘€4.5 Billion, or 12 per cent of total tax take’. The
government’s plan to address this was threefold: first, getting the cost base
down; second, keeping ‘up the real value of…investment in national productive
capacity’; and finally, doing the first two in a fair manner.
A high level of blame management accompanied the tough measures. Lenihan
addressed those who ‘instead of advancing constructive policies…try to fix the
blame and not the problem’. Lenihan then attempted to acknowledge his own
culpability while simultaneously transferring it: ‘perhaps as a government we
were over-ambitious in trying to meet the…demands…for more and better
public services when the resources were there’. This statement was immediately
followed by the observation that the opposition had never called for ‘less
spending, lower social welfare increases, higher taxes, more levies’ when the
government had rolled out its agenda in the good times. Blame was also
transferred to the unions, as the social partners could not agree to the
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government’s savings regime in the middle of the ‘worst crisis in international










Table 6.10 Media response to Lenihan’s 4 February 2009 speech
Lenihan’s statement on economic and spending measures was delivered a day
after the Taoiseach announced the Framework for Stabilisation, Social Solidarity
and Economic Renewal (see above). As a result, much of the commentary on the
government’s performance was in response to both these speech acts. A little
more than half of the media reports reflected the lack of support for the
government program—due mainly to the fallout from union opposition to
spending cuts and pay reform in the public sector. As the bearer of bad economic
tidings and social upheaval, the Finance Minister did not succeed in exploiting
the crisis for political gain.
Letters to the editor of the Irish Times provided a snapshot of public opinion.
Most reflected the anger within Ireland towards the situation at hand and much
of that anger was directed towards the government. This anger went so far as
to call for ‘senior churchmen or religious leaders [to] come together and issue a
joint condemnation of the Government’s handling of the economic crisis’ (Irish
Times 2009c:17). Successful exploitation of the crisis in Ireland was an enormous
challenge for the elected politicians, whether in government or opposition.
10 March 2009: Hurley’s blame deflection
The final speech act analysed in this chapter presented an interesting turnaround
for the otherwise staid Governor Hurley. Only two significant speech acts are
located on the CBFSA web site after the banking guarantee. Both were to
committees of the Oireachtas (Parliament), and it was the second on 10 March
to the Committee on Economic Regulatory Affairs that highlighted the change
in Hurley’s rhetoric. The change was not only in the speech, but in the media
response it garnered, particularly in relation to the questions asked of Hurley
by committee members after the speech.
The opening of Hurley’s statement was rich in the rhetoric of crisis. His economic
assessment covered the recent history of the downturn and its development at
global, EU and national levels. The global conditions were blamed for making
the ‘domestic economic situation much worse’. He outlined actions taken by the
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government and the CBFSA, including the provision of liquidity early in the
crisis, involvement at EU level to ensure national regulatory action dovetailed
with international plans and the actions to nationalise the AIB. After his opening
statement, Hurley opened himself and his colleagues to questioning by the
committee. The questions were not listed as part of the speech, however, the
media reported a large amount of blame transference from the CBFSA Governor
to the government for the severity of the crisis (Carswell 2009a:18, 2009b:2; Irish










Table 6.11 Media response to Hurley’s 10 March 2009 speech
Hurley’s address to the Oireachtas initially appeared to bemuse the media. Two
reasons for his change in rhetoric and entry into the blame game were
immediately apparent. First, Hurley had remained on as governor beyond his
retirement date to help get Ireland through the global financial crisis (Irish
Independent 2009f). This ‘post-retirement’ sense of complete independence led
him to be more ‘forthright than is usual for central bankers’ (Irish Independent
2009g). Second, Hurley appeared to be defending his own reputation through
blame deflection (O’Malley and Duffy 2009:17).
Hurley claimed he had issued numerous warnings regarding the looming peril,
which had been ignored by the government; however, this attempted deflection
drew criticism from the media. The majority of the articles analysed tended to
focus on the man, not the policy. He was variously described as ‘gloomy’, the
‘Central Bank Cassandra’ (Irish Independent 2009h) and ‘downbeat’ (Irish
Independent 2009g). One piece described Hurley’s attempt to deflect blame as
‘handwashing of breathtaking proportions’ (McManus 2009:16). Hurley’s annual
salary was also subjected to media scrutiny after his call for the Irish not to be
paid more than their EU counterparts (Carswell 2009a:18). The negativity
continued, as the only commentary that discussed Hurley’s financial forecasts
disagreed with his framing and predicted an even bleaker outlook than the one
outlined by the CBFSA (Irish Independent 2009g).
4. Framing the financial crisis in Ireland: analysis and
conclusions
Initial government attempts to exploit the financial crisis in Ireland were
discernable in two key policy moves: reform of the public sector and a push to
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implement major structural change in the way the Irish economy was moving
into the future. Within the analytical framework and time frame examined, there
was little evidence that these attempts were successful. The broader context of
Irish politics and history, however, must be taken into account to allow for a
more nuanced view of the findings. The following discussion will examine public
sector reform within a historical context and economic reform within a political
context, as well as considering some of the unintended consequences of the
government’s response to the global financial crisis. The chapter will conclude
with a comparative analysis of how these polices, in the context of the global
financial crisis in Ireland, were framed by the Taoiseach, the Finance Minister
and the bank governor.
Public sector reform
In April 2008, three months before the global financial crisis seriously manifested
in Ireland, the Fianna Fáil Government led by Bertie Ahern and with Brian Cowen
as Minister for Finance commissioned the OECD to review the operation of the
Irish Public Service. A task force was appointed on the day Cowen became
Taoiseach with the goal of preparing an implementation plan for the OECD
recommendations (Cowen 2008c). The timing of the task force announcement
illustrates the political imperative and the importance in Cowen’s view of public
sector reform. Within a historical context, the Irish public services had grown
in the boom years of the ‘Celtic tiger’ economy. Quite literally, hundreds of
departments, agencies and quangos (quasi-non-governmental organisations)
developed in the good times and the State could no longer afford them. This
growth in the public sector led to a corresponding growth in the level of service
provided to and received by the Irish population. Ireland had struggled
economically for many years and had been considered one of the ‘poor four’—or,
more unkindly, ‘PIGS’ (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain)—of the European
Union (Rumford 2002:154). This had changed with the boom economy and there
was understandable resistance in the population and the unions to any
government move to wind back spending, which would in turn impact on jobs
and services. With the downturn in tax revenue, the larger public sector was
no longer a sustainable proposition.
The push for public service reform by linking it to the financial crisis was a
politically daring attempt to win popular support—as well as support from the
social partners, or at least their acceptance of reduced government bureaucracy
and service. The announcement to implement the task force reforms fell between
the banking guarantee in October 2008 and the December 2008 budget. The
timing was designed to foreshadow the cuts the Finance Minister would announce
and to prepare the public and social partners—now cognisant of the
downturn—for the belt-tightening changes ahead.
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Reform of the Irish economy
The second major reform pushed by the Fianna Fáil Government was a
modernisation of the Irish economy. After the budget in December, the Taoiseach
launched the government’s Framework for Economic Renewal. The 105-page
plan opened with ‘Ireland faces challenging economic circumstances but there
are also great opportunities on the horizon’ (Department of the Taoiseach
2008:Foreword). Economic reform in these circumstances was a case of a type-3
framing stance. The government was laying the groundwork needed to use the
opportunity of the crisis to reform the economy. The plan repackaged existing
policies with a vision to ‘re-prioritise the business of Government and to re-focus
resources in a manner that will hasten economic renewal’ (Department of the
Taoiseach 2008:Foreword).
The framework was not well received, being variously described as ‘stale reheats’
(Irish Independent 2008i), a ‘woolly document’ (Irish Times 2008f:17), a
‘patchwork document’ (Lord 2008:9) and a ‘lead balloon’ (Lucey 2008:15). Most
of the criticism focused on the government’s attempt to map out a medium and
long-term plan for the economy, based on previously announced strategies,
while failing to address the immediate necessities of the financial crisis. The
framework disappeared almost immediately into the background as the banking
crisis resurfaced with the nationalisation of AIB. Furthermore, a different and
more pressing crisis was leading public concern: a suspected break-out of foot
and mouth disease in Irish piggeries (Irish Independent 2008h). This major export
industry was deeply affected in the lead-up to Christmas. Visible in the media
was the call for decisive leadership to see the Irish people through the combined
crises. Such leadership was glaringly absent, according to the commentators.
The media and the opposition parties both criticised the lengths to which Cowen
and Lenihan had gone in order to protect the social partnership while trying to
save the economy. The speed with which the global financial crisis manifested
in Ireland made the protracted negotiation process not only redundant in the
eyes of some commentators, but an economic hazard (Collins 2008:16). Between
the crisis in the piggeries and the broad range of political criticism, the economic
reform agenda laid out in the framework failed to gain traction. What was not
made clear in public statements or action until February 2009 was any
acknowledgment that it would be impossible to introduce the necessary reforms
or reduce spending levels to save the economy and meet all the needs of the
social partners. Decisive, coherent and bold leadership was being called for
(McDonough 2009:11). Bold leadership, however, had its own pitfalls.
Unintended consequences
The Irish Government’s handling of the financial crisis triggered a series of
unintended consequences with their own political and policy ramifications—for
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example, the backlash over the pensioner medical card discussed in the analysis
of the Taoiseach’s budget speech of 15 October 2008.
Also in October 2008, the banking guarantee generated its own crisis in the
European Union. Questions were raised about whether the Irish Government’s
actions were strictly legal in terms of the financial arrangements between EU
members. The question of legality was itself subjected to its own political
intrigues. There had been pressure on Ireland to hold a second referendum on
the Lisbon Treaty after the first referendum ended with a ‘no’ vote. Although
concerned about the legality of the Irish banking guarantee, the European Union
allegedly did not strongly oppose the move for fear of jeopardising chances of
a new Irish referendum (Irish Times 2008b). The Irish Government was also
aware that any move to bring the matter of bank guarantees before a European
court would take nearly two years and it felt secure in its actions (Irish
Independent 2008d; Irish Times 2008d). Nonetheless, the Irish economy and
banking sector are inextricably linked to the euro currency and the ECB, and
EU membership is an integral part of Irish politics. The opinions from EU member
states’ news media impacted on the domestic response to particularly the
Taoiseach’s speeches. As such, the Irish leaders still had to remain cognisant of
their nation’s position as part of the European Union.
Another unintended consequence of the October 2008 banking guarantee was
the nationalisation of the AIB. All the government statements from the time of
the guarantee declared that no bank would be nationalised as they were all
financially sound. The guarantee was simply to underpin national economic
security. This was disputed at the time AIB was nationalised; a prominent
economist claimed the government had been warned not to include AIB in the
guarantee because of its unstable circumstances (Irish Independent 2009e). This
claim led to a political slanging match in the papers over who knew what when,
and what was said to whom (Irish Independent 2009e).
Nationalisation of the AIB generated another political crisis over the ‘golden
circle’—a group of 10 high-level borrowers who were allegedly given loans of
€450 million by AIB to buy shares in AIB. Details of this arrangement came out
after the nationalisation of the bank. There were allegations that Cowen knew
of the arrangement and the names of the borrowers and this led to substantial
political pressure on Cowen and Lenihan to ‘name names’ (Collins and Hennessy
2008:1; O’Regan 2009:8).
Rhetorical consistency
The number of sub-crises generated in Ireland in the wake of the global financial
crisis necessitated a level of unity among the political leadership, which will
now be examined. With parliamentary elections not due until 2012, this chapter’s
period of analysis was situated within a relatively safe political period for Cowen
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and Lenihan. This safety translated into consistency between the political leaders
in addressing the global financial crisis. When comparing the Taoiseach and
Finance Minister with the Governor of the CBFSA, however, there were
discernable differences in the type of rhetoric used in framing the global financial
crisis. Whereas Cowen and Lenihan had a political game to play, the more secure
Hurley stuck closer to the facts at hand without recourse to crisis language.
In marked contrast with the elected leaders, the Governor of the CBFSA was
initially more reserved in his public statements. His role had been primarily to
maintain a sense of calm and to prevent panic in the markets. It was only when
the banking guarantee was announced that Hurley began to use crisis rhetoric,
falling in line with Cowen and Lenihan at that time. As noted above, Hurley
later attempted to avoid blame by claiming the government had ignored his
warnings of financial dangers (Hurley 2009).
The economic drama that manifested in Ireland was primarily the result of
exogenous factors that were beyond the control of the Irish Government.
Attempts by the opposition to blame the government for the impact of the global
financial crisis on the Irish economy were largely ineffectual. As indicated in
the above discussion on public sector reform, Fianna Fáil had not been criticised
when it was spending the boom-time revenues on public services and
infrastructure (Lenihan 2008b). Short of a major revolt within the governing
party, there was little chance of leadership change before the 2012 national
elections. This left Cowen and Lenihan room to implement some of their
medium-term strategies of reforming the public sector and economy.
In terms of the crisis-exploitation framework presented in Chapter 2, the
long-time incumbent Fianna Fáil Government somewhat surprisingly emerged
as a key advocate of radical policy change. The Taoiseach, Finance Minister and
government were the main reformers (the parliamentary opposition were also
advocates of changes, albeit different ones). The chief status quo players were
found in the unions and among student, pensioner and other interest groups.
This produced a stalemate in relation to the pensioner medical card issue and
the break between the government and the social partners. As the financial
resources of the State contracted, decisive leadership was privileged over political
niceties. While the government conceded on the pension card in October 2008,
by February 2009, it was prepared to introduce economic plans without the
consent of the unions. The Irish Government had gone from policy stalemate to
a politically imposed paradigm shift.
In the political game, the Irish Government was not forced to fend off blame for
the global financial crisis, but it was subjected to criticism for past fiscal policies.
There is little evidence to suggest that the continuing criticism had any serious
traction. The majority of commentary accepted that the major causal factors
were exogenous and had their roots in the global financial crisis. Critics of past
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policies had trouble concurrently attacking new proposals, as they would appear
as mere nay-sayers. This, combined with the remoteness of elections, was a major
factor curtailing potential blame games.
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7. France: dominant leadership
Natalie Windle
1. Crisis as leadership opportunity
The issue of political leadership in France has drawn a great deal of media and
public attention since Nicolas Sarkozy was elected President on 6 May 2007—not
least during the French Presidency of the European Union during the second
half of 2008. This period saw Sarkozy take the reins of European leadership and
acquire the moniker ‘Super-Sarko’. Sarkozy’s confident and fast-paced leadership
not only drove the broad political agenda of the European Union during those
six months, it faced the challenge of the heightened severity of the global
financial crisis, which initially surfaced in August 2007. Moreover, the
catchphrase ‘the European Union brings force’1  rang very true for Sarkozy,
whose message was heard more widely when he spoke on behalf of the European
Union than when speaking for France alone (Missiroli 2009). The EU platform
thus played a significant role in the framing of the global financial crisis in
France, especially from Sarkozy’s perspective.
On the domestic front, the crisis manifested itself in France most notably from
September 2008, triggered by the collapse of the investment firm Lehman
Brothers in the United States, which sent shockwaves around the globe. In
France, Fortis stock collapsed on 26 September as confidence in its solvency fell
and, four days later, the French, Belgian and Luxembourg governments
committed €6.4 billion towards the rescue of the bank Dexia. In the 12 months
before these events, the sub-prime crisis in the United States had already damaged
the international financial sector. In this environment, France had been taking
more precautionary measures such as ‘the law for economic modernisation’,2
which was aimed primarily at simplifying French small and medium businesses
(SMEs).3 The crisis, however, put such initiatives on hold as more immediate
measures were taken to ensure the continued financing of the economy. At the
close of 2008, Sarkozy announced a stimulus plan totalling €26.4 billion, to be
spent on public investment projects across many sectors within the next year.
In the following analysis of the French elite’s rhetoric on the financial crisis, the
focus remains on three key actors: the President Nicolas Sarkozy, the Minister
for the Economy, Industry and Employment Christine Lagarde,and the Governor
of the Banque de France Christian Noyer. All three actors held these offices
throughout the period of analysis—April 2008 to March 2009—with Sarkozy
and Lagarde taking their posts from the May 2007 election and Noyer being
appointed the governor in November 2003. The period of analysis is situated in
157
the early to mid-term of the French electoral cycle, with the next elections due
in 2012. The quinquennat (five-year term) is relevant to this case study as the
longer-term crisis management of the incumbent government will likely be a
critical consideration in the 2012 election.
Sarkozy entered his presidency with high popularity ratings, reaching 65 per
cent in the first month (CNN 2007), indicating confidence in his leadership
during ‘normal times’. This phase-two period is, however, indicative of his
leadership capabilities in a time of crisis. The first of President Sarkozy’s speeches
analysed in this chapter, from 25 September 2008, was referred to by a journalist
for Le Figaro as ‘a speech which incontestably marks the start of the second
phase of the five year term’4  (Jeudy 2008). Sarkozy’s leadership is a clear focus
of this analysis, which aims to address the beginning of phase two and how it
has impacted on public and media opinions.
Box 7.1 France’s financial crisis trajectory, April 2008 – March 2009
28 April 2008: Minister for the Economy, Industry and Employment
Christine Lagarde, holds a press conference to present a plan for the law
of economic modernisation.
13 May: While travelling to Vienna, President Sarkozy reassures artisans
and small shopkeepers that the law for economic modernisation will
simplify the process of owning your own business. On the broader
economic situation, rising prices are not a ‘fatality’, according to Sarkozy.
15 May:  Lagarde congratulates the remarkable resistance of the French
economy in the first quarter of 2008, especially the vigour of investments,
which are up to 1.8 per cent from 1.2 per cent in the fourth quarter of
2007. The French  produit intérieur brut  (PIB, or gross domestic product
[GDP]) progresses to 0.6 per cent in the first quarter of 2008, according
to the National Institute of Statistical and Economic Studies (l’Insee),
which also reviews a rise of 0.2 points on the growth of 2007, to 2.1 per
cent.
27 May: A freeze is put on property sales.5  According to recent figures
from the Ministry for Development, sales dropped to 27.9 per cent in
one year, between January and March.
29 May: Natixis, the French corporate and investment bank whose
primary shareholders are Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Épargne,
announces the suppression, in the next 18 months, of 1100 jobs, of which
850 are in France.
2 June:  Presentation of the economic modernisation bill to the National
Assembly by Finance Minister Lagarde.
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11–12 September:  EuroFin Conference in Nice, organised under the
French EU Presidency and chaired by Lagarde.
26 September:  Financial giant Fortis’s stock collapses. Fortis is refloated
on 29 September by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (the
Benelux states). BNP Paribas takes control of Fortis in Belgium and
Luxembourg for €14.5 billion.
30 September: The governments of Belgium, France and Luxembourg
underwrite the rescue of the top-tier retail bank Dexia by subscribing
to an increase in capital of €6.4 billion to keep it afloat.
10 October: The French Government promises €320 billion in
state-guaranteed lending to banks and €40 billion to recapitalise any
bank in difficulty.
12 October: At the initiative of President Sarkozy, Paris adopts the
European anti-crisis plan based on the protection of savings, financing
the economy and avoiding financial institutions’ bankruptcy.
18 October:  Sarkozy and José Manuel Barroso, President of the European
Commission, meet with US President, George W. Bush, to discuss the
redesign of the world’s financial structure.
23 October:  In a speech at Argonay, Sarkozy announces a meeting of
the G20 as well as a new strategic investment fund involving €26 billion
of loans, in order to assure the financing of the French PME.
7 November:  EU summit is held, at which a common set of principles
for reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is agreed on.
20 November:  Between 163,000 and 220,000 French teachers and
tertiary and high school students protest against the loss of jobs and
education reforms.
4 December:  Sarkozy announces a stimulus plan to boost the French
economy with €26.4 billion (1.3 per cent of GDP) to be spent on public
sector investments and loans for France’s automotive industry.
6 December: A Le Monde opinion poll suggests that 71 per cent of
respondents do not believe the Socialist Party has a ‘vision’ for France.
The Socialist Party was struggling to mount an effective response to the
crisis.
10 December:  After the announcement of a fall in private consumption,
a rise in unemployment and a commercial record deficit, Insee reveals a
dive of 2.7 per cent in overall industrial production in October.
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20 January 2009: Prime Minister, Francois Fillon, announces the
government’s intention to provide €5–6 billion to aid struggling car
manufacturers.
9 February:  German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and Sarkozy propose
a meeting of the 27 EU member states. Sarkozy announces that two French
automobile manufacturers, Renault and PSA Peugeot-Citroen, will receive
€6 billion in state loans, on the condition that they do not close factories
in France.
10 February:  Fillon unveils a stimulus package involving 1000 projects
across France; 75 per cent of the allotted €26 billion must be spent by
the end of 2009.
24 March:  Sarkozy delivers an address at Saint-Quentin, defending his
economic policy and promising to go even further.
2. Methodological considerations
This chapter is designed in line with three key approaches outlined in Chapter 2
of this volume. Specifically, it covers a 12-month period beginning in April
2008, and presents: an interpretation of leaders’ speeches addressing the financial
crisis; the public and media responses to these speeches; and a crisis-exploitation
analysis of the elite actors’ framing efforts. President Sarkozy, Minister for the
Economy, Industry and Employment, Christine Lagarde, and Banque de France
Governor Noyer were selected on the basis of their key roles in managing the
crisis. The Prime Minister, Francois Fillon, though a key player in the French
Government, was not included in this analysis because his visibility in the crisis
was eclipsed by the dominant presence of Sarkozy. The actors’ key speeches
were then chosen according to the following criteria: focus, audience and
response. Each of the key speeches analysed in this study maintained a focus
on the financial crisis and was addressed to an audience for whom the crisis was
an issue of high importance. They also received a significant amount of coverage
in the media, though this was the most true for Sarkozy.
Second, this chapter provides an empirical analysis through media and public
responses to the leaders using four daily newspapers and public opinion data.
According to popularity and circulation numbers, the three major daily
newspapers in France are Le Monde, Le Figaro and Libération, with respective
circulations of 440,000, 330,000 and 135,000 (The Connexion 2009). A fourth
daily newspaper, Les Echos, which could be likened to the Financial Times and
the Wall Street Journal, was chosen for its position as a major financial and
economics daily, with a circulation of 120,000 (About-France 2009). Le Monde
was established in 1944 by General Charles de Gaulle and is viewed as a
centre-left publication. Le Figaro has a much longer history, dating back to 1826,
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and is a relatively conservative newspaper. Libération was founded in 1973 by
Jean-Paul Sartre for the 1968 generation, and holds a more socialist position (The
Connexion 2009).
To measure media responses to the actors’ speeches, daily newspapers were
referenced and presented according to their (dis)agreement or neutrality towards
each leader and how they framed the crisis in terms of causality, severity and
policy proposals. In addition to the media response, Le Figaro-LCI Politoscope,
which published weekly surveys regarding domestic and international political
events, was utilised as a resource to gauge French public opinion. The surveys
engage 900–1100 people each week, through an online system called Cawi
(computer-assisted web interview), and compile the results along with quotas
for age, sex, socio-professional category and residential region (Le Figaro-LCI
Politoscope 2008). Last, by utilising the crisis-exploitation framework and
considering contextual factors unique to the French case, this chapter aims to
shed light on the unfolding of the French manifestation of the global financial
crisis and the framing of the crisis by three key individuals: Nicolas Sarkozy,
Christine Lagarde and Christian Noyer.
3. Crisis development and elite rhetoric in France
Nicolas Sarkozy, though originally trained as a barrister with a master’s degree
in private law, has had a long career in the French Public Service, beginning
with his position as Mayor of Neuilly-sur-Seine from 1983 to 2002. During this
time, he was also Minister for the Budget (1993–95) and Minister for
Communications (1994–95). Sarkozy was elected to his current position as
President of the French Republic with 53 per cent of the votes on 6 May 2007.
He was the key government voice on the crisis for the French audience, as well
as on the European stage while France held the rotational EU Presidency from
July to December 2008.
Christine Lagarde rose to senior management positions at the international law
firm Baker & McKenzie. In June 2005, she was asked by then French Prime
Minister, Dominique de Villepin, to join his government as Minister of Foreign
Trade. After a cabinet reshuffle, she became the first woman in a G7 country to
hold the post of Finance and Economy Minister (EuroFin 2008). A former head
of the French Treasury, Christian Noyer was appointed Vice-President of the
European Central Bank (ECB) in 1998. His international experience included
work with the European Monetary Committee, the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), G7 and G10 and positions as alternating
governor at the IMF and World Bank. In November 2003, he was appointed
Governor of the Banque de France (Banque de France 2004).
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25 June 2008: the bank governor’s early diagnosis
Noyer’s first key address in relation to the global financial crisis came in June
2008. The day before the Banque de France annual report was released, Noyer
addressed the General Assembly of the Office of Bank and Financial Coordination.
Contextually, this can still be considered the pre-crisis phase in the French
economy. The symptoms of the sub-prime crisis had remained largely contained
to the United States and the United Kingdom, although its effects had been
seeping through the international financial sector.
Noyer defined the cause of the problems as mismanagement of the system. ‘This
situation originated in a general perception that investment opportunities in
assets, apparently of good quality, were almost unlimited, and this altered the
judgement of actors’6 . In this speech, Noyer proposed ‘an ensemble of good
practices’7  more than specific policy proposals. For example, he affirmed the
importance of the role of governance in terms of managing risk, as well as
conveying that the banks that were best equipped to respond to challenges were
those that invested early in developing evaluation and control procedures and
developed their knowledge of the risks inherent in complex products. The media
response to this address was largely neutral towards Noyer’s framing of the
crisis and his leadership, although there was some disagreement with his portrayal
of the severity of the crisis (Table 7.1). An article in Le Figaro expressed this
disagreement, saying ‘even though on the stock exchange, banks have been









Table 7.1 Media response to Noyer’s 25 June 2008 speech
25 September 2008: Sarkozy’s Toulon address
President Sarkozy’s address at Toulon in September 2008 came on the heels of
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the United States. This event was a watershed
event in the financial crisis. In France, this marked the escalation of the national
crisis. Sarkozy’s approach at Toulon was twofold: he highlighted the uniqueness
of the crisis and he made a call for a new international financial order. From the
outset, Sarkozy labelled the crisis ‘a crisis of confidence without precedent’.9
He did, however, make a reference to the depression of the 1930s, noting the
current crisis had seen no equivalent since. The majority of the population—those
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under the age of seventy—had not experienced the 1930s depression, so Sarkozy
effectively conveyed the uniqueness of this crisis as the first of its kind in most
peoples’ lifetimes. After this introduction, Sarkozy highlighted the pitfalls of
the system that caused the crisis. ‘The financial crisis is not the crisis of
capitalism. It is the crisis of a system which did away with the most fundamental
values of capitalism, which in some sense, betrayed the spirit of capitalism’.10
According to Sarkozy, capitalism had allowed the rise of the West throughout
seven decades, but a betrayal of capitalist values had emerged. Having established
its corruption as the fundamental cause of the crisis, Sarkozy proposed the reform
of capitalism, because ‘anticapitalism does not offer any solution to the actual
crisis’11 . Sarkozy’s plan for a new equilibrium between the market and the State
started with the regulation of the banks and controlled remuneration. He insisted
that the severity of the crisis was substantial, labelling it the end of the post-Cold
War capitalist world.
This address is vital to understanding Sarkozy’s framing of the crisis because
he illustrates the situation in terms of its exceptionality. Effectively, his message
was that in an exceptional case, one called for an exceptional response. The
media responded to this address with overall support for Sarkozy, but also with
some concern about his policy proposals (Table 7.2). Most notably, the media
acknowledged the significance of this speech. Le Figaro referred to it as ‘the day
when Sarkozy called for mobilisation against the crisis’12  (Jeudy and Visot
2008). Les Echos mirrored this perspective, saying, ‘Nicolas Sarkozy’s discourse
pronounced at Toulon on 25 September marks his entry into the war against the
crisis’13  (Cornudet 2008). The Toulon address was undoubtedly Sarkozy’s first
attempt at crisis exploitation in the face of a financial crisis that had worsened
in the national economy.
Libération called Sarkozy’s ‘classic allocution’ messianique in his wish to be heard
by the French, who feared for their economy (Guiral 2008). This fear was real,
as demonstrated by a poll conducted by Ifop on 18–19 September, which
indicated that 81 per cent of French respondents were concerned about the
French economy in the financial crisis (Angus Reid Global Monitor 2008).
Sarkozy’s attempt at crisis framing in the Toulon address failed to reassure the
concerned French public, as evidenced by a CSA survey published in the
newspaper Le Parisien on 28 September, which showed that 51 per cent of those
surveyed did not have confidence in Sarkozy to reduce the impact of the crisis












Table 7.2 Media response to Sarkozy’s 25 September 2008 speech
26 September 2008: Finance Minister Lagarde’s budget
speech
One of Lagarde’s first public speeches after the manifestation of the crisis in
France was delivered ahead of the upcoming budget for 2009. From the outset,
Lagarde looked past the short term and framed the crisis beyond 2008–09. She
noted that ‘the plan for programming public finance effectively brings us to
2012’14 . This foresight acknowledged the severity of the crisis at hand, which
demonstrated that Lagarde’s was not a type-1 ‘business-as-usual’ frame, but
rather a type-2 frame of crisis acknowledgment.
Lagarde maintained a matter-of-fact tone throughout this speech, conveying the
grim financial projections but simultaneously reassuring that the eurozone was
better situated than the US economy. With this comparison with the United
States, Lagarde defined the crisis as one without precedent and also accounted
for its origins in the US financial sector. ‘The turbulences endured by
international financial markets over the past year reflect the consequences of a
deep purge of the American financial sector’15 . Lagarde outlined the various
proposals of the French Government for the five-year period to 2012, which
included structural reforms for employment policy (targeted at employment
candidates, seniors and youth), buying power, economic modernisation and a
tripling of the research tax credit (CIR).
The media response to Lagarde’s presentation of the 2009 budget was focused
primarily on public deficit figures and proposed policy, and there was neither
support nor opposition expressed towards Lagarde herself (Table 7.3). There
was implicit agreement with the severity of the crisis and its impact on the
budget. For example, an article in Le Figaro agreed that the financial crisis had
weakened the French economy. ‘The financial crisis which has raged for one
year has finally impacted the global economy and provoked a net slowdown in
France’16  (Lachevre and Visot 2008a).
One particular policy proposal that was criticised in the representative media
response was related to civil servants. Le Monde stated that ‘30 600 jobs would
be done away with in the public service compared to 20 900 in 2008. This is a
little less than the promise of not replacing one for every two civil servants who
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leave for retirement’17  (Lachevre and Visot 2008a). This argument was well
founded in the context of uncertainty about rising unemployment and it also
brought to the fore the credibility of the government by questioning its
commitment to its promises. On the whole, the media response to Lagarde’s
presentation of the budget was critical of the government’s approach to the











Table 7.3 Media response to Lagarde’s 26 September 2008 speech
15 October 2008: Lagarde presenting a recovery plan
Lagarde’s next key address was delivered to the Senate and was titled ‘National
plan for assuring the financing of the economy and restoring confidence’.18  In
the opening lines of this address, Lagarde defined the financial crisis in the
following terms: ‘the crisis through which we are living is excessive.’19 This
crisis of excess was explained by four factors: the excess of speculation, the
excess of credit in the United States, the excess of complexity in which the
financial profession lost control of the tools it created and the excess of
irrationality and panic on the stock exchange.
Lagarde then proceeded to outline the government’s proposal for management
of the crisis. The proposal was threefold: first, the creation of a society of
refinancing whereby funds would be raised with a state guarantee; second, the
possibility of the State reinforcing the equity capital of French banks; and third,
the Dexia guarantee in cooperation with Belgium and Luxembourg. On the first
point, Lagarde made note of a marked contrast with the plan proposed by US
Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, saying ‘our proposal is completely opposite
to the Paulson plan…the American state proposes to take control of the worst
assets…in France, the state will not buy the assets. It will loan to the banks.’20
This contrast was paramount in Lagarde’s greater narrative, which insisted that
France remained in a better financial position than many other nations, especially
the United States.
The media response to Lagarde’s 15 October speech was similar to that to her
26 September address in terms of the focus on government policy, rather than
on Lagarde herself. Lagarde was effectively viewed as the representative or
spokeswoman for a larger decision-making body. Most notable among the media
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responses illustrated in Table 7.4, Le Figaro conveyed agreement with the
proposed policy because it would go a step further than other plans adopted in
Europe and the United States: ‘French measures can serve to achieve two purposes










Table 7.4 Media response to Lagarde’s 15 October 2008 speech
21 October 2008: Noyer’s struggle to be heard
Christian Noyer delivered a noteworthy address titled ‘Reflections on the crisis’
in October 2008. In the months since his address to the General Assembly of the
Coordination Office, Noyer had been curiously absent from the public eye.
After this gap in public presence, Noyer continued his framing of the crisis at
an address to the Crédit Agricole Congress on 21 October. According to Noyer,
at this time, there were two certainties about the crisis: it would impact on the
economy in the long term and it was defined as a crisis of liquidity. Noyer
directed the focus away from the government’s leadership, towards the role of
central banks, which effectively stood ‘in the front line’22  during the combat.
Noyer organised his speech around four themes: the nature of the crisis, the
policies put in place to manage it, the macroeconomic perspectives and financial
regulation perspectives. On the last two themes, he reinforced that the fall in
confidence was not centred on France, and he promoted the value of a deep
knowledge of the banking sector, not only at the microeconomic level but in
terms of limiting risk across the entire global system. His overarching message
maintained that French banks were solid and profitable and he demonstrated
support for Sarkozy’s push to organise Europe’s crisis response.23
After his address at Nice, Noyer was presented by Le Monde as a timid figure in
the shadow of Sarkozy, with the paper saying he was ‘inaudible in a room of
100 people’24  (Bacqué 2008). This was one of the very few articles that focused
on the personality and leadership of Noyer himself, as most of the media and
public attention was engaged with policies in the banking sector rather than its
key actors (Table 7.5). Overall, there was more opinion on France’s banking
policy than on the governor himself (Ganiko 2009). The article in Le Monde on
24 October detailed Noyer’s background and provided a very positive character
reference as well as crediting Noyer with the plan for the bank guarantees.
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Table 7.5 Media response to Noyer’s 21 October 2008 speech
23 October 2008: Sarkozy’s Argonay address
One month after his Toulon address—and also subsequent to the Dexia rescue
on 30 September 2008 by the French, Belgian and Luxembourg
governments—Sarkozy delivered a key speech at Argonay. Conveying the truth
to the French people was the dominant theme of his speech. Sarkozy reiterated
the exceptional circumstances, also confirming that it was a global and not a
French, or European, crisis. This effectively exogenised the cause and origin of
the crisis. Building on his speech at Toulon in September, Sarkozy pinpointed
responsibility for the crisis to the faults and errors of financial institutions. In
advancing his declaration of the end of the post-Cold War capitalist world, which
was introduced in his Toulon discourse, Sarkozy announced that ‘without doubt,
this crisis will mark the true start of the twenty-first century, the moment when
everyone will understand that it was time to change’25 . At Argonay, Sarkozy
proposed the need for moralisation, transparency and protection. He announced
a new strategic investment fund of €26 billion, the appointment of Réné Ricol
to the position of National Credit Mediator and structural reforms such as opening
businesses on Sundays.
In this speech, Sarkozy framed the responsibility for the crisis as lying outside
France, but he accepted the responsibility of the French State to respond to it,
and to act sooner rather than later. He continued to advocate the idea of a summit,
in the form of a new Bretton Woods, thus reinforcing his commitment to
fundamental changes to the global financial system. Table 7.6 demonstrates a
similar media response to that of the speech at Toulon, with slightly more
agreement with his policy proposals and a majority of overall support for Sarkozy.
Le Monde illustrated such support for Sarkozy, saying that ‘it remains that the
style of Nicolas Sarkozy, sometimes disparaged, has played more in his favour’
and quoted a German diplomat who said ‘during a crisis, hyperactivity becomes
energy, arrogance becomes tenacity, unpredictability becomes pragmatism’26
(Ferenczi 2008). This demonstrated a sense of public support for Sarkozy’s












Table 7.6 Media response to Sarkozy’s 23 October 2008 speech
4 December 2008: Sarkozy’s Douai address
Sarkozy’s third key speech was delivered at Douai, where he affirmed that the
crisis was not a passing phenomenon. In this address, he also envisaged a
longer-term framing of the crisis and proposed how France would emerge from
it. In explaining the protracted nature of the global financial crisis, Sarkozy
acknowledged the looming problem of higher unemployment: ‘it is
unemployment that strikes up the crisis of confidence which precedes the
economic crisis.’27 This framed the crisis as a chain of events. The address
focused on government measures, especially in the explanation of the €26 billion
stimulus plan. The stimulus was to be spent on public sector investments and
loans for the French automotive industry, which employed, directly or indirectly,
10 per cent of the working population. Sarkozy portrayed this ‘massive
investment plan’28  as a historic responsibility to remake France in terms of
infrastructure, universities and research.
The media response to the Douai address continues the pattern of the response
to Sarkozy’s other speeches. Table 7.7 demonstrates overall support for Sarkozy,
but slightly higher disagreement with his policy proposals. Two journalists for
Le Figaro called the policy proposal in this speech ‘an arsenal of anti-crisis










Table 7.7 Media response to Sarkozy’s 4 December 2008 speech
13 January 2009: Lagarde’s optimism for the New Year
Lagarde’s 2009 New Year address was more reflective than her previous speeches.
It conveyed optimism for the year ahead. There appeared to be a deliberate
absence of explanation and accounting for the crisis in this address in order to
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focus on asserting the success of crisis management to date, as well as on future
plans. As such, with the early manifestation of the crisis behind her, Lagarde
outlined four reasons for hope in 2009, including positive economic signs such
as inflation coming down again to 1.6 per cent in November 2008, even though
it had gone as high as 3.6 per cent in July 2008. Other reasons were the induction
of a new administration in the United States led by President, Barack Obama,
and Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner; Europe retaining the unity
and international standing it had gained under the French presidency; and the
government’s actions, such as the stimulus plan. There was little discussion of
Lagarde’s New Year address in the papers analysed in this chapter, suggesting
just how much of the media spotlight on this matter was focused on Sarkozy.
Where reports were found, there was little disagreement with Lagarde’s framing










Table 7.8 Media response to Lagarde’s 13 January 2009 speech
21 January 2009: Noyer’s strategies for French and
European finance
Noyer delivered his address ‘Global financial crisis: public and private strategies
in response to the crisis’30  in the United Arab Emirates, on 21 January 2009.
This was a key speech, as Noyer readdressed two key themes of the crisis—its
nature and the policies in response to it—and delivered it in an international
location. In this speech, Noyer simplified the definition of the crisis. He called
it a crisis of liquidity that began in August 2007 and moved to affect the economy
on a large scale. Noyer noted that, in addition to a crisis of liquidity, it was also
a crisis of securitisation, where the packaging of debt into a financial product,
for the purpose of rating and trading, did not discriminate against bad debt.
After this, Noyer provided a further explanation of the crisis by describing how
the instability of financial structures had been concealed and the chain reaction
this had initiated. According to Noyer, there were two fundamental realities:
first, responsibility for the crisis was concentrated in the hands of financial
institutions; and second, in order to remedy the consequences of this, structural
innovation was necessary. Having established the causes, and thereby the
responsibility for the crisis in the financial sector, Noyer ushered in the role of
the State. According to him, the State held the responsibility to modify the policy
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budget, which in turn would restart the economic machine. Noyer referred, in
addition to the French domestic economy, to a wider plan for Europe, especially
in light of the French EU Presidency. The media response to Noyer’s address
largely ignored his framing of the causes of the crisis and his overall leadership,
although there was some disagreement about his severity framing and the policies










Table 7.9 Media response to Noyer’s 21 January 2009 speech
24 March 2009: Sarkozy’s Saint-Quentin address
At Saint-Quentin, Aisne, Sarkozy delivered the last key speech during this
chapter’s 12-month period of analysis. In this address, Sarkozy referred to values
and morality while reiterating that this was an unprecedented crisis. A notable
departure from his earlier speeches was evident in the explicit reference to public
opinion, which had manifested in protests through early 2009. Sarkozy
acknowledged this dissent, saying, ‘my task is to listen to those who protest,
but I also have the responsibility to listen to those who do not march in protest’.31
It is in this speech that one can perceive the type-3 framing at play. Sarkozy
claimed that the crisis gave new freedoms to think, to imagine, to act and to
invent France’s future. In even more straightforward terms, Sarkozy affirmed
that ‘it is necessary to benefit from the crisis’.32  Sarkozy insisted, however, that
in order to realise these freedoms and opportunities, everyone had a moral
responsibility, including himself.
Table 7.10 demonstrates that, despite continuing public protests and declining
popularity ratings, there was still overall support for Sarkozy in the media. In
the context of the speech at Saint-Quentin, Libération posed the question: ‘What
to say to reassure a public opinion which repudiates him in the opinion polls?
Speak of values and landmarks’33  (Guiral 2009b).
In contrast with earlier media responses, some articles after this speech took
electoral issues into consideration; ‘to have his nose on the crisis does not prevent
him having an eye on his campaign promises and the presidential election of
2012’34  (Cornudet 2009). With the 2012 election in mind, other articles discussed
the post-crisis era.
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After Toulon in September at the start of the crisis, Douai in December
on the stimulus plan, Saint-Quentin is supposed to open perspectives on
the post-crisis. All of these speeches are small stones scattered on the










Table 7.10 Media response to Sarkozy’s 24 March 2009 speech
4. Framing the financial crisis in France: analysis and
discussion
The very central role of Sarkozy aside, the three actors assumed markedly
different roles in the framing of the financial crisis. On the whole, however,
there was little disagreement between their crisis rhetoric. The French leaders
paid little attention to the cause of the crisis, which was explained by the
consequences of the US sub-prime crisis in a highly globalised economy, and
this explanation was questioned to a minimal extent, if at all, by the media and
the public. Rather, the framing contest in France was centred on the severity of
the crisis and the proposed measures and changes to policy.
Sarkozy’s key speeches during the 12-month period of analysis until 31 March
2009 maintained the underlying themes of opportunism and a break with the
past. The public response to Sarkozy’s framing of the crisis fluctuated between
support and opposition. While one could infer that the French population eagerly
accepted Sarkozy’s call for a new international financial order, it is necessary,
however, to consider the socialist opposition to fully understand the public
response to Sarkozy and his crisis framing. As one academic commented: ‘A
crisis in global capitalism provides the French political left with a blessed
opportunity to rebuild its strength in a country traditionally uneasy about so
many tenets of the free market ideology and always prone to revert to
state-centred solutions’ (Charnoz 2008:1). The political left in France, however,
was not able to mount a convincing or popular response to Sarkozy, especially
because the Parti Socialiste (PS) had recently been undergoing leadership changes.
Le Figaro-LCI survey for the week ending 27 November asked respondents: ‘In
your opinion, if she was in power would Martine Aubry [the newly elected
leader of the PS] do better, worse or neither better nor worse than Nicolas
Sarkozy?’ Twenty-four per cent of respondents said Aubry would do better,
31 per cent thought she would do worse and 44 per cent said neither better nor
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worse (Le Figaro-LCI Politoscope 2008:15). In comparison with his nearest
competitor, therefore, Sarkozy was viewed by some margin as doing a ‘better
job’. In a later Le Figaro-LCI survey, on 26 March 2009, respondents were
questioned specifically about Sarkozy’s crisis leadership. Only 46 per cent of
respondents said they had confidence in Sarkozy in facing the crisis (Le
Figaro-LCI Politoscope 2009:10).
The media response to Lagarde’s framing of the global financial crisis was more
difficult to determine compared with that of Sarkozy. Lagarde appeared to play
more of a spokeswoman role than participating actively in framing or crisis
exploitation. Her role was described as that of a ‘back office executive’ (de Buttet
2009). The limited visibility of Lagarde’s rhetoric in the media places greater
weight on public opinion data in order to analyse the response to her crisis
framing. Although French public opinion of Lagarde was generally quite
favourable, she won greater respect abroad than at home, where her reputation
came under increasing attack. A key point of contention was her (with hindsight
cavalier) suggestion that ‘the big risk is behind us’ (The Economist 2008), even
though financial markets were continuing to fall at the time.
There was disparity, however, between the media response and public opinion
data, because according to Paris-Match ratings in October 2008, Lagarde’s
popularity jumped by 5 points to 46 per cent, at a time when Sarkozy’s rating
remained at 44 per cent (The Economist 2008). Shortly after her key speech in
early 2009, Lagarde’s rating rose to 52 per cent in February, seemingly exempting
her from the otherwise growing public dissatisfaction (TF1 2009).
Overall, the public’s opinion of Christian Noyer was best exemplified by his
presence, or lack thereof, in the French media. Tables 7.1, 7.5 and 7.9 demonstrate
no comment or neutrality in most of the media responses after Noyer’s key
speeches. Noyer is for the most part not a visible public figure, especially in
comparison with Sarkozy. This can be attributed to two main factors. There was
the prominent presence of Sarkozy and the strong public interest in all aspects
of his energetic leadership style, especially during the French EU Presidency.
On the other hand, the role and visibility of Banque de France had diminished
significantly after the creation of the ECB (de Buttet 2009). In effect, there was
more public interest in French, and European, banking policy than in the central
bank governor himself.
In France, the government’s crisis-exploitation efforts were characterised largely
by type-3 opportunism and a concerted attempt to combine short and long-term
management strategies. During the global financial crisis, the attempt to alter
levels of political support in France was focused primarily on public policies,
situated in the bigger picture of policy reform. Effectively, a ‘crisis as
opportunity’ approach prevailed in Sarkozy’s rhetoric in particular. This crisis
framing, however, must also be considered explicitly within the context of three
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key distinctive features of the French case: French public opinion and political
culture; the lack of significant political opposition; and the wider context of the
crisis on the European, even global, stage.
French political culture: public opinion and state structure
French political culture is unique in terms of its state–citizen relationship and
has strong historical undertones that have continued to influence French politics
throughout the crisis period. According to David Bell (2002:15), ‘The French
state plays a much larger part in civil society (in both economics and social life)
than in some other countries. The state has provided a continuity in the life of
the nation and that has not been seriously challenged in the past.’ The national
leaders’ framing and utilisation of the crisis cannot be analysed in isolation from
the deep-seated traditions of French political culture, particularly with regard
to public opinion and the structure of the State. Policy proposals and state actions
were publicly questioned early in 2009 by way of unseasonal protests as the
crisis began to take hold at an increasingly individual level. The French tendency
to protest is considered quite normal, but it follows a routine whereby the months
that flank summer—May and September—tend to be the peak of the protest
season (Ganiko 2009). Nicholas Bavarez, an economic commentator, gave a
succinct explanation of this culture, referring historically to the Jacquerie
uprising of 1358, and conclusively classifying recurrent revolts and violence as
epitomising French exceptionalism36  (The Economist 2009b).
In addition to protest, the structure of the French State was a crucial contextual
factor, which influenced how the global financial crisis played out in France.
France responds badly to economic shocks partly because of a lack of civic
institutions below the State (The Economist 2009b). The highly centralised system
of governance therefore did not translate into comprehensive crisis management.
Moreover, concern about unemployment, which prompted the winter protests
(especially in the automotive industry, which at the time employed up to 10 per
cent of the working population), was influenced by the pre-crisis labour
structure. France’s two-tier labour market overly protected permanent jobs and
thus encouraged companies to hire most workers on flexible short-term contracts.
Once the crisis hit, it was these non-permanent jobs that were being shed (The
Economist 2009a). This labour structure sparked the public’s concern about
rising unemployment and the State’s inability to alleviate this. In the context
of French political culture and the history of protesting, the public response to
the global financial crisis was manifested in public protests. Therefore, French
political culture—particularly the relationship between public opinion and the
structure of the State—was one of the major contextual factors that influenced
leaders’ framing of and the public response to the global financial crisis.
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A lack of political opposition
Sarkozy’s, and to a lesser extent Lagarde’s, success in crisis framing was made
possible by a chronic lack of politically credible counter-frames. This issue,
although noticeable in the leaders’ speeches, became evident through deeper
analysis of the media response and public opinion data. The crisis-exploitation
framework set out in Chapter 2 proposes that there are two spheres of a framing
contest: the political sphere and the policy sphere. In the French case, however,
a political contest was almost non-existent at the time. As a non-political actor,
Noyer was by definition not part of the political crisis-exploitation game from
the outset. On the other hand, Sarkozy and Lagarde had political careers
potentially at stake. The Parti Socialiste, however, the key opposition party,
failed to mount a response to the framing of the crisis by Sarkozy and Lagarde.
Therefore, it is the policy crisis-exploitation matrix that is most relevant to the
French case (cf. Table 2.2, Chapter 2).
According to ‘the policy game’ and taking into consideration the opportunism
of the type-3 frame, French leadership projected an image of itself as an advocate
for change, rhetorically pressing for a policy paradigm shift, but in fact
implementing incremental change, at least in the short to mid-term. The
crisis-exploitation framework also proposes that
change-oriented players have to decide whether they feel that the crisis
has created the need and the opportunity to press for a wholesale
overturning of the policy’s ideological and/or intellectual
underpinnings…or whether to momentarily content themselves with
advocating more incremental changes. (Boin et al. 2009:90)
Public opinion, especially visible in the unusually high number of protests in
the winter months, forced Sarkozy and Lagarde to turn their attention towards
the everyday difficulties increasingly faced by the French population. This, at
least momentarily, made a ‘policy paradigm shift’ less desirable.
Consequently, the grand agenda for change, exemplified by the pre-crisis
movement for the ‘the law for economic modernisation’37  as well as Sarkozy’s
call in September 2008 for a new international financial order, was contested by
status quo players in particular change-averse, protest-minded segments of
public opinion. The policy game in France can therefore be situated in box IV
of ‘the policy game’—negotiated incremental adjustment.
France in a truly global financial crisis
Following the crisis-exploitation framework, type-3 frames attempt to endogenise
a crisis—to find fault in the present system and call for change (see Chapter 2,
this volume). The French case study is consistent with this frame to the extent
that the key players identified faults at the systemic level. At the same time,
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however, the key players exogenised the responsibility issue by using the crisis
to establish that the French State was not to blame. In terms of causality and
responsibility, there was little or no disagreement across the leaders’ speeches
and the public response. There was seamless consistency between Sarkozy,
Lagarde and Noyer, each of whom named the origins of the crisis in the US
sub-prime crisis. In effect, their narrative emphasised the global level, portraying
the French economy as mired in a financial system that, as Sarkozy highlighted,
had betrayed the values of capitalism.
With the benefit of holding the EU Presidency at a critical time, Sarkozy moved
beyond his national platform in framing the crisis. He pushed the initiative for
a global conference of the G20 nations, which was realised in November 2008
in Washington, DC, and followed up by the summit in London in early April
2009. His approach to leading the financial crisis at the regional European level
did not, however, meet with great enthusiasm in other EU member states, as
evidenced by the German Finance Minister, who ‘clearly opposed the principle
of “international macroeconomic regulation”, a line that seemed to open the way
for the French idea of a European economic government’ (Charnoz 2008:2). This
suggests that there was an underlying French agenda to push for greater economic
integration in the European Union.
Once again, the political culture of France is highly relevant here—in particular,
the French dirigiste tradition. ‘The dirigiste outlook currently goes against the
grain of globalisation and free market fashions everywhere else in the Western
world. There has, as with other Western societies, been a withdrawal of the state
since the 1980s but not to the same extent as elsewhere’ (Bell 2002:15). The
dirigiste tradition came to the fore in this crisis period. ‘Despite calls from the
Americans to do more to lift consumer demand, [the French] stimulus plan relies
heavily on front-loading investment in infrastructure…in line with their dirigiste
tradition’ (The Economist 2009c). This tradition not only reinforces the uniqueness
of the French State, it demonstrates the differences between the crisis responses
in the major economies of the world.
Sarkozy’s combined French and EU leadership during the early crisis invites an
interesting analysis of his personal leadership style that can be touched on only
briefly in this chapter. Sarkozy’s framing of the crisis was wrought with wider
policy and political implications. Moreover, Sarkozy projected an unfaltering
confidence in his own persuasive abilities. Complementary to this, Lagarde
maintained an optimistic demeanour across her key speeches and Noyer
consistently maintained support for government policy proposals. According
to McLennan (2009:2), one of the key rules in crisis leadership is confidence
before realism; leaders who succeed in times of crisis outwardly radiate
confidence, plan contingencies and ‘push forward with their gut instinct’.
Sarkozy certainly fit that bill during the period studied here.
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The French case study suggests that national leaders’ crisis framing, as well as
the public response to this, cannot be viewed in isolation from its political
context. French political culture, a lack of political opposition and the EU and
global platforms provided a valuable complement to the crisis-exploitation
analysis. In sum, national contextual factors, individual leadership style and
crisis opportunism shaped French crisis management in a truly global financial
crisis.
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1  ‘L’Union fait la force.’
2  ‘Le loi pour le modernisation de l’économie.’
3  Petites et Moyennes Entreprises.
4  ‘Un discours qui marque incontestablement le début de la phase 2 du quinquennat.’
5  ‘Coup de froid.’
6  ‘Cette situation a été à l’origine d’une généralisation de la perception selon laquelle les opportunités
d’investissement dans des actifs apparemment de bonne qualité étaient quasi illimitées et a altéré le
jugement des acteurs.’
7  ‘Un ensemble de bonnes pratiques.’
8  ‘Alors qu’en Bourse les Banques étaient sérieusement malmenées hier, la Commission bancaire…se
voulait plutôt optimiste.’
9  ‘Une crise de confiance sans précédent.’
10  ‘La crise financière…n’est pas la crise du capitalisme. C’est la crise d’un système qui s’est eloigné
des valeurs les plus fondamentales du capitalisme, qui en quelque sorte, a trahi l’esprit du capitalisme.’
11  ‘L’anticapitalisme n’offre aucune solution à la crise actuelle.’
12  ‘Le jour où il avait sonné la mobilisation contre la crise.’
13  ‘Le discours que Nicolas Sarkozy a prononcé à Toulon, le 25 septembre, marque son entrée en guerre
contre la crise.’
14  ‘Le projet de loi de programmation des finances publiques nous amène en effet jusqu’en 2012.’
15  ‘Les turbulences qui perdurent sur les marchés financiers internationaux depuis un an refletent les
conséquences d’une purge profonde du secteur financier americain.’
16  ‘La crise financière qui sévit depuis un an a finalement impacté l’économie mondiale et provoque
un net ralentissement en France.’
17  ‘30 600 postes seront supprimés dans la fonction publique contre 22 900 en 2008. C’est un peu moins
que la promesse de ne pas remplacer un fonctionnaire sur deux partant à la retraite.’
18  ‘Plan national pour assurer le financement de l’économie et restaurer la confiance.’
19  ‘La crise que nous vivons est excessive.’
20  ‘Ce que nous proposons c’est tout le contraire du plan Paulson…l’Etat americain propose de prendre
à sa charge les actifs les plus mauvais…en France, l’Etat n’achetera pas d’actifs. Il pretera aux banques.’
21  ‘Elles peuvent aussi servir à faire d’une pierre deux coups en aidant à moyen terme les enterprises
à se financer.’
22  ‘Au premier rang.’
23  ‘Grâce, notamment, au rôle leader de la France, l’Europe s’est organisée.’
24  ‘Inaudible dans une salle de 100 personnes.’
25  ‘Cette crise marqerua sans doute pour l’histoire le commencement veritable du XXIe siècle, le moment
où tout le monde aura compris qu’il était temps de changer.’
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26  ‘Reste que le style de Nicolas Sarkozy, parfois décrié, a plutôt joué en sa faveur. En période de crise,
l’hyperactivité devient de l’énergie, l’arrogance de la ténacité, l’imprévisibilité du pragmatisme.’
27  ‘C’est autour du chômage que se noue la crise de confiance qui precipite la crise économique.’
28  ‘Plan d’investissement massif.’
29  ‘Un arsenal anticrise.’
30  ‘Crise financière mondiale: stratégies publiques et privées pour faire face à la crise.’
31  ‘J’ai le devoir d’entendre ceux qui manifestent, mais j’ai également la responsabilité de ceux qui ne
défilent pas.’
32  ‘Il faut profiter de la crise.’
33  ‘Que dire pour rassurer une opinion publique qui le désavoue dans les sondages? Parler des “valeurs”,
donner des “repères”.’
34  ‘Avoir le nez sur la crise ne l’empêche pas d’avoir un œil sur ses promesses de campagne et sur
l’élection présidentielle de 2012.’
35  ‘Après Toulon en septembre, au début de la crise, Douai en décembre, sur le plan de relance,
Saint-Quentin est censé ouvrir des perspectives sur l’après-crise. Tous ces discours sont des petits
cailloux semés sur le chemin qui doit ramener Sarkozy à l’Elysée en 2012.’
36  ‘L’exception française.’
37  ‘Loi de modernisation de l’économie.’
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8. The European Union: from
impotence to opportunity?
Tully Fletcher
1. The European Union and the global financial crisis
The European Union is a curious and constantly evolving political institution
and the way in which EU leaders have managed their responses to the global
financial crisis draws out its unusual and at times opaque approach to crisis
management. Economic decision-making power is divided between the leaders
and finance ministers of the European member states through the European
Council and the Council of Ministers, the European Commission (the central
executive bureaucracy), the European Central Bank (ECB, which administers the
common monetary policy) and the increasingly powerful European Parliament
(McCormick 2005:79–91). It is often impossible to divorce the coordinated
crisis-management response of the European Union from the actions of its
constituent member states. It is also easy to underplay the significance of EU
institutions and their actions once a common position has been adopted. As the
global financial crisis struck Europe, its leaders eventually managed to overcome
their initial paralysis and weld a stronger, more systematic Europe-wide response.
The EU member states initially dealt with the crisis on an individual basis, but
by the end of 2008, the European Union’s complex array of leaders was
manoeuvring to adopt a common approach to the management of the crisis and
coordinate a strong Europe-wide response through the commission and the
Central Bank. By the end of October 2008, a ‘European Framework for Action’
had been adopted. By the end of November, a substantial multi-billion-euro
stimulus plan had been announced. A record-breaking cut was made to interest
rates in early December; and, at the G20 meeting of leading global economies in
March 2009, coordinated EU pressure had provided much of the momentum for
global agreements on new financial and banking regulation and economic stimuli.
The crisis had demonstrated the combined power of the European institutions
and provided an opportunity for Europe to develop a stronger common economic
approach.
It is in that context that this chapter assesses the meaning making of three key
actors in the European Union: the Commission President José Manuel Durão
Barroso, the Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs Joaquín Almunia,
and the President of the ECB Jean-Claude Trichet. Each of these actors was a
significant decision maker and leader within the European Union’s institutional
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framework vested with significant responsibility to respond to the economic
changes across the European Union as a whole. Until the end of 2008, the
Presidency of the European Council (often described as the EU Presidency) was
held by France and exercised by French President, Nicolas Sarkozy. Despite the
leadership potential of this latter office (Tallberg 2006), this chapter sets to one
side the deliberations of member state and ‘intergovernmental’ (that is, the
presidency) leaders and focuses on the roles of the ‘supranational’ leaders. The
Commission President is a significant, influential and vocal EU leader in his own
right (McCormick 2005:82–6; Verbeek forthcoming). This chapter found that
the European Union’s key leaders sought to frame the crisis in such a way as to
avoid harmful political blame and achieve effective economic cooperation,
substantial structural reforms in banking and finance regulation and a heightened
sense of European unity. In the process, the institutional leaders of the European
Union helped to drive a significant shift in macroeconomic ideology and policy
to a more interventionist style.
Box 8.1 The European Union’s financial crisis trajectory, July 2008
– March 2009
1 July 2008: French Presidency of the European Union begins.
3 September: The ECB cuts the growth forecast for 2009 from 1.5 per
cent to 1.2 per cent.
8 October: Central banks around the world coordinate an interest rate
cut in response to the credit crunch. The ECB cuts rates from 4.25 per
cent to 3.75 per cent.
12 October: An emergency summit is held of national leaders of the
eurozone countries. An agreement is reached regarding measures to
repair confidence, promote cooperation among European leaders and
ensure liquidity for financial institutions.
15–16 October: An EU summit is held and there are calls for reform of
the international financial system.
18 October: Commission President Barroso and current EU President,
Nicolas Sarkozy, meet with US President, George W. Bush, to discuss
the global financial crisis. A series of meetings of international leaders
to review national and international responses is established.
6 November: The ECB cuts rates from 3.75 per cent to 3.25 per cent.
7 November: EU Summit held (informal gathering of EU member state
leaders) and agrees on a common set of reform principles for the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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9 November: São Paulo, Brazil, hosts G20 meeting of finance ministers
and central bank governors, including EU member state representatives.
14 November: The eurozone officially enters recession after figures for
the European Union show a 0.2 per cent contraction of the economy in
the third quarter of 2008.
15 November: The EU-initiated G20 summit is held in Washington, DC,
bringing together 19 of the largest national economies; includes EU
representation as well as senior figures of the United Nations, the IMF,
World Bank and the Financial Stability Forum.
19 November: Memorandum of understanding signed on financial
assistance to Hungary—to provide up to €6.5 billion, with the first
€2 billion instalment released before the year’s end.
26 November: The European Commission releases the European
Economic Recovery Plan, worth €200 billion, with the goal of boosting
confidence in the financial systems and stimulating spending throughout
the European Union.
28 November: Inflation in the eurozone had been at 3.2 per cent in
October 2008, but falls to 2.1 per cent.
4 December: ECB cuts interest rate from 2.75 per cent to 2.5 per
cent—the greatest reduction since the euro currency was introduced.
11–12 December: The European Council approves the European
Economic Recovery Plan. The plan provides a common framework across
the European Union and is worth approximately €2 billion or 1.5 per
cent of the European Union’s gross domestic product (GDP).
1 January 2009: Czech Presidency of the European Union begins.
15 January: The ECB cuts eurozone interest rates a further 0.5 per cent
to 2 per cent.
26 January: Memorandum of understanding signed on financial
assistance to Latvia—to provide up to €3.1 billion assistance.
9 February: EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs
Joaquín Almunia’s article ‘Solve the toxic asset problem’ is published
in the Wall Street Journal.
1 March: EU leaders attend an informal European Council meeting and
establish an agreement on measures to deal with banks’ toxic assets
5 March: ECB announces further cuts in the interest rate—to 1.5 per
cent.
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11 March: Supplemental memorandum of understanding with
Hungary—announcing the second instalment of €2 billion (of up to €6.5
billion).
14 March: G20 finance ministers and central bank governors meet in
the United Kingdom ahead of the 2 April London G20 summit.
25 March: European Union expresses its intention to provide up to
€5 billion assistance to Romania.
2. Methodological considerations
Obtaining speeches made by the three key EU leaders during the period under
study was simple, as EU institutions keep extensive online records and key
speeches, and crisis updates were readily distinguishable from more mundane
announcements, especially during the financial crisis. It proved much more
difficult to conduct a study of media responses to those speeches that would be
on a par with those conducted for the national case studies reported elsewhere
in this volume. Perhaps reflecting the widely acknowledged knowledge deficit
(and absence of a well-established ‘public sphere’) associated with EU institutions
(McCormick 2005:135–6), the wide array of commentary and critique from
established and accessible print media readily available for national leaders is
less evident for EU institutional leaders.1  Nevertheless, some consistent but
limited press coverage of and responses to the key speeches were available in
four of the world’s most respected international English-language news sources:
The New York Times, The Financial Times, The Guardian and Reuters. All four
widely circulating sources carry large international sections and a commitment
to observing the behaviour and news of the European institutions. With the
exception of The Guardian (a noted British left-wing newspaper), all media
sources used here are relatively centrist in political terms, although The Financial
Times is skewed towards financial reporting and is pro-market. Despite their
quality, the coverage of the crisis by these sources focused on national leaders
in Europe and articles were sparse. One or two additional articles were used
from the respected American paper The Washington Post and Germany’s popular
Der Spiegel (available online in English).
To supplement the media response, the responses and attitudes of the national
leaders of the three largest European states have also been used to demonstrate
the level of consensus achieved across the European Union. As such, this chapter
includes an overview of the positions adopted by French President, Nicolas
Sarkozy (who was also the EU President until the end of 2008), German
Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. Their
positions will be compared with those adopted by the key EU institutional leaders
in order to assess the latter’s success in the ‘framing contests’ that developed
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around the global financial crisis (see Chapter 2, this volume). The leaders of
member states are as much a part of the audience for statements from EU
institutional leaders as are the EU citizenry. Of course, the obvious limitation of
this methodology is that it is entirely debatable who influences whom in the EU
structure, particularly in terms of the relationship between the European Council
and the commission. For the purposes of the analysis in this chapter, however,
the extent of success for an EU institutional leader in the framing contest has
been determined by the extent to which the views of the three key national
leaders were in concert with the EU leaders.
3. The President of the European Commission
Barroso’s key speech acts
29 October 2008: European ‘Framework for Action’
On 29 October 2008, Commission President Barroso made a set of remarks after
an extraordinary commission meeting called to provide an initial response to
the global financial crisis. His speech marked one of the commission’s first
comprehensive statements on the crisis. Barroso firmly acknowledged the crisis
and its risks and sought to portray it as an opportunity for increased European
cooperation and solidarity, and a chance to implement complementary policies
for growth and sustainability. He also flagged an upcoming and comprehensive
EU recovery plan to be presented in November.
Barroso opened by telling reporters that ‘the Commission has set out how we
can move from financial crisis to sustainable recovery’. There was no explicit
explanation of what was occurring (or why it was happening), though he briefly
described the problem as a ‘downturn’ and a threat to European employment
and economic stability. The speech dealt primarily with the management plan
Barroso set out as part of the European response to the financial crisis. He pushed
firmly for European coordination, solidarity and partnership and argued that
the EU funds designed to assist members should now be put to use. He also
reiterated the importance of the euro and suggested that the European Union
would be much worse off without the single currency.
‘We must swim together or sink together,’ Barroso said, before setting the
groundwork for the later stimulus plan:
We must keep unemployment to the absolute minimum and support
those who have lost their jobs. We will review how we can reinforce the
effectiveness of the Globalisation Adjustment Fund. We will encourage
Member States to re-programme funds under the European Social Fund,
to support measures to quickly get unemployed people back into work.
I also want to work with Member States to see if we can build on the
progress already made under the Lisbon Strategy to help people, in
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particular unemployed people, to start up new businesses quickly and
cheaply.
The president also suggested that the European response to the crisis should
take into account priorities in energy efficiency and climate change mitigation:
There is scope to provide new opportunities for the economy, including
for small and medium-sized enterprises [SMEs] while at the same time
helping the EU to meet other objectives, like those I have mentioned on
climate change…For example, investment in energy efficiency in
buildings can provide opportunities for the construction sector while
contributing to tackling climate change.
Though Barroso did not play the blame game in the statement, there was a clear
inference that the crisis had exogenous causes. Barroso rhetorically accepted
responsibility to act but not fault. The president framed the crisis as an exogenous
event through which Europe might be further united: ‘Europe will come through
this economic storm and emerge stronger’.
26 November 2008: the stimulus plan
The themes of the European Framework for Action statement of the previous
month were continued when President Barroso announced the €200 billion
economic stimulus package in the European Economic Recovery Plan in Brussels
on 26 November 2008. Barroso was more explicit this time in outlining his view
of the risk presented by the financial crisis:
Business as usual is not an option. That would lead to a vicious
recessionary cycle. It would lead to falling purchasing power and falling
tax revenues, to rising unemployment and the accompanying human
misery, to ever wider budget deficits, ultimately to a risk of social
instability. That is the lesson of the 1930s.
He also presented a qualification, however, on the nature of the stimulus package
and warned that
short-term spending without structural reform and without a smart
strategy for investing and paying back the borrowing can fuel a
downward spiral of debt and unemployment in the future. The cost of
fighting this crisis must not be a worse crisis in the future as we struggle
to deal with a hangover of debt.
Again, there was no particular apportionment of responsibility for causing the
crisis, but there was a detailed plan for management of the crisis through various
proposals for structural reform including measures to create labour demand,
enhanced finance access for businesses, improved energy efficiency, high-speed
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internet and increased investment in research and development in the green
manufacturing sector.
Again, Barroso attempted to frame the crisis as an opportunity for greater
European integration and cooperation: ‘The full extent of the benefits of
individual Member States’ fiscal measures will only be reaped if they are part
of a co-ordinated European response’. The emerging theme in Barroso’s
commentary on the crisis was that the crisis was serious, but presented a
significant opportunity to implement reforms that had been long considered.
His tone was one of optimism and confidence and he sought to portray the
European Union as an active player doing everything it could to address the
crisis, in what Chapter 2 of this volume would characterise as a strong, type-3
framing statement:
In all crises there lies also opportunity. And there is an opportunity now,
for Member States and European institutions, indeed for European
citizens, to understand that acting together, we can make the most of
the instruments we have at national and Community level. We can
succeed, not only for the good of Europe and European citizens, but also
for the good of the world…There are no miracle solutions and it will not
happen overnight. But I believe Europe will come through this economic
storm and emerge stronger.
25 February 2009: banking regulation
After the commission meeting on 25 February 2009, Barroso emerged to announce
that the commission would be seeking to strengthen banking supervision across
the union and to develop new levels of European cooperation in finance generally.
This time the president was less circumspect about the apportionment of blame
and squarely laid the blame for the crisis at the feet of ‘hubris’ in the banking
and finance sector:
The crisis has shown why we must deepen our supervisory cooperation
at EU level. Why we must have better crisis management systems. Why
we must be able to have a basic core set of high level rules—both
regulatory and supervisory—that are rigorously applied to all firms, by
top class supervisors. Why we must avoid what Jacques de Larosière
calls chacun pour soi solutions—everyman for himself—with no concern
whatsoever about the neighbours. That is not good enough. It never
was. And now it is totally unacceptable…Workers and families across
Europe and the world have suffered the consequences of hubris in the
financial markets. Citizens expect us to change the rules of the game and
the way the game operates. We must not let citizens down.
Barroso reiterated his position that the correct approach to the management of
the crisis was through increased European cooperation and noted that this was
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especially important in the lead-up to the approaching G20 summit. A consistent
framing pattern had emerged in which Barroso either implied or explicitly
deflected causal responsibility (though it could have been argued that the
European Union had failed to adequately regulate and supervise the financial
and banking sector before the emergence of the crisis), but portrayed an active
and comprehensive European response designed to address and mitigate the
effects of the crisis.
31 March 2009: the G20
Barroso’s championing of European coherence reached new heights on 31 March
2009 just before the G20 meeting:
The G20 will not end this crisis overnight. But it can, it must, it will,
make a difference. For the first time ever in an economic crisis, the world
is working together—and not against each other. The European Union
is leading by example. There is convergence around the EU’s common
position. We have a unique opportunity to re-shape globalisation.
He argued that ‘the EU was the first to act. For example on credit rating agencies,
on capital requirements, on deposit guarantees. The Commission will very soon
take action on hedge funds, private equity and remuneration’. This was grand
(and likely hyperbolic) language, which rhetorically placed the European Union
at the centre of things.
Again, the president was much less circumspect about attributing the blame for
the financial crisis, highlighting a lack of market ethics and inadequate regulation
of hedge funds, credit ratings agencies, accounting standards, remuneration,
tax havens and ‘uncooperative’ jurisdictions. The proactivity of Barroso’s
proposals and the commission’s position neatly sidestepped any question of
prior failure to act on Europe’s part.
Media responses to Barroso’s framing
There was little coverage in the chosen media of the earlier ‘framework for action’
and Barroso’s approach to the G20 summit; however, there was a substantial
media response to the commission’s European Economic Recovery Plan. The
New York Times reported the stimulus package on 26 November 2008 with a
relatively supportive tone, quoting Barroso extensively. The New York Times
also quoted a leading economist who, approvingly, noted that the package was
‘more ambitious’ than had been expected. Some cynicism was expressed about
German cooperation with the plan and the possibility of complete European
cooperation (Castle and Jolly 2008).
In contrast, The Guardian took a more sceptical stance, noting that the
commission’s plan was designed to ‘seize the initiative’ after lagging behind the
responses of other countries: ‘Barroso and the Commission have come under
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criticism in recent weeks for being behind the curve on the financial meltdown
and the depressing economic climate. Today’s proposals appeared to be an
attempt to catch up’ (Traynor 2008) This contradicted Barroso’s claim that the
commission’s response so far had been active and comprehensive. The Guardian’s
report also criticised the stimulus package for being ‘unclear’ on everything
from where the money was coming from to whether it would work at all. Finally,
the report suggested that the plans were less an European Commission initiative
and more of a repackaging of measures already announced by Germany and
Spain.
The Guardian was also scathing of the European Union’s proposals for an increase
in banking regulation, noting on 24 February 2009 that ‘the hedge fund and
private equity industry will this week launch a last-ditch effort to head off EU
moves to impose draconian regulation in the wake of the continuing financial
crisis’ (Gow 2009). The story drew attention to the significant divisions at the
top of the commission’s governance structure, driven by French, German and
British disagreement about the reach and extent of proposed regulation. Though
Barroso had called for cooperation generally, he had not alluded in his
announcement to the existence of pervasive political divisions (Traynor 2008).
The key framing contest here seemed to be whether the European Commission
had acted promptly or appropriately in response to the crisis. Though it did not
appear to be strongly challenged by the media, Barroso himself certainly engaged
in a consistent portrayal of the crisis as a key opportunity to implement a raft
of structural economic reforms and bring forward planned investments and
policy changes. Skirting over considerable disagreement among member states
about the size and nature of stimuli packages as well the regulatory implications
of the crisis that were in plain view, he tried—with some success—to muster
political will and public support for concerted action at the European level.
4. EU Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs
Almunia’s key speech acts
11 November 2008: a recipe for recovery
On 11 November 2008, Commissioner Almunia gave a speech to the second
Brussels International Economic Forum titled ‘A recipe for recovery: the European
response to the financial crisis’. Almunia was explicit in identifying the crisis
and its causes, arguing that
after the period of excess and risk accumulation in the financial sector,
we are now living through a painful market correction. The financial
system is enduring a phase of severe deleveraging, characterised by
dysfunctional credit markets, unprecedented write-downs in asset
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valuations, generalised risk aversion, and threats to the stability of the
banking sector.
He went on to state that ‘from the beginning’, Europe had taken ‘decisive action’
with an injection of capital into credit-starved banking institutions and cutting
interest rates and the unprecedented level of coordination across Europe in the
response. The commissioner also argued (and perhaps pre-empted comments
about hindsight and lack of action) that ‘the last months have exposed the
weaknesses in our financial systems’.
In terms of the proposed management of the crisis, Almunia echoed many of the
commission president’s stated priorities and argued for long-term reforms in
increased research and development, projects for a green economy, energy
efficiency and a strong and coordinated European response. Almunia, however,
also had another priority and argued for the preservation of the free-trade area
in Europe and an aggressive international campaign against protectionism and
barriers to global trade:
We also need to work together to prevent protectionism from taking
hold. In developed and developing countries alike, economic nationalism
is on the rise and the benefits of globalisation are being questioned
following the crisis. This is understandable. But history tells us that it
is a dangerous tendency, one that can turn a downturn into a protracted
and more severe problem…It is vital that we in Europe reaffirm our
commitment to the principle of openness and lead by example. We must
uphold the competition rules that underpin the Single Market and come
out strongly against trade barriers.
In general, Almunia framed the crisis as one with exogenous causes (inadequately
regulated international financial institutions), but accepted (as did Barroso)
responsibility to address the underlying factors and treat the symptoms of the
crisis. These were to be achieved with European cooperation and increased
supervision, but avoiding protectionist measures.
25 February 2009: interview with The Financial Times
On 25 February, Commissioner Almunia granted a wide-ranging interview with
The Financial Times (see Atkins and Barber 2009). He did not discuss the crisis
or its causes specifically but rather assessed the European management of the
crisis and some of the challenges it presented. He was more circumspect than
the commission president on the effect of the European stimulus and noted that
the ‘degree of co-ordination could be seriously improved…I don’t say the present
fiscal stimulus is useless at all. But the efficiency of the stimulus will be increased
if the degree of co-ordination is improved’.
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Almunia made the inference that the poorly regulated finance and banking sector
(including tax havens) was to blame and expressed his support for stronger and
‘broader’ financial regulation:
The financial system will be more regulated. This will mean less leverage,
less flexibility in the financial system, and less influence for the financial
system in the aggregated results of our economy…Either we accept that
our growth will be lower than in the past because the stimulus from the
financial sector will be smaller.
He also noted, however, that the present level of direct state intervention in
banks would be temporary and that, in time, ‘capitalism’ would return to business
as usual: ‘I don’t think we’ll go back to the high level of state intervention and
public regulation in industry or other sectors’. The commissioner seemed to be
striking an almost apologetic tone, clearly regretting the changes that were being
made and the increased level of government intervention in the economy, but
still supporting the necessity of the measures being put in place.
4 May 2009: spring forecast
On 4 May 2009, Almunia delivered his spring forecast on the economic and
financial state of the union and its key institutions. The forecast opened with a
‘nutshell’ summary that provided a neat synopsis of the commissioner’s frame
of the crisis:
Intensification of financial crisis and sharp contraction in world trade
drove global and EU economies into recession; Financial markets
gradually stabilising, but remain fragile; Ambitious EU and government
action key to achieving stabilisation towards end 2009 and moderate
growth in 2010; [and] Leading indicators provide some positive signals.
The commissioner called the financial crisis Europe’s ‘deepest and most
widespread recession since World War II’, but he attributed a gradual
stabilisation to the ‘swift and massive intervention’ of the European Community
through the European Economic Recovery Plan. Almunia noted that the
projections were for a recovery in the coming quarters thanks to the fiscal
stimulus measures, the bank rescue plans and monetary easing. He also argued
that the fiscal stimuli should continue into the future in order to effectively
manage the crisis over time. Essentially, the framing sought here was that the
crisis had exogenous causes, but was being dealt with effectively by European
authorities.
Media responses to Almunia’s framing
Overall, explicit and systematic coverage of Almunia’s speeches was poor; his
public visibility when addressing the European Union’s handling of the global
financial crisis outside Brussels was largely eclipsed by that of Commission
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President Barroso. In response to Almunia’s ‘recipe for recovery’ speech on
11 November 2008, The Financial Times called into question the commission’s
claim to be pioneering the proposed measures. Though Almunia (like Barroso)
claimed much of the credit for the European response, The Financial Times noted
that:
Economists said some governments were already proceeding along the
lines suggested by Mr Almunia. The ruling coalition in Germany, for
example, wants to offer tax incentives for the installation of
energy-efficient home heating systems or the purchase of cars emitting
lower levels of carbon dioxide. (Barber 2008)
The Financial Times journalist also suggested that the individual EU governments
had taken the lead in drawing up the main emergency rescue measures for the
banking sector, though the commission had been responsible for some of the
subsequent specific details (Barber 2008). The contest here appeared to be over
whether the commission had in fact been providing leadership in the crisis or
whether it had just adopted measures already being undertaken and claimed
them as its own.
5. The President of the European Central Bank
Trichet’s key speech acts
4 December 2008: cutting interest rates
At the press conference after a meeting of the governors of the ECB, President
Trichet announced a decision to cut interest rates by 75 basis points (the biggest
cut the ECB had ever made) after two 50-point reductions in the previous two
months. This was the direct response to what the ECB had identified as a
significant reduction in inflation, attributed to the ‘intensifying and broadening’
financial crisis. Pointing to ‘global economic weakness’, Trichet told journalists:
The economic outlook remains surrounded by an exceptionally high
degree of uncertainty. Risks to economic growth lie on the downside.
They relate mainly to the potential for a more significant impact on the
real economy of the turmoil in financial markets, as well as concerns
about protectionist pressures and possible disorderly developments
owing to global imbalances.
Like the two commissioners, Trichet highlighted the need for disciplined and
uniform policymaking across the European Union. The purpose of this was,
Trichet said, to preserve fragile public confidence in the economy. Throughout
his comments, Trichet too sought to outsource any blame for the crisis while
adopting responsibility for addressing the symptoms of the problem and framing
the European response as a policy success.
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9 January 2009: paradigm change
In January 2009, Trichet went a lot further when he addressed a round table at
the International Colloquium. In a reflective speech, he focused on what he
portrayed as the underlying causes and key solutions to the crisis. He pointed
to the responsibility of international financiers:
The current crisis stands out because it is affecting the heart of the global
financial system. Its root cause was a widespread undervaluation of risk
in the global financial system, especially in the most advanced economies.
This included an underestimation of the quantity of risk financial
institutions took upon themselves and an underpricing of the unit of
risk. Risk was underpriced because, among other things, financial market
participants largely extrapolated ongoing trends and the very low levels
of volatility in financial markets and in the real economies going forward.
The European Union had, in contrast (according to Trichet), ‘reacted promptly’
and in a coordinated manner to prevent ‘contagion’. The ECB President further
hammered financial firms and argued that short-term thinking and excessive
risk taking were directly to blame for the crisis:
Among financial market participants (traders, managers, risk committees
and boards of directors alike) for a long time there has been an excessive
focus on short-term profits to the detriment of longer-term business
performance. This has resulted in excessive risk-taking and, particularly,
an underestimation of low probability risks stemming from excessive
leverage and concentration.
He also outlined his views about the appropriate response and called for increased
transparency and regulation in the banking sector. Like his colleagues at the
commission, Trichet praised the European institutions for their quick action:
The swiftness and the magnitude of the decisions taken by central banks
as regards the supply of liquidity and the decisive actions taken by
governments and parliaments as regards recapitalisation in the financial
sector and the provision of guarantees have proved effective in avoiding
a meltdown of global finance.
He concluded by arguing that the necessary response to the present situation
was to engage in a ‘paradigm change’ in the global economy, away from
short-term thinking to an approach based on ‘medium and long-term
sustainability’ (but was otherwise low on the specifics of such an alternative
‘paradigm’). Again, the dominant framing sought was one of exogenous
responsibility but a ‘domestic’ opportunity and responsibility to enact a new
regulatory system and a success story so far for the European response.
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27 April 2009: Chatham House speech
As the pressures of a collapsing European economy mounted, Trichet became
even less circumspect when he addressed the Chatham House Global Financial
Forum on 27 April 2009. He now blamed the crisis squarely on the finance and
banking sector’s ‘unfettered speculation and financial gambling’ instead of the
management of ‘genuine’ economic risk. Though ‘financial liberalisation and
financial innovation had made a significant contribution to the economy’, there
had been a simultaneous weakening of the screening procedures for credit,
which had resulted in a decline in underwriting standards and lending
responsibility.
Trichet told his audience that the ECB’s main response to the crisis was to lower
interest rates, followed by a guarantee for European banks designed to back up
liquidity. There was an imperative to manage the crisis and improve productivity
by increasing and maintaining public confidence in the euro and the European
economy. Trichet said that ensuring the continued viability of Europe’s banks
was his primary concern and a foundation for potential recovery. In all, this
third speech was less of an exercise in self-praise than his previous ‘paradigm
change’ speech and more of an apportionment of (exogenous) blame and plans
for mitigation.
Media response to Trichet’s framing
The New York Times lauded the ‘historic pace’ of the reduction in interest rates
across the globe, but especially in Europe, in an article on 4 December 2008
(Dougherty 2008). The article also highlighted divisions between Trichet, the
European Commission and European governments over the pace of change. It
suggested that despite the unprecedented reduction in rates, ‘The European
Central Bank’s reluctance to outline a more forceful strategy for the future
exposes it to the charge that it is underestimating the severity of the downturn,
and that it is passing on opportunities to get ahead of it, analysts said’ (Dougherty
2008).
At the press conference for the reduction in ECB interest rates itself, Trichet
faced questions about whether such a significant reduction might have a
detrimental impact on market confidence (which he claimed was his primary
concern), and whether his focus as the President of the ECB on rates alone was
too narrow to appropriately address the crisis.
The primary framing contest over the ECB’s interest rate cut (the only one of
Trichet’s three key statements analysed here to attract significant media attention
in the sources used) was in regard to the reduction in rates and whether this
represented an appropriate response. Furthermore, questions seemed to exist
about whether the rate cut was substantial enough or even too substantial. More
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broadly, Trichet appeared to work hard to characterise the crisis as the result
of excessive risk taking in the financial sector.
6. Member state leaders: the road to collaboration
As discussed earlier in this chapter, it is impossible to divorce decision making
at the EU institutional level from the thoughts and actions of leaders of the
member states, particularly the larger states such as France, Germany and the
United Kingdom. The leaders of those three key EU member states are used here
to shine additional light on the public and political impacts of Barroso’s,
Almunia’s and Trichet’s efforts to frame the severity, causes and implications
of the crisis in particular ways.
French President Sarkozy, German Chancellor Merkel and British Prime Minister
Brown demonstrated a remarkable consistency of views in the public arena once
the initial ‘cascade’ of hasty national decisions to guarantee bank deposits had
run its course. From late 2008 onwards, more coordination took place at the EU
level, especially in the lead-up to the G20 summit. Initially, however, there was
significant disagreement about the size and necessity of stimulus packages and
the extent of new banking regulation, with Germany holding out for a more
fiscally conservative line. As the New Year rolled over, however, the extent of
agreement on the necessity for European cooperation on new regulation and
stimulus and the need to rethink the commitment to unrestrained markets became
remarkable. The statements of the various national leaders mirror that evolution.
As early as September 2008, The Washington Post had reported on a speech that
Sarkozy had given in Toulon (see also Windle, this volume), in which the French
President had
joined a broad spectrum of European leaders and commentators who
have interpreted the financial crisis as a death knell for the current
financial markets and banking systems. Their comments sometimes have
betrayed an ‘I told you so’ sentiment, after years during which US
officials suggested that many of Europe’s economic problems stemmed
from an excess of regulation and government intervention. (Cody 2008)
As the crisis gathered pace in September, Merkel’s rhetoric was strongly geared
towards harsh criticism of policymaking in Washington. Her government rejected
the need to provide a stimulus package or bailout for the German financial system
(Der Spiegel 2008). And, in early December, while Brown, Sarkozy and Barroso
all called for more cooperation between EU leaders to respond to the economic
crisis, Merkel continued to resist the need for a stimulus package and refused
to commit to funding the commission’s stimulus plan. ‘Merkel has said for the
past 10 days that she would not join in a race to spend billions of taxpayers’
euros as one way to stimulate the economy and instead would take her time and
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assess what short- and long-term measures to take’ (Werdigier and Dempsey
2008).
By late January 2009, however, Germany had implemented a stimulus package
of its own and was supporting the European stimulus plan. It was now in lockstep
with France and Britain in calling for tighter regulation of financial markets and
increased European cooperation (Connolly 2009; Fincher 2009). It was a major
U-turn, and it was clear that Merkel’s government had given in to economic
reality and EU pressure. By the time the G20 summit rolled around towards the
end of March 2009, Germany, France and Britain had all adopted the same policy
response to the crisis, as separate states and as part of the EU institutions. It was
clear that all three leaders had adopted a joint enthusiasm for government
intervention in the economy, including intensive European cooperation. Their
rhetoric began to reflect this. It appeared more likely that they had been
convinced by each other, rather than by Barroso, but nonetheless it was clear
that the key European leaders had come to accept the crisis framing and policy
stances that had been adopted consistently by the EU institutional leaders early
on.
7. Conclusions: the power of rhetoric or the power of
interdependence?
The three key EU players attempted to mobilise support for major, closely
coordinated policy change in response to the crisis. Barroso, Almunia and Trichet
all identified the crisis as a profound event with exogenous causes. There was
a consistent pattern of attempting to apportion blame for the crisis to excessive
risk taking and the unrestrained capitalistic behaviour of private banks and
financial institutions, studiously avoiding mention of any regulatory deficiencies
either at the EU or the national level (for example, the allegedly ‘soft’ UK system
of banking regulation, which had tolerated and even encouraged precisely that
kind of behaviour). The assessment of the severity of the crisis was also consistent
across the three EU protagonists: they identified and expressed the global
financial crisis as a significant risk to the existing economic structure and to
growth, productivity and employment. All three made credible statements about
what the crisis meant for Europe, across the months sampled here.
In general, though some media coverage was critical of the success or timeliness
of the European Union’s decision making and policy program, it appears that
the message of key opportunities for substantial structural change and increased
European cooperation and coordination broke through, and gained traction
among the media and the leaders of three key member states discussed above.
The best proof of this came from the unified approach taken by the European
Union at the G20 summit after successful cooperation before the event. The
available coverage of the European response to the crisis revealed few complaints
that the commission and the ECB had failed to act appropriately or that the
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European Union’s stated goals of increased regulation and European cooperation
were not the universally favoured outcomes. Each of the European leaders had
acted decisively, on a broad scale, and in tune with their EU colleagues and the
commission.
The remarkable turnaround in German political opinion on how best to address
the crisis and the consistent pattern of exogenous blame shifting and type-3
opportunity-seeking rhetoric from the EU institutional leaders and the three key
member state leaders could be construed as evidence of how successful these
actors were in framing the crisis and creating their desired meaning. It was
someone else’s fault (the United States, the financial sector) and the commitment
to free markets had to be reconsidered where a clear need existed for the
European Union and EU member states to directly intervene in their economies
to address the crisis.
The most substantial gain achieved by the three EU actors during the period
analysed by this chapter was an increased level of European cooperation on the
functions of the banking and finance system. Each time a leader made a speech
or a statement, the primary stated cause of the crisis was the various failures of
the international banking and finance system, and each time a solution was
proposed it was either a temporary stabilisation measure or a substantial and
pan-European structural reform designed to reduce the potential for a repeat
crisis. As the timeline moved forward, it became clear that a consensus had
emerged that strong collective regulatory action was an appropriate response
to the crisis. The rhetoric strongly suggested that a substantial paradigm shift
had occurred in the political and policy realm: for the Europeans, there was a
new mandate for government intervention in the economy and a new legitimacy
for European Union-wide economic action. What is less clear, however, is whether
these shifts occurred because of the inherent persuasiveness of the EU actors’
discourse. Perhaps, in line with Lindberg and Scheingold’s (1970) classic
statement on the pivotal role of crises in forging European integration, member
state leaders came to the party because the sheer pressure of economic realities
left them with little room to manoeuvre.
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1 The effort to construct a media analysis in this case was hampered partly by practical difficulties.
The author is monolingual and, while a combination of leading national papers and magazines in the
main member states (such as Le Monde, Le Soir, Frankfurter Allgemeine and Der Spiegel) would constitute
a credible proxy of ‘European public opinion’, their English-language web sites were either limited in
their coverage or had inadequate search engines.
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Part IV. No hiding place: the meltdown
and the Asia-Pacific region

9. Australia: ‘the lucky country’ on a
knife edge
Matthew Laing and Karen Tindall
1. Batten down the hatches
In October 2008, the All Ordinaries, Australia’s oldest share index, having
reached an all-time high in late 2007, went into free fall. By March 2009, it had
halved in value—a record low. As the other polities studied in this volume fell
into recession, the Australian public watched on, increasingly feeling the effects
of the downturn. The lack of government debt and the apparent resilience of
Australia’s economy—tied as it was to the still-booming China—provided reasons
for hope. As the crisis hit an increasing number of Australia’s trading partners,
however, the pinch was increasingly felt. Together, this highlighted the
challenges leaders faced when trying to convince the public not to lose confidence
in the economy. When in June 2009 the Rudd Government was able to declare
that ‘Australia is the only advanced economy as of today not in recession’, the
policy of pre-emptively tackling the economic downturn appeared to be
vindicated.
Throughout these tense months, maintaining business and public confidence
was a key concern of Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, Treasurer Wayne
Swan, and Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) Glenn Stevens. They
sought to articulate the crisis to key stakeholders and the broader Australian
public, to contain the crisis, to create support for the unprecedented measures
they were taking and potentially to use it to their advantage. This chapter
examines their public leadership during this period.
The Rudd Government had been in power since December 2007. In this period,
several high-profile events abroad served to raise alarm bells in Australia. Three
months before Rudd assumed office, the United Kingdom had experienced the
most severe run on a bank in more than a century, and three months into Rudd’s
first term US investment bank Bear Stearns collapsed. The Australian economy
was experiencing a continuing resource boom and, consequently, the RBA
continued to raise rates to keep a lid on inflation (maintaining a 7.25 per cent
interest rate until September 2008). Meanwhile, the US Federal funds rate was
approaching zero and central banks around the world had begun to reduce their
own rates. With increasingly dire economic news from abroad, Australians were
watching the storm clouds gather. By September 2008, the crisis was well and
truly on Australia’s doorstep.
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Box 9.1 Australia’s financial crisis trajectory, March 2008 – March
2009
4 March 2008: Interest rates peak at 7.25 per cent, the RBA stating that
there is a need to control inflation and slow growth.
20 March: Australian investment group Opes Prime collapses—the first
victim in Australia of the global financial crisis.
10 April: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that Australia
will not suffer from the same slump in growth rates that other nations
will as a result of the global slowdown.
14 May: The ‘responsible’ and ‘inflation fighting’ 2008 federal budget
is handed down in surplus. Beechwood, the largest home builder in New
South Wales, collapses.
16 May: The All Ordinaries rises above 6000 points, driven by growth
in mining stocks. Three days later, the Australian dollar hits a 24-year
high of 95.71 US cents.
June: Australia is defying global trends, with gross domestic product
(GDP) growing 0.4 per cent in the June quarter.
3 July: Borrowing for housing drops to its lowest rate since 1991.
10 July: The All Ordinaries drops below 5000 points on the back of
investor concern about global recession.
25 July: The National Australia Bank (NAB) announces a write-down
of almost $900 million worth of residential mortgage-backed securities.
Within days, the ANZ Bank announces similar losses.
6 August: Consumer confidence levels and home-loan approvals are
found to be in historic decline.
20 August: Opposition Leader, Malcolm Turnbull, claims that ‘talking
the economy down’ by the government has had a deleterious effect on
economic confidence.
2 September: The RBA cuts the cash rate back to 7 per cent.
15 September: The RBA injects $1.3 billion into the financial sector.
Treasurer Swan warns that Australia will not be immune from the effects
of the financial crisis.
16 September: Prime Minister Rudd states that the global financial crisis
still has ‘a long way to run yet’ as the Australian dollar falls to 12-month
lows and the share market falls to four-year lows.
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18–21 September: Chaos on Wall Street starts another wave of dramatic
tumbles at the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). The Federal Government
places a ban on the short-selling of stock.
26 September: In an address to the United Nations General Assembly,
Rudd calls for a global response to the financial crisis
7 October: The RBA slashes interest rates to 6 per cent.
10 October (Black Friday): The All Ordinaries takes a 21-year record
dive of 8.2 per cent to 3939, and $87 billion is wiped off the value of the
ASX.
14 October: Rudd announces a $10.4 billion stimulus package to help
Australia avoid going into recession.
24 October: Investment giant Babcock & Brown goes into trading
insolvency.
November: Major companies Allco Finance, Freightlink and ABC
Learning go bankrupt.
4 November: The RBA cuts rates to 5.25 per cent.
16 November: G20 Washington Summit announces the six-point
economic plan. Rudd reiterates the need for international responses at
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting the next week.
21 November: The All Ordinaries sinks to a new low of 3235.
December: Australia’s GDP growth rate contracts in the December
quarter, falling to –0.5 per cent.
2 December: The RBA cuts its interest rate to 4.25 per cent.
8 December: The ANZ job advertisement survey and NAB business
confidence index fall to their lowest levels since the 1991 recession.
January 2009: Unemployment rises to 4.8 per cent; building approvals
fall almost 13 per cent nationally.
21 January: BHP Billiton lays off 3300 workers.
1 February: Swan announces that a budget deficit is now ‘inevitable’.
3 February: The cash rate reaches a historic low of 3.25 per cent. The
government announces the $42 billion National Building and Jobs Plan.
March: Unemployment hits a four-year high at 5.7 per cent; GDP
recovers to 0.4 per cent.
13 March: The All Ordinaries hits its lowest point in nearly six years at
3052.
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26 March: The RBA announces its belief that the economic stimulus
package is working.
2. Methodological considerations
This chapter follows the methodology laid out in Chapter 2. Twelve key speeches
were chosen—four from each leader—from the period late March 2008 to March
2009. The speeches were selected primarily on their direct relevance to the crisis
and the amount of coverage they received. Where possible, however, effort was
made to include a spread of dates, thereby allowing insight into the evolution
of the leaders’ frames.
To gain a sense of the counter-frames and framing contests in Australia, this
chapter considers a key sample of print media. The three prominent newspapers
selected for analysis—The Australian, The Age and the Australian Financial
Review (AFR)—were chosen for a number of analytical reasons. Fairfax owns
two of the papers (the AFR and The Age), while News Corporation owns the
other (The Australian). The AFR, a national paper, is the most prominent business
daily, with an average daily circulation of 90,000 (92,000 on the weekend)
(Australian Press Council 2008). Although its circulation was not as high as some
of the other major broadsheets, its focus on economics and finance was desirable
for this project. The Australian, with a circulation of 136,000 (301,000 on the
weekend) (Australian Press Council 2008), has a centre-right editorial outlook
and is the only other major national paper, often featuring more commentary
on economic matters than the metropolitan dailies. The Age, with a circulation
of 208,000 (and an average of 228,000 on the weekend) (Australian Press Council
2008), considered to be left-wing or centre-left, is a Melbourne-based paper
circulated in other major centres.
Within seven days after each address, all references to the speech or its
substantive content were extracted from these three publications and analysed.
The extent of agreement with Rudd’s, Swan’s or Stevens’ framing of the severity,
causality, proposed policy and overall support for the speaker is discussed after
each speech section. Using this qualitative analysis as a general indicator, it is
possible to gain a sense of the responses to each speech and to identify the main
framing battlegrounds. Public opinion data from Essential Research, Newspoll,
Nielson and GlobeScan were also used to provide a contextual backdrop and,
where applicable, were taken into account as indicators of the public’s response
to the leaders’ framing.
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3. Crisis exploitation and elite rhetoric in Australia
31 March 2008: the Prime Minister and the crisis abroad
Kevin Rudd had been Prime Minister for nearly four months when he embarked
on the first major trip of his administration, arriving in the United States just
weeks after the failure of Bear Sterns. Though Australia had to that point
remained relatively unaffected by the sub-prime crisis, the shock collapse of
Australian investment group Opes Prime on 28 March had begun to raise
questions about the underlying stability of the Australian financial system (Urban
2008).
Speaking before the US Chamber of Commerce in Washington, DC, the Prime
Minister summarised the Australian position by describing the ‘current global
financial crisis’ as one of ‘powerful cross-currents’. He described Australians as
‘acutely aware’ of the financial crisis and spoke strongly of its ‘gravity’. His
reporting of the Australian economy in the speech was, however, rosy, and he
spoke at length about its sustained growth and strong fundamentals.
‘Cross-currents’, it seems, was a convenient turn of phrase here to reconcile the
US and European economic turmoil with the boom conditions still being
experienced in Australia. He highlighted the role that China and the developing
economies had played in this regard.
The Prime Minister pinpointed cheap credit and the subsequent re-pricing of
risk as chief causes of the crisis. A long period of economic expansion in the
financial sector had led to ‘lending extended without sufficient attention to risk’.
The sophistry of lending instruments had outpaced the market’s ability to
understand and appraise them and the innate uncertainty of the situation had
amplified the crisis by discouraging investors and recovery. Rudd chose not to
assign blame to any particular government or body, instead treating the
developments as somewhat of a fait accompli stemming from cycles of economic
behaviour and the increasing complexity of international finance. He was also
quick to point out the strong and well-regulated nature of the Australian financial
system, implying at least that no blame for the crisis could be traced to Australia.
That explanation neatly dovetailed with his conclusion that the solution was ‘a
global response by our national regulators to a global crisis’. Though he
recognised only minor implications for the Australian economy, his enthusiasm
for participating in a global economic response was unequivocal. Australia was
and would be participating at every level in formulating an international
regulatory response: ‘we must be an active participant in a coherent global
economic response’ (emphasis added).
Though the speech itself did not grab the headlines in Australia, its theme did
not escape media commentary amid broader attention given to the Prime
Minister’s search for a ‘global role’ (Flitton 2008; Shanahan and Marris 2008;
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Walker 2008). The Australian’s editorial commenting on the speech broadly
agreed with Rudd’s sentiments on the limited severity and unforeseeable cause
of the crisis in Australia. It was, however, at best lukewarm about his policy
response, admonishing governments not to be ‘over-eager to find ways to get
involved’ in fiscal regulation (The Australian 2008a) and seeing the speech more
cynically as part of a continuing strategy by the Prime Minister to eke out an
increased global role for Australia (The Australian 2008b). The AFR went a step
further; while supporting the free-trade aspects of the speech, it too was mildly
critical of expanded prudential regulation (AFR 2008a; S. Turnbull 2008).
2 June 2008: the Treasurer’s post-budget assessment of
the global crisis
In June, three weeks after handing down his first budget, Wayne Swan presented
a statement on Australia’s financial stability to the House of Representatives.
Although the US sub-prime crisis was yet to truly affect Australia, this speech
represented one of the first tangible policy moves to address it. Swan’s office
simultaneously posted four media releases on policies summarised in this speech,
regarding global ‘outreach meetings’, guarantees for depositors, continuing the
four-pillars policy and the implementation of recommendations by an
international body.
Swan highlighted the deterioration of the situation in the United Kingdom and
the United States in the previous year. While acknowledging that ‘to a much
lesser extent, Australia also saw some of the impact’, Swan played down the
severity and externalised the causality. According to Swan, Australia had been
impacted by the ‘US sub-prime financial crisis despite our financial institutions
not sharing its causes’. Swan’s framing emphasised the role of ‘declining
confidence’ and ‘global uncertainty’ in explaining ‘so much of the downturn in
the US economy overall’. Indeed, Swan stressed that although Australian banks
were not threatened by any immediate risk, Australia was one of the last two
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations to
have not yet guaranteed bank deposits and doing so now was a wise precaution.
It was a simultaneous acknowledgment and mitigation of critical threat.
Claiming ‘Australian Government agencies…performed their duties well in
minimising the impact of this global crisis on the Australian economy’, Swan’s
responsibility narrative focused on the reasons for Australia’s relative success,
rather than distributing blame for what had gone wrong. He credited Australia’s
‘sound financial institutions…supported by a strong prudential regulatory
framework, and an adroit central bank’. At this point in the crisis, Swan believed
governments’ responsibility was not to intervene but to ensure these institutions
‘have the tools they need to act swiftly and effectively’. The policies announced
in June 2008 were not major departures from existing practices nor were they
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radical interventions. Swan framed the crisis as an incident, a ‘long and difficult
financial episode’ with knock-on effects in Australia, but an episode nonetheless.
Swan’s speech was a type-2 frame of sorts. It acknowledged problems and sought
to strengthen the existing structures. The frame also demonstrated elements of
a type-1 ‘business as usual’ response, as he claimed the worst of the crisis was
bypassing Australia and there were indications of improvement. In the speech,
the few adjustments (such as guaranteeing bank deposits) in light of the crisis
abroad were portrayed as precautionary steps taken to reduce anxiety.
The speech elicited a lot of response to the major policy implications in Swan’s
speech: the deposit guarantee and the continuation of existing banking policy
(namely, the four-pillars scheme). Nearly all of these responses were critical
(Colebatch 2008a; Cornell 2008; Harper 2008; Jury 2008; Williams 2008b). All
three papers, but in particular the AFR, were unconvinced that Australia’s
success in weathering the crisis to that point had much to do with prudential
policy, and strongly questioned Swan’s explanation of Australia’s crisis
endurance (Cornell 2008; Durie 2008; Williams 2008b). A few other reports of
the speech were nonchalant, offering only very weak support for the Treasurer,
his explanation of the circumstances and his subsequent policy pronouncements
(Patten 2008; Tingle 2008a). It seems, then, that the media attached even less
severity to the crisis than the Treasurer, presenting a firmly type-1 counter-frame
and taking the speech instead as test of the ‘free-market credentials of a new
government’ (Tingle 2008a). Only a couple of articles were willing to support
the Treasurer and a more serious framing of the emerging crisis (Patten 2008;
Wood 2008a).
13 June 2008: the bank governor stating his priorities
In June 2008, inflation was still the focus of Glenn Stevens’ speech to the
American Chamber of Commerce in Australia. He did, however, address the
issue of the US crisis, claiming that ‘the worst fears of a serious financial collapse
have abated somewhat’, but acknowledging that ‘considerable uncertainty’
remained for the coming year or so. Stevens reassured his audience that Australia
had different concerns to those about the US economy. This explanation also
acted as justification for why the RBA was keeping cash rates high while the US
Federal Reserve had halved rates in the past six months. Stevens partially
divorced the US crisis from issues present in the Australian economy. He
acknowledged the severity of the crisis in the United States and the United
Kingdom and its impact on Australia (including causing households to ‘adopt a
more cautious attitude to borrowing and spending’). He also, however, described
the reasons why Australia was not likely to have the same experience as the
United States, the United Kingdom or Europe—in part because this suggested
‘a moderation in growth in domestic demand is occurring’ and there was the
‘need for a moderation’.
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Overall, the speech allocated neither blame nor credit for Australia’s financial
state. He stated that ‘the seriousness of the sub-prime credit crisis, and the
associated weak outcomes being experienced in the US, and thought to be in
prospect in the UK and some parts of Europe, are well understood by Australian
households and businesses’, but this was not the case for the resource boom,
the reasons behind inflation and how these factors interacted. As such, while
this speech addressed the global financial crisis, it was largely to alert people
about why it was not Australia’s greatest economic concern.
Stevens framed the crisis as a passing phase: the US economy is struggling with
a ‘period of weakness’ and a ‘period of adjustment’. This did not mean, however,
that the global economic status quo was going to remain the same. He pointed
to ‘the change in the trade experience of Australia…[as] an indicator of the way
the weight in the world economy is gradually shifting to the Asian region’. In
his view, the pace of demand growth needed to slow and ‘domestic
consumption…is being asked to make some room, for some period of time, for
the rise in other forms of investment’. He explained that he was ‘seeking to head
off further problems’. Stevens indicated the need for a change—one that he had
already been acting towards incrementally by trying to affect the economy
through careful manipulation of the cash rate. With inflation remaining the focus
and cash rates rising, it was still largely business as usual for Stevens.
The explanation, expectation, policy and strategy outlined by Stevens were
generally supported in the media. Reporting in all three papers (The Age 2008a;
Rollins 2008a; Wood 2008b) on the speech was largely positive and went along
with the general theme of inflation dominating government economic
pronouncements (Khadem 2008; Murdoch 2008). With reference to the spectre
of ‘stagflation’ (high inflation and low growth) hitting the Australian economy,
a broad spectrum of commentators sided with the governor in the belief that it
was the low-growth fears that were unfounded, with one commentator
proclaiming there was ‘little to fear’ (Bassanese 2008a). As with Swan weeks
before, the media preferred the type-1 frame, and the occasional commentator
saw storm clouds on the horizon (Gittins 2008).
17 September 2008: the bank governor insists on the big
picture
By mid-September, cracks were starting to appear in the Australian economy’s
armour. In his first address after the Lehman Brothers collapse, Stevens chose
to speak about the long-term perspective and positive outlook for Australia. In
an immediate agenda contestation during a question and answer session after
the speech, Stevens’ attempt to set the agenda was derailed by questions about
recent economic developments, the crisis abroad and whether Australians were
receiving an overly optimistic narrative of the situation.
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In this speech, Stevens minimised the impact of the crisis on Australia, which
had ‘been affected by these forces, but much less than the countries at the
epicentre. Our financial system is weathering the storm well.’ The crisis was
articulated as a catalyst for shifts. For example, Stevens portrayed the complex
factors surrounding the emergence of China as ‘an opportunity and a challenge
for Australian business and policymakers, and not just in the resource sector’.
One of these factors was that ‘we have had to absorb a massive income boost…of
course, there are worse problems to have!’. These underlying forces were all
argued in a positive (or neutral) light.
Because there was not much of a ‘crisis’ (according to Stevens), there was little
reason to apportion blame or suggest policies to deal with it. Stevens attempted
to calm Australians, urging them to ‘step back…to focus on the bigger picture’.
He sought to convince the audience that it was not an Australian crisis, ‘even
in the volatile conditions in which we all find ourselves at present’. He
acknowledged the short-term fear, but even in the days after the Lehman Brothers
collapse, he urged people not to make too much of the crisis as it was the collapse
of US confidence, not Lehmans as such, that was the problem.
The somewhat out-of-step and cautiously optimistic frame from the Reserve
Bank Governor triggered a divided media response. Far from the unanimous
chorus of optimism in earlier months, by September, media confidence in
Australia’s ability to avoid the worst of the financial crisis had plummeted (Oatley
2008; Stammer 2008; Williams and Martin 2008). Stevens’ presentation of the
crisis as requiring some degree of reform and increased transparency was
uncontroversial (Mitchell 2008a; Stutchbury 2008a). Interpreting the severity
and implications of the latest turn in the financial crisis for Australia was,
however, up for grabs, notwithstanding Stevens’ posture. Stevens’ comment in
the question and answer session that the Australian banking system was ‘light
years away’ from the crumbling US system set off a wave of commentary that
was characterised by uncertainty about the future of the crisis (Bassanese 2008b;
Hewett 2008; Stammer 2008). As an act of meaning making and in stark contrast
with the speech made a few months earlier, Stevens’ attempt to continue with
a type-1 crisis framing now rang hollow with many commentators, the majority
of whom now seemed to moving to a type-2 conception (Winestock 2008a).
10 October 2008: the Treasurer goes to Washington
On the day that Swan spoke at the Brookings Institution, the OECD released a
report praising Australia as one of the economies to have ‘so far’ avoided major
turmoil. On the same day, however, the All Ordinaries fell 8.2 per cent—the
worst drop in 21 years. Still, this speech was used to explain the success of
Australia, rather than explaining the crisis. Swan brushed over the potential
severity of the crisis in Australia, simply saying ‘our share markets have
fallen’—despite the speech occurring after several days of bad news on the
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Australian share market. He repeated his oft-voiced mantra that Australia was
‘better placed than almost any other developed economy to withstand the fallout’.
His chief concern was with the health of the global system. Swan offered advice
and lessons from an apparent success story, quoting the OECD report, which
stated that ‘thanks to prudent management’ (as well as ‘high profitability and
strong capitalisation’), the Australian economy ‘has stood up well to the ongoing
global financial market turbulence. So far, the financial sector has withstood the
crisis.’
This speech also demonstrated the shift that had occurred from his previous
resistance to government intervention to a more activist stance. Swan claimed
that the OECD ‘endorses the new Rudd Government’s ambitious reform agenda
aimed at lifting our country’s productive capacity and addressing climate change’.
Swan’s speech highlighted his aspirations for a shift towards a more global
financial architecture and away from dominant ideologies and protectionism.
He strongly advocated the utilisation of existing global forums and institutions
to assist during this crisis and to prevent future ones. Swan made use of historical
analogies to bolster his argument. He invoked the ‘hard work' and 'plenty of
sacrifice’ in the post-World War II decades, which led to a ‘level of prosperity
[our] parents could scarcely imagine during the depths of the Great Depression’.
He praised the Bretton Woods agreement as a ‘great moral as well as economic
achievement’.
Likewise, the current global problems required a ‘long term solution not just a
quick fix’. Type-3 rhetoric appeared when Swan attacked ‘blind faith in markets’
and put Australia forward as a lesson in ‘successful regulation’ and leadership,
wondering how ‘any responsible leader [could] observe all around us the
wreckage of this latest bout of financial adventurism without being stirred to
act’.
With this speech coming at a time when the crisis had reached fever pitch in
Australia, media commentary was generally supportive of Swan’s framing of
the crisis as something created by the structure of the international financial
system and the pressing need for reform (The Age 2008b; AFR 2008b; Guy 2008).
With the media now rapidly escalating its estimation of crisis severity (O’Sullivan
and Saulwick 2008; Uren and Stutchbury 2008), there was, however, continuing
scepticism about the government’s line and the solutions offered (Grattan 2008a;
Grenville 2008), with one commentator noting that the government was doing
little but ‘jawboning to keep up confidence’ (Grattan 2008a). As with its response
to Stevens in the month beforehand, the media struggled to reconcile the apparent
gap between economic events and the line coming from the government.
Mirroring this concern, in the same week as this speech, the first polls were
conducted on questions concerning the economic crisis. In the period 7 October
to 12 October, 52 per cent of respondents were confident in Australia’s ability
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to withstand the global financial crisis, with 42 per cent not confident. Approval
of the government’s response to the global financial crisis sat at 52 per cent,
with 28 per cent disapproving (Essential Research 2008a).
14 October 2008: the Prime Minister addressing the nation
The four days between Swan’s address in Washington, DC, and Rudd’s address
to the nation were a critical sense-making and decision-making period for the
government. On 12 October, the government announced a guarantee for all
deposits in Australian banks in an attempt to prevent capital flight. With talk
of the economic crisis reaching fever pitch in the media and in the public sphere,
however, Rudd took the initiative to realign the framing of the crisis around the
government’s response.
There are few acts of meaning making designed to be as dramatic as or more
poignant than an address to the nation. The first theme of the address was one
of severity. Stating that Australians had become ‘concerned, anxious or even
fearful as to the future’, the Prime Minister spared nothing by describing the
situation as ‘the worst financial crisis in our lifetime’ and compared it with ‘a
national security crisis’—a far cry from the contained and limited crisis talked
of previously. As media reports pointed out, as little as a week beforehand the
government had been conspicuous in its proclivity to avoid talking in emergency
terms (Dodson 2008). With this speech there could now be no doubt about the
high-stakes nature of the crisis.
If, however, Rudd was strong in emphasising that the ‘tough times have now
arrived’, he was perhaps even stronger in treating the crisis as something that
was affecting Australia through no fault of its own. The crisis was allegedly
caused by news of the crisis impacting on other places. It was the fear of crisis
more than any internal problem that was to blame. Indeed, the one statement
that obliquely accounted for the onset of the crisis was: ‘Nonetheless, as Prime
Minister, I was not prepared to stand idly by while people’s fears here were
being fed by the stream of bad economic news from abroad.’ Rudd’s second
major theme, then, in accordance with Swan and Stevens, was one of defensive
reassurance—emphatically denying that any cause or blame for the crisis was
on Australian shoulders and outlining the ‘absolute confidence’ Australians
should have in their system.
The nature of the first and second theme strongly suggests the third—that the
management of the impact of the crisis should be ameliorative rather than
reformative. The address was used to announce the $10.4 billion ‘Economic
Security Strategy’—a package designed to inject funds into the economy to keep
growth positive and jobs available. It fed into reassurance too, with a strong
emphasis on decision making—including comments such as ‘decisive action’,
to ‘take whatever action is necessary’ and ‘responsible governments step in’.
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The combination of these two themes served to highlight and strongly emphasise
the severity of the crisis and to unambiguously absolve the government of
responsibility and base its policy response on that mantra.
The address was met with nearly unanimous media support on all aspects—a
unanimity that was itself commented on (Martin 2008a; Ricketson 2008). The
Age came out strongly in support of the government’s framing of the crisis (The
Age 2008c; Grattan 2008b; Martin 2008a). The AFR was more subdued in its
support for the Prime Minister, noting ‘Rudd’s repackaging of himself as a
proactive Prime Minister always on the alert for a pre-emptive strike’ (Tingle
2008b). Support for the government’s stance on the severity, nature and
management of the crisis was, however, strong—although not without some
questions about potential deficit (AFR 2008c; Dodson 2008). Similarly, The
Australian recognised the critical turning point in the treatment of the crisis
rhetorically in Australia and was quick to welcome it and the government’s
response (Kelly 2008; Megalogenis 2008; Stutchbury 2008b). Just one commentary
remained wary of Rudd’s rhetorical framing, believing it to be a convenient way
to exploit the crisis in order to implement programs in unrelated social areas
(Shanahan 2008a).
Several major polls saw significant rises in the Prime Minister’s approval rating
in the aftermath of the speech (Newspoll 2009; Nielsen 2008). Most saliently
though, approval of the government’s handling of the global financial crisis rose
20 points from the previous week to 72 per cent, with disapproval dropping to
just 12 per cent (Essential Research 2008b). Similarly, confidence in Australia’s
ability to withstand the financial crisis rose by 11 per cent from the previous
week to 63 per cent (Essential Research 2008b). Evidently, the new type-2
severity frame presented by the government was one the public and media found
far more amenable, despite the negative economic implications.
19 November 2008: the bank governor’s plea for
perspective
Even during Australia’s worst period of the crisis to date, Stevens held firm to
his frame: largely type-1, business-as-usual rhetoric. While noting the
‘breathtaking turn of events’ in mid-September, he used more measured language
than Rudd and Swan. He placed it into the category of a ‘cyclical event’ that
happened at a time when growth was slowing anyway and the most unpleasant
frame he provided was that Australia was ‘battling economic weakness’. The
crisis was not caused by ‘a sequence of financial events’ but because these events
‘led people to think it will turn out to be a bigger event than hitherto expected’.
Continuing with this theme, he cautioned that ‘the biggest mistake we could
make would be to talk ourselves into unnecessary economic weakness’.
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In the vein of a type-1, business-as-usual frame, Stevens did not feel that the
situation in mid-November warranted significant policy moves because ‘in facing
the financial problems themselves, the most important steps have already been
taken by countries at the epicentre of the crisis’. In a type-2-style frame, however,
he asserted that ‘these measures cannot avert a significant slowing in the global
economy’ (that is, there is still a threat, albeit not critical). In defence of existing
structures, these policies averted ‘potential systemic collapses that would have
had massive repercussions throughout the world’. Towards the end of the speech,
Stevens injected some type-3 rhetoric, noting that ‘every episode of crisis
provides some new lessons’ that can be ‘incorporated into regulatory and
supervisory practice’. Although using the turn of phrase ‘prudent borrowing’,
Stevens came out in support of the government running a deficit to ‘continue
worthwhile public investment’.
The speech concluded with the overarching type-2 frame that: acknowledged
the severity of the crisis (the ‘situation is serious’; ‘we face difficult
circumstances’); cited exogenous causes; and argued that the status quo was
worth preserving (‘we need not, and should not, abandon the well-established
and tested policy frameworks that are in place’).
The speech received ample commentary, with most headlines capturing the
imputed prospect of either a recession (Colebatch 2008b; Martin 2008b) or a
deficit (Rollins 2008b; Winestock 2008b). The media reacted strongly to Stevens’
continuation of a largely type-1 crisis framing. Many commentators were critical,
believing Stevens’ framing to be unrealistic (Uren 2008b), and a strongly
downcast view of the economic situation persisted (AFR 2008d; Korporaal 2008).
In presenting a domestic deficit as a management response to the situation,
however, Stevens received wide support, with many commentators placing
blame on the government for dodging the concept for so long (Colebatch 2008b;
Grattan 2008c; Mitchell 2008b). The AFR was particularly supportive, seeing
Stevens’ comments on the matter as ‘a healthy dose of realism’ (AFR 2008d),
with the media often contrasting it with the obfuscated government position on
Australia’s budgetary future (Colebatch 2008b). In Australia, it was the
technocrat, not the politicians who gave the first mention of a deficit and started
the debate before the government itself would volte-face on the subject a week
later.
26 November 2008: the Prime Minister’s ‘temporary deficit’
Until mid-November, the Rudd Government had done everything it could to
avoid the prospect of a budgetary deficit becoming a reality (The Australian
2008c; Uren 2008a). So, when Rudd was ‘absolutely upfront’ in Parliament on
26 November and made a single mention that the government would ‘if
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necessary…use a temporary deficit’, it awoke a political dragon that continued
to dominate crisis discourse well into the next year.
It came as no surprise, then, that the Prime Minister’s address to the House of
Representatives outlining the potential for a deficit did so only after dedicating
two-thirds of the speech to a sobering rundown of the economic context. The
crisis ‘has grown from a trickle to a flood’. It had affected ‘every nation. Every
government. Every economy.’ A far cry from the rhetoric of Australian resilience
to the crisis, Rudd here dismissed that period as ‘the first part of the storm’. At
this point, a ‘quantum shift’ had occurred and the decisions that would need to
be made had much higher stakes because, although it was alluded to only
implicitly, Australia was staring down the barrel of a recession.
The explanation for this change was one made in constant reference to other
nations: everything Australia had experienced was what the rest of the world
had experienced. In particular, Rudd cited the slowdown in China and the plunge
in commodity prices as major factors impacting on Australia’s downturn. These
shifts had in turn ‘had a profound effect on [the] budget position’, with a $40
billion downgrading of anticipated tax income for the government.
Rudd stated that ‘under [these] circumstances, it would be responsible to draw
further from the surplus and, if necessary, to use a temporary deficit to begin
investing in our future infrastructure needs’. Rudd justified this move at length.
Undoubtedly cognisant of the fallout such an announcement would have,
however, the Prime Minister also listed numerous measures the government had
taken. He framed the administration in an active light, stressing in particular
that ‘the budget built a strong surplus’ and its fiscal policy epitomised responsible
governance.
A potential budget deficit was thus slotted rhetorically within the crisis frame.
Rudd’s account was that of a major crisis managed by a responsible government
that was willing to take whatever ameliorative steps were necessary—and that
this was a policy path that was not just the ‘nation’s mission’, but ‘the mission
of the international community’. In a shift of rhetorical emphasis from previous
speech acts analysed here, Rudd made it clear that there was no alternative to
the path the government was setting out on. The alternative to deficit spending
and Labor’s fiscal policy was to ‘sacrifice growth and jobs’. To not go into deficit
would be ‘irresponsible’. Specific stigmatisation of the alternative to government
policy as job losses and economic depression was a powerful platform from
which the government could define and subdue opposition. Doing so was
important because, while most had accepted events so far as externally imposed
on the Australian economy, a decision by the government to go into deficit was
a risk and entirely within the government’s choosing, thus creating a need to
shift the frame of crisis meaning to better suit this new and riskier period of
government policy.
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The media responded rapidly and vociferously to the mention of a potential
deficit. Many commentators felt that the speech merely shifted rhetoric to
comport with what had already become understood economic reality and that
the severity of the situation and inevitably of a deficit were unquestionable
(Grattan 2008d; Ruehl 2008; Tingle 2008c). If anything, according to some, the
speech was slightly disingenuous by playing up the crisis so much yet
simultaneously burying and qualifying the use of the word ‘deficit’ (Grattan
2008d; Wood 2008c).
The media was quick to note the speech’s political effectiveness as an act of
framing and rhetoric and the difficulty it created for the opposition (Carney
2008). The media was, however, routinely divided on the degree to which it
substantively agreed with the approach espoused. Several articles in the AFR
and The Australian were sharply critical of the belatedness, lack of detail and
sense of panic in the speech, which had the potential to undermine circumstances
and provided a poor response to the crisis (AFR 2008e; Davidson 2008; Shanahan
2008b; Stutchbury 2008d). Others in the same papers arrived at different
conclusions, supporting the Prime Minister’s position and his willingness to use
the deficit to relieve the effects of the crisis (The Australian 2008d; Steketee 2008;
Wood 2008c). The media was, however, virtually unanimous on one point: that
the speech heralded the entry of the government into new and far more politically
tricky territory than it had previously been in (Stutchbury 2008e; Tingle 2008c).
23 January 2009: the Treasurer’s visit to ‘ground zero’
Speaking to investors in New York at a time when Australians had started to
feel the economic pinch yet continued to strongly support the government,
Swan needed to present an image that would appear positive to potential investors
and would boost confidence back home in Australia, but would also not jar
significantly with the reality of Australians feeling the effects of the downturn.
He derided the ‘false prophets’ who had told the world ‘that the only economic
role for the state in a free market economy is to remove itself’. Furthermore,
Swan insisted that the crisis was not caused by globalisation but by ‘spectacular
regulatory failure’. He claimed that Australia’s ‘realistic understanding of the
role of government in the contemporary market economy’ was key to its success
in responding to the crisis, and he emphasised and detailed the policy
implemented and action taken ‘swiftly and decisively’ by the Rudd Government
in the onset of the global crisis.
By now, Swan was adamant that the crisis was not just an incident. Instead, ‘the
global financial crisis occurred at a time when our economies were already under
pressure to change in profound ways’. Drawing an analogy with Hurricane
Katrina, he claimed that the crisis ‘shockwave’ exposed underlying weaknesses
in the system. Swan called for the global economy to be rebuilt into an ‘economy
that nations, their citizens, and their environment really need’—something that
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his government was already working towards. Speaking in type-3 mode, Swan
therefore represented the crisis as ‘an opportunity for reform that must be
grasped…we must make the best of a bad situation’. Swan shared with the New
York audience his ‘picture of what we believe the post-crisis Australian economy
will look like’, with the focus shifting from strengthening existing financial
systems or even addressing global economic structures to society-wide alterations
and improvements in the wake of the crisis.
Response by the media to this speech was comparatively limited. This might be
considered surprising given that, in hindsight, the speech flagged many of the
elements that would eventually come together as the new
ideological/interventionist philosophy that Rudd would expand on at length in
The Monthly within a week. The Australian picked up on this in a couple of
commentaries, linking the speech with the coming of a debate about the future
role of government in the domestic economy (Franklin 2009a, 2009b; Milne
2009); however, in general, the speech went unnoticed. A global poll conducted
a week before Swan’s speech found that at this point Australians largely held
similar views to those articulated by the Treasurer. According to the poll, ‘more
than three in four Australians (76 per cent) agree that the current economic crisis
points to the need for major changes in the international economic system, while
slightly less than half (48 per cent) agree that major changes are also needed for
their own economy’ (BBC World Service 2009). In any event, the speech would
prove in retrospect to be a primer for the third major framing change undertaken
by the government in February 2009.
February 2009: Rudd’s essay
By early February, it was clear that Australia was not going to escape significant
impact from the global financial crisis. The stock market had lost more than
one-third of its value, unemployment was rising and the economy had
temporarily dipped into recession. In the February edition of The Monthly, the
Prime Minister published a lengthy essay redefining the terms of the crisis on
an explicitly ideological basis. No longer simply blaming the work of greedy
capitalists and irresponsible risk-takers, Rudd wrote that the global financial
crisis was at that point the most salient symptom of a fundamentally flawed
system—one underpinned by a discredited ideology and doomed to failure by
virtue of its own design.
Rudd pointed out that the crisis was now so severe it would ‘mark a turning
point between one epoch and the next’. In his sentiments, the crisis was ‘the
greatest dislocation of our lifetime’. The underlying problem for Rudd now was
no longer one of inadequate global regulation or poor practice; it was one of
inadequate ideas. The crisis ‘called into question the prevailing neo-liberal
economic orthodoxy of the past 30 years’. The long leash given to the financial
sector and lack of oversight led to systemic problems and irresponsible patterns.
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This was not incidental though; Rudd posited that the crisis was ‘generated by
the system itself’, implying the inevitability of the failure of the ideological
regime.
Rudd now focused blame squarely on the proponents of neo-liberal ideology:
the US Federal Reserve, investment banks, extreme capitalism and subscribing
political parties. Rudd placed his opposition, the Liberal Party—‘home of
neo-liberalism in Australia’—within that broad grouping of blameworthy
neo-liberal adherents. The ideology that the Liberal Party upheld had ‘not served
Australia well in preparing for the current crisis’.
The ideological antidote to the crisis was social democracy: ‘the international
challenge for social democrats is to save capitalism from itself.’ While Rudd
moderated his comments by seeing the need to ‘recognise the great strengths of
open, competitive markets’, by and large, it was the social-democratic ideology
that had to be employed in order to make things right again. Australia’s specific
role was somewhat consistent with earlier remarks: to ‘provide international
support for [US President, Barack Obama’s] leadership’ as part of a US-led
reconstitution.
The allocation of blame to the neo-liberals was framed conveniently to avoid
any blame falling on the so-called social democrats or the Labor Party in Australia.
One government Rudd specified as upholding the values that had to be
implemented in order to rebuild the economy was the 1983–96 series of Labor
governments led by his predecessors, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating. ‘They were
able dramatically to improve the productivity of the Australian private economy,
while simultaneously expanding the role of the state in the provision of
equity-enhancing public services.’ Many, however, would traditionally associate
the Hawke–Keating governments with the global neo-liberal economic trend of
the period and they arguably laid down most of the neo-liberal economic system
that Australia had going into the crisis (Edwards 2009). In Rudd’s meaning
making, however, the political now took centre stage.
Given the nature of the essay, the significant response in the media tended to
roll down more politically dispositional grooves. The moderately conservative
The Australian was particularly critical, variously describing Rudd’s essay as
an ‘ill-informed ideological crusade’ (Costa 2009), a ‘cheap attack’ and ‘arrogant
promise’ (Albrechtsen 2009a) and an ideological ‘blame game’ (Sheridan 2009).
At the same time, The Age was more positive in its response (Colebatch 2009a;
Gans 2009), with the AFR assuming a mixed but often critical stance (Crowe
2009a; Simes 2009).
Regardless of disagreement about the substantive line of the essay, most
commentators were sceptical about the kind of rhetoric on display. Several
articles (Albrechtsen 2009a; Hewett 2009; Tingle 2009a; Wright 2009) saw it as
a nakedly political act designed to open up a previously muted argument about
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the ideological repercussions of the crisis. It was allegedly designed to first,
bolster and justify a comprehensive and high-spending stimulus package and
budget (which included numerous components that had little relevance to the
recession); and second, to wed the political opposition to a supposedly failed
ideology and discredited policies. Other articles expressed distaste for the
‘blatantly political’ timing and character of the essay (Edwards 2009; Sheridan
2009) and its numerous internal contradictions and misrepresentations (Burchell
2009; Hirst 2009). The essay was seen by some as symptomatic of a shift in
rhetoric and strategy by both parties to ‘score points’ and assign blame for the
crisis (Grattan 2009; Tingle 2009b).
There was, however, every indication that the shift was well received by the
public. In polling conducted throughout February, support ranged as high as
84 per cent for certain ‘social-democracy’ measures such as education and
infrastructure investment (Essential Research 2009a). Fifty-one per cent agreed
specifically with the stimulus package as framed by Rudd, with only 33 per cent
disagreeing (Essential Research 2009a). Irrespective of traditional resistance, the
public did not reject the shift to a type-3 framing.
20 February 2009: the bank governor addresses the House
In late February, the bank governor had to face the House of Representatives
Standing Economic Committee to account for the actions of the RBA in response
to the crisis and the effects of these policies on the economy. Since his most
recent statement to the committee in September 2008 (not analysed here), the
crisis in Australia had escalated and the RBA had cut the cash rate by 3.75 per
cent.
Stevens held firm to the various elements of the three frames seen in previous
speeches. He acknowledged that the end of 2008 had witnessed ‘the most intense
financial turmoil seen in decades’, but he minimised the severity by saying that
the ‘worst of the turmoil was actually fairly short lived’. He expanded on his
optimistic prediction that Australia would likely ‘have done well in comparison
with most other countries’. He claimed that the policy action had been effective
and insisted that the causes had been the public reaction to the shocks of 2008,
not the shocks themselves. He remained adamant that the crisis was not as severe
as many believed and even though the magnitude of the slowdown had come
as a surprise, the slowdown itself was not unexpected.
He went on to exogenise the cause of the crisis by claiming that the ‘deterioration
in international conditions was so rapid that no policy response could prevent
a period of near-term weakness in the Australian economy or, for that matter,
other economies’. Furthermore, he asserted that the crisis was not as severe as
it could have been and he vindicated the Rudd Government’s response, stating
that ‘the extraordinary actions of governments and central banks in that
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period…helped to stabilise what could have been a catastrophic loss of confidence
in the global financial system’. His message was one of near-term realism and
long-term optimism.
Reporting on the Stevens speech, the media picked up on two themes: the RBA’s
apparent optimism in the face of continued negative news (Martin 2009a;
Thornton 2009) and the governor’s support for the government’s policies in the
crisis (Rumble 2009). The AFR captured in its editorial the continuing conflict
between optimism and pessimism in the assessment of severity in that period
(AFR 2009), though it was generally deferential to the governor’s assessment
and in broad agreement with the general direction outlined for RBA policy
(Mitchell 2009; Rumble 2009).
Some commentaries, however, openly questioned Stevens’ optimism, with one
article commenting that it was ‘his job to put a positive spin on things’ and thus
‘naturally the [governor] had no criticism of the Government’s stimulus package
or market interventions’ (Colebatch 2009b). They pointed out that previous
assessments of economic conditions had proved wrong through unforeseen
events, and thus there was no reason to suspect that it could not happen again
(Thornton 2009). In a similar vein to previous responses to Stevens’ comments,
therefore, the media was inclined to question his framing of the severity of the
crisis, while being generally supportive of him personally and the management
strategy espoused.
23 March 2009: the Treasurer’s promise for the future
This speech reflected a treasurer resigned to the troubles of the economy but
with a determination that the future would be bright, and a goal of rallying the
nation. Speaking to the Sydney business community, Swan, in an address titled
‘A future of promise’, characterised the crisis as ‘the worst the world can throw
at us’, insisting that ‘no country in the world can hope to escape unscathed,
including us’. This acted to reinforce his assurance that Australia was ‘still faring
better than almost all other developed nations’. He attempted to evoke patriotism
and inspire a fighting spirit, telling the audience that to succeed ‘we mustn’t
freeze in the face of immediate challenges, or use them as an excuse to retrench
and retreat’. This theme was also present as he described the policy approach
of the government—‘to act early; minimise the depth of the problem; be in a
position to recover faster. In short, stay on the offence.’
Swan tried to claim that the ‘national mood’ was one in which ‘the short-term
is full of challenges, the long-term is full of promise’. Swan’s focus on the future
was apt given the split in public attitudes about the hope for the short term. A
poll conducted in the week before Swan’s speech found that 43 per cent of
respondents felt that the government’s actions did not matter because ‘the
Australian economy cannot be protected from the effects of the global financial
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crisis’. However, 44 per cent still had faith in the government’s influence,
believing ‘if the Government takes the right actions it can protect Australia’s
economy from the effects of the global financial crisis’ (Essential Research 2009c).
While not attributing blame for the crisis, Swan deflected criticism that the Rudd
Government was not meeting its election promises. Swan said that he would
‘have preferred to have spent my time ticking off items on our “to do” list’ and,
after sitting ‘in opposition during the boom years’, he had to now ‘chart a way
through such an extraordinary international economic collapse’, which he claimed
the government was succeeding at. He asserted that the government’s first
stimulus package had kept Australia out of a recession and, having announced
the $42 billion stimulus package a month earlier, this was a sort of
vindication—or at least encouraging.
Swan did not stop there, however, criticising ‘lazy and predictable arguments
about deficits and government debt’. He claimed that the weakness of these
arguments ‘lies in their assumption that global economic conditions have not
changed, when clearly they have, in the most damaging fashion’. Swan excoriated
those who ‘fall back on ideology’, ‘think we should let events run their course’
and ‘opportunistically deny our economy is being buffeted by global forces’.
He even suggested they might be ‘willing Australia to fail’. Swan claimed that
he was not replacing one ideology with another but replacing an ideological
approach with a ‘pragmatic’ approach. This speech, strongly projecting a type-3
frame, was an attempt to rally the public in unity against the exogenous crisis,
discredit the opposition for working against the government’s policies (and
apparently Australia as a whole) and present an optimistic (and opportunistic)
perspective on the crisis.
Coming on the heels of the announcement by Rudd that recession was now
virtually unavoidable (Kerin and Walker 2009) and amid a series of other
high-profile economic developments such as the ‘Ruddbank’ and state debt
crises, the media did not find much in the speech to comment on—though it
was reprinted in full in The Australian (The Australian 2009a). Much of the media
was more concerned with announcements of budgetary implications after the
Treasurer in his speech flagged that change would need occur (Kerr 2009; Steketee
2009). The Australian ran an article calling for ‘rhetorical discipline’, which was
critical of the government’s recent attempts to frame the crisis through newly
politicised terms (The Australian 2009b). The majority of articles were interested
far less in descriptions of the severity or explanation of the crisis, hanging out
instead for specific policy prescriptions (for example, Crowe 2009b). It is
interesting to note that this speech, which invokes the same type-3 framing that
Rudd broached in the month before, seemingly raises far less controversy.
Whether this was due to a tacit acceptance of this new frame or just a general
lack of media interest is an interesting point to speculate on.
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4. Framing the financial crisis in Australia: analysis and
discussion
These speeches suggest that crisis framing during the period studied moved
from a type-1 (severity minimised, incidental) to a type-2 (severity acknowledged,
incidental) and finally to a type-3 (severity maximised, systemic problem)
diagnosis. There were also a number of consistent themes that persisted in the
framing of the crisis in Australia, which will be discussed further below.
In the speech acts from March to June 2008, the crisis was seen as something
remote and with limited consequences for Australia. With confidence bolstered
by high commodity prices and a strong Asian economy, the spectre of inflation
and economic overheating was seen as the real economic management priority
for the government. Explanation and blame for the crisis were diffused and
sectoral, allocated to a runaway banking sector and poor decisions made by
greedy financiers. In sum, the global financial crisis was still viewed very much
as a sub-prime crisis, warranting only minor responses. This frame was consistent
with what many other cases studied here maintained in the lead-up to the crisis
manifesting as a global recession, where governments tended to play down the
crisis to maintain confidence and contain political and policy consequences.
The undeniable seriousness of the crisis hit home fast in September 2008. As
evidenced by the confused responses to Stevens’ speech in that month, it was
no longer tenable to deny the severity of the crisis. It stands to reason that this
period was one in which the government itself was trying to make sense of the
crisis. Within just four days of a relatively upbeat speech by Swan on 10 October,
the Prime Minister appeared before the nation to dramatically revise the
government’s severity stance, lifting the political stakes along with it. By
mid-November, both political actors had redefined the crisis squarely into a
type-2 frame (severity acknowledged/incidental causes). This framing became
politically necessary to justify the thorny issues of deficit and recession, both
of which seemed inevitable by the end of 2008. Action was, however, framed
as ameliorative; the government chose not to define the crisis as one of systemic
problems, instead maintaining a line that Australia could not be ‘immune’ from
international economic conditions in spite of having nothing to do with the
genesis of the crisis.
This frame shifted slowly, however, to what began to look like a type-3 (severity
maximised, symptomatic causes) categorisation by January 2009. The government
began to point to something systemically wrong that led to the crisis:
neo-liberalism. Rudd’s essay in The Monthly marked a new and concerted effort
to outline ‘neo-liberal’ ideology as the framework that allowed the crisis to occur
and, as such, presented a justification for a new ideological policy platform from
which the government must operate: social democracy. Though still finding
little at fault with the financial framework in Australia per se, Rudd nevertheless
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found a common (if poorly defined) ideological enemy behind the crisis,
suggesting its domestic adherents had to absorb some of the blame.
Finding a culprit: the political game
Having taken office in late 2007 after 11 years of their opponents’ rule, the Rudd
Administration could easily sidestep blame. If anything, the circumstances
allowed the government to occupy the position of the ‘critics’ rather than
‘incumbents’ in the Boin et al. (2009) typology. Yet during the first two framing
phases at least, arguably there were no clear ‘incumbents’ or ‘critics’. Blame was
made relevant only towards the end of the period studied. The overwhelming
consensus in politics and in the media had long been that Australia was the
innocent victim of world chaos, and indeed the strength of the banking system
and financial regulations in Australia were the bulwarks that had warded off
toxic assets. Even as the severity of the crisis increased, blame was absolved and
responsibility was denied with little contention. It was only in January–February
2009 that the government rhetorically began to focus the blame—in this case,
on its ideological opponents and its predecessors, by tying them in with the now
‘guilty’ intellectual edifice of neo-liberalism.
This was not just a Rudd effort. Swan’s speech in January in particular indicated
that oppositional forces were ‘willing Australia to fail’ (Swan 2009b) rather than
abandoning their ideological platform. As a result, the political game moved to
box III (Table 2.1 in Chapter 2): a blame showdown where, paradoxically, it was
the government playing the critic and focusing blame and the opposition refusing
to accept it. Indeed, Rudd’s essay in February was enough to incite former Prime
Minister John Howard to make his first post-government written commentary,
denying responsibility, and he was joined in strenuous opposition by other
prominent Liberal Party figures and conservative media. As a strategy of political
exploitation, however, the government’s action can be seen as effective, as the
Liberal opposition struggled to distance itself from the label and to present a
viable or acceptable counter-frame for the events.
Policy exploitation: Labor’s new deal
Fitting the three framing periods, policy exploitation in the first two was designed
mostly to be ameliorative. Incremental reforms—such as bank deposit insurance,
a moderate stimulus package paid from the surplus and some minor fiscal policy
adjustments—were the modus operandi under which the government proceeded
(with little opposition) until major reframing in January.
The assignation of blame and identification of a systemic problem in early 2009,
however, allowed (at least rhetorically) a much broader scope of policies to be
justified as necessary to deal with the crisis. The government proceeded from
here to generate a shopping list of tangentially related reforms such as a
carbon-efficient economy, an education revolution, taxation reform and greater
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global cooperation (Swan 2009a). The new ‘economic reform agenda’, replete
with a $42 billion stimulus entitled the ‘Nation Building and Jobs Plan’, was
launched from this platform of rhetoric as essential to avoiding recession and
warding off future crises. How politically opportunistic this was is a matter of
conjecture; much of what has been implemented in the wake of the crisis is
merely pre-existing election promises repackaged as recession busters. Other
policies, however, have arguably gone through more smoothly than otherwise
due to a convenient rhetorical frame. One example might have been the rolling
back of the private health insurance rebate (in spite of an election promise to
keep it), which was publicly framed as a crisis-borne necessity in the May 2009
budget. Swan and Rudd themselves obliquely referred to the policy opportunities
offered by the crisis in their speeches (Swan 2009a) and there is plenty of evidence
to suggest they have utilised them with considerable success.
With the media and public focused squarely on the financial crisis by
October–November 2008, there was, however, perhaps no choice for a
government whose election credibility relied at least in part on delivering on
significant social promises. Crisis or no crisis, Labor faced a political bottom line
and an election in less than two years.
Even before the height of the severity of the crisis in September–October, there
was some degree of crisis exploitation for the purposes of policy. In the first of
Rudd’s speeches studied, and supported by Swan’s speech in June 2008, the
government used the foreign crisis to springboard itself into the international
policy arena. By this stage, the sub-prime crisis had been extant for months. As
such, at a time when Australia was seen to be soundly based and escaping the
fate of many other Western nations, Swan and Rudd were eager to frame the
crisis as an opportunity for Australia to participate actively in a global regulatory
response. This was congruent with an existing internationalist agenda: bidding
for a seat on the UN Security Council, setting nuclear disarmament talks and
discussion of an Asian Union. The global financial crisis provided another
opportunity for the Rudd Government to engage this policy platform. Evidently
though, this international agenda was dropped as domestic conditions
deteriorated.
The policy-exploitation game highlights the dangers for those tagged as the
‘status quo’ players. In Australia, while the government effectively framed itself
as the proactive agent of change and reform, the rhetoric of the government
meant that the opposition found it difficult to play the role of either incumbent
or policy defender. By and large, it competed with the administration as an
alternative agent of change. In this context, it was comparatively easier for the
then new government to simply define its long-serving predecessors in the
opposition as agents of the status quo. Throughout the first quarter of 2009,
Rudd and Swan labelled resistance to government policy responses as merely
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adherence to defunct ideology—ideology accused of causing the crisis in the
first place. This left the Liberal Party with hard choices. On the one hand, they
risked the ‘me-too’ tag and a lack of definition if they sought to associate
themselves with change and support government policy. On the other, if they
sought to defend the status quo they risked irrelevance and association with the
elements that were being blamed for the crisis. It was perhaps no wonder that
by the end of March 2009, the Prime Minister had reached record approval
ratings and there had been little change in the support for the opposition or its
leadership. Key, then, to the unfolding of the framing contest was how the
government seized the initiative; with the government defining the position of
its opponents as status quo players, the opposition was cornered into playing
the game from a side it would not necessarily have intended.
Exploitation objectives: politics and technocracy
As has been the case in other countries studied in this volume, the Reserve Bank
Governor began with descriptions of the crisis quite similar to those of Rudd
and Swan, but parted ways with his political counterparts as the crisis progressed.
The technocrat has little to gain from engaging in political framing contests. The
role of the RBA Governor was one where he was strategically interested in
maintaining confidence and economic stability, and thus his interests congealed
around presenting as supportive a picture as possible.
By the same measure, Stevens was afforded more room to manoeuvre in his
framing. While he scaled up his assessment of the severity of the crisis alongside
the government (though not to the same degree), it was his speech in November
that first breached the topic of deficit spending to support growth. This came
amid a fortnight in which the government almost farcically avoided mentioning
the dreaded ‘d’ word—a fact commented on extensively in the press (Colebatch
2008b). Within a week of Stevens’ speech, however, the Prime Minister had
turned on a dime to signpost the government’s intention to (if necessary) go into
budgetary deficit to support fiscal policy.
By January, the political rhetoric was advocating a raft of policy changes, while
Stevens remained stuck firmly to his definition of the crisis in Australia as a
severe incident but part of the business cycle. Nonetheless, Stevens often spoke
in tacit support of the government’s approach to the crisis. To maintain
credibility, the governor had to walk a fine line between expressing support for
the government and becoming an unofficial cheerleader—a line, according to
some reports from the period, that the governor was unable to keep to (Colebatch
2009b). While there was a clear differentiation between the framing undertaken
by the government and the bank, innately there was a connection too. Their
roles were separate, yet they relied on each other for certain rhetorical cues and
leaned on each other for certain justifications. The relationship was a complex
one, but it played an important role in the framing game.
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Counter-frames: the media and the public
In an overall sense, the media and the public were solidly consistent in their
support for the government during the crisis and there were plenty of indications
that the government’s framing of the crisis was largely successful. Though the
media maintained certain editorial and political positions, the degree to which
newspapers supported or critiqued the government appeared to be more
case-by-case. In the first two framing phases identified (type-1 and type-2), this
was understandable as government activity attracted little controversy. In the
final stage, the blame allocation and ideological agenda pushing elicited a stronger
response from the traditional right-leaning news media. Nonetheless, as public
support for Kevin Rudd coasted at high levels for most of the period, it was
probably unsurprising that the newspapers encapsulated that sentiment of
general support. All through the time studied, the Rudd Government maintained
consistently high polling figures. From May 2008 until March 2009, approval
for Rudd’s performance never fell below 61 per cent (Nielsen 2008, 2009). From
the critical period of mid-October 2008 until mid-March 2009, between 53 per
cent and 63 per cent of Australians were confident that the Australian economy
could withstand the global financial crisis (Essential Research 2009b).
One exception to this pattern might be the government’s earlier attempts to
maintain a low-severity frame during the escalation of events in September and
October. In was in these months of the period studied, after the Lehman Brothers
collapse but before the Prime Minister’s address to the nation, that the lowest
levels of public support were observed. When a type-2 frame was belatedly
adopted, the public rallied, despite the somewhat negative implications of such
a change. Similarly, media commentaries on the speeches in the transition period
were most consistently sceptical of the government’s line on severity. In the
area of severity, it seems the government had less room to move than elsewhere,
and attempts to play down the crisis in the earlier stages appear to have made
the government seem out of step rather than calming the situation.
When the government proactively seized the framing initiative in mid-October,
however, and pursued a type-3 frame in early 2009, the public’s mood largely
rallied behind the government, indicating, if anything, that the later framing
was a successful endeavour for the Labor Party. The Prime Minister’s popularity
and economic confidence remained in the high sixties (Newspoll 2009) and
support for the new stimulus package in February was as high as 84 per cent
for some measures (Essential Research 2009a). In contrast with attempts to frame
the severity of the crisis, assigning causes and framing a response to the crisis
were fairly successful endeavours for the government, even as it moved into
otherwise controversial territory.
Also interesting is what agenda the media might have set for crisis definition.
The most prominent example of this was deficit spending—a matter that required
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an extensive rhetorical frame to be set up to even introduce it as a possibility.
That necessity was driven largely by a salience of the issue created by the media,
as even the vaguest of references to this matter were latched onto with a ferocity
that compelled the government to be well prepared.
Conclusion
In summary, the Australian story in this volume has been one of fluidity in
framing and proactive adaptation. Coming on the back of 11 years of conservative
government, the Rudd Administration was very successful in framing its new
government as a dynamic agent of change. Astutely coming to embrace the
severity and scale of the crisis, it was able to tailor its election promises, its policy
platform and its broader ideological agenda to the circumstances and frame them
as cures to the ills of the financial crisis. In the process, it tethered its erstwhile
opposition to perceived historical failures and untenable ideologies. The Rudd
Government adapted its rhetorical strategy to utilise the crisis, focus blame and
embrace policy implications. The strategy has, however, been an evolving one.
The significant shift in tone from mid-2008 to early 2009 demonstrates the
complexity and situational nature of framing contests, and the government faced
a difficult balancing act when creating a rhetorical frame that could be received
as realistic by its constituency without shanghaiing the government agenda.
Though many observations have been discussed previously, one that seems
critical to the success of the Rudd Government in this case is positioning.
Flexibility to seize the initiative and define the players in the framing contests
proved to be critical for the government. Despite starting as a defender of the
system and playing down the crisis, the government was able to quickly recast
itself as a champion of change and action by October 2008, and gave
programmatic weight to that action by February 2009. Once accomplished, the
framing battle itself was confined to light skirmishes as the opposition struggled
to present an alternative frame and escape definition as a defender of a failed
financial system.
In this chapter, we have been limited to examining just a slice of what occurred
rhetorically during the escalation of the crisis (and how it was received).
Nonetheless, while the global financial crisis undeniably increased the complexity
of governing and created more difficult political and fiscal terrain, the Australian
case demonstrates the significant political power of crisis framing and how,
when harnessed well, crisis could be wind in the sails of the government,
generating political momentum. In the middle of 2009, as the crisis continues to
demolish the political capital of Western governments, their leaders can only
look upon Kevin Rudd with envy.
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10. New Zealand: electoral politics in
times of crisis
Michael Jones
1. From crisis to crisis to elections
For the scholar of crisis leadership, the New Zealand Government’s response to
the 2008–09 global financial crisis represents a distinct and interesting case
study. The combination of three characteristics in particular renders it unique.
First, New Zealand’s small, open economy is heavily dependent on trade,
particularly in agricultural products; consequently, even in the best
circumstances, it is hopelessly vulnerable to the vagaries of commodity prices
in the international economy. Second, when the crisis hit New Zealand it was
already in the grip of a home-grown economic downturn, attributable to a severe
drought and a slowing of the housing market. Finally, the occurrence of the
crisis immediately before a general election, on 8 November 2008, ensured that
attempts by leaders to interpret economic events were intensely politicised and
contested.
This chapter will analyse the leadership of key players in New Zealand’s
experience of the global financial crisis through an application of the theoretical
framework advanced by Boin et al. (2009; see also Chapter 2, this volume). As
a caveat to their theoretical model, Boin et al. (2009:95, 98–9) observe that
situational and temporal factors can significantly influence the course and
outcomes of a crisis. As suggested in the opening lines of this chapter, the course
and outcomes of the global financial crisis in New Zealand are certainly no
exception. Indeed, the three aforementioned characteristics, which render the
case unique, have important implications for any attempted analysis.
The first situational factor—New Zealand’s small, open economy—influenced
crisis leadership in conflicting ways. In one sense, it allowed New Zealand’s
leaders to externalise blame for the crisis more easily, but at the same time, it
gave them very limited ability to reduce its impact. Consequently, the master
narrative of the crisis in New Zealand was not one of climactic, unforeseen events;
indeed, domestic banking and financial institutions remained relatively strong
(Bollard 2008c). Rather, it was a narrative of steady decline in growth and steady
rises in oil and food prices—following developments in international
markets—until a recession was declared on 5 August 2008. Tellingly, Morgan
Research’s (2008d) consumer confidence polling suggested that the New Zealand
public, having felt the sting of an international downturn during the 1997–98
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East Asian financial crisis, were aware of their vulnerability to international
developments, and their confidence fell away accordingly.
The second situational factor—the home-grown downturn—was also significant.
This was because it was in the interest of all political actors, at various times,
for the framing of the two crises to become linked. Early in the period, the Clark
Government sought to link the developing international crisis to the domestic
downturn in order to escape blame for the latter. Later on, the new Key
Government sought to establish a similar link in order to blame the Clark
Government for the effect of the former.
Finally, the significance of the November general election as a temporal factor
cannot be overstated. In particular, this was because all early pre-election polls
strongly suggested that the vote would produce a change of government (Morgan
Research 2008a; One News-Colmar Brunton 2008a; TV3-TNS 2008). The
coincidental occurrence of elections heavily skewed all media coverage and
popular perception of the crisis towards its impact as an electoral battleground.
This resulted in two very different narratives running through the leadership
of the crisis: one of a long-standing government desperately struggling against
its decline; the other of a long-standing opposition seizing its first opportunity
to govern in more than a decade.
2. Methodological considerations
The advent of a change in government during the period under study prevented
this chapter from focusing on three central leaders, as in most of the case studies
within this volume. Instead, in this chapter, the focus of analysis is on two key
economic leaders within each of the two governments in office during the period:
the Prime Ministers Helen Clark and John Key, and the Ministers of Finance
Michael Cullen and Bill English. The New Zealand electoral context also renders
problematic the figure of Dr Alan Bollard, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand (RBNZ), whose equivalent is considered in the other case studies.
By convention in New Zealand, the RBNZ Governor attempts to keep a low
profile during the lead-up to an election so as to keep the office de-politicised.
Bollard upheld this convention, limiting himself largely to the legally required
monthly ‘monetary policy statements’ and biannual ‘financial stability statements’
during a period that was unfortunately simultaneous with the emergence of the
crisis (Bennet 2008).
Additionally in New Zealand, the Department of the Treasury (Kaitohutohu
Kaupapa Rawa) is charged with a unique, bipartisan public information function
under Section 26T of the Public Finance Act 1989. This became especially
significant in an electoral context when it was required to publicly release a
Pre-Election Economic and Fiscal Update (PREFU) and a Briefing to the incoming
minister, as it did at the height of the crisis. To account for these characteristics
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of the case, this chapter includes the two Treasury releases during the period
of the election, as well as two speeches made by Governor Bollard when he
resumed his public framing role after the election.
The analysis of each speech act contains two components situating it in terms
of the framing contests and rhetorical strategies described in Chapter 2, and then
gauges the public reception of the speech, through analysis of three of New
Zealand’s newspapers: the Dominion Post, The Press and the New Zealand Herald.
Quantitatively, the media response is represented in tabular form with each
responding article coded as agreeing, remaining neutral or disagreeing with four
aspects of the speech’s framing: 1) its framing of crisis severity; 2) its framing
of crisis causation; 3) its framing of the proposed policy response; and 4) support
for the speech-maker (for the references supporting each table, see the online
appendix at <http://globalfinancialcrisis.wetpaint.com/>). This quantitative
analysis is followed by qualitative analysis examining the degree to which the
media responses accept, adopt or reject the frame’s narrative of the crisis. In the
case of the frames put forward by the Treasury and the RBNZ, which are apolitical
and not widely covered in the media, the chapter will proceed directly to
qualitative analysis.
The three papers selected for analysis were chosen to provide a representative
sample of New Zealand’s print media. First, according to polling by Nielson
Media Research New Zealand (2008), they were the three highest-circulating
papers in New Zealand in 2008. Second, they are published in each of New
Zealand’s three largest regional centres: the Dominion Post is published in the
capital, Wellington (southern North Island); The Press is published in
Christchurch (South Island); and the New Zealand Herald is published in
Auckland (northern North Island). Moreover, Nielson’s polling also suggests
they have the dominant readership within the region surrounding their centre
of publication. This was considered important to account for any regionally
specific perspectives on the crisis. Finally, the three papers—while all centrist
and more provincially than ideologically defined—represent a fair ideological
spectrum.
Box 10.1 New Zealand’s financial crisis trajectory, November 2007
– December 2008
November 2007: Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Governor Dr
Alan Bollard, releases the biannual ‘Financial stability report’ reassuring
New Zealanders that New Zealand banks have virtually no direct exposure
to the US sub-prime market and have engaged in very little securitisation.
He warns, however, that as funding costs rise, credit conditions will
tighten (Bollard 2007).
245
New Zealand: electoral politics in times of crisis
6 March 2008: Bollard (2008a) warns that there is a risk that the
slowdown in the US economy and international financial market
turbulence could result in a sharper downturn in New Zealand.
7 May: Bollard (2008c) says New Zealand’s financial system has so far
withstood ‘a severe test from global financial markets’ and has ‘very
little exposure to offshore credit risk or structured debt products’.
22 May: The New Zealand Treasury (2008a) releases the Budget Economic
and Fiscal Update (BEFU). Finance Minister, Michael Cullen, delivers
the 2008 New Zealand budget.
5 June: Bollard releases his ‘June monetary policy statement’ in which
he announces that the official cash rate (OCR) will remain unchanged
and now projects little to no gross domestic product (GDP) growth in
2008 and only a modest recovery thereafter (Bollard 2008d).
27 June: Statistics New Zealand releases its quarterly GDP update, ‘Gross
domestic product: March 2008 quarter’; these are the first strong
indicators that New Zealand is headed for recession (Statistics New
Zealand 2008).
8 July: The New Zealand Institute of Economic Research’s (NZIER 2008)
Quarterly Survey suggests New Zealand is technically in recession.
5 August: The New Zealand Treasury’s Overview of July Economic
Indicators (2008b) predicts that the economy will slide into technical
recession.
11 September: Bollard releases his ‘September monetary policy
statement’ (Bollard 2008e) in which he announces that the OCR will be
reduced by 50 points to 7.5 per cent and projects continuing inflation
and possibly further OCR reductions.
6 October: The New Zealand Treasury (2008c) delivers its Pre-Election
Economic and Fiscal Update (PREFU).
8 November: New Zealand General Election.
12 November: Bollard releases his biannual ‘Financial stability report’
(Bollard 2008f). He states that New Zealand’s banks are well positioned
to withstand the economic downturn. Deputy Governor, Grant Spencer,
assures New Zealanders that their deposits are safe.
19 November: John Key’s Government is sworn into office.
4 December: Bollard releases his ‘December monetary policy statement’
in which he announces reductions in the OCR to 5 per cent, bringing
the cumulative reductions since July to 3.25 per cent (Bollard 2008g).
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4 December: The New Zealand Treasury releases Briefing to the incoming
Minister of Finance 2008: medium-term economic challenges (Treasury
2008d).
18 December: The New Zealand Treasury releases Economic and Fiscal
Forecasts: December 2008 (Treasury 2008e).
3. Crisis development and elite rhetoric in New Zealand
23 May 2008: Prime Minister Clark’s budget speech
On 22 May 2008, Michael Cullen unexpectedly seized on gloomy forecasts in
the Treasury’s Budget Economic and Fiscal Update (Treasury 2008a) to cast his
budget as a response to uncertain times (Cullen 2008a). The next day, in her
traditional, post-budget address to the Auckland Chamber of Commerce, Clark
went further than any New Zealand economic leader had to date. The Prime
Minister book-ended her explanation of the budget with cautionary rhetoric.
She opened by stating that ‘this year’s budget has been written against the
background of a slower global economy which has obvious ramifications for
New Zealand’ and concluded with a reminder that the budget had been ‘written
against external factors which are not what any of us would want but which
we have to work around’. She was not specific about the severity of the global
financial crisis, which she described as ‘the fall out of the sub-prime crisis in
the United States’, which ‘has been felt around the world’. She did, however,
place it at the centre of a confluence of externally caused factors that had resulted
in a sufficiently severe ‘backdrop’ to which the budget had been tailored to
respond. She supported the budget’s combination of stimulus investments in
infrastructure and tax relief for struggling families as the best policy response
to this crisis.
Within the analytical framework, Clark’s speech suggests that her decision to
begin framing came well before she could have made accurate sense of, or decided
on any response to, the global crisis (at least based on Treasury’s numbers). Her
frame emphasised the severity of the crisis, justifying an about-turn on tax cuts
in the budget. It stressed the threat the crisis posed to the prosperity that New
Zealanders had enjoyed under her (status quo) government. Clark’s intention
seems to have been to link the frame of the home-grown downturn to that of
the international crisis, and thus exogenise any blame attributable to her
government for the former.
Clark’s framing highlights the dangers of viewing crises as discreet political
episodes, particularly when calculating the intent of actors. Boin et al. (2009:85)
posit that a political risk of overemphasising the severity of a crisis is to be
accused of being ‘alarmist’ or ‘opportunist’. Clark clearly accepted this risk, but
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she did so in order to superimpose a crisis her government could not control on




















Table 10.1 Media response to Clark’s 23 May 2008 speech
Note: DP = Dominion Post; NZH = New Zealand Herald.
As the small numbers in Table 10.1 suggest, Clark’s framing was to a degree
buried by (perhaps more newsworthy) budget coverage focused on the content
of Cullen’s proposals. Where it was reported in detail, however, the papers
largely accepted her emphasis on the severity of the global crisis (for instance,
Janes 2008a). While Clark was successful in framing the importance of the global
crisis, opinion polling suggests she was not able to escape blame for the
home-grown downturn. Indeed, Labour suffered a shock drop in the polls
(Morgan Research 2008b; One News-Colmar Brunton 2008b). Qualitative analysis
can perhaps suggest the reason for this, with all of the articles analysed treating
the budget as the key opportunity for Labour to reverse its poor approval ratings
before the election. Clark’s framing was widely perceived as a transparent attempt
to pre-empt any generous tax cuts being offered by the National Party (New
Zealand Herald 2008a). As such, while Clark’s frame was accepted, she might
have fallen victim to what the crisis literature describes as a ‘credibility trap’
through her overly partisan reading of the crisis (Boin et al. 2005:81).
27 June 2008: Treasurer Cullen’s reassurance attempt
In the afternoon after the release of Statistics New Zealand’s worrying quarterly
GDP update, Finance Minister, Michael Cullen, delivered a brief speech reassuring
New Zealanders that these data were attributable to a short-term shock. The
framing within this brief speech was important, however, as it became a position
Cullen would reiterate as a succession of concerning economic figures emerged
in the next two months (Treasury 2008b). Cullen’s speech was straightforward.
He continued to attribute the crisis to external factors and to assert that the
budgetary proposals were an appropriate policy response, as Clark and he had
done earlier. Seeking to maintain confidence in the economy, however, he
back-pedalled over its severity, which he now limited to the short term. Indeed,
he described New Zealand’s ‘medium-term economic and social prospects’ as
‘very healthy and strong’. Cullen’s downplaying of severity suggested that his
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sense making had advanced to the point that he was comprehending an
international downturn creating a crisis of confidence in New Zealand, and that
he decided to alter his frame in order to bolster confidence—a key part of the
Finance Minister’s economic leadership in any circumstance of uncertainty.
The most interesting aspect of Cullen’s framing was its relationship to his sense
making. He appeared to have backed away from the crisis rhetoric employed
by himself and Clark in the budgetary debates, because he realised that the crisis
was more serious than he had first appreciated. This could be attributable to
Labour’s punishment in the polls after the budget; however, it was just as likely
to demonstrate an interesting unwillingness to curtail opportunistic crisis rhetoric
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P (3)NZH (1); P (1)NZH (1); P (1)No comment/
neutral
Table 10.2 Media response to Cullen’s 27 June 2008 speech
Note: DP = Dominion Post; NZH = New Zealand Herald; P = The Press.
The spread of numbers in Table 10.2 demonstrates how open the
‘event-significance’ framing contest over the global financial crisis was at the
time of Cullen’s speech. It is noteworthy that all of those disagreeing with his
framing of the severity of the crisis argued that it was more severe. Those
disagreeing with his causation were unwilling to excuse the government for the
earlier domestic downturn. Moreover, the small number of articles simply
represents the fact that at that point in New Zealand politics, the global financial
crisis had not yet made it from the business pages into the mainstream news.
Qualitative analysis of the articles supported the claim that Cullen’s speech
occurred at a time of genuine uncertainty among commentators in New Zealand.
Given this context, an attempt to maintain confidence was probably a responsible
act by the Finance Minister. When opinion crystallised a week or so later,
however, Cullen’s optimistic medium-term forecast began to attract criticism,
and would have attracted more had not the opposition’s forecast been equally
disproved (Eaton 2008; O’Sullivan 2008). This indicates that all framing contests
are relative.
6 October 2008: the Treasury’s pre-election update
On 6 October 2008, after two and a half months of worsening crisis and with
the New Zealand economy now technically in recession, the Department of the
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Treasury released its Pre-Election Economic and Fiscal Update (PREFU), as
required by the Public Finance Act 1989. Unparalleled among the cases studied
in this volume, New Zealand’s PREFU is a legally required, independent
assessment of the nation’s economic position before the beginning of the electoral
period. As such, its sense making and framing of the crisis—while depoliticised
and not an act of crisis exploitation—had a defining impact on subsequent acts
of crisis exploitation by political leaders.
Within its projections, the PREFU defined the impact of the global financial
crisis as ‘severe’, effectively closing off the event-significance framing contest
to all subsequent frames. It projected that growth in the year to March 2009 was
down to 0.1 per cent from 1.5 per cent in the May budget and would be
rebounding in the next two years. Even more concerning for ordinary New
Zealanders was its projection that unemployment was expected to rise to 5.1 per
cent by March 2010 and could rise as high as 6.1 per cent in 2010. By necessary
implication, the PREFU attributed the crisis to external factors, although it
presented a range of policy options that left open the prospect of continued
framing contests regarding management of the crisis.
The projections of the PREFU generally stood up to media criticism, although
some reports cited independent research suggesting that the Treasury’s
projections could even have been slightly on the rosy side (Weir 2008a). The
major effect of the PREFU’s frame was to set the crisis as the defining issue of
the electoral period and to immediately begin another framing contest between
New Zealand’s two dominant parties.
6 October 2008: Cullen’s response
At the PREFU’s release, and in direct response to its frame, Cullen gave a speech
in which he abandoned his downplaying of the severity of the crisis and
described the ‘developments of recent weeks’ as ‘perhaps unprecedented in
living memory’. This was, however, only partial abandonment, as he also stated
that ‘New Zealanders can feel a very high degree of confidence that New Zealand
and Australia will emerge through these challenging times in better shape than
many other developed nations’. He reinforced the Treasury’s implicit attribution
of causation to international developments, seemingly suggesting with the above
statement that New Zealand’s economic management before the crisis was superior
to that of many other developed nations. Moreover, he strongly asserted that
budgetary measures, such as ‘the Government’s strong infrastructure program’
would be timely in their impact on this crisis. Simultaneously, he was expressly
critical of any suggestion of further tax cuts in this context—a pointed attack
on the advocacy of such cuts by opposition leader, John Key.
Situating Cullen’s speech within the crisis-exploitation framework draws attention
to the obvious connection between Cullen’s speech and Labour’s sense making
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after the PREFU. It is interesting to note, however, that this speech occurred
before the decision to strongly exploit the crisis politically, which became evident
five days later in Clark’s 11 October speech act. The content of Cullen’s frame
was now type-2, following the emphatic demonstration of severity in the PREFU.
In acknowledging severity, however, Cullen did not totally abandon the ‘severity’
framing contest, arguing that New Zealand’s long-term prospects remained good,
which would have significant implications in Clark’s subsequent reframing.
Cullen’s clear intent was to mount a twofold pre-emptory defence: he aimed to
demonstrate his budgetary measures were justified in the crisis while
simultaneously using the crisis to pre-empt any National Party attempts to exceed
his tax cuts.
Cullen’s framing in this speech is perhaps most interesting for its restraint. This
is especially true given the full-frontal assault against Key’s economic philosophy
launched in Clark’s framing five days later. This suggests either that Labour had
not decided yet to thoroughly exploit the crisis or, more likely, that they were
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Table 10.3 Media response to Cullen’s 6 October 2008 speech
Note: DP = Dominion Post; NZH = New Zealand Herald; P = The Press.
Table 10.3 bears testimony to the polarising effect that such a momentous PREFU
in an electoral context had within the commentariat. It is important to note,
however, that all those who disagreed with Cullen’s half-hearted framing of
severity considered the crisis to be more severe, especially in terms of New
Zealand’s long-term economic prospects. Table 10.3 does evince a general
dissatisfaction with Cullen’s continued reliance on four-month-old budgetary
solutions to a problem that now dwarfed the problems they were originally
designed to address. This reliance on outdated framing was also significant in
the qualitative analysis, which showed a general distaste among commentators
for Cullen’s attack on Key’s further tax cuts—promised well before the crisis
worsened (Cosgrove 2008; Oliver 2008). That said, much of the commentary on
Cullen’s frame, and certainly the opinion polling, was expectantly waiting for
Key’s post-PREFU response.
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8 October 2008: the prime minister-in-waiting’s big plan
After the PREFU, Key finally ventured a counter-frame to the Clark Government
with his release of the ‘National’s economic management plan’ on 8 October.
While Key was not in government at this point, this speech has been included
as one of his two speeches in this chapter’s analysis because it was this initial
framing of the crisis that carried him through the election and followed him into
government. After the PREFU, Key acknowledged the severity of the crisis,
although he chose to make only minor adjustments to his promised tax cuts—still
outspending Labour. Unsurprisingly, Key sought to blame the incumbent
government, suggesting that the ‘suddenness and severity of the international
downturn has exposed our economy’s weaknesses more quickly than anyone
would have expected’, but asserting that those weakness had been ‘present for
some time’. He emphasised the need for the New Zealand economy to ‘grow’ out
of the red ink and thus advanced policies directed towards long-term growth.
Key’s speech is best characterised as a classic type-3, which attempted to utilise
the economic crisis to expose deficiencies in Labour’s economic management
and economic policies. As such, Key’s frame represents the first genuine challenge
to Labour within the ‘causality’ framing contest. It is clear that Key’s intent here
was to frame the crisis in a manner favourable not just to a change in government,
but to a major shift in macroeconomic management.
Within the crisis-exploitation framework, Key’s framing demonstrated some of
the advantages of opposition (see McCaffrie, this volume). As an opposition
leader with a healthy (perhaps insurmountable) lead in the polls, Key was able
to wait out the uncertainty of July and August 2008 until he had the data of the
PREFU available to confirm his sense making (Morgan Research 2008c). His
low-risk strategy also demonstrated the overarching narrative of the Clark




























Table 10.4 Media response to Key’s 8 October 2008 speech
Note: DP = Dominion Post; NZH = New Zealand Herald; P = The Press.
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Table 10.4 demonstrates the difficulties of attempting to adopt a low-risk strategy
in framing a crisis. Key’s unwillingness to water down too much his electorally
popular tax cuts accounts for much of the criticism apparent in Table 10.4, which
was surprisingly high given Key’s continued 10-point lead in the polls (Morgan
Research 2008c; One News-Colmar Brunton 2008c). Indeed, qualitatively, almost
all of the disagreements with Key could be attributed to his inability to
adequately recognise the severity of the crisis and change his outdated tax policy
(New Zealand Herald 2008b). Running through the criticism of Key was a sense
of disappointment that, with his poll lead so substantial, his policy was not
bolder. Indeed, one headline described him as a ‘Prime minister in waiting…with
an albatross for his rival’ (New Zealand Herald 2008c), which captured well the
extent to which the onus was on Labour to take political risks with the crisis.
11 October 2008: Clark upping the ante
At the Labour Party campaign launch, on 11 October, Clark decided to
aggressively reframe the crisis in a final effort to stave off electoral defeat. From
the stage of Auckland’s Town Hall, Clark resurrected analogies to the Great
Depression of the 1930s before declaring ‘a curtain is being drawn on the era of
the free wheeling unregulated money traders and financiers whose greed has
shaken the international financial system to its very core’. In rhetoric reminiscent
of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first inauguration speech, in which he
made reference to the malicious ‘moneylenders’ as key culprits of the Great
Depression, Clark attributed blame to ‘greed merchants’ who had destroyed ‘the
lives of ordinary people in real jobs trying to put food on the table for their
families’. She then announced two new policies—a retail bank deposit guarantee
and an additional stimulus package—before concluding by asking voters to
consider who they ‘really trust with the future of our economy’.
Situated within the crisis-exploitation framework, Clark’s speech can be
characterised as distinctly anti-status quo framing by an incumbent government.
Clark’s aggressive reframing should be characterised as the result of her
acknowledgment that without dramatic action Labour would suffer electoral
defeat. Her frame itself is an interesting mix of type-2 and type-3, with the
neo-liberal international status quo (and by implication its advocates within
New Zealand) being identified as the critical threat to a still-prosperous domestic
status quo produced under her government’s stewardship. Clark’s frame
represented a decisive response to Key’s contribution to the causality-framing
contest three days earlier, with thinly veiled references to Key’s background as
a merchant banker in the description of ‘greed merchants’. Finally, Clark’s
intention went further than just to exogenise blame from her government; she
intended to apportion it to ideological stances similar to those advocated by the
opposition.
253













NZH (2); P (1)   Disagrees
DP (1); NZH
(3); P (1)
NZH (2); P (1)NZH (2); P (2)NZH (2); P (1)No comment/
neutral
Table 10.5 Media response to Clark’s 11 October 2008 speech
Note: DP = Dominion Post; NZH = New Zealand Herald; P = The Press.
Table 10.5 attests to a generally positive reception for Clark’s framing. In
particular, the solid support for the severity and causality of Clark’s frame
suggest she tapped into a longing within the electorate for more meaningful
engagement with economic issues of great concern. The disparity in ‘Support
for speaker’ reflects criticism from some commentators of Clark’s transparent
exploitation of the crisis for electoral gain—in particular, her announcement of
a deposit guarantee without consulting the opposition. Interestingly, however,
any loss of credibility was confined to the media, as after Clark’s speech, Labour
enjoyed a brief surge in the opinion polls, gaining on the National Party for the
first time in the period (One News-Colmar Brunton 2008d). Clark’s aggressive
and initially successful crisis framing—which was reinforced consistently by
her party during the election—was, however, not sufficient to sustain the trend.
By the end of October, Key’s lead—which never shrank substantially—was
again widening, leading to his emphatic victory on 8 November (Ministry of
Justice 2008).
4 December 2008: the Treasury briefing to the incoming
government
After the election of the Key Government on 8 November 2008, another of the
New Zealand Treasury’s public information functions became relevant: the
Briefing to an incoming minister. Again unparalleled among the other cases studied
in this volume, in the briefing, the Treasury issues its independent, ‘frank and
fearless’ public advice to the newly elected Minister of Finance. In December
2008, this provided the public servants within the Treasury a second opportunity
to provide an expert-driven, non-political view of the crisis.
In the briefing, Treasury defined the severity of the crisis as ‘extremely
challenging’ and demanding of immediate action if the deterioration of the
economy was to be stopped. Moreover, it argued against further short-term
stimulus, claiming that the National Party’s promised tax cuts went beyond
what most other Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
nations were doing. It warned that living within the NZ$1.75 billion spending
cap the National Party had pledged to maintain would be difficult. Instead,
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Treasury suggested a shift in spending away from ‘low-return’ investments,
such as lower staff–pupil ratios, to improving accountability for pupil
achievement and the development of teaching practice; suggesting New Zealand
superannuation might have to be less generous; and proposing alternative forms
of tax restructuring.
Coming in the aftermath of the political game’s climactic conclusion, Treasury’s
briefing represented a significant contribution to the framing of the crisis in the
‘policy game’ (see Chapter 2, this volume). As such, even though the new Finance
Minister, Bill English, soundly rejected it (see below), the briefing provided an
important alternative to the National Party’s proposed structural reform of the
economy.
5 December 2008: the new Treasurer’s reform bid
On 5 December, English responded to the Treasury’s briefing by advancing his
own framing of the global financial crisis’s impact on New Zealand. To give
himself maximum room to manoeuvre, English opened his framing by
acknowledging the severity of the crisis, stating that the government’s books
were likely to get worse before they got better. He then moved quickly to
attribution of responsibility, which he placed squarely on ‘Labour’s complacency
and refusal to address structural issues dragging down our growth potential’,
which increased the vulnerability of the New Zealand economy to global
developments. English then advocated a policy response based on the removal
of ‘barriers that have prevented New Zealand becoming more competitive and
achieving higher productivity growth’.
It was clear that English’s framing followed recognition of the crisis as a critical
opportunity for his party to advance its structural economic reforms early in its
term. He sought to endogenise as much blame as possible, targeting the policies
of the previous government. His intention appeared to be to build public
sentiment behind neo-liberal economic reforms by discrediting the status quo.
This framing of the global financial crisis to build support for centre-right,
neo-liberal reforms was remarkable given that the same crisis had, in almost all
other instances, been framed to the opposite effect. For example, in New Zealand’s
close neighbour and financial trading partner Australia, Prime Minister, Kevin
Rudd, used the crisis to proclaim the death of ‘neo-liberalism’ (Rudd 2009; see
further Laing and Tindall, this volume).
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Table 10.6 Media response to English’s 5 December 2008 speech
Note: DP = Dominion Post; NZH = New Zealand Herald; P = The Press.
Table 10.6 shows the somewhat muted media response to English’s framing.
Much of this reaction can be attributed to the honeymoon period English was
enjoying, with the neutral responses effectively meaning acquiescence to the
National-led Government’s mandated agenda. Qualitatively, it is remarkable the
commentary did not address the extent to which English was going against the
grain of international developments. This was especially significant given that
the Treasury’s briefing pointed out expressly that the National Party’s program
of tax cuts was out of step with the rest of the OECD (Treasury 2008b).
10 December 2008: the bank governor’s warning
Having been compelled by convention to keep a low profile during the election,
RBNZ Governor, Dr Alan Bollard, on 10 December 2008, felt at liberty to advance
his framing of the crisis. He re-emphasised the severity of the crisis, warning
that the road to recovery for New Zealand would be long. In particular, he
expressed concerns about high inflation, which had to be reduced before the
RBNZ could ease monetary policy to stimulate the economy. Moreover, he warned
that falling international commodity prices could not be relied on to automatically
reduce short inflation, as the operation of other factors such as the exchange
rate, taxes and firms’ margins could result in a lag of six months or more. Bollard,
not just attributing the continuance of the crisis to external factors, warned that
all sectors of the economy would need to refrain from adding inflationary
pressures if New Zealand was to recover in the short term.
While it was not really picked up by the media, Bollard’s post-election framing
of the crisis was particularly significant for two reasons. First, after the electoral
populism of the politicians, Bollard’s speech represented the first attempt to
advance a framing of the context specific to business leaders who—beyond the
short-term calculus of an electoral contest—were a key audience for the
government’s economic management and for the outcome of the ‘policy game’.
The second reason for the importance of Bollard’s framing was its focus on
immediate challenges, which highlighted weaknesses in the more long-term,
policy-oriented framing attempts by English and the Treasury. The immediacy
of these short-term challenges was to become even more apparent eight days
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later with the Treasury’s release of its Economic and Fiscal Forecasts (Treasury
2008e).
18 December 2008: further bad news from English
After the sharp deterioration of New Zealand’s economic forecast in the Treasury’s
Economic and Fiscal Forecasts, Finance Minister English was compelled to reframe
the severity of the crisis—in particular, for the next 12 months. English described
the new Treasury forecast of ‘sharply increasing public sector debt and higher
fiscal deficits over the next five years’ to be ‘outside the range the government
considered prudent’. This led English to hint at a policy response that appeared
to be in tension with his government’s promised tax cuts—notably: ‘putting
the economy on a strong medium to long-term footing, limiting spending growth,
getting better value out of existing spending, ensuring that tax bases are
maintained, and ensuring that government assets were managed as effectively
as possible’.
It was clear that Treasury’s December forecasts overtook English’s initial sense
making, particularly with regard to the short to medium-term urgency of the
crisis. With this frame, English shifted his position and was now attributing far
more blame to international developments (the Clark Government was not even
mentioned). His intention was most likely to frame the crisis in a way that
acknowledged the enormity of the challenge facing his government but also


















Table 10.7 Media response to English’s 18 December 2008 speech
Note: DP = Dominion Post; NZH = New Zealand Herald; P = The Press.
The quantitative analysis in Table 10.7 reveals that when it came to the economic
crisis, English’s honeymoon in the press was cut short. Qualitative analysis
emphasises this point. For the first time during the period, a genuinely alarmist
didactic ran through much of the commentary as it began to come to terms with
the prospect of sizeable budget deficits into the foreseeable future (for example,
Weir 2008b). Some commentators looking further ahead warned of long-term
difficulties such as accelerated infrastructure drift to Australia and even an
unfavourable structural realignment of the international economy (for example,
Janes 2008b).
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27 February 2009: the bank governor at the ‘Jobs Summit’
The final two speech acts to be analysed both occurred at the Key Government’s
‘Jobs Summit’ on 27 February 2009. This summit was intended to generate ideas
for the Key Government in preparing its first critically important crisis budget.
Even though it occurred slightly after Key’s opening address, Bollard’s speech
will be analysed first, as it provided the authoritative frame of the crisis for the
summit.
In framing the impact of the global financial crisis at the Jobs Summit, Bollard
re-engaged in the first framing context to curtail the sweeping use of historical
analogy in describing the severity of the crisis. Bollard emphasised: ‘to be clear,
the state of the global economy and the outlook are very serious, but we are
nowhere near Depression-level economic condition.’ Using a more apt historical
analogy, Bollard described the present crisis in world growth terms as ‘somewhat
below the early 1980s recession’. Bollard then framed the effect of the crisis as
one of producing a ‘new global balance’, which in broad terms meant that
economies such as New Zealand’s would ‘have to save more, reduce household
deficits, build exports and improve their external balances’. Bollard concluded
that within the Western world, ‘New Zealand’s economy and financial system
are relatively well-placed to weather the adjustment. Our challenge will be to
remain well-positioned to take advantage of the economic recovery when it
comes’.
This framing by Bollard is significant in its context at the opening of the Jobs
Summit. As the summit itself was an attempt to restore confidence in the economy
through coopting New Zealand’s business elite, it was critical to open with a
relatively positive framing of the crisis. As the country’s key financial technocrat,
Governor Bollard was in a uniquely credible position to provide this. His
authority was evident from universal acceptance of his frame.
27 February 2009: the new Prime Minister’s call to action
The final speech act to be analysed in this chapter was delivered by Prime
Minister Key in opening the Job Summit. The summit, a brainchild of his
government, was intended as a forum to produce ideas before the delivery of
his government’s first budget in May, which inevitably was to be cast as a
crisis-response budget. If nothing else, it represented a tremendous opportunity
for the Key Government to close a credibility grab in bringing New Zealand’s
most respected economic minds into line behind its frame.
Key opened his address by framing the problem as one about which something
could be done. He scolded that ‘we will not gain anything today or in the months
ahead if we become lost in hand-wringing and crystal ball gazing about how
bad things are’. As such, he framed himself and the participants at the summit
into the crisis as ‘doers’.
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The Job Summit followed from the sense making of the Key Government that
the economic crisis was going to be a defining feature of its term, and from a
decision to gain external credibility in order to assist its framing of the crisis.
Key’s framing represented a step back from the type-2 frame adopted late in
December by English, in so much that blame for the crisis was not totally
exogenised to international factors. It was important for Key to show that the
government and the country’s chief economic players would be able to ‘do’
something about it. Key appeared to be focused on gaining external credibility
for his government’s frame, while ignoring internal sources of credibility, such






















Table 10.8 Media response to Key’s 27 February 2009 speech
Note: DP = Dominion Post; NZH = New Zealand Herald; P = The Press.
Table 10.8 suggests that the media response to the Job Summit address, and
indeed to the summit itself, was mixed. It is true that some of the ‘No comment/
neutral’ articles that merely reported the advent of such an august gathering
would have served Key’s purpose of increasing his government’s credibility.
The solid portion of articles that disagreed with the severity of Key’s frame as
well as his policy response can, however, be attributed to the sentiment that a
summit was not an appropriate response to a crisis of this scale (for example,
Van Beynen 2009). The pervasiveness of this critique of ‘trivialisation’ throughout
the media coverage served to partially undermine the momentum Key might
have hoped to obtain for his proposed reforms.
4. Framing the financial crisis in New Zealand: analysis
and conclusions
Having analysed the attempts to frame the global financial crisis by key New
Zealand leaders, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the impact of crisis
exploitation within the case. In particular, it is useful to focus on the two ‘games’
that lie at the core of crisis exploitation: the political game and the policy game
(see Chapter 2, this volume).
In terms of the political game in New Zealand, the impact of crisis exploitation
was noted, but probably not decisive. The National Party, led by John Key,
maintained its convincing lead in the polls throughout and was eventually
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electorally successful. In one sense, this could be seen as a justification for those
who argue that already-popular leaders are more likely to emerge successfully
from a crisis situation (Wilkins 1987; Seeger et al. 2003). Such an inference would,
however, ignore two important conclusions from the case. First, the Clark
Government’s crisis exploitation—while unsuccessful—did have a noticeable
impact on the polls. Its ultimate failure is explained just as well by the Key
opposition’s competent crisis leadership as it is by Key’s general popularity.
Moreover, throughout the period, the actions of all key players could be
accommodated within a crisis-exploitation framework. This suggests, if nothing
else, that the actors themselves considered crisis management to be of significant
importance and they acted accordingly. In the terms outlined in the ‘political
game’, an unpopular incumbent attempts first to minimise blame (box I) but
then chooses to risk a blame showdown (box IV) in a last-ditch effort to reverse
an imminent electoral defeat. This behaviour might be different to that posited
as likely, ceteris paribus, in Chapter 2, but it can nonetheless be accommodated
within the framework. Indeed, this chapter found such an accommodation to
be illuminating.
It is in the context of the ‘policy game’ (see Chapter 2, this volume), however,
that the utility of the framework is borne out. An interesting anomaly of the
case, noted above in the analysis of English’s first speech act analysed in this
chapter, is the extent to which the Key Government was successful at exploiting
the economic crisis to implement ‘neo-liberal’ economic reforms. Such reforms
were anomalous because in almost all other countries, including New Zealand’s
close neighbour and financial partner Australia, the global financial crisis had
led to the discrediting of neo-liberal economics.
Such a disparity in policy response between two close neighbours suggests the
policy outcomes of crises are shaped by much more than the content of the crisis
itself; it suggests the crisis framing is of the utmost importance to the policy
outcomes. Boin et al.’s (2009) conception of a ‘policy game’ would seem an
efficacious way to theoretically model this policy side of the framing contest. In
the case of New Zealand, box III of Table 2.2 (Chapter 2) would seem to explain
the neo-liberal outcome; there had been a major and swift rhetorical/symbolic
change in New Zealand economic policy after the crisis, which was successfully
framed as a consequence of New Zealand’s lack of competitiveness in global
markets.
The key question remains: what determined success in these framing contests?
Considering the political and policy games in New Zealand together, it seems
there was one factor that could incorporate the impact of popularity and that of
a persuasive crisis in explaining causation: credibility. Elsewhere, credibility
has been considered to constitute the key factor in determining the success of
‘meaning making’ after a crisis (Boin et al. 2005:79–83). In the New Zealand case
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study, its significance seems to be demonstrated. The insurmountable challenge
for the Clark Government was not unpopularity so much as the ‘credibility trap’:
any attempt to exploit the crisis to reverse this unpopularity without that
intention becoming transparent. Moreover, the Key Government’s early success
in implementing significant neo-liberal policy reform would seem best explained
by its ability to frame a crisis that struck during a home-grown downturn as
being linked to the economic management that caused that downturn. If there
is one salient lesson that the unique case of New Zealand should suggest to the
scholar of crisis leadership, it is therefore the importance of credibility as a
determinant in the political and policy outcomes of crises.
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11. Singapore: staying the course
Faith Benjaathonsirikul
1. Crisis management in a ‘moderated democracy’
Singapore has presented itself as a unique and interesting case among nations
deeply affected by the global financial crisis. The Lee thesis (after Lee Kuan Yew,
who formulated it succinctly) argued in sum that freedoms and rights hampered
economic growth and development (Sen 1999). The combination of a moderated
democracy with limited governmental transparency and little freedom of the
press, free speech or welfare rights has seen Singapore controversially typecast
as a soft authoritarian and anti-democratic state. Singapore, however, has found
its niche in its ability to foster liberal enterprise based on manufacturing, service
and speculative investment. Singapore presents itself as a nation built on the
business acumen of its people, harnessed through meticulous planning and
shepherded by benevolent-paternalistic government.
The People’s Action Party (PAP) has been the sole ruling political party in
Singapore since 1959. Since the general election in 1963, with Lee Kuan Yew as
its leader, the PAP has dominated Singapore’s parliamentary democracy and has
been central to the country’s rapid political, social and economic development.
Although the PAP professed a rejection of Western-style liberal democracy, it
has, since its inception, accepted the need for some welfare spending and
pragmatic economic intervention. Mauzy and Milne (2002) discern four major
underlying principles of the PAP: pragmatism, meritocracy, multiracialism and
communitarianism.
Singapore grew into South East Asia’s wealthiest economy and, in 2008, had
kept its rank for the third successive year as the easiest place to do business in
the world (Brook 2008). Nevertheless, notwithstanding an average growth rate
of 8 per cent between 2004 and 2007, Singapore was the first East Asian country
to fall into a recession as a consequence of the global financial crisis. Due to
conservative economic policies—a remnant of the 1997 East Asian financial
crisis, combined with an existing well-regulated market—the exposure of
Singapore’s banks to sub-prime mortgages was limited. The country’s reliance
on foreign investment, however, and its heavy dependency on trade made it
particularly sensitive to volatilities and shocks in the global financial markets,
and in particular, to key exports of manufactured goods to the United States
and Europe, which in the past few years accounted for nearly 33 per cent of
total non-oil exports (Thangavelu 2009).
267
The huge losses in Singapore’s wealth from the collapse of international stock
markets further exacerbated already declining economic conditions. Although
it was difficult to establish a true figure due to lack the of disclosure of their
assets and trading activities, it was estimated that in 2008 alone the Government
of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC)—one of two government-funded
institutions known as sovereign wealth funds—made an estimated loss of US$33
billion (Paris 2009). Temasek Holding Pty Ltd, GIC’s sister agency, accrued an
estimated loss of US$39 billion in the eight months between 31 March 2008 and
30 November 2008. The vulnerability of Singapore’s two sovereign wealth funds
was due mainly to heavy investments in distressed Western financial institutions
such as Citigroup, UBS AG, Barclay’s Bank and Merrill Lynch.
With the constraints on democratic accountability operating in the Singaporean
political system, the potential scope for any particular crisis to threaten the
political fortunes or policy commitments of incumbent leaders is limited. There
is no credible opposition party and past voting behaviour in Singapore indicates
that PAP office-holders are firmly in the saddle. Still, a crisis that has the potential
to destabilise the key pillars of prosperity on which much of PAP’s authority
and public legitimacy rest, is worth closer examination. A crisis-induced rise in
political disaffection among Singaporeans could have dented the long-term
credibility of the PAP and, in particular, the Lee family.
Box 11.1 Singapore’s financial crisis trajectory, December 2007 –
March 2009
25 December 2007: Temasek Holding Pty Ltd (Temasek), a Singaporean
investment fund and arm of the Singapore Government, buys a large
stake in US financial services company Merrill Lynch at 13 per cent less
than market value—spending $14 billion. Temasek also holds an option
to purchase a further $600 million worth of shares by the end of March
2008.
25 June 2008: Temasek buys £200 million worth of shares in British
bank Barclay’s after the bank announced it would issue new shares worth
£4.5 billion to bolster its finances, which had been hit by losses on US
mortgage-backed securities.
29 July: Temasek increases its stake in Merrill Lynch. Temasek had
previously paid $5 billion for new shares in the company; it is now
entitled to a discount totalling $2.5 billion on this purchase. Temasek
spends the discount returned to it by Merrill Lynch on an additional
purchase of $900 million worth of shares in the company at a price of
$24 a share—half of the purchase price paid in December 2007.
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Mid-September: The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) pledges
to hold inquiries into potentially wrongly sold Lehman Minibond notes,
though it does not indicate any commitment to order financial institutions
to buy back the notes and denies having authority to compel financial
institutions to compensate consumers. The total size of the Lehman
Minibond program was S$508 million, of which S$375 million was sold
to approximately 8000 retail investors through nine distributors. These
notes are considered growth stock, as opposed to income-producing
assets, of a high-risk nature.
October: Easing of monetary policy; lowering of trading band to allow
depreciation of currency.
10 October: The MAS issues a statement that Singapore’s policy of
modest and gradual appreciation of the Singaporean dollar’s nominal
effective exchange rate policy, standing since April 2004, has been
tightened to help mitigate inflationary pressures in lieu of sustained
growth and rising commodity prices. Advanced estimates released by
the Ministry of Trade and Industry show, however, that Singapore’s
gross domestic product (GDP) has declined by 6.3 per cent—due mainly
to external shocks transmitting into a domestic slowdown in financial
and trade channels.
20 October: The government moves to guarantee all Singaporean dollar
and foreign currency deposits of individual and non-bank customers
until 31 December 2010. The PAP sets aside S$150 billion as sufficient
to back S$700 billion of individual deposits and non-bank customers.
This is a precautionary measure to avoid any potential erosion of
Singaporean banks’ deposit base and to ensure an international playing
field for Singapore.
Late October: The MAS establishes a US$30 billion swap facility with
the US Federal Reserve as a pre-emptive measure to ensure dollar liquidity
for the Singaporean banking system.
Early November: Singapore’s DBS Bank retrenches 450 workers to cut
costs.
November: The government pledges $1.5 billion to help firms secure
credit, followed by a further announcement that it is ready to run a
bigger budget deficit to boost the economy.
11 January 2009: Temasek acquires shares in Bank of America by
converting shares it had purchased in Merrill Lynch (see 25 December
2007 and 29 July 2008) into shares in Bank of America, which had
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recently purchased Merrill Lynch. Temasek now owns 3.8 per cent of
Bank of America.
22 January: The government announces its 2009 ‘Resilience Package’
totalling $20.3 billion (8.2 per cent of GDP) made up of five components:
jobs for Singaporeans; stimulating bank lending; enhancing business
cash flow and competitiveness; supporting families; and building homes
for the future.
6 February: Board of Directors of Temasek announces CEO, Ho Ching
(wife of Lee Hsien Loong), is stepping down after Temasek’s ailing
performance in 2008.
2 March: United Overseas Bank shares fall about 6 per cent to
S$9.38—the lowest level in almost six years.
6 March: Recent Economic Development in Singapore report states that
GDP has further contracted by 16.4 per cent in the fourth quarter of
2008 after the 2.1 per cent decline in the preceding quarter. It is reported
as the steepest sequential contraction on record and is marked by rapid
deterioration in trade-related industries and a sharp drop in financial
services. Reported retrenchment of 13 400 workers in 2008 (a rise from
7700 in 2007).
2009: Government expects budget deficit of $8.7 billion (3.5 per cent of
GDP) for FY2008—a significant rise from the budget deficit of $2.2 billion
for FY2007.
2. Methodological considerations
In a bid to downplay Singapore’s dire economic situation, there was marked
concurrence in commentary about the unravelling of Singapore’s economy by
the three most significant actors in economic policy: Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong, Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam, and the Managing Director
of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) Heng Swee Keat. Below we
describe and analyse the development of their rhetoric as the crisis unfolded.
Analysing its reception in Singaporean public opinion, however, presented a
challenge unique to the case studies in this volume.
Official censorship of the Internet, media reporting and newspapers was the
primary obstacle to gauging public opinion. Although the Singaporean
Constitution provides for freedom of speech and expression, it permits official
restrictions on these rights. In practice, the government has significantly
restricted freedom of speech and freedom of the press (US Department of State
2009:2a). High-level censorship and lack of credible opposition parties in
Singapore ultimately had the effect of limiting, and possibly skewing, publicly
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expressed opinion. Although the Straits Times (Singapore’s highest-selling
newspaper), Channel News Asia and Business Times were consulted as sources
of information, it must be noted that the government has a significant influence
on the printed, electronic and televised media in Singapore; thus, these three
news media sources could be only loosely consulted as general indicators of
public opinion.
The nine speech acts were chosen based on the grounds that they addressed the
main stakeholders or, in the case of the Singaporean budget speech for 2009,
provided a template for other meaning-making processes. The speech acts were
analysed in accordance with the volume’s analytical framework (see
Chapter 2)—that is, considering their representation of the severity and causes
of the crisis, the allocation of responsibility for the crisis (and its handling) and
the articulation of its policy implications. In using the heuristic of the political
crisis exploitation game, the degree to which the three key actors’ credibility
was affected by the public reception of their crisis rhetoric is also assessed.
Finally, the policy crisis exploitation game was used to assess the possibility of
a shift in policy away from the status quo as a result of (un)successful framing
of the crisis by the three key actors.
3. Crisis development and elite rhetoric in Singapore
27 June 2008: Finance Minister Shanmugaratnam blaming
(foreign) hubris
In his address to the Association of Banks (ABS), Tharman Shanmugaratnam
attributed the cause of the global financial crisis to hubris after the boom of the
past two decades. The long period of macroeconomic stability had led to
heightened risk-taking behaviour and leveraging reaching unprecedented levels
in global finance, while credit spreads on risky assets fell to exceptionally low
levels. Financial engineering and the search for higher yields led to an explosion
of complex financial derivatives, as such high-yield securities backed by
sub-prime mortgages originating in the United States found their way into the
books of financial institutions in other parts of the world, especially Europe.
Shanmugaratnam emphasised the exogenous origins of the global financial crisis,
stating that Singapore’s experience had been somewhat exceptional in that:
Singapore’s challenges mirror those faced elsewhere in Asia, but are in
some ways more pronounced. We are a price taker in the true sense,
given our small size and the openness of our economy and financial
markets. We cannot insulate ourselves from global prices of food or fuel,
or anything else.
He alluded to the possibility that the global financial crisis would trigger a new
phase in the globalised world. Monetary policy in the past had been too loose
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and with this as the fundamental flaw, symptoms such as boosted aggregate
demand and increased leveraging in financial markets had surfaced. He alluded
to a systemic problem with Western practices of neo-liberalism—in particular,
in the United States.
Although at this stage the depth and implications of the global financial crisis
in Asia had not yet materialised, and the speech featured no new policy
commitments, it was interesting to note Shanmugaratnam’s defence of the
non-prescription of fiscal policy at this early stage of the crisis. Later, Singapore’s
stimulus policy intervention would come to pass in the form of the so-called
‘Resilience Package’, totalling S$20.5 billion, creating the largest budget balance
deficit ever incurred in the city-state.
24 July 2008: monetary authority managing director
Heng’s ‘business as usual’
At the time of Shanmugaratnam’s address to the ABS General Meeting in June
2008, the depth and implications of the global financial crisis in Singapore had
not been fully realised. Crisis rhetoric and framing processes in mid 2008 were
largely subdued in comparison with later speeches. At a press conference marking
the release of the MAS’s Annual Report, Heng Swee Keat referred to the crisis
as ‘unusual market volatility’ and maintained that despite external market
volatilities, Singapore had still recorded strong growth, though economic activity
had moderated. No radical policy had been introduced to combat the early stages
of the global financial crisis.
In this press conference, Heng attributed Singapore’s economic slowdown to
factors beyond the control of the Singaporean Government. The rise in inflation
was imputed to external developments, such as high oil prices, continued high
prices of food and inflationary pressures on trading partners. Although the cause
of the rise in basic living expenses and inflation was attributed to external
influences, at this point, blame was not a large factor in the framing of the crisis.
As Heng commented on the United States and Europe: ‘The international financial
system and the global economy are still facing significant challenges and
downside risks. So far, prompt action by financial authorities in the US and
Europe has helped avert a wider crisis. But financial markets remain uncertain
and volatile.’
Overall, Heng’s remarks at the press conference typified a type-2 ‘crisis as critical
threat’ posture. Although no blame had been allocated, causation had been
attributed to external factors. Heng’s address represented a defence of the status
quo. He reassured his audience of the soundness of past MAS policies in
combating rising inflation. Reminiscent of Lee’s stance, Heng expressed that in
the face of increasing volatility globally, there was no room for complacency
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and that the MAS had tightened its monitoring of financial markets and
supervision of financial institutions:
We need to remain vigilant in the face of a number of risks in the global
economic and financial environment. We will continue to work closely
with the industry to identify vulnerabilities and threats to financial
stability through macro surveillance and stress testing. MAS’ work in
the coming year will continue to be driven by our mission of supporting
non-inflationary economic growth, and fostering a sound and reputable
financial centre.
17 October 2008: Heng managing blame
In October, Heng gave a press conference in response to stakeholders’ concerns
about the suspect sale of high-risk financial instruments to poorly informed
retail investors, the effects of which became evident only in lieu of the global
financial crisis, forcing many to forgo their entire savings, including many who
could not afford to do so. This speech represented a crisis within a crisis. The
PAP professed to have well-regulated financial institutions, but in light of the
global financial crisis, flaws became evident.
Heng began by recognising the significance of the inappropriate selling of bonds,
especially to vulnerable customers unable to absorb adverse market fluctuations
without risking financial ruin. He also largely externalised the blame for the
fiasco to the private sector financial institutions and their representatives,
portraying the regulator (MAS) as well meaning and proactive in finding a
solution to protect the most vulnerable of Singapore’s investors.
The speech also highlighted, however, the pragmatic ideology of Singapore’s
elite. Although stressing that the MAS required financial institutions ‘to have
a rigorous process to look into every complaint and resolve them fairly’, Heng
delegated the responsibility for investigating the scandal to the very financial
institutions that had sold the products to begin with. This left him open to
questions about the MAS’s commitment to aiding those affected. Although Heng
assured his audience that there would be an independent third party overhearing
complaints, he did not give operational details about how this third party could
audit the decisions of financial institutions’ review panels. He emphasised a
self-regulating approach in putting his trust in the review panel and their chairs
to conduct thorough reviews of each case and communicate their decision to
their customers within a short time.
Given the PAP’s traditional emphasis on detailed regulation to achieve economic
prosperity and social stability, the MAS, as Singapore’s de facto central bank,
might have been identified as having failed to monitor closely enough the
activities of financial institutions. Heng’s posture in this speech was clearly a
defensive one. Damage control was the name of the game.
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22 January 2009: Shanmugaratnam’s budget statement
Shanmugaratnam’s 2009 budget statement foreshadowed the government’s
intended policy responses to the global financial crisis, which had begun to hit
Asia hard in the preceding months. He opened by mentioning the uncertain
times Singapore had fallen into and that the prospect for 2009 remained uncertain
as all major economic regions of the world were experiencing a simultaneous
recession. He re-emphasised that the global financial crisis had descended on
Singapore from outside, as its economic fortunes were so closely tied to those of
the global market: ‘We had known and had highlighted the downside risks of
a US recession and a worsening global credit crunch. But like other governments
and the vast majority of private forecasters, we did not anticipate the speed and
scale of the deterioration in the global economy in the last six months’.
Acknowledging the far-reaching implications of the global financial crisis,
Shanmugaratnam mentioned systemic changes happening right across the
financial sector, including in Singapore:
Several of the foreign banks, especially those with weak balance sheets
globally, have been focusing on re-capitalisation in their head
offices…even the stronger players, including our local banks, have taken
a step back to reassess their lending strategies because of the uncertainty
over the depth and duration of this recession.
He maintained that the credit situation in Singapore had held steady until October
2008, when there was a decline in credit due to a decrease in demand as well as
banks becoming more cautious about the prospects of loan recovery.
Although in 2008 growth in Singapore had been much faster than in any other
Asian newly industrialised country, and the government’s strategy had kept
unemployment low, Shanmugaratnam predicted that the worst manifestation of
the global financial crisis in Singapore would be in terms of job losses. Attempting
to soften the bad news, he emphasised Singapore’s advantage in the global crisis
in that the government was able to provide resources to respond to the immediate
needs of businesses and households while not compromising long-term
investment. On this issue, Shanmugaratnam claimed credit for the government
having ‘rigorously adhered to a prudent fiscal policy, spending within [its]
means, maintaining a stable base of revenues, and building up a nest egg of
reserves for contingencies’.
Shanmugaratnam also mentioned that the government, while it could help sound
companies weather the storm of the global financial crisis and sharpen their
competitiveness, would ‘not be able to save companies that are inefficient or
whose products have lost relevance or appeal in the marketplace’. In other words:
the government would allow the crisis to cull inefficient or lagging businesses,
while its own interventions would be aimed at supporting thriving industries.
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He emphasised that the major measures taken by the government were not
necessarily aimed at preserving the status quo. How well companies were able
to benefit from the government’s support would depend largely on how well
they were able to review their business models, restructure and put efforts into
improving their products and exploring new markets. This was in line with
PAP’s longstanding meritocratic ideology of finding Singapore’s niche strength
through a form of market-based natural selection. In a bid to reduce
unemployment, workers were also encouraged to make significant adjustments
to allow businesses to cut costs, such as accepting pay cuts, and businesses also
were responsible to ‘cut costs to save jobs, not cut jobs to save costs’.
To aid productivity, Shanmugaratnam detailed the Resilience Package totalling
$20.5 billion, aimed at saving jobs and helping viable companies stay afloat. He
outlined that this package would not bring Singapore out of recession, but would
help avoid a sharper downturn and lasting damage to the economy. Unlike the
fiscal policies of foreign countries, Singapore’s Resilience Package entailed a
supply-side approach aimed at helping businesses retain workers by
strengthening cash flow in order to provide more support and confidence for
the domestic sector. This strategy reflected the government’s desire to bolster
Singapore’s service sector in order to, like Hong Kong, develop a more
competitive service and retail industry. As such, the global financial crisis
provided the opportunity for the PAP to restructure and retrain the labour
market so that the country could ‘emerge stronger and ready to seize new
opportunities, just as [we] did when [we] responded to the Asian Financial Crisis
a decade ago’.
19 February 2009: Prime Minister Lee’s pride in fiscal
prudence
Throughout Prime Minister Lee’s speech to the Standard Chartered gala dinner
on 19 February—his first major utterance in recognition of the crisis—he
moulded his crisis rhetoric to stress the superiority of the Singaporean model.
The crisis, he said, was due to a systemic problem with Western practices of
neo-liberalism. Careful not to criticise neo-liberalism itself, he found fault with
the ways in which Western governments had managed their financial institutions,
the effects of which were now spilling over into the local economy:
In Singapore, it is unlikely for a bank to fail due to domestic problems,
but problems elsewhere may affect its operations here. If it is a major
financial institution, there could be large ripple effects on the health of
other banks and confidence in the entire financial sector. We will
therefore need to watch for contagion and deal with systemic risk.
Lee’s criticism of the West’s lack of prudential care and responsibility implied
a belief that its culture bred an acceptance of unnecessary risk taking and careless
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disregard for the flow-on effects of individualistic behaviour that epitomised
Western neo-liberal culture. This was clever politics, serving to exogenise the
causes of the economic problems and at the same time reaffirm that the PAP’s
apprehensiveness about Western-style liberal democracy was justified and the
alternative model of a controlled, phased liberalisation of the financial industry
had served Singaporeans well.
In the wake of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the PAP had taken a pragmatic
approach to liberalising the banking sector. Unlike the policies of foreign
governments that installed more protectionist measures in times of recession,
Singapore had eased its competition policy, exposing its banking sector to
overseas rivals. Combined with consolidation of the banks, these measures served
to create a stronger and more dynamic local banking sector. At the same time,
however, prudent and conservative regulatory policies were implemented, which
Lee now claimed had buffered Singaporean banks from exposure to toxic assets
and non-performing loans (NPLs). Lee claimed credit for preparing Singapore
with a well-developed ‘disaster subculture’ and ‘safety culture’ that ensured
protection of banks and resources through conservative lending policies and
high levels of government surveillance and interference—otherwise referred to
as ‘vigilance’. As a result, Singapore had been able to put away reserves in the
form of high past surpluses that ultimately helped the State weather the global
financial crisis.
Although Lee acknowledged that the collapse of Lehman Brothers had an
unexpected impact in Singapore (and around the world) through credit-linked
structure products, he ascribed this not to the failure of government supervision,
but to the poor conduct of financial institutions grounded in a lack of
understanding of the failing instrument they had sold. Lee took the opportunity
to warn investors against future investments in complex securitisation products
or investing in risks they could not bear, as such high-risk investments ‘can
destabilise the whole financial system in unforeseeable ways’—a reminder to
Singaporeans that their foremost duty was to their country.
22 February 2009: Lee’s defence of the Singaporean way
Just three days later, Lee continued his meaning-making efforts. In his speech
on 22 February, he focused on the strength of Singapore as a nation and, by
association, the strength and conviction of its government in looking after the
best interests of Singaporeans. He acknowledged that the global financial crisis
was the worst economic crisis experienced in Singapore in the past 60 years. He
exogenised the causes of the problem and the responsibility for its solution by
saying that in order for Singapore to recover, other economies must first
recover—in particular, the United States and the European Union—which he
did not expect to happen any time soon. Communication of these sentiments
achieved a dual objective: it acted to absolve the government from any blame
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while also playing down public expectation about the government’s ability to
resolve the crisis.
Lee reiterated the success of his policies that had enabled the government to
store reserves from past surpluses, which fully financed the current Resilience
Package, as well as the so-called Skills Programme for Upgrading and Resilience
(SPUR), aimed at retraining Singapore’s workforce to make it more competitive.
Lee highlighted the government’s intervention through the introduction of the
Credit Scheme, which had helped businesses avoid wage cuts, defer
retrenchments or reduce the number of workers that had to be retrenched, while
other businesses had used it to expand. With expected growth of 2–3 per cent
in GDP in the next four to five years, Lee emphasised his government’s proactive
stance in buffering Singaporeans against the massive job losses seen in other
countries—again, juxtaposing Singapore’s situation with that overseas. He often
drew comparisons with ‘other countries’ to attempt to reassure the audience
that Singapore had not suffered badly comparatively, and moreover, that the
PAP had been prepared and well funded to aid Singaporeans through programs
to help the unemployed find jobs through training and professionals through
their Professional Skills Programme (PSP). This stance was reminiscent of
Singapore’s rejection of a welfare state. Instead of proposing monetary aid for
the unemployed, the PAP encouraged the workforce to retrain.
Lee maintained that only in Singapore could a company cut costs without massive
retrenchment and he gave three reasons for this: the Job Credit spurt, Singapore’s
flexible wage system and flexible work arrangements. As such, Singaporean
workers must aspire to be ‘better than the cheaper ones, and cheaper than the
better ones’. Although the global financial crisis was an exogenous problem,
Singapore must endogenise its long-term interests. Instead of hiring foreign
workers, jobs could be found for Singaporeans by reducing the cost of hiring
Singaporeans and upgrading the skills of each Singaporean employee through
training.
4 March 2009: Heng’s gloomy outlook
With the local economy nosediving, Heng’s address to the International Institute
of Finance offered dire prognoses, designed to communicate a sense of urgency
that had been lacking in Lee’s and Shanmugaratnam’s speech acts. Consistent
with Lee and Shanmugaratnam’s crisis rhetoric, Heng emphasised the
unprecedented and exceptional nature of the crisis, and recognised the
unconventional measures taken by financial authorities in efforts to arrest the
unfolding events.
The epicenter of this crisis is the US—it is the world’s largest economy,
holder of the international reserve currency, and home to the largest and
most sophisticated financial system. So we are talking about the core of
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the global financial and economic system where severe problems arose
and have since spread across borders.
The combination of European banks’ and other financial institutions’ significant
exposure to US assets, over-leveraging and dependence on benign conditions
for liquidity aided the rapid financial stresses that had travelled from the United
States and into the European Union. Japan, having relied on external demand,
had also been derailed by the contraction in the US and EU markets. With its
own domestic activity afflicted, Japan’s capacity to support other emerging
economies had diminished, thus damaging those emerging economies. In 2007
alone, the United States, the European Union and Japan had accounted for 50
per cent of global GDP.
Heng predicted the possibility of a new global order, as US households might
no longer be able to function as the engine for the world economy—and with
no clear alternative yet in sight. On this point, his view interestingly, though
subtly, deviated from that of Lee and Shanmugaratnam. For the Prime Minister
and Minister for Finance, it had not been a matter of whether the United States
would regain its position in the status quo, but when.
In his address, Heng called for a proactive, decisive and coordinated response
from Asian financial leaders in order to counter the effects of the global financial
crisis in Asia. Although he believed that since the 1997 East Asian financial
crisis, fundamentals in the Asian financial system and economy had become
generally sound—banks had been well capitalised and, unlike their Western
counterparts, had limited exposure to toxic assets—Asian economies that were
more reliant on external demand were expected to contract more sharply. Heng
emphasised that although it had been important to focus on the ‘here and now’,
structural weaknesses could emerge from short-term measures, damaging the
long-term viability and health of Asian economies. As such, leaders were
encouraged not to base their actions on sequential responses that had
underestimated the severity of the global financial crisis. Remedial action that
was too tentative or lacking in conviction could trigger renewed bouts of panic
and thus delay recovery.
24 March 2009: Shanmugaratnam finetuning the message
In a speech to the Singapore Business Awards on 24 March, Shanmugaratnam
acknowledged the significance of the global financial crisis as likely the deepest
recession in history. The Minister for Finance did not, however, offer the same
optimistic view of Singapore’s situation as had the Prime Minister. Recognising
that Singapore’s growth had been notably affected by the global financial crisis,
he did not expect the worst of the recession to surface within the next two
quarters. He forecast that growth for Singapore would remain weak until at least
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the end of 2010. This admittance of the dire situation of Singapore’s economy
was not unexpected, as the economic indicators were there for all to see.
Echoing his own and the other two leaders’ assertions that the blame for the
crisis lay elsewhere, Shanmugaratnam was explicit in his criticism of foreign
governments and foreign politicians for not taking a hard policy line to discipline
their constituencies, as well as not having provided much boost to their
economies by way of discretionary spending. Their tightening of credit,
according to Shanmugaratnam, had acted as a drag on the global economy and
Singapore would suffer the consequences.
In contrast, he congratulated the incumbent PAP for taking forward measures
during the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, which had cushioned the impact of
the global financial crisis in Singapore. Furthermore, Shanmugaratnam praised
Singapore’s entrepreneurs. As this was an address to the Business Awards,
Shanmugaratnam’s audience would likely have consisted of stakeholders who
would find most benefit from the PAP’s measures to counter the effects of the
global financial crisis. Some of the measures included supporting cash flow
through reduction in corporate tax, property tax rebates, the enhanced-loss
carry-back scheme to help companies making losses and foreign-sourced income
exemption. He also foreshadowed a suite of other business-friendly measures—for
example, a reduction in administrative speed bumps and reducing regulatory
roadblocks. Shanmugaratnam also highlighted small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) as a point of focus for future growth whereby they would be encouraged
to expand globally, at the same time appealing to foreign SMEs to invest in
Singapore. He also proposed to introduce an integrated system of financial
reporting to lighten the regulatory compliance burden of companies, especially
SMEs. Most significantly, he highlighted the government’s decision to enter
into a risk-sharing scheme with banks to encourage banks to continue lending
to SMEs by moderating the risks. Although these measures were proposed to
encourage competition and coordination among businesses, it is interesting to
note that some of the measures proposed would draw corporate governance
away from the democratic issue of corporate transparency.
28 March 2009: Lee’s call for unity
In Prime Minister Lee’s speech to the Manual and Mercantile Workers’ Union
(the biggest and one of the oldest unions in Singapore) on 28 March, he took a
defensive stance. This presented a significant variation from his previous
speeches, revealing deeper concerns about the local impact of the crisis. In what
by now had become a familiar mantra, Lee first exogenised responsibility and
blame for the global financial crisis and attributed Singapore’s current plight to
the United States and Europe, omitting more endogenous contributing factors
such as Singapore’s heavy dependence on speculative trade. Lee acknowledged
that while recent US Government crisis measures were helpful, the global storm
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had, inevitably, produced a surge in unemployment, particularly in Singapore’s
manufacturing sector, tourism and transportation businesses. Although job
losses had so far not affected the service sector, Lee advised Singaporeans to
brace themselves, as eventually the service sector would also be affected.
Lee’s thinly veiled concern in this speech was about social stability. Pointing to
France, where three million people had taken to the streets in protest against
the policies of President, Nicolas Sarkozy (see further Windle, this volume), Lee
feared the discontent of the unemployed and impoverished would trigger fear
and frustration. Eventually the unemployed would look for someone to blame
and would lash out at governments. Highlighting the social impact of recession
in this way, Lee betrayed an awareness of the growing unrest among the
Singaporean workforce. He then attempted to address this issue before it could
potentially become a crisis situation in itself, urging Singaporeans to unite in
times of duress. He stressed that tripartite cooperation between the government,
workers (and unions) and businesses had never been more important. Its strength
had to be preserved in these times of economic decline.
Lee reiterated once again that Singapore had no control over its external
environment and must do the best with what was available to it. Singapore,
being a ‘price taker’, had to accept and operate within global economic
constraints. As such, the PAP had been capable of only buffering Singaporeans
from the worst effects of the global storm—limiting their overall responsibility.
Policies covered by Lee in this speech were largely in line with the PAP’s
longstanding rejection of protectionist measures and welfare payments to the
aged or unemployed. Rather, Lee encouraged workers to accept demotions, pay
cuts and, alternatively, retrain to work in a different industry as job opportunities
presented themselves. The government had, as part of its Resilience Package,
set up agencies to help reallocate the unemployed to available jobs—at times in
different fields—as well as encouraging the aged to continue working.
As such, based on a loose assessment of the employment situation, the likely
outcome of the crisis-exploitation game would be elite escape with little change
in public opinion regarding Lee’s credibility. In part, this could be attributed
to Lee’s and the PAP’s consistent and established political and economic ideology,
which had been endogenised by the majority of Singaporeans. Based on the issue
of unemployment alone, a paradigm shift would be an unlikely event, thus a
policy stalemate between the opposition and the PAP would likely endure.
4. Framing the financial crisis in Singapore: analysis and
conclusions
Perhaps not surprisingly in a highly centralised system of government, there
was a great deal of consistency between the messages of the three leaders. The
core refrain was as follows: this is a nasty crisis; it has been caused overseas; we
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are well placed to weather the storm; we are doing everything we can to enhance
business competitiveness, but we have to accept that our dependence on our
major trading partners’ economies is overwhelming; as long as they are in
recession, we will face significant uncertainty and unemployment; but we cannot
allow this to diverge us from our tried and tested approach to creating long-term
prosperity.
In the majority of speeches analysed in this chapter, the speakers directed the
cause and responsibility towards the United States as the origin of the global
financial crisis. Further to this, with varying degrees of explicitness, they
lamented the failure of US legislators and regulators to diagnose and manage the
health and viability of its financial markets and banking system. Heng even
expressed some doubt about the United States’ ability to fully recover—alluding
to possible long-term changes in the world order, the substance of which might
become clear only after the global financial crisis and its effects had fully
dissipated.
Singapore has been known as the financial and business hub of East Asia. With
the pride of the nation hinging on its commercial success and high standard of
living, economic crises pose an existential threat to this small city-state. In what
could be construed as an attempt to regain consumer confidence and confidence
in its leaders, the most prominent hallmark of the three key actors’ crisis framing
was the propensity to deflect blame—mostly towards foreign governments and
organisations, but also, to a lesser extent, to naive domestic investors and
misconduct within some domestic financial institutions.
Though comparatively small, some differences in tone and emphasis are notable.
Lee’s unflinching optimism about Singapore’s capacity to weather the storm was
not fully met by Shanmugaratnam and Heng, who were more inclined to stress
the fragility of the situation (while sharing Lee’s staunch defence of the
government’s past and present economic policies). Overall, however, the
impression one gets is that whether spontaneously or by purposeful coordination,
the speeches all served the same underlying purpose: to consolidate and
strengthen the PAP’s political capital and at the same time advance and defend
longstanding PAP policies. On this line, the PAP has, arguably, successfully
turned a crisis situation into an opportunity to implement pragmatic, and perhaps
otherwise unacceptable, policies that will redirect and reshape Singapore’s
business community in ways that fit the PAP’s vision for the future of Singapore.
At the same time, the proactive attitude shown by the PAP in its attempts to
buffer Singapore from the worst of the effects of the global financial crisis might
not have been for purely pragmatic purposes. With Prime Minister Lee often
being accused of attaining his position through nepotism, the global financial
crisis might have come at a good time for him to prove himself as being as
indispensable to Singapore as Lee Kuan Yew had been, and that the PAP’s role
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in Singapore society was still viable and not yet redundant. Even in a ‘managed
democracy’ political leaders must, to a considerable extent, accept the discipline
of public criticism and social opposition (Dreze and Sen 1989).
In their meaning-making efforts with regard to the global financial crisis, the
ruling party injected their values into their depiction of the situation and their
narratives of severity, causality and responsibility. Whether Lee’s or the PAP’s
private sense making coincided with their public pronouncements remains
unclear. With the memory of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and Singapore’s
vigorous and largely successful response to it still looming large in their own
(and, presumably, the Singaporean public’s) minds, they might have believed
their own, self-confident rhetoric. Politically, barring a total economic collapse,
it is unlikely that there will be any significant paradigm shift or substantial
damage to the long-term image of the Lee family or the PAP as a result of this
crisis.
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Part V. Comparisons and reflections

12. Contesting the frame: opposition
leadership and the global financial crisis
Brendan McCaffrie
1. Whose crisis?
The global financial crisis has dominated inter-party political contests in almost
all major democracies, presenting challenges and opportunities to executive
government leaders and opposition party leaders alike. In their public responses
to crises, opposition leaders complete many comparable framing tasks to those
of executive leaders. Opposition leaders, however, typically have lesser resources,
fewer political weapons and limited responsibility for the real crisis response.
These differences create a distinct and difficult challenge for opposition leaders
in crises. Despite these restricted opportunities, opposition leaders can exploit
crises for political gain. This chapter demonstrates how opposition leaders in
three different political systems utilised the public sphere to do this, and explains
their consequent political successes and failures.
Political opposition is understudied in political science, while opposition
leadership is almost entirely neglected. This is unfortunate, as oppositions and
opposition leaders are crucial to maintaining the accountability and legitimacy
of governments, and as such should be better understood than they are.
Opposition leadership can be defined in many ways. Traditionally, the term
‘Leader of the Opposition’ has been used in Westminster systems to refer to the
leader of the largest non-government party in parliament. Moving beyond
Westminster systems, this conception becomes problematic.
In presidential systems such as the United States, it is very often unclear who
is leading the non-government party. In situations of divided government, when
the president’s party does not hold a majority in both houses of Congress, it can
also be unclear which is the non-governing party. As Dahl (1966:34) notes of
the United States, ‘[t]o say where the government “leaves off” and “the
opposition” begins is an exercise in metaphysics’. Additionally, the definitional
restriction to the largest non-government party cannot accurately represent
different oppositional configurations displayed in multiparty coalition systems.
For instance, after the 2005 German federal elections, the centre-right Christian
Democrats (CDU/CSU) became the senior governing partner in a ‘grand coalition’
government with the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). The CDU/CSU’s
preferred coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), was the largest
non-government party although it held only 61 of 614 Bundestag seats and was
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ideologically similar to the CDU/CSU. Moreover, it was clear from the
post-election posturing of the SPD that the most significant opposition to the
leadership of Chancellor, Angela Merkel, would come from within her own
grand coalition government (Richter 2006).
This chapter does not investigate the roles of minor-party oppositional leadership
or extra-parliamentary oppositional leadership in the financial crisis. The simplest
term to describe the types of opposition leadership investigated here is
‘alternative executive leadership’. Each of the opposition leaders discussed has
been engaged in a legitimate attempt to replace the incumbent head of
government. With this as the common goal, and bearing in mind the nature of
the global financial crisis, it is unsurprising that opposition leaders focused on
the third and fourth framing contests described in Chapter 2. Apportioning
blame (third contest) and providing alternative policies (fourth contest) are
opposition leaders’ two strongest weapons.
They might find the first framing contest, which centres on defining the
significance and severity of events, a more fruitful avenue of attack in other
types of crisis than it was at the onset of this financial crisis. This is because
oppositions typically rely on the same economic data as governments and have
fewer economic experts at their disposal to interpret those data, making it
difficult to contest government statements about the severity of negative
economic events. Furthermore, offering a bleaker picture of the state of the
economy than government leaders do leaves opposition leaders susceptible to
claims that they are acting irresponsibly by diminishing consumer confidence
and thereby damaging the economy. This difficulty was exemplified by Britain’s
Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, who warned of the
potential for a run on the pound, only to be pilloried by the government, media
and even his own party (Helm et al. 2008). This was a rare example of an
opposition attempting to make a mark in the first framing contest. Given the
outcome, this rarity is hardly surprising. In the cases studied, the first framing
contest is a relatively minor one and therefore it is excluded from the analysis.
The second framing contest—in which political actors attempt to define the
cause of a crisis—is crucial to opposition leaders’ abilities to blame the
government for the disaster. If a government leader effectively defines the crisis
as caused by external events, it becomes virtually untenable for an opposition
leader to claim that the government or its leader is culpable for the negative
effects of the crisis. In the specific case of the financial crisis, it made little sense
to define an opposition leader’s causal frame as distinct from their blaming frame.
Alternative government leaders gain nothing by offering a causal frame that
does not, either directly or indirectly, apportion blame to the government. As
such, these two framing avenues—causality and blame—will be examined
together in section three of this chapter.
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2. Cases and context: opportunities and expectations
The three nations selected for analysis—the United Kingdom, the United States
and Germany—are each considered archetypes for different systems of
government. The United Kingdom has the original Westminster system and its
opposition behaves almost exclusively as an alternative government. Since World
War II, there has not been a coalition government and its only major deviation
from a classic binary government–opposition dichotomy is a fairly strong third
party, though typically it is not strong enough to prevent a majority government.
The United States has a presidential system with a pure separation of powers.
As such, it presents significant challenges in locating an opposition, let alone
its leader. This chapter examines the period of the 2008 US presidential election
campaign, as elections are perhaps the only time when both major parties have
an obvious leader. They are certainly the only times when alternative government
leaders can be readily identified. Germany is seen to epitomise consensus systems,
with a proportional representation voting system and a growing history of
coalition governments. The rise of the minor parties at the expense of the two
major parties in recent times led to only the second German ‘grand coalition’
government, in 2005, although at the time of writing Germany was approaching
an election with another grand coalition one likely possibility. This chapter
defines the German alternative executive leader as the leader of the junior
coalition party, which during the onset of the financial crisis was the SPD.
Ordinarily, this would present a difficulty in that much of its opposition to the
Merkel-led ‘union’ of CDU and CSU parties is not conducted in the public realm.
Fortunately, the proximity of the September 2009 election and the SPD’s decision
to choose its chancellor candidate an entire year before the poll escalated the
public nature of the SPD’s opposition to the union parties.
United Kingdom: a besieged government and a vulnerable
economy
The United Kingdom entered the financial crisis with a more immediately
vulnerable economy than either Germany or the United States. Under the Labour
Government, Britain had enjoyed a decade of immense prosperity, with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) declaring that between 1996 and 2005 the
United Kingdom’s ‘growth of real GDP per capita was higher and less volatile
than any other G7 country’ (IMF quoted in Lee 2008:17). The consistently high
exchange rate of the pound against other currencies in that period, however,
discouraged exports and resulted in a poor balance of trade. Even with booming
financial and business services sectors, which delivered almost 30 per cent of
gross domestic product (GDP) (The Guardian 2007), the United Kingdom ran
consistent trade and current account deficits (Lee 2008). This reliance on financial
and business services coupled with a dependence on overseas borrowing meant
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that the financial crisis, with its sharp decline in lending, damaged Britain’s
economy severely and rapidly.
The Labour Government entered the financial crisis after more than a decade in
office, but with the experienced Prime Minister, Tony Blair, having stepped
aside for his long-time Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, in June
2007. Brown performed well in the polls during his first few months as leader,
with Labour consistently leading its rival Conservative Party by single-figure
margins (UK Polling Report 2009). Despite this leadership transition, Brown’s
long tenure as Chancellor meant that he was inextricably linked with the
economic performance of the nation, especially as he had long boasted that his
stewardship of the economy had resulted in ‘the longest period of sustained
economic growth since records began’ (Brown quoted in Milne 2007).
Traditionally, the governing Labour Party was a centre-left social democratic
party. The ‘New Labour’s’ third-way politics broadly accepted a move towards
a neo-liberal economic strategy (Heffernan 1999), although some commentators
contested the extent to which this was the case (cf. Beech 2008). This meant that
little distinguished the Conservative Party from the Labour Government on
economic matters except for Labour’s slightly greater predilection for public
spending.
For Conservative Opposition Leader, David Cameron, who took on the role in
December 2005, the economic situation and the length of the Labour
Government’s tenure combined to create strong opportunities to attack Brown
and his government using blaming tactics. Brown essentially had responsibility
for the economic system and had claimed responsibility for its successes. The
severe hardship that Britain was to face in comparison with many other Western
European nations would mean that as long as the public accepted Brown and
his government as responsible for the crisis, or even just for its severity, Labour’s
popularity would slip. In the policy contest, however, the Conservatives would
likely be hampered by their ideological proximity to the failing economic policies
of the Labour Government. Cameron would be unable to press for a paradigm
shift in economic policy and would be forced to focus on technical issues and
specific policy failings of the Brown Government. Thus, the global financial
crisis would provide significant but by no means unlimited opportunities for
Cameron as opposition leader.
United States: competing opposition leaders
When the sub-prime mortgage crisis visibly struck the financial sector in March
2008 with the collapse of Bear Sterns investment bank, President, George W.
Bush, was suffering unremittingly low approval ratings. A Gallup Poll published
on 20 February 2008 (Saad 2008) found that 31 per cent of respondents approved
of Bush’s performance—a result that was strikingly similar to those of the
290
Framing the global economic downturn
preceding months. The Bear Sterns failure also coincided with the 2008
presidential election campaign. Polling suggested that presumptive Republican
nominee, Senator John McCain, was roughly level with eventual Democratic
nominee, Senator Barack Obama, with some polls favouring the Democrat and
others the Republican (Real Clear Politics 2008). These polls should be treated
with caution, as McCain had won the Republican nomination, while Obama was
still battling Senator Hillary Clinton for the Democratic nomination, but they
do show that each leader was in a reasonable position to utilise the crisis to their
political advantage.
The financial crisis struck the United States at the end of the two-term Bush
Republican presidency. In terms of apportioning blame, the unpopularity and
apparent culpability of Bush made him an obvious target. With two presidential
contenders who had not been part of the Bush Administration and had explicitly
opposed it on many issues in the past, each could use blame tactics against Bush.
This would be easier for Obama than McCain, as Obama could repudiate the
entire Republican Party. It is also important to note that blaming the incumbent,
though likely damaging to Bush, would be far less relevant than blaming the
opposing candidate. This meant that the relevant argument could either shift to
blaming the partisan ideology behind the crisis or to focus on the policy contest.
Either argument would again likely favour Obama. The vehemently free-market
Republicans were intractably associated with the ideology that public debate
increasingly blamed for the crisis. They were also unlikely or even unable to
argue for a policy shift, whereas the more centre-left Democrats could plausibly
argue for stricter regulations of the finance sector. Therefore Obama had greater
opportunities to use the weapons of blame and policy to exploit the crisis to his
political advantage than did McCain.
Germany: spot the opposition
Compared with the other nations examined in this chapter, Germany felt the
early effects of the financial crisis fairly moderately. Admittedly, the government
was forced to bail out IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG on several occasions from
mid 2007, and to rescue Hypo Real Estate in September 2008, after the Lehman
Brothers collapse in the United States because of each of these lenders’ exposure
to the sub-prime crisis. Financial problems in Germany, however, remained
largely distinct from the rest of the economy, which led Europe in managing 1.5
per cent growth in the first quarter of 2008 (Dougherty 2008). This was due
largely to its strong and varied export sector. When the crisis made other nations
less able to buy its goods, the German economy did falter (The Economist 2009).
An idiosyncratic factor of the political and economic context in Germany is a
deep fiscal conservatism that leads politicians to shun state intervention through
stimulus packages and other similar measures (Bovensiepen et al. 2008).
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The German political context at the time of the crisis was intriguing. The ‘grand
coalition’ government of SPD and union parties was an uneasy alliance between
parties that had been staunch competitors since the State’s founding in 1949—bar
one period of an equally uneasy coalition imposed by political circumstances
from 1966 to 1969. Condemned to collaboration by the election outcomes, the
parties forged the coalition in a difficult negotiation process subsequent to the
2005 election. The masterful posturing skills of outgoing Chancellor, Gerhard
Schröder, secured for the SPD a majority of cabinet positions, among them the
highly important Finance Ministry, which was taken by Peer Steinbrück (Richter
2006). The negotiation phase also saw the Christian Social Union (CSU), the
Bavarian sister party to the Merkel-led Christian Democratic Union (CDU),
awarded the Economics Ministry, and from the time of the election until February
2009, the Economics Minister was the reluctant and economically uninterested
Michael Glos. As a result of Glos’s lack of economic acumen and Merkel’s lack
of trust in him, Steinbrück had far more involvement in economic decisions
throughout the crisis (Nelles and Neukirch 2008). Glos’s frustration at his own
lack of influence led him to call publicly for the government to change policy
and introduce tax cuts (Bovensiepen et al. 2008), and ultimately to resign in an
unorthodox manner designed to embarrass Chancellor Merkel (cf. Crossland
2009). The significant input of Steinbrück had allowed the SPD a far greater
opportunity to affect government policy in response to the crisis, but
consequently limited its ability to blame the government for failing to prevent
the crisis, or respond appropriately.
The SPD’s legacy as the previous governing party further limited its potential
to advocate a policy shift. Under Schröder, the SPD Government implemented
a largely neo-liberal set of economic proposals known as ‘Agenda 2010’, which
cut taxes, reduced welfare programs and reformed the labour market. Schröder’s
SPD was very strongly associated with the neo-liberal ideology and had been
the senior governing party in a coalition government with the Green Party until
2005. Seemingly, it was in a poor position to cast blame on a centre-right party
that had been in government for a comparatively short period. When
Frank-Walter Steinmeier became the SPD chancellor candidate, this connection
to the Agenda 2010 reforms intensified. Steinmeier had participated in the design
of the program in the bureaucratic post of head of the Office of the Chancellor,
where he was one of Schröder’s political confidantes.
A further limitation on the SPD was its waning popularity. After performing
better than expected in the 2005 election—garnering 34.3 per cent of the vote
and forcing the grand coalition situation—the SPD’s polling numbers declined.
In the last few months of 2007, major polling agencies consistently recorded its
support at between 25 and 30 per cent compared with the CDU/CSU’s polling
in the very high 30s (Der Spiegel 2009). Worse was to come after then party
leader, Kurt Beck, reneged on a promise not to deal with the far-left Left Party
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and backed the bid by State of Hessen’s SPD leader, Andrea Ypsilanti, to form
a government there with the support of the Left Party. The Left Party’s strong
connections with the former East German regime made this a politically fraught
situation. It caused ructions within the SPD on a national level and ultimately
failed when rebel SPD member Dagmar Metzger in Hessen refused to accept her
own party as a government (Deutsche Welle 2008a). Beck’s popularity plummeted.
A poll in March suggested that he was the preferred chancellor for only 13 per
cent of voters, while also showing just 23 per cent support for the SPD Party
(Der Spiegel 2008a). Beck was replaced as party leader in September 2008 by
Franz Müntefering, while Foreign Minister and Deputy Chancellor, Frank-Walter
Steinmeier, was announced as the SPD’s chancellor candidate for the 2009
election, thus becoming the alternative government leader. The weak position
of the SPD would appear to limit its ability to attack the CDU/CSU even further,
particularly in the last months of Beck’s party leadership, when speculation
about his future was frequent.
Of the cases discussed here, the German opposition leadership was in the worst
position to use the weapons of blame and policy change. It was handicapped by
its high level of responsibility for the economic situation in having a two-term
neo-liberal economic policy legacy to defend and in providing the most important
minister in German economic matters to the current coalition government.
Although traditionally the SPD had been the party of centre-left social democracy
in Germany, it was in no position to advocate a major ideological shift in economic
policy because of its close ties to the neo-liberal system in place. Furthermore,
the political landscape was dominated by fiscal conservatism—with Merkel and
Steinbrück each motivated by the long-term goal of a balanced budget rather
than short-term attempts to ward off recession (Deutsche Welle 2008c).
3. The second and third framing contests: causality and
blame
United Kingdom: winning a blame showdown
Opposition leaders rarely if ever treat causality as distinct from blame. This was
exemplified by David Cameron’s contention immediately after the run on
Northern Rock bank in September 2007: that this was caused by too much public
and private debt—a problem fostered by the Brown Government (Elliot and
Seager 2007; Harding 2007). Cameron repeated this claim like a mantra throughout
the financial crisis, clearly seeing an opportunity not only to blame the
government for its part in creating the crisis but to undo the public perception
that the Labour Government had managed the economy successfully in the past
decade. He therefore claimed that the previous boom had been ‘built on a
mountain of debt’ (Cameron quoted in Webster and Elliot 2007).
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In the immediate aftermath of the Northern Rock failure, Cameron struggled to
make a political impact. In the first week or two after the news broke, Labour
advanced from its slim advantage to a double-figure lead in several polls. This
government bounce was short-lived, however, and by the second week in
October most polling agencies showed the Conservatives in front (UK Polling
Report 2009). The Northern Rock issue lingered for months. It was mid-February
2008 by the time the government decided to nationalise the institution, leading
Cameron to argue that Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, should
resign and that the Brown Government had failed by dithering over the
nationalisation (Watt 2008a).
In continuing to promote the message that the Labour Government had done
little to restrain debt, Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne,
noted in March 2008 that Brown had failed to prepare the country for possible
tough times. Here, Osborne was careful not to suggest that a downturn had
begun, merely claiming that there should always be emergency funds in case of
one (Riddell 2008a). This allowed the Tories to avoid the appearance of a reckless
party that endangered the economy by reducing public confidence. It also
allowed them to avoid the risk of appearing economically ignorant by suggesting
a major economic slump was on its way when it might not happen. In April,
Osborne continued the pressure over the public debt, claiming that the United
Kingdom had the largest budget deficit in the developed world. This statement,
though perhaps not entirely accurate given the size of the US deficit (Milne
2008b), was an effective one, because it distinguished the UK situation from that
of the rest of the developed world. It damaged counterclaims by Brown that the
real cause of the financial crisis was the United States. Osborne and Cameron
repeated this claim several times over many months, although eventually Osborne
altered the phrasing from ‘largest deficit’ in the developed world to ‘worst public
finances’ in the developed world (Webster et al. 2009).
The excessive-debt narrative served Cameron and Osborne well for the best part
of six months, as the Conservatives continued a steady climb in the polls. From
4 May 2008 to 14 September 2008, in 40 voting-intention polls taken by major
polling agencies, the Conservatives led by an average of 19 percentage points.
The next week, the crisis reached its climax. The failure of Lehman Brothers in
the United States and the ensuing market turmoil sparked a Labour poll revival
(UK Polling Report 2009). At this point, the crisis changed in nature, and to help
explain the collapse of financial institutions, a secondary causal and blaming
tool became prominent. The Conservative leadership used the idea of a failure
of financial regulation to blame the government for the financial crisis. Cameron
and Osborne continued to make debt the principal issue, most likely because
the Tories had little intention of making substantial alterations to the system of
financial regulations themselves. Nevertheless, Osborne did take the opportunity
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to attack Brown for a failure of regulation (Webster and Elliot 2008; Wintour
2008).
On 30 September 2008, Cameron announced an unlikely policy of bipartisanship
(Elliot and Wintour 2008). This was apparently in response to the failure of the
United States to pass a bank bailout bill through Congress because of ideological
party divisions. British bipartisanship was short-lived, lasting a little more than
two weeks before the opposition leader began criticising Brown’s crisis response,
reverting to the debt narrative and labelling Brown’s solution to the crisis
‘borrowing and borrowing and borrowing’ (Cameron quoted in Stratton 2008).
Neither the bipartisan strategy nor the subsequent reversion to the political
contest appears to have had any impact on poll results.
Immediately after the September–October turmoil, the Labour Party rallied in
the polls and throughout December 2008 they had closed the gap to within single
figures (UK Polling Report 2009), prompting talk about Brown calling an early
election to profit from the favourable view of his international crisis-management
leadership. This also proved short-lived and in the New Year the Tories
re-established their double-figure lead. At this time, Cameron unveiled a new
blaming strategy. He spent a considerable amount of time calling for Brown to
admit to mistakes in his response to the crisis and to apologise for them (Rawnsley
2009). As well as bluntly implying that Brown was culpable for the United
Kingdom’s parlous economic situation, this tactic played at a popular
characterisation of Brown—that he was chronically unable to admit mistakes.
Furthermore, it was a useful way to harness anger felt by those in the electorate
who had suffered through the crisis and direct it towards the Prime Minister.
The opposition’s blame frame led to a revival in its fortunes soon after the
September 2007 Northern Rock episode. The advanced age of the Labour
Government and its willingness to take responsibility for the perceived successes
of the British economy in the preceding decade made it an easy target when that
economy began to falter. This was especially salient given that the United
Kingdom’s situation appeared worse than in many other European nations. The
debt message that Cameron and Osborne proffered was simple to understand
and consistently applied. Circumstances assisted the Conservative opposition
leader, but he still had to apply a plausible and consistent message against a
political opponent who was not prepared to accept blame for the crisis.
United States: blame as a fait accompli
At first glance, the US situation was a contest between two challengers with an
outgoing incumbent, making it impossible for one candidate to blame the other
for the financial crisis and fruitless to blame the President. Senator Obama,
however, managed to blame not just the President, but the broader ideology of
his party and thereby include McCain in the blame frame. In a March 2008
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address, after the Bear Sterns collapse, Obama blamed the Bush Administration,
including its tax cuts for top earners and the war in Iraq—two major policies
on which McCain agreed with the President—as causative factors in the crisis.
Obama also blamed nameless ‘lobbyists and politicians’ who had dismantled the
regulatory framework governing the financial sector (Obama 2008).
In contrast, McCain blamed the behaviour of lenders in financial institutions for
the deteriorating economic situation, but also somewhat surprisingly, those who
took out loans. His heaviest focus was on financial institutions’ ‘rampant
speculation’, but he also suggested that homeowners had engaged in dangerous
borrowing (Rohter and Andrews 2008). Unsurprisingly, McCain spent the entire
campaign attempting to distance himself from Bush. It was easier for Obama to
deliver a clear message of blame towards Bush and the man who followed him
with a similar economic philosophy.
In September 2008, after the Lehman Brothers failure, the competition for blame
intensified. Obama persisted in denouncing the Bush Administration’s ‘failed
philosophy’ (Landler and Stolberg 2008) and equating McCain with Bush on
economic policy (Healy 2008; Page 2008). He repeated this message ad nauseam,
though conspicuously seeking to moderate the personal attack element inherent
in the statement, arguing, ‘I certainly don’t fault Senator McCain for these
problems, but I do fault the economic philosophy he subscribes to’ (Obama
quoted in Calmes 2008a).
McCain continued to deflect blame towards the bankers and Wall Street greed
(Calmes 2008a). Obama’s strategy of equating his opponent with Bush was clearly
hurting McCain. In the last weeks before the election, Bush removed himself
almost entirely from the public eye, attending only a handful of relatively minor
events. He avoided making policy pronouncements or discussing the state of
the economy (Stolberg 2008). The President’s invisibility was clearly a deliberate
Republican strategy. A humiliation for Bush, it was a clear sign that the McCain
campaign knew it was losing the blame contest. McCain was always going to
struggle to win this contest as Obama had the advantage of being able to create
an ideological separation between himself and the events that led to the crisis,
as well as between himself and the incredibly unpopular President. McCain was
not only inextricably linked to the apparently failing ideology and the President,
he was unable to find a similar angle with which to blame Obama for the events
of the crisis. Neither Obama’s party nor the relatively inexperienced candidate
had been in control of the political system for the previous eight years. In these
circumstances, only an extraordinary failure of public performance could have
seen Obama lose the blame contest.
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Germany: blame dilemmas
Superficially, it seems highly unusual that in Germany a weakened social
democratic party was virtually unable to blame a governing centre-right party
nearing the end of its term. As noted above, the nature of the grand coalition
government, the fact that the SPD controlled the finance ministry throughout
that government and the party’s recent alignment with the neo-liberal consensus
meant that if there was blame to be apportioned to a political party in Germany,
the SPD was more likely to be receiving it than dispensing it. For the SPD under
Beck and later Steinmeier to blame the government that it was a part of would
risk having its charges reflect poorly on itself. Merkel and the CDU could rebuff
any specific public complaints about the government’s response to the crisis
with the contention that the junior governing partner should have raised its
concerns in cabinet. Furthermore, the leaders could not blame Finance Minister
Steinbrück, who was instrumental in announcing and defending government
economic and financial policy, but was also a senior member of the SPD.
The SPD still had the capacity to make political headway during the crisis but
these achievements were unlikely to be won in the public sphere unless Merkel
failed in her response to the crisis. This last possibility would have been more
likely had the SPD contested the severity-framing contest. For then party leader
Beck to dispute the significance of the crisis, however, would have invited
criticism that he was diminishing public confidence in the economy.
The German causal and blame frame that emerged early in the crisis was a
consensus position, with Merkel and Steinbrück each blaming the United States
for the crisis. Merkel claimed that it was a result of the United States’ resistance
to stricter regulations on its financial sector (Deutsche Welle 2008b). Steinbrück
concurred with this exogenised frame: ‘The United States is the source of the
crisis, and it is the focus of the crisis’ (Der Spiegel 2008b); ‘More than anything,
the finance market is an American problem’ (Der Spiegel 2008c).
Eventually, with Steinmeier as chancellor candidate, the SPD began to blame
the ideological commitments of the CDU/CSU parties, claiming, ‘The rule of
radical market ideology that began with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan
has ended with a loud bang…This new time that is dawning now must become
our time—the time of social democracy’ (Steinmeier quoted in Moore 2008).
While the SPD’s shift to the left appears to have been a cynical and opportunistic
exercise in crisis exploitation, the advantages of the move away from the free
market are to be found in greater party unity rather than in a newfound capacity
to win the blame contest. Unlike Obama, who was successfully able to blame
his opponent by blaming his ideology, Steinmeier and his party had recently
been committed to a neo-liberal economic program.
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4. Opposition by looking forward: the politics of policy
change
United Kingdom: the rewards of doing nothing
Despite the Tories’ huge advantage in being able to successfully blame the Labour
Government for the crisis, Cameron faced repeated criticism for his failure to
articulate alternative policy (The Guardian 2008a, 2008b; Riddell 2008b). Cameron,
however, well understood that winning was ‘not really about your policies and
your plans’ (Cameron quoted in The Guardian 2008b). Still, the consistency of
this criticism raises two important questions. First, why were the Tories unable
to articulate an alternative policy platform? Second, did they really need to
articulate an alternative policy platform?
The Tories had an ideological commitment to the neo-liberal economic program
that was already in place. It is difficult to make a personal pledge to betray one’s
own principles and it is even harder to drag an entire party along against its
will (Oborne 2009). One of the greatest problems Cameron had to face was that
there were powerful arguments for stronger financial regulations to prevent
destabilising lending practices, but his party’s free-market advocates had long
argued for less regulation (Elliot 2008). This philosophy was apparent when
George Osborne stated that ‘no one takes pleasure from people making money
out of the misery of others, but that is a function of capitalist markets’ as he
opposed the government’s proposal to ban the practice of short selling, in which
shareholders sell shares they expect to drop in price, then repurchase them when
they do (Osborne quoted in Milne 2008a; The Observer 2008). The Labour position
was likely to be popular and it was hard to see what the Tories’ tacit
encouragement of short selling would achieve in policy terms, but the
Conservative ideological belief that governments should not interfere with the
market overwhelmed each of these concerns. Similarly, Osborne and Cameron
consistently opposed the temporary government ownership of the failing lending
institution Northern Rock (Watt 2008a).
Considering the second question, does it matter that the Tory Party failed to
create a consistent regulatory or stimulus policy with which to oppose Labour?
The answer is that in this case it did not. Voting-intention polls showed that the
Conservatives had a double-figure lead over Labour in all but one poll throughout
the second quarter of 2009. The last time the Labour Party had been in front in
a single poll was 23 January 2008 (UK Polling Report 2009). With such consistent
poll leads, who needed good policy to convince floating voters?
That is not to suggest that Cameron acquiesced on all government proposals and
neglected to announce policy at every juncture; there were several interesting
policy contests. Opposition policy was, however, piecemeal. Rather than offering
a coherent alternative and advocating radical reforms to the government policies
298
Framing the global economic downturn
that it said were failing, the opposition suggested only minor alterations. This
included broader intervention and takeover powers for the Bank of England to
use in the case of failing financial institutions. This policy seemed reasonable,
but Cameron announced it at the same time as he opposed the government’s
takeover of failing bank Bradford & Bingley. This was a confusing stance. It did
not completely oppose nationalisation of failing institutions, but merely changed
who was to decide to nationalise them (Elliot et al. 2008). Presumably, the
free-market Tories preferred banks not to be nationalised but, forced to accept
its necessity in some circumstances, would allow it as long as they did not have
to take responsibility for it if in government.
Brown’s policy failures as prime minister contributed to the opposition leader’s
success despite lacking an organised policy strategy. The government’s removal
of the ‘10p tax rate’ for the lowest income earners was particularly harmful. This
meant that instead of paying 10 per cent income tax, the lowest earners would
be paying 20 per cent—a change that the Commons Treasury Committee
considered to be an ‘unreasonable’ way to raise tax revenue (Duncan 2008).
Months later, Brown made an uncharacteristic admission that the policy was a
mistake (Watt 2008b). This policy led to bitter infighting within the Labour
Party, allowing the Conservatives to calmly watch on as Labour attacked itself
(Webster 2008).
Cameron’s Conservatives did not advocate a paradigm shift because of their
ideological support for the spluttering free market. Instead, they sought to
contain policy change and retain a broadly neo-liberal economic system. Cameron
selectively contested certain policies and certain aspects of policies, but never
outlined a broader vision of what the new British economy would look like
should he win office. Labour’s occasional policy gaffes and sporadic infighting
helped Cameron, whose Conservative Party, as of mid 2009, remained heavily
favoured to win the next election. It seemed that this eventuality would likely
be a result of the ability of the Tory leader to win the third framing contest,
while at best drawing the fourth.
United States: the other guy blinked
In one respect, Republican Presidential Candidate McCain was in the same
situation as David Cameron. Like the Tories, the Republicans subscribe to a
free-market ideology, perhaps even more fervently so. As noted in section three,
Obama had success in tying McCain and the neo-liberal agenda to Bush and
presenting it as a failure of ideology. Like Cameron, McCain had very little room
to manoeuvre on his economic position. He could afford neither to abandon his
free-market ideals and lose his core constituency nor to maintain too rigid a
neo-liberal position for fear that he would be compared with the outgoing
President and coupled to an apparently failing ideology. Also like Cameron, he
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was criticised for lacking an overarching plan or vision for the future of the
economy (Brooks 2008).
All of these factors combined to make it difficult for McCain to respond to the
rapidly changing events of the financial crisis. Initially, he opposed the bailout
of insurance brokers AIG. Two days later, when the Bush Administration pushed
the bailout through, McCain accepted it as ‘unavoidable’ (Calmes and Zeleny
2008). Similarly, in response to the Bush Administration’s $250 billion injection
into the banking sector, McCain initially expressed opposition and then
grudgingly supported the move (Calmes 2008b).
McCain made other errors in his public leadership that added to his policy
mistakes and allowed Obama to depict him as erratic and risky (Bumiller and
Healy 2008). He was ridiculed for declaring at the time of the Lehman Brothers
disaster in mid-September 2008 that the fundamentals of the US economy were
strong (Balz and Barnes 2008; Jackson 2008). Even worse was his unusual tactic
to suspend his campaign and arrive in Washington, DC, to help broker a solution
on the late-September $700 billion bank bailout bill. This bid largely backfired,
as McCain appeared to be an unhelpful member at the negotiating table, hardly
speaking at all (Nagourney and Bumiller 2008). He then sought to have the first
presidential debate postponed, attracting an attack from Obama, who contended,
‘It is going to be part of the president’s job to deal with more than one thing at
once’ (Barnes 2008).
One policy position that McCain consistently maintained throughout the
campaign, though not necessarily beforehand, was his commitment to continuing
the high-income earner tax cuts introduced by President Bush. This was a policy
that he needed in order to retain the right-wing segment of his party’s supporters.
Perhaps, given the circumstances, it was unfortunate that the economic policy
that he was best known for was regularly referred to as the ‘Bush tax cuts’,
unwittingly exacerbating McCain’s unwanted association with the unpopular
President.
In stark contrast with McCain’s general vacillation, Obama spoke after the
Lehman Brothers’ calamity, stating clearly, ‘What we’ve seen in the last few
days is nothing less than the final verdict on an economic philosophy that has
completely failed’ (Zeleny 2008). Obama spoke consistently of the failure of
inadequate regulation and advocated a new regulatory approach (Harwood and
Cooper 2008). Although he left the policy details until after the campaign, it was
clear that Obama was advocating a stricter system of regulation and he did not
waver from that.
The delicate balance McCain had to strike between keeping supporters on side
and maintaining distance from an unpopular president and a faltering ideology
was awkward, and ultimately proved too difficult. McCain could not maintain
a consistent position in the face of rapidly changing events. Obama was able to
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repudiate the failing ideology, to repudiate the failing President and to offer a
consistent message of change. It was unimportant whether his policies were
better in theory or better in detail than McCain’s, as the mistakes and
inconsistencies in McCain’s policies ensured that he lost the policy contest even
if Obama was not particularly impressive. Like Brown, McCain blundered into
disaster; Obama like Cameron could win merely by looking on, and he had the
additional advantage of greater consistency in repudiating the unrestrained free
market.
Germany: missed opportunities
In the German polity there was great potential for an alternative government
leader to pressure the Chancellor to create a stimulus package after the
government implemented a surprisingly small package of €5 billion per annum
in November 2008. As noted above, the consensus in Germany was for the
government not to spend on such matters. Finance Minister, Peer Steinbrück,
was a firm believer that stimulus packages did not work, as evidenced by
Germany’s efforts in the 1960s and 1970s, and he was known to be a difficult
man to bypass (Bovensiepen et al. 2008). The strong exogenised causal frame
that he and Merkel created early in the crisis, when each blamed the United
States, implied that there was nothing the German Government could do to fix
the crisis (Deutsche Welle 2008d). In December, the government finally introduced
a €50 billion stimulus package of public investment and tax cuts. This was partly
a result of international pressure from European nations that felt the German
Chancellor had not done enough to curb recession in the largest economy within
the European Union (Der Spiegel 2008e). Other leaders of major European nations
even excluded Germany from a summit on the response to the crisis (Deutsche
Welle 2008e). CEOs of leading German companies also pressured the government
to stimulate the economy (Der Spiegel 2008f).
Further opportunities to oppose the Chancellor on economic policy materialised,
with Merkel’s failure to make a convincing speech explaining measures taken
to address the crisis (Nelles and Neukirch 2008). Merkel also erred in mid-October
2008 when creating an independent board of economic experts to draft new
financial regulations by choosing Hans Tietmeyer to head the group. Tietmeyer
had been a member of the supervisory board of Hypo Real Estate, a lending
company that the government had bailed out with a rescue package only a few
weeks earlier. The SPD expressed outrage and Tietmeyer chose to withdraw
from consideration for the position (Der Spiegel 2008d).
The failure of the SPD to do more publicly to oppose their rival governing
partners began to cause internal tensions, with the left wing of the party claiming
that Steinbrück was not adhering to SPD values and was preventing the SPD
from taking its natural approach (Der Spiegel 2008e). That the SPD did not behave
as a genuine alternative government party in offering a policy paradigm shift
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was entirely understandable because of the grand coalition. Steinbrück’s
approach to his position as Finance Minister was refreshingly non-partisan. The
international and national media pilloried his refusal to consider a stimulus
package in the early stages of the crisis, but he acted from conviction instead of
taking a populist stance and attempting to damage the Chancellor and her party.
The ideological position of the party was another major factor in preventing the
SPD from pressing for a policy shift. The SPD’s strong ties to the neo-liberal
economic system through its work as senior coalition partner in the Schröder-led
government reinforced this stance.
Steinmeier, on the occasion of his official confirmation as SPD chancellor
candidate, announced his determination to lead a social-democratic campaign,
spurning neo-liberalism and the free market. This, as of mid 2009, has had no
discernable impact on the party’s polling status. Many German commentators
viewed it as a manipulative attempt to exploit the crisis (Moore 2008).
Steinmeier’s campaign launch in April 2009 continued the SPD’s shift to the left,
including proposals to increase taxes on the rich and cut taxes for lower income
earners. This was met with indignation even from the Green Party, the SPD’s
preferred coalition partner, which issued a statement asserting, ‘What the SPD
is proposing today is the opposite of what they did during four years in the
grand coalition. So we have to ask them: “Are you really serious?”’ (Deutsche
Welle 2009). The SPD might have been better off at this point had it been in a
non-government opposition arrangement, rather than part of the grand coalition.
It would certainly have been more able to utilise the crisis politically without
being admonished for its cynicism. Moreover, it might have been able to emerge
from the crisis as a victor of the policy-framing contest, which so far it clearly
had not.
5. Conclusions: opposition and crisis exploitation
Alternative government leaders seeking to exploit financial crises have two
weapons to use in the public sphere. The first is the negative weapon of blame,
while the second is the more constructive weapon of policy creation. It is clear
from the cases in this chapter that the ability to use these weapons is constrained
by the different political systems and political contexts within which opposition
leaders operate. Furthermore, it is clear that an opposition leader can exploit a
crisis successfully while using only one of these weapons effectively. This was
certainly the case for David Cameron, who won his blame-framing contest
convincingly but was rather less dominant in the policy-framing contest, either
breaking even or winning by default. The implication is that a different British
prime minister might have been a tougher challenge for Cameron in this contest.
This research suggests that to win the blame contest does not necessarily require
a direct link between an opponent and the crisis itself. The indirect links from
John McCain to George W. Bush and from McCain to the neo-liberal ideology
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were more than enough to give Barack Obama a resounding victory in this
contest. Moreover, leaders’ success in the blame contests presented in this study
hinged on the ability to hold an opponent responsible for the economic system
presently in place. This appeared to be a function of how long an opposing party
had been in power in recent years.
The findings of this study suggest many potential avenues of research and this
chapter has only begun to open up the field of opposition leadership in crisis
situations. A larger study is needed to determine whether its core finding—that
in a crisis the blaming contest is politically more productive for oppositions than
the policy contest—holds. It would also be valuable to investigate whether it is
possible to win the policy contest without already having won the blame contest.
Perhaps the most interesting finding of this research is that party leaders who
could take a committed ideological stance against the neo-liberal economic
program attempted to do so, and this created a pathway to victory in the
policy-framing contest. Parties that were ideologically aligned with the neo-liberal
program tended to have great difficulty offering an effective alternative. This
led such parties to focus on the third contest, as the Tories did, or suffer the
consequences of appearing manipulative, as the SPD will probably do in the
September 2009 elections. Although opposition leaders have limited avenues
through which to exploit financial crises, they can make political gains,
particularly if they can blame their opponents for the downturn and if they can
repudiate the orthodox ideology.
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13. Crisis leadership in terra incognita:
why meaning making is not enough
Arjen Boin
1. Managing a financial tsunami
The global financial crisis that started some time in 2007 and continues to unfold
is a pure example of a trans-boundary crisis: it washes over geographical
boundaries and leaves no sector of economic and social life untouched. It is
hideously complex and thus hard to map and comprehend; it escalates through
‘tipping points’ and rides reversed feedback loops. The damage is staggeringly
high and mounting. The ‘new normal’ that will emerge after this crisis will likely
look very different from the one we had before.
Comparisons with the depression years of the 1930s often suggest the current
crisis is not nearly as bad and is mostly under control, but the debate raging
among economists tells a different story: nobody knows how bad it really is and
what is still in store for us (for instance, Bradley et al. 2009). Economists disagree
about how many toxic assets are still out there, what the consequences of
worldwide stimulus packages will be, whether lost manufacturing jobs will ever
return to Western economies and when it will be over. For political leaders, the
global financial crisis is terra incognita.
How can political leaders navigate this unknown terrain? Traditional
crisis-management skills—making ‘hard calls’ under pressure and with little
information—are no longer sufficient according to crisis researchers. It is not
just what they do or decide; what truly matters is what leaders say, the way
they say it and the way it is understood by others. Great crisis leaders—Abraham
Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and John F. Kennedy—are
remembered for their eloquence and their words of consolation and inspiration
when it mattered most.
In the early months of his presidency, Barack Obama was frequently referred
to as the ‘cheerleader in chief’ and the ‘psychologist in chief’ (tellingly, perhaps,
it remained unclear who the ‘economist in chief’ was). The US President was
chastised alternately as being ‘too pessimistic’ and ‘naively optimistic’. The
attitude and words of leaders still matter a great deal in times of crisis.
Crisis leadership, in this perspective, is essentially about the use of discourse
aimed at shaping a shared understanding of adverse events and providing
guidance for dealing with them (’t Hart 1993). The underlying assumption is
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that incumbent elites try to frame the events and persuade the public (through
the media) to accept their definition of the situation. The hypothesis is that a
well-executed meaning-making strategy will help win the framing contest and
thus shore up political capital and the policy commitments of leaders (Boin et
al. 2009).
2. Management by discourse: does it work?
How did leaders fare during the global financial crisis? Surprisingly, perhaps,
most survived the period under study; there were a few changes in the ruling
party following elections held during the crisis, but it is not clear how the
electoral outcomes relate to the actual management of the crisis. The lasting
impression that emerges from this book, however, is of a group of leaders that
stumbled and fumbled in their pursuit of an ever-escalating crisis.
The starting position of all leaders was similar: they downplayed or denied that
there was a crisis. They thus placed the burden on those who sought to convince
the public that there was a crisis. This initial defensive position would greatly
limit their room for rhetorical manoeuvring.
In their subsequent descriptions of the evolving crisis, the leaders under study
used very similar wordings: they pointed to ‘outside forces’ and spoke of ‘very
challenging’, ‘unprecedented’ times—the ‘worst since the Great Depression’.
They admonished people not to panic: ‘we are well placed’ to manage these
times, much better than other countries, as ‘the fundamentals of our economy
are strong’. And, of course, they promised that ‘we will come out better than
we were’.
They also displayed a strong tendency to moralise: many could not resist the
temptation to blame the US system (US leaders, in turn, could not hide a hint of
satisfaction when the European economies took a nosedive). When more and
more financial institutions disclosed their ‘toxic assets’, the blame quickly shifted
to greedy banks and their bankers.
The leaders seemed constantly behind the curve: by the time they recognised
that there was a crisis, it had already spun out of control. After they failed to
‘talk up the economy’, they failed to ‘talk down the crisis’. When they were
finally ready to admit that the situation was bad, they were forced to emphasise
how strong ‘the fundamentals’ were in fear of adding fuel to the fire.
An intriguing observation of this book is that the selected media apparently
showed little interest in the speech acts of these leaders. The newspapers, in
other words, did not recognise any news value in the meaning-making efforts
of political leaders.
This could mean that leaders ‘make meaning’ through different media—local
media, television and the Internet—or in different venues (parliamentary debates,
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informal conversations, op-ed pieces). It could also mean that leaders were not
trying very hard to offer a distinct interpretation of events—one that would
deviate from the tired rhetoric described above and would therefore generate
‘news’.
A reading of the chapters suggests that leaders were caught in a prisoner’s
dilemma. If all leaders are trying to make meaning of the same event, it becomes
dangerous to offer radically different interpretations (especially if everyone is
aware that their statements can directly affect the process of crisis escalation).
Timely and realistic assessments of existing vulnerabilities, evolving problems
and escalating downturns can, after all, chase away investors, drive down the
currency and sink the stock markets.
3. Crisis exploitation: how, then, does one exploit a global
crisis?
US presidential candidate Obama used the evolving crisis to his advantage,
attacking his opponent, John McCain, for declaring repeatedly that the
‘fundamentals of our economy are strong’. Obama did not, however, win the
election on a bad economy alone. Moreover, President Obama found it hard to
exploit the crisis to further his political agenda (his stimulus bill was watered
down considerably to please Republicans). If anything, the continuing crisis is
seriously hampering his reform objectives (think of a new health system or a
greener climate).
The global financial crisis did come in handy for those leaders who were already
facing an economic downturn due to longstanding vulnerabilities. Those leaders
were relatively quick to recognise the global financial crisis, making sure to
stress its ‘unprecedented’ and exogenous nature. In a similar vein, we can
conclude that the global financial crisis relieved some leaders of the responsibility
for dealing with complex policy problems that could now be branded
‘unaffordable under the current circumstances’. While all this can be categorised
as a form of crisis exploitation, it has little to do with the timely use of
‘opportunity windows’ (Kingdon 1997) to push through otherwise unpalatable
or infeasible reforms.
The dearth of targeted and timely reforms in the wake of a global
crisis—supposedly a great time for deep reform (Hall 1993)—suggests crisis
exploitation might be harder or less prevalent than theory sometimes suggests
it is (Kingdon 1997). In spite of cheerful comments that a ‘good crisis should not
be wasted’ (‘il faut utiliser une crise’), few fundamental proposals were
successfully initiated to redesign the financial system.
The idea that leaders can and do exploit crises to further their political interests
thus merits renewed scrutiny (cf. Boin and ’t Hart 2000). A successful effort
would require a serious understanding of crisis dynamics; leaders would have
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to grasp how and why these crises escalate and what they can do to arrest the
process. Moreover, they must have a firm grasp of the way journalists, opposition
leaders and interested citizens perceive and assess their frames and actions. They
would have to persuade people that they could shift a crashing economy this or
that way.
This book shows that crisis exploitation is not without risks. Leaders who try
can become caught in so-called credibility gaps. For instance, emphasising
external causes might divert attention from home-grown failures, but it also
undermines the legitimacy of subsequent reform proposals. Overplaying the
crisis to push through a reform package can create expectations that the proposed
reforms cannot meet. Botched efforts to exploit a crisis might fuel public cynicism
with regard to the functioning and performance of the political system.
4. Reconsidering crisis leadership
Lest we become too gloomy about the prospects for crisis leadership, we should
perhaps apply a wider and more balanced leadership perspective. In the
introductory chapter, the editors helpfully define crisis leadership in terms of
nine challenges (meaning making is only one of them). The global financial
crisis—still in full swing at the time of writing—has tested world leaders on the
first five: the challenges of sense making, meaning making, decision making,
coordination and delimitation. Apart from meaning making (discussed above),
how did leaders perform on those other four challenges?
Perhaps one of the most glaring failures of global leaders—and especially US
leaders—is found in the sense-making domain. ‘The field of economics is anything
but an exact science,’ ’t Hart and Tindall correctly note in the introductory
chapter. At the same time, no PhD in economics was required to recognise that
the US economy was bound to run into serious trouble. Indeed, many journalists
mapped the deep vulnerabilities as far back as 2005. When the economy was
spiralling into recession, former President Bush and Senator McCain continued
their talk of ‘strong fundamentals’.
It took leaders of all countries a remarkably long time to diagnose the situation
correctly. Hindsight does not make this assessment harder than it perhaps should
be. The knowledge—as any analysis of op-ed pages, economic headlines and
serious news reports will confirm—was widely available. One would have to
conclude that leaders did not want to acknowledge or confirm an uncomfortable
and inconvenient truth.
Leaders performed much better when it came to critical decision making. Once
the extent of the potential damage had become undeniable, leaders acted with
remarkable speed and courage. US leaders infused the system with unprecedented
sums of money after the failure of the Lehman Brothers Bank threatened to take
the system down in September 2008. ‘If we don’t do this, we may not have an
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economy on Monday,’ Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, reportedly told
US law-makers (Nocera 2008). This was only one of the many drastic decisions
taken across the world. It serves as a reminder that decision making is still a
critical part of the crisis leadership package.1
A global crisis that cascades across policy boundaries requires crisis coordination.
This has traditionally been viewed as somewhat of a holy grail: it is hard in good
times and nearly impossible in bad times—or so the thinking goes (Boin et al.
2005). It was thus impressive to see the level of coordination that was achieved
across sectors, administrations (the remarkable cooperation between the outgoing
Bush Administration and the incoming Obama Administration) and between
countries. The role of international organisations such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the European Union grew quickly
and with little controversy.
It is hard to prove, but leaders seemed much less adept at managing expectations
(the challenge of delimitation). With few exceptions (such as Singapore’s leader),
leaders consistently avoided telling the public flat-out that an economic crisis
of this size and scope would drag down a society’s level of wellbeing. (Compare
this with the frank talk delivered by US President Roosevelt in his ‘fire-side
chats’; ‘Yes, we shall have to give up many things entirely,’ Roosevelt told his
fellow countrymen after declaring war on Japan in December 1941.) The
hardest-hit countries will have to learn to live within their means. That usually
means more taxes and less government spending. The rhetoric of world
leaders—as analysed in this book—suggests nothing of the kind.
Taken together, it would seem that leaders are better at doing than talking during
a crisis. They find it hard to admit a crisis has arrived. Their crisis rhetoric is
often bland and cliché ridden, as this book documents so well. And, when they
finally address the crisis, leaders shun the cold, hard truth.
What can we learn in terms of trans-boundary crisis management? As the classic
tasks of crisis management at first glance appear to have been fulfilled reasonably
well, most mileage can be gained from an improvement of early warning and
sense-making capacities. This crisis had all the markings of an announced crisis.
The key question, once again, is therefore: why did they not see it coming
(Turner 1978)?
A preoccupation with the functional dimensions of crisis management—getting
a clear picture of the situation, making critical decisions, coordinating multiple
parties—has long prevented crisis scholars from recognising the importance of
the symbolic dimension of crisis management. This book demonstrates how far
crisis researchers have come. This empirical study also signals the limits of
meaning making: the inescapable conclusion is that the management of crisis
symbolism is not enough; trans-boundary crises demand the full execution of
all crisis tasks.
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14. Framing dilemmas in the quest for
successful crisis management
Allan McConnell
1. Why the cacophony?
Many science fiction films feature a scene where an alien lands on Earth and is
puzzled by the bizarre antics of human beings performing even the simplest of
tasks. Perhaps aliens would struggle to make sense of how leaders of the world
have responded to the global financial crisis. In the face of arguably the biggest
single threat to world stability in recent times, some leaders virtually ignored
it (former US President George W. Bush), some said the system was near to
collapse (Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd), some said they did not help
cause the crisis in any way (Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong),
others said they held a degree of culpability (UK Chancellor, Alistair Darling)
and almost everyone started with one position only to take a contrary stance
some months later. What is going on? Why have the leaders of the world
responded in a multitude of different and constantly changing ways to essentially
the same problem?
This puzzle goes to the heart of political science and public policy. As Shapiro
and Bedi (2007) suggest, we can see the world as little more than the product of
a series of disparate contingencies or we can see it primarily as the operation of
certain laws or at least tendencies in political behaviour. Most political science
seeks to impose some sense of order on the world to explain patterns of continuity
and regularity, as well as change. Hence, we have perspectives such as new
institutionalism, rational choice, group and network theory, socioeconomic
power and ideational-based models. All attempt to explain the world and its
patterns of political behaviour. Many such analyses of the global financial crisis
will no doubt emerge in the years to come.
This chapter is not the opportunity to dive into these models and apply them
to the global financial crisis. It is, however, an opportunity to put forward a
framework that I would argue does help identify a constant amid the diversity
and dynamics of framing responses. It is based on the assumption that leaders
will always attempt to successfully manage a crisis. It does not claim to be the
only constant, or that leadership ‘agency’ is all powerful, but I consider it to be
an important finding that has the potential to be factored into many different
policy models. Part of the thinking here is derived from work I have been
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undertaking on policy success in relation to non-crisis issues (Marsh and
McConnell forthcoming; McConnell forthcoming). Let me explain further.
2. Striving for success in crisis management
Crises present extraordinary challenges for political leaders. Amid threats,
uncertainty and urgency, they must undertake a number of tasks, such as making
sense of what is going on and articulating its depth and scope to a wider public.
I would argue, however, that such tasks are means towards ends, rather than
ends in themselves. The goal of leaders is to successfully manage a crisis. After
all, who would want to fail, except as an interim measure towards a longer-term
success? The focus of this book is ‘framing’ and therefore we need to ask: if
leaders strive to produce frames in order to successfully manage a crisis then
what does a ‘successful’ frame look like from their perspective? The clues are
already in Chapters 1 and 2, but I want to draw them out:
• Crisis-management frame for political success: a frame that is intended to
ensure political survival and protect or even enhance reputation.
• Crisis-management frame for policy success: a frame that is intended to steer
policy down a desired track, whether it be continuity, change or a
combination of both.
Of course, it is not possible to get inside the minds of leaders to prove these
assumptions. Even interviews have limitations. A large element of crisis
leadership is based on instinct rather than a rational appraisal of objectives and
all the possible means of achieving them (Flin 1996). Nevertheless, it is a relatively
straightforward task to look at the global financial crisis case studies and
attribute, with a high degree of plausibility, ‘success’ motives. For example, in
terms of the political game, the initial ‘business-as-usual’ frame (type-1) of
Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, could be read as an attempt to play
down the crisis, while playing up his credentials as an experienced economist
who was strongly placed to lead the country at the forthcoming election. This
frame suited his quest to hold onto office and enhance his reputation. With
regard to the policy game, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark’s framing
of the crisis as both threat and opportunity (type-2 and type-3) can be read as
an attempt to pave the way for policy reform. The fact that an election was
looming illustrates that a striving for political success can be contingent on
policy success—in this case, the need to demonstrate that the existing Labour-led
government was best placed to manage the global financial crisis.
Importantly, no frame is guaranteed to succeed. Some strategies are riskier than
others. Risks relate to the likelihood that goals will not be met (Drennan and
McConnell 2007). Context is crucial to assessments of risk (Douglas 1992; Althaus
2008). The same activity—walking slowly across the road—is low or even no
risk when the road is empty, but high risk if done on a busy motorway.
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Leadership framing of crisis is little different. A frame can be at low risk of failing
to achieve ‘success’ in one context, but that same frame can be high risk in
another. We need to think, therefore, about ‘context’.
Context can be all manner of phenomena such as culture, time, political mood
and economic activity. For the purposes of focusing on framing, I consider
context to be the existence or otherwise of strong and credible counter-frames
to those articulated by leaders.
If leaders strive for political success by projecting a frame that is intended to
ensure their political survival and protect and even enhance their reputation
then—all things being equal—a lower risk context is when there is no strong
and credible counter-frame in existence. Clearly, this is typically the case in the
early sense-making and meaning-making stages of a crisis when leaders need to
be out in the public sphere with statements on issues of crisis severity, causes,
responsibilities and remedies. Many of the chapters in this volume reveal early
attempts to exogenise the global financial crisis and play down its severity (for
example, in Canada, the United Kingdom and Ireland), although such frames
can survive intact for long periods when there is no credible opposition to
produce authoritative counter-frames (for example, in Singapore and to a large
extent Canada). When the context is different, however, these same framing
strategies can become barriers to political success. It seems clear, for example,
that former US President George W. Bush’s initial business-as-usual response
(playing down the crisis as little more than a market correction) was
understandable in terms of his low popularity and a desire to protect his political
capital. With corporate failures and increasingly worse economic indicators
leading to credible counter-frames, however, his framing became a barrier to
achieving his political goals—for example, ending his term in office on a relative
‘high’ in terms of job approval. His conversion to a type-2 ‘crisis as threat’ frame
was a logical move if he was to have any hope of protecting his political
reputation and avoiding the label of being chronically ‘out of touch’ with every
major crisis in the United States after 9/11.
A similar logic applies to contexts, risk and the policy game. If leaders strive for
policy success by seeking to steer policy down their desired route (stability,
reform or a combination) then—all things being equal—a lower risk context is
when there is no strong and credible counter-frame. In the United Kingdom,
Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and Chancellor, Alistair Darling, adopted a
type-2 ‘crisis as critical, global threat’ frame, a move that was suited to conserving
the British policy status quo and, in the political game, circumnavigating
questions of the 11-year-old Labour Government’s co-responsibility for the
occurrence of the crisis. A type-2 frame on its own does not, however, provide
the legitimating framework when strong counter-frames are emerging from
opponents and the media that policy reforms are needed to tackle a crisis. With
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the Conservative Party ascendant in the polls—though not necessarily pushing
a radically different and more popular line on the financial crisis—and the media
sceptical towards the government, the move of Brown and Darling to a type-3
frame becomes understandable. They started presenting the crisis more explicitly
as a trigger for regulatory reform. A quest for policy success seems evident in
both phases, but frames need to be aligned with goals, otherwise risks of failure
are generated.
One might be led to believe, therefore, that crisis framing is a simple task. All
that leaders need to do is think about what they want, assess the strength of
and support for counter-frames and then opt for the lowest-risk framing strategy
with the highest likelihood of political and policy ‘success’. As I will explain
below, however, leadership is never simple and crisis leadership is doubly
complicated.
3. Hot spots: crisis-framing dilemmas
After reading the case studies in this volume, it seems evident to me that there
are three main ‘hot spots’ in terms of the leadership challenge of crisis framing.
I use the term hot spots to refer to dilemmas of crisis framing that are particularly
tough because they put leaders under pressure to perform with decisiveness
and conviction at a time when they are being pulled in different directions.
Fast versus successful framing
Crises shatter our understanding of the world (’t Hart 1993) and create political
space that political actors seek to fill rapidly with efforts at meaning making.
They present frames designed to tell stakeholders and the general public of what
happened and what needs to be done. Crises, however, generate uncertainties
(knowledge deficits, ambiguous and contradictory information) that do not lend
themselves easily to quick framing that will protect political credibility and
guide policy action (or inaction). During crises, leaders seldom have the luxury
of picking ‘the right time’ to offer their accounts, as they normally would. If
leaders do not produce credible frames to fill the information and interpretation
vacuum triggered by the occurrence of unscheduled events with great speed
then others will step in and dominate the discourse.
Crisis-management research has identified various potential leadership pathologies
in crises (Boin et al. 2005; Drennan and McConnell 2007). In sense making, for
example, leaders can (be led to) misunderstand crucial dimensions of the crisis.
Basing their initial public meaning-making efforts on a faulty or incomplete
diagnosis of what is going on presents a major risk to leader credibility in a
crisis. Despite logic leading us to assume that leaders will initially engage in
low-risk framing strategies, they might veer towards high risk through, for
example, publicly under-reacting or overreacting. The need to fill a crisis-induced
meaning-making vacuum places extraordinary and sometimes unrealistic
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pressures on leaders, who, like anyone else, are confronted with surprising,
bewildering, ambiguous, sometimes contradictory signals and expert opinions.
Amid all the pressures of crisis management, they might misjudge the accuracy
of their own sense making or the persuasiveness of their meaning making.
The latter can occur when they fail to pay enough attention to the evolution of
the context in which their frames are being received, interpreted and challenged.
Former Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar fell prey to this in the framing
contest that developed in relation to the 2004 Madrid bombings. Coming just
before general elections, the attack did not just traumatise the nation, it divided
it. Aznar’s quick and emphatic claim that the attacks were perpetrated by the
Spanish State’s long-time adversary, the Basque nationalist extremists of ETA,
was quickly construed by opposition groups as an opportunistic move to ‘cover
up’ the true causes of the attack—namely, ‘payback’ by al-Qaeda for Spanish
participation in the US-led war in Iraq. The opposition was very effective in
dramatising the force of its counter-frame; and it was helped along by a trickle
of information from the police investigations into the attacks, which began to
point in the direction of Muslim extremists. Aznar persevered regardless and
his party paid the price at an election a few days later (Olmeda 2008). Likewise,
George W. Bush’s initial business-as-usual frame with regard to the financial
crisis began to crumble politically as the material realities of the crisis unfolded
and lent credence to voices much more pessimistic than Bush’s.
Frame consistency versus frame adaptability
Once leaders espouse a particular crisis frame, subsequent events and their
interpretation lead almost inevitably to the emergence of counter-frames. Initial
crisis frames rarely stand the test of time. In other words, the context changes
and a low-risk frame becomes high risk unless action is taken. This presents
leaders with two key challenges: a) to know when the context is changing, and
b) to know when the context has altered sufficiently that a new frame really is
needed. There is a danger of holding on tightly to an outmoded frame when
events and counter-frames lead to a serious questioning of the credibility of the
author of the original frame. Canadian Prime Minister Harper’s tenacious
assertions (type-1 frame) that the crisis was ‘elsewhere’ and would have little
effect on Canada were discredited when the country slid into recession and his
political authority was severely challenged in Parliament.
Framing for political versus policy success
I have suggested that political leaders always strive for success in two domains:
‘politics’ and ‘policy’. These are often not necessarily complementary, and in
crises the tensions between them can become stark. Framing a crisis in order to
ensure political survival or enhance political reputation might jar with a framing
strategy designed to shape the future direction of policy. Producing a frame that
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satisfies both can be difficult. The Irish Government was fairly quick in settling
into a crisis-as-threat frame (type-2) with an element of opportunity emerging
later (type-3). These frames were better at providing the foundations for the
successful achievement of policy reforms (cuts to pensioner medical benefits,
public service reforms and a modernisation of the Irish economy) than they were
for shoring up political credibility. Political frames and policy frames do not
always go hand in hand. Judging how to blend them while striving for political
and policy success can put political leaders under immense pressure.
4. Conclusion
Perhaps if the mythical alien came down to Earth, armed with an understanding
of how leaders will always strive to ensure political and policy success in response
to crisis, it would not be particularly puzzled by the multiple and conflicting
leadership responses throughout the world to the global financial crisis. Crises
push human beings in all sorts of directions as they struggle to ‘succeed’ and
find their way out. Framing is a way of attempting to succeed in political and
policy terms, even though the journey can become rather heated and mistakes
can be made along the way.
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15. Managing trans-boundary crises:
leadership challenges for the EU
Presidency
Bengt Sundelius
1. Crises without borders
In the bulk of this book, research findings have been presented on how national
leaders have handled the many aspects of the recent international financial
collapse and its multiple effects on their societies. Theoretically informed
empirical examinations of several political systems have shown the perils of
leadership under severe financial conditions. We expect much from our public
leaders in the national hot seats.
In this chapter, I heighten the stakes of top-level crisis management even further.
Trans-boundary crises such as the financial meltdown in 2008–09 or the likely
pandemics of the 2009 influenza season are even more complex than more
common disasters that are by and large bounded by space and time. The global
financial crisis of 2008–09 as examined in this volume is an early example of a
type of fast-paced and vastly diffused development that leaders are likely to
experience more frequently in future years.
Trans-boundary phenomena require that multiple actors in distinct jurisdictions,
in coherent ways, jointly handle the shared crisis and its often-unexpected
aftershocks. The leaders of the G8 and G20 member states were activated in the
global financial crisis for this reason. In the European Union, the European
Commission and the European Central Bank were very active (see Fletcher, this
volume). The French Presidency during the second half of 2008 headed the
common crisis-management efforts that involved a number of initiatives, top-level
meetings and financial support packages (see Windle, this volume).
In Europe, a multilevel form of crisis management is emerging. Effective crisis
coordination must here be fostered across levels, sectors, institutions and
sovereign jurisdictions. It would be prudent to strengthen European networks
of crisis coordination before events overtake the capacity for effective joint
management. This type of preparatory work is well under way and it seems to
have been given some priority by current and recent presidencies. The legitimacy
of the European Union can be strengthened and the social distance to its citizens
can be shortened when the common union capacity to manage crises is put to
the test by unexpected trans-boundary phenomena.
323
The Presidency of the European Union is responsible for multinational, multilevel,
multi-sector and multi-institutional leadership in situations of severe stress for
the union, its 27 member states and almost 500 million people. During the second
half of 2009, Sweden serves in this capacity. In his program statement of 1 July,
the Swedish Prime Minister and EU President, Fredrik Reinfeldt, listed the
top-priority issues facing his six-month tenure: finding a durable solution to
climate change and overcoming the financial collapse. Reinfeldt concluded the
manifesto boldly: ‘We must also be prepared to manage the unexpected. Sweden
is ready to meet this challenge.’ Many observers claim that the test of the
performance of an EU President rests on the ability to excel in public leadership
in the high-stakes and very visible media setting of dealing with gravely
consequential problems that are not yet known. Some presidencies do very
well—such as the French term during 2008—while others fare less well.
This memo is directed to the holders of the EU Presidency. I am convinced that
research into crisis management has practical value. Recognising all the limitations
of trying to turn research findings into ‘how-to’ (or more often ‘how-not-to’)
recommendations, this essay draws on the scholarly evidence for reflections and
advice to the incumbent EU Presidency. Leaders have to face the challenges,
make choices and live with the consequences of their action or inaction. After
many years of observation of crisis leadership, I have considerable respect for
the difficulties and burdens of exercising authority and upholding credibility
in crisis—in particular, when facing trans-boundary phenomena. My normative
stand is that I applaud crisis leadership practices that help minimise human and
material losses and other societal costs, while also upholding fundamental values
of democratic governance, the rule of law and citizen rights. When our academic
understanding can in modest ways enhance crisis leadership, along the above
criteria, so much the better.
2. Making sense of uncertainty and complexity
Before a political leader can engage in exploitation strategies to build public
credibility, one must engage in individual and shared sense making. Uncertainty
and complexity are key early parameters of a rapidly evolving trans-boundary
challenge (and the chapters in this volume clearly illustrate how leaders around
the world have grappled with these parameters in making sense of the escalating
financial crisis). Crises are characterised by communications overload and by
information shortage. In spite of vast investments in information-gathering
agencies, intelligence analysts and a close reading of the daily news, public
leaders appear genuinely taken by surprise over and over again.
As the leader of the union, you should be aware of how information is filtered
and summarised before it reaches your desk. You should probe behind the
seductive phrases in texts and the compelling charts in briefings. Examine how
the information given to you is being framed. Time spent on a critical dialogue
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over how to diagnose the rapidly evolving situation is an investment in your
remaining years as a leader in good public standing.
The institutional features around you matter for how you can deal with crises.
As EU President, you are clearly not a free agent but an institutionally embedded
policy shaper. Your leadership must be connected not only with proactive crisis
responses, but with strategic questions of institutional design. The
implementation of your national decisions is in the hands of the professionals.
Coordination in crises across professional boundaries has proven to be at least
as difficult as cooperation across geographical borders. The mandarins of the
union’s sprawling bureaucracies can hold the presidency hostage to their
preferred line of action or inaction.
Crises can drive you out of control and literally out of office. Beware not to lose
control of your own team. Stay proactive with your organisation and with the
media. This is not the time to hide; rather, you must remain visibly on top of
the dramatic situation. Do not allow yourself to be driven by events. Seize the
formative moment to shape the course of events. Relate the crisis to the
fundamentals of your public mission, to the storyline of your presidency.
Crises cast long shadows. Prepare yourself and your staff for dealing with
cascading effects over the long haul. Monitor from the beginning the
second-order consequences, which will come back to haunt you if you remain
unprepared. Check how the crisis, and your handling of it, is reflected through
the media. The press mirrors your actions and the appearances of action or
inaction. Fluid images of success or fiasco are framed through media reports of
what you seemingly did and did not do in the crisis. Is your preferred narrative
the dominant one for the public meaning-making process?
Public officials often regard the media as an adversary in crises. Much of the
attention of your staff is devoted to how to meet the demands of journalists. You
get instant reports from your associates about how the coping effort plays out
in the media. Bad reviews invite commentary within your inner circle about
unfair treatment and poor journalistic styles. The crisis scenario can turn into a
script of them against us. A comforting myth is created that ‘we are the victims
of circumstances, who are trying our best to handle a grave situation’.
Crises are not only threatening challenges to be coped with. Exploitation
processes can be identified and explored, as covered in this book. Crises and
their aftermaths also offer space for changes of policy, procedures and
institutional designs. A period of serious inquiry, evaluation and
recommendations that are based on this analysis is needed between crisis and
public reform. Leadership in crisis should include a personal and organisational




Leadership in crises will sometimes invite the taking of draconian measures.
Forging effective and visible action might take precedence over other equally
vital considerations. Quick, forceful and possibly effective intervention in a
crisis, however, might come at the price of eroding the legitimacy of democratic
governance and the rule of law. At what cost to democracy, civil liberties,
freedom of the press and public stature at home and abroad will your strong
crisis leadership image be earned? What kind of value base do you want to
embody as president, and—when push comes to shove in a crisis—do you
propose the union makes trade-offs between effective and appropriate
governance?
In the heat of the dramatic moments of urgency and immediacy, strategic
considerations must be part of decision making. When the ordinary grind of
political life again takes hold after the urgent phase has passed, draconian crisis
measures will, however, appear in another light. How then to account for the
choices made in the heat of the moment?
3. Accepting the heat at the top
The craft of governing a multinational union requires a judgment call between
rash moves in the heat of crisis and sliding into the avoidance of responsibility.
By emphasising certain procedural priorities, arrangements or regulations,
attention can be shifted away from the substantive controversy at hand. Delays
can be created through exercises in consensus building or legal requirements of
unanimity. You should distinguish between a calculated postponement and a
drift into avoidance by fear of taking responsibility for the whole.
The danger of entrapment at the top, rather than of splendid isolation, seems to
characterise crisis decision making by European public leaders. You might find
yourself highly vulnerable to the restrictions of the normative and regulatory
frameworks and procedures that the professionals claim have bearings on the
crisis at hand. Political leadership, however, requires sensitivity to the more
ambiguous symbolic and politically charged elements of a crisis. These dimensions
are rarely on the horizons of the sectoral specialists or operational professionals
that might do much of the advice giving in an acute crisis. The presidency should
therefore enforce a holistic view of the requirements for crisis leadership, in
contrast with national concerns or sector-based perspectives grounded in distinct
professions. It is best to build such a shared paradigm for trans-boundary
coordination in advance of the next major crisis.
When matters go wrong, it is comforting to be able to point the finger at
somebody or something else. It is tempting in the aftershock of a crisis to engage
in blame shifting. One can claim that the media created a hostile event or inflamed
a difficult situation in the union into a crisis. One might rationalise that with a
more responsible media role, the crisis would not have erupted at all or our
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ability to manage the situation would have been much better. Crisis research
shows time again, however, that it is counterproductive to blame the media for
your possible shortcomings or for inflaming a situation or affecting the outcome
of a crisis. You can meet the media only through a proactive posture. You cannot
hope to silence journalists or crush the impact of the rapid flow of news images
on the public.
If you cannot blame the media, why not point the finger inside the less than
perfect construct that you have been obligated to lead? Finding scapegoats lower
down the hierarchy or across the institutional or partisan divide would seem a
prudent post-crisis strategy for a political leader. History is filled with examples
of how mid-level officials face charges linked to crises, while the top leadership
escapes from any public accountability claims. Not only is such a
blame-management strategy normatively problematic, it will turn the bureaucracy
against you, making it fearful of being frank when the next crisis comes along.
Avoiding responsibility is short sighted. Leaders and their organisations alike
thus forgo the opportunity for self-evaluation, learning and institutional reform
that crises create. Teflon leadership comes at a price.
4. Practice makes perfect
A leader’s success in a crisis rests heavily on the ability under uncertainty and
time pressure to make informed choices among competing priorities. In part,
this skill can be developed through experience. Seasoned officials thrive in the
hectic pace of deliberations and decisions. Many tend to develop astute
self-confidence in their abilities to handle high-pressure situations. The French
Presidency of 2008 excelled in this skill, while the subsequent Czech Presidency
paled in comparison.
The distinctive feature of national and multinational crisis decision making,
however, is the onslaught of qualitatively new challenges. There are limits to
the ability of political leaders to prepare for crisis coping through on-the-job
experiences. You also need systematic training through scenario-based simulations
to instil a sense of the unique features of crisis decision making compared with
other and more frequently experienced types of policymaking situations. It is
better to discover your shortcomings coping with a crisis in discrete training
settings than expose them live in the media limelight.
Giving strong verbal commitment to an improved crisis-management capacity
in the immediate aftermath of tragic events, such as 9/11, 11/3 or 7/7, is
commonplace among leaders. How many of them, however, really follow it up?
The responsible public leader commits to the task of continuous capacity
enhancement long after such dramatic events. Without a leadership commitment,
the work towards improving the organisational capacity for low-probability but
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high-consequence events will soon slide into a low-prestige ritual without
adequate staff motivation.
5. Beyond the thrill ride
Crisis management is a highwire-balancing act without a safety net; one wrong
step and your political life could be over. Successful tiptoeing along the
suspended wire might just buy you the thrill of strong public endorsement and
the envy of your peers. From a democratic governance perspective, two
competing dimensions must be balanced in order to enjoy the fruits of the thrill.
One element of good governance is the capacity to deal effectively with crises
affecting the security of societies and the safety of people. Another necessary
element is the ability to strengthen the legitimacy of democratic governance
through crisis-management actions within the realm of publicly accepted laws,
norms and practices. Consequential actions based on urgency and immediacy
must pass the scrutiny of post-crisis investigations and the ensuing accountability
debates. In high-stakes situations, your leadership integrity is being put to the
test—and in full public view
Crisis management also stands between stability and change. Many of the
operational concerns of crisis performers are focused on dealing with traumatic
events in terms of threats to political stability, public order or economic disaster.
The slide is not long in crises from defending stability to becoming locked into
a posture of rigidity. The imminent threat of fundamental change is then met
by avoidance or by draconian measures. This fixation on ensuring stability is
merely one side of the calculus of high-performance crisis management.
Leader rigidity in the face of political or financial challenges can be
counterproductive to system-level transformations benefiting society and citizens.
One question is often asked ex post facto by informed observers, such as scholars
or journalists: a crisis for whom? As the responsible leader of the union, you
should also raise this fundamental and thorny issue, while in the midst of crisis
coping. What are the stakes and who are the stakeholders of this unfolding
event? Where do I, as the temporary caretaker of the union of 27 democratic
societies, fit into this unfolding script of turmoil between stability and change?
Taking the time for some strategic reflection while in the eye of the storm is a
good investment in a political future after the crisis has passed.
Crisis leadership presumes the skill to balance often overwhelming information
and expert recommendations with other equally important perspectives.
Sensitivity to the wider political and indeed international landscape within and
beyond the union is an important quality. A robust normative compass is a
source of inner strength. Political leadership often means the ability to grasp
and connect with the fleeting public view of what constitutes a reasonable course
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of action in a given high-stakes situation. Crises offer windows of opportunity




16. Public leadership and the social
construction of economic catastrophe
Paul ’t Hart and Karen Tindall
1. Meaning-making predicaments
In a study of Alan Greenspan’s rhetorical leadership, Bligh and Hess (2007:98)
state:
It is entirely possible that in a post-crisis situation characterised by
tremendous uncertainty, no prior cases or precedents to examine, or
previous experiences to draw upon, leaders grapple with not only how
to make sense of a situation but also how to frame the situation when
they themselves may not have a firm grasp of what it means for the
future.
Precisely this predicament—how to engage in persuasive public meaning making
when your own backstage sense making is continuing and problematic—has
been faced by the leaders studied in this volume. It formed the core of the interest
with which this study began.
How do leaders resolve this predicament? It depends. Crisis communication
scholars tell us that
leadership can have a positive or negative impact on the development
of a crisis. Leadership can be a positive force by helping to frame the
meaning of a crisis event, expressing appropriate concern and support,
overseeing mitigation, coordinating support, and facilitating timely,
open communication. In many cases, however, crisis leadership is
characterised by strategies minimising harm, denying responsibility,
and shifting the blame (Seeger et al. 2003:241).
The crisis exploitation model presented in Chapter 2 and used by the case study
authors to interpret the verbal behaviour of the chief economic policymakers
of nine polities offers some ideas about why crisis leadership can evolve in one
way or another. Put in Clausewitzian terms, it claims that crises constitute the
continuation of politics as usual by other means. When extraordinary events
occur, continuing struggles for political ascendancy do not cease; they can
intensify. The same goes for continuing debates about public policy, which can
be jolted in one way or another by the challenges crises pose to the resilience of
existing governance ideas and practices.
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When the unexpected happens, public leaders become the focus of intense
attention. In a context of uncertainty and stress, they have to act on the public
stage—to talk sensibly, to steer people’s beliefs and emotions, to project
authority. They have to do so, however, in the knowledge that the very
occurrence of a crisis puts them under intense scrutiny. Their past and their
present performances will be judged in a new light. The political price of a slip
of the tongue, bad timing or clumsy dramaturgy can be considerable—for
government leaders and their chief rivals alike. There are, however, also
considerable gains to be achieved from capturing the public’s ear and gaining
its support for one’s portrayal of the crisis and the ways in which it could best
be managed.
It was in this high-stakes, mixed-motive context that the leaders studied here
talked about the economic catastrophe that was unfolding before their and our
eyes. Some might have felt overwhelmingly threatened by the crisis, whereas
others might rather have sensed the opportunities it presented to them. Some
were good at reading the writing on the wall and did not hold back in depicting
the depth of the problems. Others were keen to keep the wolves at bay by
projecting optimism. Some were keen to publicly justify their past policy stances;
others focused on using the crisis to leverage policy change. In this chapter, we
reflect on what these studies can teach us about the nature, use and limits of
rhetoric in taming and exploiting crises.
2. Hard realities versus soft talk
And what a crisis it was. Once it went beyond its origins in the US mortgage
market, the financial meltdown hit most of the Western world hard and fast. It
presented governments and citizens with a set of stark, undeniable, immediate
realities. Share markets tumbled, with hundreds of billions of dollars wiped off
capital assets day after day. Real estate prices came tumbling down in places
such as New York, London and Singapore. Once mighty corporate empires filed
for bankruptcy. Others came hat-in-hand to the government to be bailed out or
were taken over. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and other global economy
watchers weighed in with ever more pessimistic outlooks. The world saw bank
runs, Iceland going broke, Wall Street suicides, mass sackings, repossessed
homes, abandoned construction sites. In 2009, virtually all major economies
were experiencing what economists awkwardly called ‘negative growth’. And
for those who cared to look for them were the shattering consequences of falling
Western demand in the developing economies of the world.
During the months scrutinised most closely in this volume, these were the hard
realities of the financial collapse and the economic downturn it triggered. With
‘the facts’ so incontrovertibly on display for all to see, and so many to acutely
feel, there were definite limits to what leaders could aspire to when it came to
332
Framing the global economic downturn
shaping and bending public perceptions of the severity of the economic problems
that had arisen. The upbeat, euphemistic ‘business as usual’ talk that some of
the leaders studied here used to downplay the crisis during its initial stages was
so patently disproved by the material realities of the downturn that—sooner
rather than later—most of them staged a rhetorical retreat from crisis denial
(type-1 rhetoric, in Table 2.1) to crisis acknowledgment (type-2 rhetoric).
Although ours has been a study of rhetoric as the main instrument of crisis
leadership, the findings of the case studies teach us an important lesson: if
material realities are hard, immediate and widespread enough, political and even
expert talk becomes soft in comparison. In terms of framing the problem and
putting it right at the top of the political agenda, the brute facts lead and public
discourse has to follow, leaving less scope for ‘spin’ than politics in normal times
does.
In this, the financial crisis stands in marked contrast with the other great crisis
of the present era: climate change. The politics of climate change have long been
dominated by framing contests about the very nature of the problem (Pettenger
2007). Does it exist? How bad is it now and how much worse will it become?
What is causing it? The reasons for this difference are not hard to spot. Whereas
the downturn hit the very financial centres of the Earth first in immediate and
devastating fashion, the realities of climate change were much harder to spot
and interpret. Much of the debate was based on models and projections, not
directly observable facts. Some of the more conspicuous forms of ecosystem
change (mostly degradation) that did occur in real time were found mostly in
far-flung places such as the polar zones or tropical rainforests. Moreover, even
when such effects were registered and caused wider public concern, it was not
immediately obvious that ‘climate change’ was the prime cause. Softer facts,
longer timelines, more selective and ephemeral impacts, tenuous causal
links—climate change was bound to offer much more of a rhetorical battleground
than the global financial crisis. It had to be ‘sung into existence’ (Patterson and
Stripple 2007) rather than imposing itself abruptly and non-negotiably on the
world, as the financial meltdown by and large did. The framing contest around
the existence of climate change and its deleterious effects has long been the main
game; the framing of the severity and causal nexus underpinning the financial
meltdown quickly became a sideshow. It was a space that almost all of the
policymakers studied here abandoned quickly, leaving it to small tribes of
ideological warriors—masking as economists—to fight over what the rest of the
world now felt was a trivial question. However flimsy their arguments are
gradually becoming, after decades of research and debate, there are still numerous
climate change deniers in the world today; but there never have been and never
will be global financial crisis deniers.
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The fact that the existence of a severe crisis that had its roots in the US sub-prime
mortgage sector and spilled over into its financial institutions at large quickly
became a non-issue did not mean that there was no space for social construction
and thus political contestation in the management of the financial crisis. On the
contrary: as the case studies demonstrate, policymakers within and across
countries often proposed markedly different interpretations when it came to
questions of responsibilities and remedies.
Consider the question of responsibilities first. There was much scope for
externalising versus internalising that issue and (de-)politicising the
accountabilities of public office-holders and institutions accordingly. Even if
the root causes were exogenous (in the United States, in the market sector), were
our own financial systems resilient enough to absorb the market distress? Were
our regulatory practices instrumental or detrimental to this resilience? Were the
incumbent policymakers alert enough to spot the problems early on and did
they take sensible measures to curb their impacts? Or did their early interventions
in effect aggravate the crisis rather than contain it (for example, Taylor 2009)?
These questions were never far from the minds of the speech-makers we studied
and were certainly on the minds of those reporting their speeches and holding
them accountable politically.
The same goes for the question of policy implications. In all the countries studied,
policymakers faced the same predicament: what do we do now? Nationalise
banks? Subsidise or take over ‘strategic’ corporations more widely? Slash taxes;
which ones and by how much? Offer cash payments? Redesign financial
regulation? Go at it alone in protecting domestic industries? Or develop economic
stimulus and pursue reforms in regional and global arenas? Bewildering as the
sheer magnitude and hitherto unthinkable nature of some of these policy
predicaments might have seemed, astute policymakers would have been quick
to see possible silver linings behind the clouds of the current crisis. Perhaps it
was a good time to use the crisis as cover for one’s pet policy innovations that
would otherwise be politically impossible to achieve?
In the remainder of this chapter, we dig a little deeper into these two clusters
of questions, corresponding to what we in Chapter 2 call the political game (about
responsibility and accountability) and the policy game (about preserving and
innovating modes of governing) of crisis exploitation. In these games, elite
rhetoric inevitably plays a key role, no matter how ‘hard’ are the facts of the
crisis at hand. In the latter part of the chapter, we tease out some recurrent
patterns in the crisis rhetoric of the public office-holders studied here. We
conclude by reflecting on the limitations and implications of this study.
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3. Who done it? Rhetoric of responsibility and blame
In his book Credit and Blame, Charles Tilly (2008:13) reminds us that
responsibility does not necessarily equal cause. Your judgment, my
judgment, and a medical specialist’s judgment as to what actually caused
a given hospital patient to die often turn out to be irrelevant for the
assignment of blame. Cause–effect connections usually play only a
secondary and contingent part in determination of responsibility. That
determination typically emphasises judgments of intent and competence.
Likewise, Bovens and ’t Hart (1996:137–8) observe:
The crucial—but often implicit—question in…debates [about the causes
of disasters] is where, when and how misfortune stops and
mismanagement begins…Some failures have such grave consequences
or pose such a threat to our worldview or sense of justice that ‘bad luck’,
however appropriate in empirical terms, will not be accepted as an
explanation. Especially those who have been injured will continue to
look for someone to blame.
Anticipating and managing blame have become second nature to contemporary
politicians and public servants. In an era of high visibility, floating voters,
declining trust in traditional elites and institutions and collective obsession with
risk and danger, those who govern and their servants are answerable for an
awful lot. They have learned that when the news is bad, and the policies they
have to sell are about retrenchment, contraction, redistribution benefits or
allocating risks, the ‘politics of pain’ set in, with ‘blame avoidance’ being the
name of the game (Pierson 1994; Hood 2002; Pal and Weaver 2003). So, when
confronted with the biggest financial and economic breakdown in well more
than half a century, the holders of executive office studied here knew there
would be blame games to play. No matter that there was little dispute about the
causal narrative of the crisis: this problem was ‘made in America’. This put
former US President George W. Bush et al. on the spot, but implied that all the
others were essentially off the hook. Nevertheless, most of them must have
known that the story would not end there. Although the root causes of the credit
crunch might have been beyond their control, nasty questions might still present
themselves. Why did you not see it coming? Was our financial system really as
resilient as it could have been? Did you do enough to mitigate the impact of the
crisis once it was under way? Why have you not been leaning much harder on
corporate excess? In making meaning about the developing financial crisis,
therefore, our policymakers were not just managing the issues themselves; they
were managing the potential political fallout from the issues. They also knew
that other public voices—oppositions, sceptical journalists, expert
besserwissers—would weigh in on the framing of responsibility.
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As Table 2.1 suggests, they had roughly two options: deny all responsibility or
accept that they could have done more and better in at least mitigation. Likewise,
journalists, non-governing parties and other actors in the debate had the options
of absolving government actors from (co-)culpability or pinpointing blame on
them. Depending on the configuration of their choices, different types of blame
games could ensue. And although there were some notable differences, the
similarities stood out most. Careful study of the speeches across the nine
jurisdictions reveals the following general pattern.
• Issues of responsibility and blame do not enter the official discourse until
the crisis is well under way, as the first impulse of most policymakers is to
downplay the severity of the problems. They thus sidestep the very need for
blame.
• Once past the denial stage, speech-makers make a concerted attempt to
exogenise the causes of the crisis across territorial (‘it’s the Americans’ or, in
the case of Singapore, the West) and institutional (‘it’s the market’) borders.
The fallback position is thus to attempt to deflect blame.
• At the same time, virtually all of the politicians—unlike the national bank
governors—attempt to moralise the issue, by accusing key corporate actors
of ‘greed’, ‘recklessness’, ‘unscrupulousness’ and the like. They do some
‘pinpointing’ of their own. Like all blamers, they draw moral lines between
‘them’ and ‘us’ (Douglas 1992; Tilly 2008), so as to erase any doubt among
their audiences about who is at fault (and who, by implication, should get
off scot-free).
• Virtually all speakers engage in attempts to ‘jump over’ blame, by moving
straight from assessments of severity and causes to talk about the need for
regulatory reform in the financial sector, domestically but most emphatically
at the international level (see further below). This is a rhetorical feat: the
system is broken and should be fixed, but let’s not talk about who should
bear responsibility for it being broken in the first place.
• And finally, a limited number of speakers engage in some form of
admission—not of ‘guilt’, but of the presumably lesser evils of naivety (about
the extent to which perverse incentives in the financial sector have bred
deep cultures of corporate irresponsibility) and lack of vigour in tightening
regulation. All stop well short of public contrition, though a few acknowledge
and empathise with the extent of suffering borne by the ordinary citizens
who have been the losers in the crisis.
In all, this pattern corresponds closely with the findings of other studies of blame
management—namely, a pattern of ‘staged retreat’: the potential blamee tries
to keep the discussion about blame as far away as possible from themselves, but
as the pressure on them increases (because new facts become known, more people
have become angry or credible other voices are starting to question their
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involvement, competence or intent), they retreat to less ideal but still potentially
workable forms of blame avoidance (Bovens et al. 1999; Brändström and Kuipers
2003; Hood et al. 2007). It is important to note that none of the policymakers
engaged in proactive acceptance of responsibility, forfeiting the option of ending
up in the relatively benign ‘blame minimisation’ game type, in which early and
forthright public acknowledgment of responsibility gets the blamee ‘off the
hook’ in the media and parliamentary arenas (see Table 2.1; for empirical
illustration, see Brändström et al. 2008).
This general pattern was punctuated by several differences of timing and
emphasis. For example, Singaporean and European Commission leaders did not
budge in their responsibility rhetoric; in contrast, UK policymakers, particularly
Chancellor, Alistair Darling, eventually did engage in some acknowledgment of
responsibility. What factors might have caused such differences? They are mainly
contextual, underlining that there is truth in the cliché that where one stands
depends on where one sits. On the basis of the case studies—and other than
obvious factors such as personal beliefs and styles or being in versus outside
government—we would nominate the following factors.
• Salience of accountability pressures: lacking real media or legislative scrutiny
in these matters, Singaporean and European Commission policymakers could
afford to gloss over questions of responsibility.
• Type of office held: much of the political heat of accounting for the crisis fell
on the politicians and there were at times marked differences in the
responsibility rhetoric of heads of government and finance ministers on the
one hand, and bank governors on the other (only the retired US Federal
Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, in a Congressional hearing in October
2008, came out with a highly publicised acknowledgment of responsibility).
The bank governors, as bureaucrats, were able to concentrate more on
diagnosing and managing the operational crisis. They therefore generally
steered clear of statements that could lead others to question their past
prudence, lest these might spill over into doubts about their present
competence in crisis response.
• Length of incumbency: obviously, policymakers such as UK Prime Minister,
Gordon Brown, former New Zealand Prime Minister, Helen Clarke, and Irish
Taoiseach, Brian Cowen, who had held an executive leadership position for
several years before the occurrence of the crisis, were more at risk in
discussions about responsibility than their counterparts such as Australian
Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, incoming New Zealand Prime Minister, John
Key, and US President, Barack Obama (and their treasurers), who took office
just before or in the middle of the crisis. The latter were far better able to
credibly shift blame to others—notably, their predecessors. Some in effect
presented themselves primarily as blamers, not blamees, with US Treasury
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Secretary, Timothy Geithner, and Rudd the most conspicuous examples.
Conversely, some opposition politicians during the crisis were muted in their
criticism of government passivity in the face of a growing bubble that was
waiting to burst only because they themselves had been in government in
the years leading up to the meltdown. It shows that Table 2.1 ignores the
crucial influence of temporal factors (and thus possible role changes and
factors mediating media predispositions towards the responsibility rhetoric
of various elite actors) in its prediction of the nature of crisis-induced blame
games. Determining who blames and who accounts is not a matter of taking
a snapshot view of a crisis; it instead requires understanding crises in terms
of the unfolding of a much longer political scenario.
In the end, there was surprisingly little hardball politics of blaming going on
during the period under study. Yes, the crisis became a prominent election issue
in New Zealand, the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada. In Canada,
however, the incumbents survived, whereas in New Zealand and the United
States, one had the distinct impression that the loss of the incumbents (or their
parties) was over-determined to begin with by a host of other factors.
Perhaps the immediate challenges of absorbing and taming the crisis were too
overwhelming (and controversial). This suggests that blame still needs to be
apportioned later—for example, in the context of the inevitable inquiries that
are being announced in various countries at the time of writing. Perhaps blame
was effectively privatised in this case, with impoverished account holders and
investors chasing financial executives in the courts. Perhaps, however, there
simply was not enough semantic space and political appetite left for pinpointing
blame domestically for a fiasco that has widely become labelled as the global
financial crisis. Anthropologists might be on the mark in observing that those
who have been injured will always look for someone to blame; but if the victims
are in their millions scattered across the planet, the more likely it is that the
search will be fruitless. It is the ultimate ‘many hands’ problem: the more ‘global’
the crisis, the larger the number of hands that have helped bring it about and
the easier it is for incumbent elites to successfully engage in blame-avoidance
rhetoric, with blame ultimately evaporating rather than crystallising.
4. What now? Rhetoric of policy and reform
The global financial crisis spawned a wide array of ad hoc measures and policy
interventions. More broadly, the crisis produced a great deal of reform rhetoric
from leaders and from opposing parties and interest groups. The presence of
such contests forced leaders into the position of status quo player or change
advocate, and choose between preserving or innovating modes of governing.
Previous research into economic crises suggests that governments react strongly
to the prospect of mass unemployment. Moreover, the negative public sentiment
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that comes with the threat of mass unemployment provides governments with
a greater mandate for action (Keeler 1993). Furthermore, economic crises produce
‘opportunity windows for reform’ that governments can harness (Baumgartner
and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995; Wilson 2000). Therefore, while economic crises
might limit governments’ budgets, they also allow policymakers greater scope
to implement reforms that would otherwise be met with fervent opposition. The
reason is simple: ever since former US President Franklin D. Roosevelt stepped
in to stem the tide of the Depression through proto-Keynesian government
activism, the public expected governments to ‘do something’ in times of recession
and rising unemployment. Governments can capitalise on that momentum by
packaging tailor-made reactions to the current economic circumstances along
with additional policies it had wished to implement all along but which can now
be reframed as forming an integral part of the recession-busting strategy (Rodrik
1996). This was evident in many of the polities studied in this volume. In
Australia, the ‘education revolution’ and climate change technology became
part of the reform rhetoric, as did European unity and integration in the EU
leaders’ reform rhetoric.
Kuipers’ (2006) work on policymaking and ‘competing crisis narratives’ claims
that crises open up space for actors to construct their own crisis narrative. A
leader or opposition group can utilise crisis narratives to describe their own
version of events and propose reform to adapt the system to meet the exogenous
changes and the new challenges. Nevertheless, to be effective, the narrative
must be in sync with, or speak to, the experience of the broader public (Hay
1999, 2002). Kuipers (2006:181–2) notes four indicators that a crisis narrative is
being constructed: the use of the word ‘crisis’ to describe an undesirable
situation; claims that the situation is urgent and requires drastic action; when
the broader public is asked to comply with reforms or the leader appeals to
solidarity during the crisis, as in wartime; and when the complex crisis situation
is simplified or the leader makes use of metaphors and historical analogies to
explain the situation. When these narratives catch on and are accepted by the
public, they pave the way for reform in the system. Each of the polities studied
in this volume displayed some if not all of these elements of crisis narratives in
relation to policy and reform.
The leaders studied here needed to determine what they believed to be the right
course of action. At the same time, however, they were held accountable for
their decisions and had to articulate their strategic actions and their policy moves
(or even others’ policy moves) to the public. Their policy moves were at times
reactive and improvised, as they needed to rhetorically prime their audiences
in the rapidly evolving situation.
The policy game laid out in Chapter 2 of this volume suggests that leaders take
one of four rhetorical positions. As a ‘change advocate’, they might press for a
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policy paradigm shift or for incremental reform, or as a status quo player, they
might attempt to resist or contain policy change. Opposition parties, unions and
interest groups, sections of the media and/or demographics of the public might
take up the other side of the contest.
The case studies demonstrate that the model’s assumption needs to be refined.
We encountered a couple of interesting situations where both sides of the contest
were pro-reform. Disagreement and contest instead centred on the specific
policies that should be implemented—or more often, the scope and pace of the
proposed reforms (incremental versus paradigm shift). For example, in the United
Kingdom and Australia, the head of government and the opposition leader both
claimed to favour some kind of reform. At the same time, Prime Ministers Brown
and Rudd both attempted to portray their opposition leaders, David Cameron
and Malcolm Turnbull, respectively, as advocates of the old ‘failed’ system. In
Australia, this caused problems for Turnbull, particularly as the media remained
largely supportive of the government. In contrast, for Cameron, Brown’s strategy
did not make much of a dent as the media and public were quick to note that
Brown had had 11 years in which to offset the alleged flaws of the ‘neo-liberal’
economic philosophy of the previous Conservative governments and had
apparently missed the opportunity to do so. Blaming predecessors is simply not
credible in these circumstances.
At times, the media was more focused on the leader’s behaviour and style than
on the government’s policy. For example, in Canada, Prime Minister Stephen
Harper’s alleged lack of sensitivity to the suffering of ordinary Canadians became
a key storyline, much more so than the critical vetting of the substance of his
statements—at least for a while.
Our case studies suggest some recurrent patterns in the policy component of
leaders’ crisis rhetoric. One was the prevalence of bricolage: combining
tailor-made responses with essentially policy initiatives that were thrown in
because they fit the leader’s election promises or prior convictions or were
skilfully brought to the leader’s attention by advisers, bureaucrats and interest
groups. As predicted by models of agenda setting and policymaking that stress
the role of contingency and opportunism (for example, Cohen et al. 1972;
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995), the economic crisis spurned actors
to advance ideas and proposals that would otherwise not be accorded the same
attention or levels of funding. For example, in Australia and the European Union,
the crises speeded up initiatives to (re)invest in green technology. In Ireland, it
provided momentum to Prime Minister Cowen and Finance Minister Brian
Lenihan’s ‘Framework for Economic Renewal’.
Some leaders managed to successfully incorporate non-economic policy into
crisis rhetoric. After the Australian Government’s announcement of the major
stimulus package that would send the economy into deficit, opinion polls
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indicated that the public was strongly in favour of spending on renewable
energy, tax cuts and other projects for the betterment of society, which made
up the package, but comparatively, they were somewhat less supportive of the
package as a whole or of the notion of large-scale deficit spending. As such, it
was rhetorically prudent for Australian leaders to highlight the benefits of the
package to particular, high-priority policy sectors. This highlights the importance
of matching the crisis narrative to the felt experiences of those on the ground
(Kuipers 2006)—something at which some leaders, such as Obama, excelled and
others, such as Brown and Harper, failed.
Second, the policy contests that ensued in the course of the crisis were to a
considerable extent fuelled by underlying ideological disagreements. In some
cases, leaders spent considerable rhetorical effort attacking ‘neo-liberalism’ and
its free-market policies, with the Australian and Singaporean Prime Ministers
leading the way. Conversely, the New Zealand case demonstrated how the same
set of events was utilised by incoming Finance Minister, Bill English, to push
for less rather than more government regulation of financial markets. This
position was taken up by some Republicans and Hayekian economists in the
United States, but was clearly repudiated by Obama and Geithner. Debates about
the merits of stimulus packages in most of the countries studied appeared to
hinge not on the size of projected deficits, but on the underlying beliefs about
the relative merits of ‘big’ versus ‘lean’ government.
Third, the global nature of this economic downturn created an extra dimension
for political leaders—one that they could use to their advantage. The majority
of political leaders highlighted the international dimension of the crisis, not
simply to blame exogenous forces, but when discussing reform or policy
implementation. During a crisis, there is often a need for leaders to appear action
orientated, but domestic opposition might tie their hands in taking bold
initiatives. Calling for, organising and visibly working with peers, however, in
ad hoc meetings of international forums such as meetings of the G7, G8 and G20,
EU conferences and regional summits provides national leaders with excellent
opportunities for ‘self-dramatisation’ (Edelman 1977). It also helps supranational
leaders (such as European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso) make
the case for the pivotal role their institutions can play in forging common
approaches to what are clearly trans-boundary crises.
Advocating international reforms also allowed leaders to perform the balancing
act of appearing as proactive change agents while in the same breath talking up
the strength of their domestic economies and defending their record in regulating
their national financial sectors. It also shifted part of the policy game to
international arenas where domestic opposition forces had no seat at the table.
Internationalisation of crisis rhetoric was evident to a different degree and for
a different purpose in each of the cases. For French President, Nicolas Sarkozy,
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the EU Presidency was a chance for France (and Sarkozy) to be heard; for the
United Kingdom, hosting the G20 was a chance to appear in charge and at the
centre of the solution. For the open economies of Singapore, New Zealand and
Ireland, however, the global dimension of the crisis was mainly a source of
despair rather than a feasible source of relief.
Fourth, the leaders’ past records greatly shaped and constrained their ability to
credibly advocate particular policy stances. Some leaders had been in charge of
their country’s financial regulation and economic policy for a long time when
the crisis materialised. For example, UK Prime Minister Brown and Irish Taoiseach
Cowen had both been treasurers in long-serving governments before taking over
as party leader and head of government. Canada’s Prime Minister Harper had
built much of his authority on his reputation as an astute economist. The public
deference this generated appeared to buy him time when the crisis first
materialised, but then appeared to backfire as his optimistic predictions were
defied by growing unemployment cues. In Ireland, it was impossible for Cowen
to escape criticism for his old policies when attempting to introduce new ones.
Fifth, the least prominent yet also the least criticised speech-makers in our set
were the bank governors. Although in normal times bank governors are key
figures in interpreting economic realities to investors and entrepreneurs, during
the hottest months of the global downturn, their speeches were often eclipsed
by the attention paid to the words and actions of the heads of government. When
the going gets tough, it is clearly the politicians rather than the technocrats who
are monitored most closely by the media and the public.
Though perhaps their relative visibility was low, their credibility might have
been higher than that of the government leaders, particularly the long-serving
ones for whom the crisis was first of all a source of potential electoral
embarrassment. In contrast, the bank governors’ statutory independence and
reputation as non-aligned technocrats protected their credibility, with media
coverage of their speeches on balance far less critical than that of politicians’
speeches. In the US case, the picture was more complicated. Former US Federal
Reserve Bank Governor Alan Greenspan’s very public admission of having made
critical errors of judgment that had allowed the monster of the mortgage bubble
to grow unchecked could have dented public confidence in his successor, Ben
Bernanke. Bernanke moreover struggled with having to manage the biggest
crisis of the financial system he is supposed to help preserve while at the same
time having to adjust to the political transition from the Bush to the Obama
Administrations.
Some bank governors were vocal and visible. In Australia, Reserve Bank
Governor, Glenn Stevens, was the first of the Australian leaders to broach the
issue of deficit spending, and only after the media picked up on this did the
Prime Minister and Treasurer actively discuss in public what would later become
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a reality. Most governors were not publicly known figures before the crisis but
came to be seen as significant players. In the United Kingdom, Bank of England
Governor, Mervyn King, became part of a media-perpetuated controversy
speculating on a rift between him and the government. In Ireland, Governor of
the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority, John Hurley, was respected
for staying on past his retirement date. In many cases, including Ireland and
Australia, the central bank governor was seen to ‘inject reality’ into the rhetoric.
In contrast with the coverage of the politicians’ speeches, the overwhelming
tendency was for journalists not to focus on the personal characteristics and
political beliefs and interests of the governors, and instead concentrate on the
substantive merits of their policy arguments.
Finally, the speeches were notable for their strategic uses of the past. Popular
in leader rhetoric during the global financial crisis was the use of historical
analogies to simplify explanations and manage public sentiments. Australia’s
Treasurer, Wayne Swan, used the analogy of Hurricane Katrina to convince his
audience that through crisis came a better understanding of underlying
weaknesses in a system. Various leaders likened the crisis to an ‘economic
tsunami’, tapping into recent global memory to underline the severity of the
crisis. Predictably, virtually all leaders invoked the Great Depression of the
1930s when attempting to maximise the severity of the recent downturn, but
they also used historical analogies to ‘sell’ policy. Brown and Darling tried on
several occasions to sell their policy proposals using the analogy of the Bretton
Woods agreement (as did leaders in France and Australia) and even the Marshall
Plan. President Obama drew analogies from throughout US history of economic
policy that spurred great change and modernisation, and this rhetoric seemed
to resonate. The Singaporean Prime Minister tapped into the well of the Asian
financial crisis of the 1990s to highlight his government’s preparedness and the
claimed superiority of the country’s regulatory regime (which had already
incorporated the lessons the Western countries would now be forced to learn
all over again).
The point about using analogies in meaning making is not that they are correct;
it is that they resonate—as opposed to their use in the leaders’ own sense making,
when incorrect analogies can fatally wound the diagnostic capacity of leaders
(Brändström et al. 2004). When analogies are widely challenged, they backfire.
When they appeal to universal symbols and are carefully crafted and timed,
however, their metaphorical power in weaving a crisis narrative (Kuipers 2006)
can do more to shape public perceptions of a crisis than any set of facts and
charts is able to.
5. So what? Final reflections
We need to place this study in proper perspective. Our findings are to be
regarded as setting the stage rather than speaking the final word on the power
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and limitations of elite rhetoric in the global financial crisis. For all its faults,
however, this study does raise a few larger questions about leadership, rhetoric
and crisis that we will flag in this last section of the book, as a potential bridge
from this study to its as yet unwritten successors.
Nostra culpa: flaws and limitations
There is no denying that our effort has been a limited one in several key respects.
In particular, we should note that we studied only three public office-holders
per country—those who were most intimately involved in macroeconomic
management—and thus possibly failed to register publicly voiced differences
and disagreements within the government. We selected only a limited number
of speeches per office-holder, not replicating Wood’s (2007) towering effort of
studying each and every word they uttered on the crisis, so there is a risk of
sampling bias. The speeches we selected here might not have captured the full
breadth or all the twists and turns over time in the rhetoric of the leaders
involved. We focused exclusively on speech-makers on the government side of
politics, thus excluding the voices of non-governing parties and interest groups.
We adopted a fairly crude set of measures of assessing media responses, focusing
on newspapers, and concentrating on broadsheets at that, for the most part
ignoring the electronic media and the tabloids whose reach alone might have
made them at least as salient a venue for registering the ‘vox populi’ when it
came to the public reception of crisis rhetoric. We looked at public opinion data
where available and to provide a contextual backdrop, but we know that caution
should be exercised when attributing (changes in) leaders’ approval ratings to
a particular speech or action by that leader.
We hope—and expect—that in years to come, others will revisit the ground
covered in this study more comprehensively and methodically than we have
been able to in the short time frame we imposed on ourselves. It remains to be
seen whether such exercises will refute, complement or merely reinforce the
conclusions of the case studies and the general observations offered here. For
the moment, the obvious limitations of this study will not stop us from leaving
the reader with a few final questions and reflections that have emerged from it.
Does rhetoric matter?
This leads into a larger question: does leader rhetoric matter at all? Allan
McConnell’s chapter reminds us that leaders always strive for political and policy
success, and rhetoric is one of the tools they employ to achieve it. The question
is how powerful a tool it really is. Or, perhaps more sensibly, to wonder whether
crises lend themselves well to management by speech. It is hard to deny that
there are times when rhetoric—words plus the dramaturgy involved in their
delivery—matters a great deal in politics. No one who closely followed the
dramatic 2008 US election campaign—overshadowed by the cascading financial
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crisis shattering its corporate giants—which delivered the United States its first
African-American President, Barack Obama, would have failed to register the
galvanising effect of his persona and presentation on a crisis-ridden nation
desperately looking for new leadership. How powerful, however, was the rhetoric
of the leaders studied here in naming, framing and taming the financial crisis?
Can leaders speak ‘words that succeed’ even though the economic indicators of
the day suggest that their policies are failing (Edelman 1977)?
This question is of interest to those scholars in political science and international
relations who argue on either side of the debate between ‘realism’ and
‘constructivism’. This debate comes in many guises and the proponents of the
two positions use different labels to describe themselves. The main bone of
contention, however, is whether political contests and outcomes are driven first
and foremost by the material realities that they purport to shape or by ‘ideas’
(cognitions, beliefs, norms, tacit knowledge, models) that people have in their
heads and that exist quite independently of those material realities (Bevir and
Rhodes 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008; Marsh and Furlong 2002; Furlong and
Marsh 2007; Marsh 2008).
Our study would be of interest to each side in this debate. As we intimated in
the opening section of this final chapter, the brute facts of economic breakdown
that were unfolding on a daily basis during most of 2008 and the early months
of 2009 greatly constrained the ideational space when it came to answering the
question ‘Is something bad the matter?’—as something so obviously was. And
consequently, the heads of government, finance ministers and bank governors
who initially attempted to do what they normally did when faced with a sluggish
economy—talking it up—were forced to stage fairly rapid and significant
rhetorical retreats. The leaders who had confidently asserted that their country
was better prepared than anywhere else to withstand the temporary turbulence
caused by problems in US financial markets (and words to that effect) did not
offer a pretty sight. All had to back down from their repeated and emphatic
assertions about their own system’s resilience and admit that this crisis was not
going to pass them by. They received a hard lesson in the full extent of economic
globalisation: along with sharing the benefits of open markets and
interdependencies comes a share of negative spill-overs—and little can be done
to avoid them. Only in Singapore and Canada did leaders hold out a bit longer—in
Canada because the Prime Minister genuinely seemed to believe he knew better
and was not convincingly corrected by experts or credible opposition
counterparts, and in Singapore because of the lack of opposition. By late 2008,
even their staunch optimism had to give way to preparing the public for pain.
There is also much in this study for constructivists to consider. The differences
within and between countries on how to combat the crisis were sometimes stark.
They were the product of pre-existing beliefs, more so than of material realities
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or interests. Regardless of how badly their particular country was affected by
the downturn, fiscal conservatives and free marketeers blamed misguided
regulation and ill-designed bailouts for the escalation of the problems. They
consequently advocated a less-constrained market rather than government
intervention as the ultimate solution for the crisis. They deplored the level of
indebtedness their ideological opposites were getting taxpayers into as a result
of the stimulus packages they were proposing. In contrast, ‘neo-Keynesians’ and
other advocates of activist government saw this crisis as the perfect bankruptcy
of their ideological opponents’ long dominance in political-economic thought
and policy. They therefore dubbed the crisis the greatest market failure in
modern history and their rhetoric readily adopted the language of government
as pivotal regulator and wealth defender.
Whatever happened to rallying around the flag?
One of the conventional wisdoms of political science is that in times of crisis,
people ‘rally around the flag’. That is, they lend their support to whoever
happens to be in charge of the government. The first Gulf War was a classic case
in point. American and global public opinion wholeheartedly embraced the
White House’s definition of the situation: evil dictator invades harmless, oil-rich
neighbour, and it is the duty of the world community to not let him get away
with it. The 9/11 attacks in the United States generated pretty much the same
response—as the 1982 Argentinean invasion of the Falklands Islands had done
within the United Kingdom (Lai and Reiter 2005). The phenomenon has been
associated in particular with international security crises, although detailed
studies have demonstrated that the strength of the effect is highly variable
depending on, among other things, whether the conflict involves real war and
the way in which it is reported in key media outlets (Oneal and Bryan 1995).
The phenomenon has parallels in the world of natural disasters, where researchers
observe the emergence of ‘altruistic communities’ and ‘prosocial
behaviour’—people setting aside their daily routines and their political
differences to help those affected by the destruction (Dynes 1970:84; Tierney
et al. 2001).
Leader rhetoric can help bring about the effect and in return leaders can be
important beneficiaries of its occurrence (Schubert et al. 2002). That is why
leaders like to ‘securitise’ problems: framing them as threats to core national
values and interests (Buzan et al. 1998; Eriksson 2002). Doing so successfully
lifts these issues above the fray of day-to-day politics and elevates the leaders
in question to key managers of the national interest (rather than spineless,
poll-following opportunists).
This being the case, a puzzle presents itself: why did we see so little of this in
evidence in the case of the global financial crisis? A striking feature of media
and public opinion responses to the leader speeches is how guarded or even
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overtly critical the majority of them are. This surprised us. Surely a crisis of this
magnitude lent itself to securitisation, in that a credible case could have been
made that the very foundations of national prosperity were at stake? It is perhaps
not so surprising that a fading leader such as Bush, who arguably had already
gone ‘one war too far’ in Iraq (McAllister 2006) and whose reputation for crisis
management was fatally tarnished in the wake of the Hurricane Katrina fiasco
(Preston 2008; Boin et al. forthcoming), could not pull this off—but neither could
his much-vaunted successor nor many of the other heads of government studied
here. In his October address to the nation, Rudd certainly tried to rally
Australians in ‘the economic equivalent of a national security crisis’, but this
did not remain a dominant theme. Perhaps it is because economic downturns
come without enemies that can be stigmatised and inflated to mobilise support
for the government (‘corporate greed’ was tried by almost all leaders, but never
really settled in the public’s mind as the prime culprit).
In fact, although they might feel counterintuitive, our impressions are in fact
in line with the results of public opinion research that suggests that
head-of-government popularity takes a dive when the economy does likewise.
The leadership lesson that can be drawn from this appears to be as follows: you
might be able to frame your way into popularity during war and disaster, but
you cannot frame your way out of unpopularity in a recession (nor should you
expect to get the credit for economic booms in the same way that you might for
winning wars; cf. Kinder 1981). As Bengt Sundelius reminds us in his chapter,
inconvenient or ill-managed crises can drive leaders out of a job and governments
out of office.
A crisis in progress
The ‘quick response’ approach to the social science research of this volume
deconstructs a process that is still evolving. In that sense our study is shooting
at a moving target. At the time of writing, the majority of polities studied in this
volume had not undergone a major post-crisis election. It will be a process worth
observing as the rhetoric of blame and reform is likely to be brought to the fore.
Political careers and institutional futures will inevitably rely on the result of the
continuing political and policy framing contests triggered by the economic
downturn. It is too early to tell whether the paradigm shifts or overhauls of
current regulatory institutions and practices advocated by some will materialise.
A considered answer to one of this volume’s central questions—concerning the
success of the meaning-making efforts of these leaders—can be provided only
by a subsequent study, conducted when the waves produced by the current
crisis have fully settled.
One thing is clear, however: the economic downturn has opened the floodgates
of economic orthodoxy and regulatory practices underpinning the political
management of the market economy within states and across the international
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system as a whole. Time will tell who will emerge as the winners and losers
among the elites and institutions most closely involved in the framing contests
that lie at the heart of the reform struggles that are picking up momentum as
this book comes to a close.
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